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What Can Wikipedia Tell Us about Open Source Politics? 
David Karpf 
Taubman Center for Public Policy and American Institutions 
Brown University 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers the emergence of large-scale “commons-
based peer production” projects such as Wikipedia.org from an 
institutional development perspective in order to comment on 
the potential and limitations of so-called “open source 
politics.” The argument it makes is threefold. First, that that the 
lowered transaction costs and information abundance found 
online transform a subset of public goods problems, essentially 
replacing free ridership with mass coordination as a central 
challenge. Second, that the boundaries of this subset are 
defined by a “power law topology” and by existing “interest 
horizons.” These parameters limit the overall impact of 
commons-based peer production for the political space. Third, 
that all such hubs move through a common five-stage 
institutional development process, directly related to standard 
models of the diffusion of innovation. The paper concludes by 
deriving a set of hypotheses regarding the circumstances under 
which commons-based peer production is likely to be 
successfully applied to political action. 
Keywords: Web 2.0, open source politics, diffusion of 
innovations, user-generated content 
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Introduction 
 
“Imagine a world in which every single person on the planet is given free access to the sum 
of all human knowledge. That’s what we’re doing.” – Jimmy Wales, founder of Wikipedia 
 
The rise of “commons-based peer production,” first in the field of open source software 
development and recently spreading to a diverse array of fields, has produced wide hopes for 
the emergence of “open source politics.” No consensus definition exists for the term, but it 
generally represents an amalgamation of hopes and dreams for social transformation from 
political commentators, consultants, futurists, and open source software practitioners. If 
clusters of volunteer software developers can group together online and peer-produce a 
successful challenge to corporate giants like Microsoft, couldn’t citizens likewise group 
together to mobilize for large-scale political change? Such hopes run inevitably into the 
challenges of collective action that have long been the purview of political scientists. Has 
collective action fundamentally been changed by the novel communication patterns found 
online? If so, just how far do these changes extend? 
The purpose of this paper is to use one such peer-produce community – Wikipedia.org – to 
derive a set of hypotheses that can be broadly applied to the study of “open source politics.” 
While the literature on Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FL/OSS) and related practices 
of commons-based peer production has undergone significant advances in recent years (see 
Weber, 2004; Benkler, 2006; Zittrain, 2008; and Kelty, 2008 to name just a few), research on 
open source politics continues to face substantial conceptual hurdles. Open Source software 
is characterized by the open accessibility of source code, and is clouded by popular 
misconceptions about the resultant production process. Open Source politics has no direct 
equivalent to source code (faulty software code fails to compile, faulty political strategy has 
no such equivalent), and thus it mostly refers to “bottom-up” or “transparent” political 
practices –themselves often based in cloudy misconceptions of open source production. This 
presents several conceptual issues, not the least of which is defining testworthy hypotheses 
and identifying the set of institutions appropriately dubbed “open source” in the political 
arena. What is the general pattern that such participatory communities follow in their 
formation? Where are they likely to develop, and where should their spread be limited? 
The paper is intended as a theory-building exercise. It draws heavily upon the robust 
literature on Wikipedia, most notably Andrew Lih’s The Wikipedia Revolution, Jonathan 
Zittrain’s The Future of the Internet (And How to Stop It), and Clay Shirky’s Here Comes 
Everybody, to derive a set of hypotheses about participatory community-formation in other 
fields. In so doing, it also summarizes several of the core distinctions between the online 
communications environment and previous communications regimes, particularly with 
regards to the challenges facing collective action. In a similar vein as classic works like “The 
Iron Cage Revisited” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the paper ends with hypotheses, rather 
than beginning with them. The goal here is to sketch a set of testable theoretical propositions 
which can potentially illuminate the scope and substance of the heretofore ill-defined field of 
“open source politics.” 
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Why Should Students of Politics Study Wikipedia? 
Wikipedia, “the encyclopedia that anyone can edit,” is a public good, both in definition and 
in spirit. It clearly meets the classical definition of public goods, being both nonrival (my use 
of Wikipedia does not reduce your ability to use it) and nonexclusive (all people can access 
Wikipedia, regardless of whether they contributed to it). Perhaps more importantly, it is 
animated by a set of decision-makers and participants who self-consciously develop it as a 
free, abundant public resource.  Founded in 2001, Wikipedia has grown from curious social 
experiment to the 6th most-visited site on the entire web, receiving more unique visitors per 
day than the websites of the New York Times, LA Times, Wall Street Journal, MSNBC.com, 
and the Chicago Tribune combined. In this success there lies a significant puzzle for social 
scientists. For at least the past 40 years, since the publication of Mancur Olson’s The Logic of 
Collective Action, we have known with relative certainty that public goods suffer from the 
“free rider” problem and, except where this free rider problem is overcome, are 
underprovided to society. Public goods in a free market are almost by definition 
underprovided. With over 10 million articles across 200 languages, Wikipedia has been 
subject to plenty of critiques, but “there just isn’t enough of it,” has never been among them.  
Though not a political endeavor itself, the case example of Wikipedia illustrates a number of 
core concepts regarding the structure and novel attributes of web-based communication 
protocols, and of the online communities that such communication has enabled. As such, it is 
of great interest to the scholarly debate on “open source politics.” The following section will 
use Wikipedia to demonstrate how the condition of information abundance found online 
replaces the traditional problem of free ridership with an ascendent mass coordination puzzle. 
The problem of mass coordination is solved through the development of a power law 
topology in which large hub spaces let communities-of-interest engage in collaborative 
efforts that would have been impossible under previous information regimes. Novel solutions 
to the collective action problem, and novel structures for collective action, become possible 
online because of these changes to the costs, abundance, and availability of information. The 
emerging landscape of collective action fundamentally departs from previous eras in direct 
relation to the salience of these attributes, and Wikipedia serves as a guiding example for 
understanding them. 
Much of what makes Wikipedia worthy of analysis is the sheer scale of its success. The only 
websites more frequently-visited than Wikipedia are the search engines/email providers 
Google, Yahoo, Windows Live/MSN, video sharing site YouTube.com, and social networking 
site Facebook.com. Unlike these for-profit internet giants (YouTube being a subsidiary of 
Google), Wikipedia operates with a budget of less than $500,000 and a staff of fewer than a 
dozen employees (Lih, 2009. Pg 4). A core of 75,000 active volunteer “Wikipedians,” along 
with 9.5 million registered users and an untold number of anonymous users contribute the 
bulk of content, citations, and edits. Despite providing little opportunity for fame or 
recognition to the volunteers, this expanding volunteer corps has remained resilient against 
attempts to subvert the site through vandalism or thinly-veiled advertising. A 2007 study by 
the Pew Internet and American Life Project found that 36% of American adult Internet users 
consult Wikipedia. It is especially popular amongst the well-educated, with 50% of all online 
Americans who hold a college degree using it as a reference. On a typical day, 8% of online 
Americans consult Wikipedia, making it more popular than online purchasing, dating 
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websites, setting travel reservations, using chat rooms, and participating in online auctions. 
(Rainie and Tancer, 2007) This raises the practical question of whether Wikipedia is now so 
distinct as to be something different, something greater, than an encyclopedia. Consider the 
following: in the pre-Internet era, what percent of Americans would we suspect consulted an 
encyclopedia on an average day? Is it likely that looking things up in the Encyclopedia 
Brittanica has ever been more popular in daily life than purchasing goods or trying to find a 
date? 
Wikipedia’s ascendant growth has made it a standard example among the cross-disciplinary 
community interested on the internet’s impact on the economy, society, culture, media, and 
politics. Yochai Benkler treats it as an example of “commons-based peer production” in his 
2006 Wealth of Networks, arguing that the lowered transaction costs of the internet allow for 
the development of a networked information economy in which volunteer-based production 
can compete with and even outperform firm-based production (Benkler, 2006). Clay Shirky 
offers the site as a prime example of “organizing without organizations” in his 2008 Here 
Comes Everybody. (Shirky, 2008) Axel Bruns suggests that production in these web spaces is 
so distinctive as to require a new term: “produsage” rather than “production.” (Bruns, 2008) 
Jonathan Zittrain uses it as a prime example of the principle of “generativity” in The Future 
of the Internet – and How to Stop It (Zittrain, 2008), while David Weinberger uses it to 
animate his discussion of changing search protocols in Everything is Miscellaneous 
(Weinberger, 2007). The site is more than just an easy example for such authors. As the most 
mature example of these voluntary online participatory communities, it provides important 
insights into the possibilities and limitations of other such communities as they move from 
small-scale to large.  
Political scientists have paid less attention to Wikipedia per se, but they have begun to look 
into the more generic impacts of the internet’s lowered communication costs on online 
collective action. Arthur Lupia and Gisela Sin (2003) argue that Mancur Olson’s work is 
“built from historically uncontroversial assumptions about interpersonal communication. 
Today, evolving technologies are changing communication dynamics in ways that invalidate 
some of these once uncontroversial assumptions.” They go on to present a formal model that 
suggests the organizational advantage held by small groups in Olson’s day is muted by online 
communication, while the selective benefits that many groups were once able to offer as an 
incentive for participation are occasionally undermined by the open access of the web 
(disciplinary journals, for instance, now face open-access, free web-based competition). 
Bruce Bimber, Andrew Flanagin and Cynthia Stohl (2005) likewise attempt to 
reconceptualize collective action as a phenomenon of “boundary crossing” between public 
and private domains, an indication of how near-costless participation in online petitions and 
other web-based pressure tactics has become. 
For students of politics, Wikipedia ought to be considered as a central puzzle regarding the 
mediating effects of new communications media on collective action and other public goods. 
Why does commons-based peer production like this occur, and how broad are the 
applications likely to be? Will the practices and architectures of open source software “port” 
seamlessly into the public sphere of political action, and what are the circumstances under 
which such activity is likely to occur? As the largest and most notable example of commons-
based peer production among citizens who do not themselves write software code, Wikipedia 
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provides an ideal venue for generating hypotheses about the application of open source 
production processes to the political arena.  
The next section will use the Wikipedia example to synthesize several core concepts 
regarding internet-mediated communication. Centrally, it will demonstrate that the structure 
of the web supports the development of large-scale communities that, benefiting from strong 
“network effects,” can produce tremendous public goods on the basis of surplus labor 
contributions from hobbyists and partisans. When the costs of participation approach zero, a 
more complete demand curve for political engagement is revealed. In so doing, the section 
seeks to separate much of the marketing hype surrounding open source production from what 
has actually been learned about the production process itself. This will lead into a second 
section describing the growth of “network-enhanced goods” like Wikipedia along a five-
stage process linked to standard adopter classes in the diffusion-of-innovations literature 
(Rogers 2003, Von Hippel 2005), paying particular attention to the institutional development 
challenges present at each stage. A third section then derives a set of hypotheses regarding 
the stability of power law hubs over time, and the conclusion then makes several points about 
the political implications of these hypotheses. 
 
The Success of Wikipedia: Easy, Fun, and Full of Network Effects 
Wikipedia was founded in 2001 after Nupedia, an attempt at producing an online 
encyclopedia based on traditional expert-produced and –reviewed contributions, failed to 
gather momentum. Jimmy Wales had launched Nupedia as an open-access competitor to 
pricey encyclopedias like Britannica. His expectation was that the speed and ease of email 
communication could lower the costs of producing a high-quality encyclopedia, making the 
information free for all visitors.1 Nupedia was to be expert-led, with a traditional (and 
daunting) seven-stage peer-review and editing process. What Wales and his collaborator 
Larry Sanger learned was that the increased speed of e-mail alone does little to transform 
production processes. The hefty editing process resulted in numerous bottlenecks, leading to 
an estimated 25 articles in its first three years. As academic journal editors have likewise 
learned, moving from the fax, phone, and mail systems to digital communication alleviates 
some elements of peer review and content production, but the overall savings prove marginal. 
In attempting to radically simplify the production process, Wales and Sanger turned to the 
“wiki” (from the Hawaiian word “wikiwiki,” translating directly to “fast” or “speedy”) 
software platform. Wiki software code enables open content creation and peer editing. Any 
user with access (and on Wikipedia, most articles are accessible by all) can click an “edit 
this” button, make changes to the document, and have those changes instantly available to 
other users. Past versions are automatically archived and viewable, making such 
experimentation a low-risk affair.  
Developer Larry Sanger wrote a memo to the two-thousand member Nupedia mailing list at 
                                                 
1 Nupedia, unlike Wikipedia, was designed as a for-profit venture of Wales’s company, Bomis.com.  While 
entries were to be free, the site was intended to generate revenue through ad sales.  Wikipedia was eventually 
launched as a separate nonprofit after a controversy among volunteer “wikipedians” over whether the company 
would one day profit from their free labor. 
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the launch of the wiki-based site, saying, “Humor me. Go there and add a little article. It will 
take all of five or ten minutes.” (Shirky, pg 113) With the bottlenecks eliminated, over 1,000 
articles were written within a month, and 10,000 were written within nine months. Clay 
Shirky describes this as a general shift enabled by the internet-based information regime: 
from “filter, then publish,” to “publish, then filter.” (Shirky, chapter 4) Print-based 
publication is costly and (thus) scarce. Firms are necessary to provide editorial and quality-
control decisions at the front end, ensuring that the final product is well-written and attractive 
to a paying audience. Comparatively, Shirky notes that web-based publication is 
“ridiculously easy.” Indeed, ever-expanding transistor capacity and server space render the 
web an abundant information environment where point-to-point communication (e-mail) can 
happen near instantaneously and self-publication is free. Wikipedia could not exist without 
internet-mediated communication, and moreover it could only exist through the embrace of 
novel alternatives to traditional production practices.  Faster and cheaper 
communications media alone produce little change, but they create the possibility for novel 
structures for mass collaboration and collective action. 
The ease of publishing online may be self-evident, but that is a far cry from assuring high-
quality encyclopedia entries. Indeed, Wikipedia’s quick rise in popularity was accompanied 
by an avalanche of skepticism regarding the quality of the new-entrant encyclopedia. The 
basic criticism could be summarized as, “Wikipedia is free, and worth every penny.” Jim 
Giles published a 2005 study in Nature magazine challenging this claim through a 
comparison of Wikipedia and the Enclopedia Britannica. Peer reviewers recruited by Nature 
found an average of 4 inaccuracies per Wikipedia article, and 3 per equivalent Britannica 
articles (Giles, 2005). This led to a back-and-forth firestorm, with Britannica staff criticizing 
the study and demanding a retraction. Nature offered a clarification of its methodology, but 
stood by the study and refused to retract it. Physicist Bernardo Huberman has since 
conducted his own research on Wikipedia articles, finding a strong correlation between the 
number of edits a Wikipedia article receives and the accuracy and writing quality of the 
article (Huberman 2007). Put another way, the more contributors a Wikipedia article 
receives, the higher its accuracy and the better the writing. This is not entirely intuitive – 
certainly, anonymous visitors can and do engage in “graffiti” attempts on Wikipedia pages, 
and motivated partisans attempt to distort pages to favor their point of view. The site has 
developed both a set of community norms and practical computer code that lead 
contributions to have a net-positive effect. 
Jonathan Zittrain, the co-founder of Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society, 
traces the success of Wikipedia to three key attributes. The first is what he colorfully terms 
“verkeersbordvrij,” from an unusual and surprisingly successful experiment in traffic 
management in the Dutch city of Drachten (Zittrain, pps 127-130). Drachten has done away 
with traffic signs, parking meters, and parking spaces, instead setting a few minimalistic 
traffic rules and asking citizens to mindfully operate their cars when interacting with one 
another. Likewise, Wikipedia began with a bare set of basic rules – (1) articles should display 
a neutral point of view (NPOV), (2) no copyright infringement, and (3) ignore any rules if 
they get in the way of building a great encyclopedia– and relied on the Wikipedia community 
to mindfully work them out, developing additional rules and protocols as needed.2 As Jimmy 
                                                 
2 Today, the three rules have been expanded to “five pillars:” (1) Wikipedia is an encyclopedia. (2) Wikipedia 
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Wales has remarked, “Generally we find most people out there on the Internet are good. It’s 
one of the wonderful humanitarian discoveries in Wikipedia, that most people only want to 
help us build this free nonprofit charitable resource.”3 Additional rules have been added over 
time to manage controversies and improve site quality, but these principles remain at its core. 
The wiki software code and abundant server space are necessary conditions for this 
organizing structure. The code lets any community member or passerby offer positive 
contributions, small or large, while saving past versions for easy review. Graffiti attempts or 
biased contributions to an article can thus be removed from the page with a simple click of 
the “revert to past draft” button. “Bias” and “neutrality” are, of course, terms of art rather 
than an exact science, but the second attribute helps the community to approximate neutrality 
rather effectively. 
The second attribute is the inclusion of a “discussion page” alongside every main Wikipedia 
page. This is a space for Wikipedians to explain and justify their changes, discuss article 
quality, and engage in deliberation and disagreement over controversial topics without 
cluttering the main page. Major edits made without explanation and justification are likely to 
be reverted, providing an incentive for thoughtful, deliberative engagement. Given the 
participation of hobbyist communities, many heated “flame war” exchanges occur over 
topics that are obscure to the mainstream, but passionately debated within a community-of-
interest. This is an example of what Lawrence Lessig terms “Code-based governance.” 
(Lessig 1999) Within cyberspace, many of the decisions about how people can and should 
interact are determined not through government regulation, but by the development of 
supportive code. Indeed, the original wiki platform did not feature such pages, and after 
substantial discussion and debate over Wikipedia’s listserv, community member Clifford 
Adams customized the software to create these pages. (Lih, pp 65-66) One challenge for 
scholars interested in studying the web’s impact on society is that new code is constantly 
being developed, and the seemingly impossible dilemmas of 2002 are rendered easily 
solvable by the new software architecture of 2009. Without discussion pages, Wikipedia 
would face steep challenges in supporting the NPOV norm. Rather than developing complex 
organizational bylaws and chains of command, Wikipedia and other online spaces 
incorporate new Code-based solutions that support community norms by making positive 
contributions easier and negative contributions harder. 
The third attribute of Wikipedia’s success is the core of initial editors – what I will refer to 
later in this paper as an actively engaged set of “lead adopters.” (Von Hippel 2005) Wikipedia 
needed this initial group of committed, substantively knowledgeable, and technically skilled 
contributors because the value of the site is almost entirely derived from its network 
externalities. Consider the value of Wikipedia to the fifth contributor to visit the site 
compared to its value to the 5,000,000th contributor. Early on, the site is error-prone, full of 
topical holes, and of questionable quality. Later, it benefits from a phenomenon first 
described by internet ethnographer Eric Raymond when discussing the success of the open 
source software movement: “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” (Raymond, 2001) 
                                                                                                                                                       
has a neutral point of view. (3) Wikipedia is free content. (4) Wikipedia has a code of conduct.  (5) Wikipedia 
does not have firm rules. 
 
3 Excerpted from a December 5, 2005 interview with CNN.  Quotation from Lin, pg 112. 
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Raymond had found that open source software is successful in direct proportion to the size of 
its community, because a software bug that seems tremendously difficult to one person is 
likely to be a simple fix for someone else. This network effects phenomenon has received 
various treatments among computer scientists, the best known being “Reed’s Law,” from 
David Reed, which suggests that the value of internet-mediated communities rises 
exponentially with the size of the network (because each additional member can engage in 
one-to-one or many-to-many communication, increasing the number of possible groups by 
one exponent). (Reed, 1999).  
Jimmy Wales explains the success of Wikipedia in similar terms: “the technology required 
for Wikipedia is essentially rather simple. You need a database, you need a Web server, you 
need a Web browser, and you need the wiki editing concept. While the wiki concepts was 
invented in 1995 by Ward Cunningham, Wikipedia didn’t start until 2001. So all of the 
technology, including the idea of a wiki, which is a web site that anyone can edit, has existed 
since 1995. …The answer is, Wikipedia isn’t a technological innovation at all; it’s a social 
innovation. What we figured out between 1995 and 2001 was not new technology. We had 
the Web already, but we discovered the basic idea of how to organize a community.” (Lih, pg 
xvi emphasis added) This notion of Wikipedia as a community is of crucial importance for 
generating hypotheses about “open source politics” more generally. As the site has grown, it 
has added additional rules and it has empowered a layer of “superusers” with additional 
editing privileges as a reward for their positive contributions and as a means of engaging in 
distributed community management.  
At base, what we find with Wikipedia is the same phenomenon Yochai Benkler describes in 
The Wealth of Networks. The lowered transaction costs of the internet enable elaborate 
structures of peer-production, often through armies of committed volunteers, that compete 
with and occasionally outperform firm-based production. This is not to say that 
hierarchically-managed firms will disappear in a sea of voluntarism – there are substantial 
limitations to “crowdsourcing” – but it is to say that the change in information regimes 
enables communities to engage in sophisticated mass collaboration, particularly in those 
areas of the web where large communities, effective norms, and supportive code have 
managed to congeal. Wikipedia has attracted such broad scholarly interest because it 
challenges not only the encyclopedia industry, but the foundational literature in political 
economy on the logic of the firm (Coase 1937, also Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
Returning to the initial puzzle, none of these institutional structures necessarily explains why 
the public good known as Wikipedia avoids the pitfall of free ridership as laid out by Olson. 
One answer to that issue is to note that the great majority of Wikipedia visitors do in fact free 
ride. Wikipedia globally has about 75,000 “active” members. These are registered users who 
provide 5 or more edits to the site per month. About 10% of these are “very active” 
wikipedians, contributing 100 or more edits per month. Given the site’s overwhelming 
popularity, with 8% of all Internet users visiting daily,4 we can extrapolate that for every 
active content-producer, there are tends of thousands who free ride on the public good. Most 
users of Wikipedia do not take part in the editing or article-writing process, despite the 
                                                 
4 http://alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details/wikipedia.org.  This accords with the findings from the 2007 Pew 
survey, but tracks traffic on the global, rather than national, level. 
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tremendously low barriers to entry. So free ridership does indeed occur on Wikipedia, but it 
is not the problem that we would be led to expect. No one would likely say that the central 
issue for Wikipedia is that it is underprovided.  
Clay Shirky, Benkler, and Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl all converge on a similar point: when 
the costs of participation in collective action approach zero, we face a condition of 
abundance rather than one of scarcity. People have limited time and limited money, but they 
have virtually unlimited opinions. What we see on Wikipedia is essentially a multifaceted 
version of what Olson termed a “privileged group.”5 When the good in question is not money 
or time, but rather specialized information, we find that there are plenty of people who are 
“wealthy” in some form or another. Put another way, most everyone has a hobby. Hobbyists 
have always happily incurred the “costs” of discussing their topic of interest, often in 
excruciating detail. When they do so on Wikipedia, they provide exactly as much of the 
public good (information about video games, the history of knitting, etc) as they themselves 
want, and this provides more than enough for inquiring minds. 
This is not to say that mass collaboration, collective action, and the provision of online public 
goods is seamless and assured. Rather, it is to say that the shift from slower, costlier 
information regimes to an instantaneous, abundant online information regime creates a 
different dilemma for social engagement. Specifically, the geography-less, abundant online 
space creates tremendous challenges in search. How are we to identify good, verifiable 
information from bad? How are motivated partisans or hobbyists to find each other with no 
central square, and how are onlookers to take advantage of the fruits of these hobbyists’ 
labor? Wikipedia critically benefits from the network externalities of all these hobbyist 
communities gathering in the same, identifiable location. If five sites all competed for the 
same niche of “online information hub,” the sum of those parts would be far less than the 
whole found on Wikipedia. Indeed, initial developer Larry Sanger eventually left Wikipedia 
and started his own site, Citizendium.org, because he felt there should be a greater role for 
credentialed experts (Bruns 2008). In two and a half years, the site has built a small 
community of 800 contributors, authoring 10,700 articles in total and attracting a fraction of 
a percent of Wikipedia’s audience.6 For this reason, I depart from Lupia and Sin (2003) and 
Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl (2005). I would suggest that the critical challenge to online 
collective action is not public-private boundary-crossing or the declining value of selective 
incentives, but rather solving the search dilemma under conditions of abundance – a 
challenge which approximates a mass coordination game. 
 
                                                 
5 Olson suggests that two types of group will face minimal free rider problems.  Small groups will be able to 
identify non-contributors, creating reputation pressures and incentives to recognizably participate (Chong, 1991, 
develops this case further with regards to social movements).  Privileged groups feature a single wealthy 
participant who will provide as much of the public good as he or she likes regardless.  If the wealthy patron has 
a strong enough taste for the good, all will be satisfied regardless of free riding. 
 
6 http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/CZ:About  Also see http://alexa.com/siteinfo/wikipedia.org+citizendium.org  
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Hyperlinks, Hubs and Power Laws:  
Solving the Search Dilemma through Iteration 
Before there was the World Wide Web, there was the hyperlink. Hyperlinks provide the 
networked structure of the internet, with clickable links embedded in text which direct a 
reader from one page of text to another. A solitary web page with no inbound or outbound 
hyperlinks lies, in a very real sense, at the periphery of the World Wide Web. Though such a 
page is accessible through direct input of its Uniform Resource Locator (URL: the text-based 
“address” appearing after http:// in the address line of a web page), one would be unlikely to 
stumble upon it through everyday surfing. 
The hyperlink calls to attention two dimensions of the internet’s novel search puzzle. First is 
the anti-geographic nature of the medium itself. Search in the offline world is aided by 
landscape-imposed scarcity. Towns and cities have physical centers and peripheries, and this 
translates directly into the price system of the real estate market. There is a cost imposed by 
being out-of-the-way, either for residencies (commute) or commercial zones (foot traffic and 
shopping districts). Thus restaurants tend to be grouped together, one can generally expect to 
find a pawn shop in close proximity to a race track, and proximity to desirable locations 
translates into higher rents. On the internet, by contrast, there is no physical landscape to 
traverse. As one example, consider the hundreds of millions of blogs have been created and 
then abandoned. This provides the slightest inconvenience for Google, the company upon 
whose server farms most of these sites are hosted, and whose search algorithm must handle 
them, but the realities of increasing bandwidth and transistor capacity relegates this to a 
minor nuisance at most.  From the user’s perspective, dead blogs and abandoned web pages 
do not litter any landscape, because the Web is composed of hyperlinks and we are never 
forced to traverse their pages in our daily online pursuits. An abandoned blog goes 
unhyperlinked, and thus floats to the periphery of web “space.” The lack of geography on the 
web is a substantial component of the condition of information abundance found online. 
There is no such thing as “location, location, location.” 
The second dimension is the challenge for like-minded hobbyists of finding each other. 
Internet communication is instantaneous, but also asynchronous. One can post a message to a 
discussion board or send an e-mail alert and it will be immediately viewable, but as opposed 
to a phone or face-to-face conversation, replies do not necessarily come in real time. Lacking 
town centers, where are hobbyists, partisans, or other communities-of-interest to gather? 
With no town center, what good is a self-publishing soapbox, anyway? This is closely related 
with the problem of identifying verifiable information on the web. In essence, the internet 
lowers the communication costs for all types of publication and online group interaction. 
Scarcity provides some baseline assurance that a group or information source is reliable; the 
very act of publication or gathering indicates an ability to surpass some minimal cost 
threshold. Under the condition of abundance, how are we to tell reliable information from 
speculation? How are we to find other like-minded participants when there literally is no 
“there” there?  
Hyperlinks provide the kernel of the solution, with Google’s PageRank algorithm acting as 
pioneer. Prior to PageRank, internet search was tremendously problematic. The two standard 
solutions were to provide a top-down directory of all web pages or offer a search mechanism 
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based on the appearance of keywords on a webpage. The problem with directories was 
twofold. First, the scale and rapid growth of the web meant that no directory could manage to 
be comprehensive. Second, directories are built around meta-level organizing assumptions 
about the categories a user will wish to search through. Thus AOL.com, for instance, could 
provide a list of topical headings such as “sports,” “news,” and “entertainment” and then 
further divide the categories into fine-grained subheadings. But a user interested in new banjo 
strings and information on an upcoming jamboree would have little idea where to begin. 
Keyword-based search could help with this, organizing results based on the combination of 
“banjo strings,” and “jamboree,” but separating new information from old becomes 
problematic, and such keyword searches are easily gamed. Google’s ingenious solution was 
to include hyperlink data in the presentation of search results. Pages with numerous 
hyperlinks, particularly from other sites that are highly-linked, appear at the top of the results 
page. Thus google lets web users “vote with their feet,” in a sense, indicating the quality of 
an information source based on the number of web users who have chosen to link to it. The 
simple inclusion of this network data in their search results is what led Google to rise from a 
tiny startup, three-person operation to the largest company in the online space. (Vise and 
Malseed 2005) 
Physicist Albert Lazlo Barabasi offered an important early treatment of these link patterns on 
the web in a 1999 article in Nature Magazine. As he would later describe in his public-
audience book, Linked, Barabasi was interested in the distribution of links among web pages. 
His early assumption had been that link distribution would approximate a normal curve, 
indicating that the web could be understood mathematically using the standard assumptions 
of random graph theory. Instead, Barabasi found that link patterns followed a heavily skewed 
distribution approximating a power law or Pareto distribution. Vilfredo Pareto initially 
observed these distributions in his study of wealth disparity in European societies, leading 
them to often be termed “rich get richer” or “80-20” distributions, since he found that 80% of 
a society’s wealth was held by the top 20%, and that the greater the level of income, the more 
stark the disparity. Power laws are based on a decaying function in which the Nth-largest 
node is 1/Nth the size of the largest node. (Barabasi 2003) Clay Shirky and Matthew 
Hindman produced separate studies in 2003 demonstrating that the blogosphere in particular 
displays power law tendencies in its hyperlink distribution, leading to the emergence of an 
“A-list” or elite status among early political bloggers. Though there has been some debate as 
to whether these link patterns are a power law or some other heavily-skewed distribution 
(Drezner and Farrell 2008), what is of particular interest here is the mechanism that Barabasi 
tells us produces power law distributions.  
Barabasi demonstrates in his article that power law distributions emerge in a network 
simulation when two simple conditions are present: (1) growth and (2) preferential 
attachment. Simply put, if a network is growing and new links between nodes are determined 
based upon the preferences of their observable neighbors, then a set of “hubs” will develop 
over time, as the link-rich are more likely to gain additional links, further increasing link 
disparity over time and, critically, developing a power law distribution. Growth plus 
preferential attachment leads to the emergence of power law hubs. This is crucial to the 
question before us in this chapter, because it serves as an iterated solution to the mass 
coordination problem we find online. 
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Let’s say you are interested in discussing left-wing politics. Living in a conservative rural 
town, you would like to turn online in order to find other people with similar interests. Where 
do you go? Where are they? The previously-mentioned lack of geography provides a 
dilemma. You have no strong preference regarding the location of the conversation, and 
neither do the other members of your nascent community-of-interest. Your interest is in 
finding the same “place” online (and, later, in the place providing supportive environment for 
healthy, spam- and “troll-“free discussion and possibly tools for further collaboration). This 
is a classical example of a coordination game, in which actors have neutral preference 
rankings among options, but wish to arrive at the same solution as one another. In a single-
iteration coordination game, this can be solved through sequential action: the first actor 
makes an arbitrary decision and all others follow suit. If actors move simultaneously, or 
without knowledge of each other’s actions, the problem becomes far more challenging. But 
in an iterated coordination game, preferential attachment emerges as a viable and simple 
solution. In particular, a google search will reveal the most popular spaces where like-minded 
people are already meeting. Rather than selecting an online forum, blog, wiki, etc at random 
and hoping that a community-of-interest will show up, each additional latent community 
member can choose to rely on the actions of those who came before them.  
Preferential attachment leads directly to the emergence of power-law hubs, and a general 
principle for web science practitioners: large hub spaces online are different than small 
spaces. The topology of the web, as it has grown over time, is ruled by power-law hubs such 
as eBay, Wikipedia, DailyKos, YouTube, MoveOn, and Facebook. Each of these “web 2.0” 
spaces offer value to their users in direct proportion to the network effects provided by large 
crowds of similar users. Online hub spaces move through identifiable phases of institutional 
development as they diffuse through the user population and face challenges related to scale 
and changing demographics and interests of different user classes. 
The study of power law distributions in online politics is mostly attributable to Matthew 
Hindman’s work, particularly his 2008 book, The Myth of Digital Democracy. Therein 
Hindman argues the emergence of power laws in online traffic creates a “Googlearchy,” or 
google-imposed hierarchy, leading to heavy elite stratification and limiting the transformative 
potential of the medium. Working with traffic data supplied by Hitwise, Hindman argues that 
the barriers-to-entry online are not substantially lowered by the new media environment. 
Though the costs of self-publication have been dramatically reduced, those costs have been 
offset by the new costs of building a massive online audience. These power laws, to 
Hindman, are a problem; he argues that they represent the reemergence of elite politics that 
in turn limits the transformative potential of the online communication. While I do not 
dispute Hindman’s empirics, the case of Wikipedia suggests that we should be circumspect 
about his interpretation. The Internet’s power law topology means there can only be one hub 
site occupying Wikipedia’s niche. But Wikipedia’s users are not attempting to build 
Wikipedias of their very own. They are, instead, looking for a coordination point where they 
can access “the sum of all human knowledge.” The path to power-law-hub status is a 
developmental process, and it yields a set of institutions that are substantially more open and 
participatory than those characterizing the previous information regime. The utility of power 
law hubs in solving the mass coordination problem has been largely ignored in the research  
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literature thus far. By providing an iterated solution to the mass coordination problem present 
in the anti-geographic space found online, power law topology facilitates a revised logic of 
online collective action. 
 
Institutional Development of Hub Communities:  
A Five-Stage Adopter Class Model 
Wikipedia benefits from the power law topology of the Internet, developing a large 
community of participants, active and passive, and benefiting from the substantial network 
externalities that they provide. The rise from nascent startup to power law hub did not occur 
in a smooth progression, though. Wikipedia was able to succeed because its leadership 
skillfully and artfully moved it through a predictable series of development challenges that 
occurred as the community grew and changed. All such internet-mediated community spaces 
move through the same diffusion process as virtually any other new product or innovation: 
(1) beginning with a tiny group of lead adopters who co-create the good, (2) expanding to a 
larger early adopter class which is highly motivated but less technically skilled, (3) launching 
into the much larger early majority class, whose motivation and skill level is more varied and 
whose size pressures the system to adapt, (4) adopting protections against spammers and 
malicious attacks as the site attracts the late majority class and becomes recognized as 
“valuable online real estate,” and (5) dealing with challenges to institutional power structures 
as growth slows at the laggard phase and questions regarding voice and equality rise to the 
fore. These stages are of particular interest because they accord both with Wikipedia’s 
experience and with the longstanding literature on diffusion of innovations. (Rogers 2003) If 
Hindman and others are correct about the stability of power law hub sites online, then there 
can only be a small number of these online communities-of-interest, and their development 
pattern is itself an important topic for investigation. 
 
A Brief Overview of the Diffusion Literature 
The definitive text regarding diffusion research is Diffusion of Innovations by Everett Rogers. 
First published in 1962, the book is now in its fifth edition and has been cited over 19,000 
times,7 a testament to Rogers’s longstanding impact on the field. Rogers notes that ideas, 
farm products, viruses, and a whole range of other innovations fit a standard “S-curve” as 
they diffuse through a community over time. Figure 1 offers a graphical representation of the 
S-curve, along with the five traditional adopter classes. Eric Von Hippel relabels the 
“innovators” as “lead adopters” in his book, Democratizing Innovation. He notes in that work 
that the first tiny group of adopters often help to co-create the good, repurposing it and 
providing feedback to the original firms or labs who are releasing the new product. This is 
particularly true in the computer industry, with beta-testers providing feedback to proprietary 
software companies and open-source programmers actively participating in the software 
development process. Following Von Hippel, I use the term “lead adopters” rather than 
                                                 
7 Obtained through Google Scholar: 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&cites=7511022991152445218  
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“innovators” here (Von Hippel 2005). Note the relative size of the five adopter classes, with 
lead adopters being the smallest group, the early and late majorities making up the bulk of 
the population, and early adopters and laggards representing 13.5% and 16% of the 
population apiece respectively. This is based on an assumption that time-of-adoption follows 
a normal curve, with the early and late majorities covering one standard deviation from the 
mean, early adopters representing the second standard deviation to the left of the mean, lead 
adopters representing 2+ standard deviations to the left and laggards representing all 
adoptions occurring more than one standard deviation to the right. (Rogers, pg 281) 
 
Figure 1: Standard Diffusion Curve8  
One of the most important findings from the diffusion literature is that these adopter classes 
are demographically distinct from one another. Survey research has routinely found that 
younger, wealthier, better educated, and more “cosmopolitan” members of society have a 
stronger taste for innovation than their neighbors (Rogers, pps 272-282). Lead adopters and 
early adopters tend to have peer networks that span wide geographies, exposing them to new 
ideas and innovations long before their neighbors do. Thomas Valente further advances this 
notion of separate adopter classes in Network Models of the Diffusion of Innovation. Valente 
unites the longstanding diffusion research tradition with the emerging field of social network 
analysis, treating actors in a community as nodes in a network with varying adoption 
thresholds. He goes on to identify three critical mass points: one at the shift from early 
                                                 
8 Image obtained through Google images: 
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.cyfm.net/articles/images/S-
CurveDetail.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.cyfm.net/article.php%3Farticle%3DDont_Good_Ideas_Fly.html&h=90
0&w=900&sz=67&hl=en&start=4&sig2=aXHLBuRCvt8cFz6sdhO5Ag&tbnid=cAFVuhipoW-
dfM:&tbnh=146&tbnw=146&ei=trjzR6K_FYyGeufesIgB&prev=/images%3Fq%3Ds-
curve%2B%26hl%3Den%26lr%3D%26safe%3Doff%26sa%3DG 
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adopters to early majority, a second at the pivot point between early and late majority, and the 
third at the shift from late majority to laggards. (Valente 1995) This approach is particularly 
valuable because it suggests that not only are there differences between adopter classes, but 
there are also temporal differences between the various phases of adoption. 
It is worth noting at this point a methodological difficulty in the diffusion and networks 
literatures. As Wasserman and Faust note in their text, Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications, population definition is a crucial and troubling issue. (Wasserman and Faust 
1994 pps 30-35) For early diffusion researchers studying farm implements, the population 
under study would be farmers in an identifiable community. For later research on drug 
development, the population would be medical doctors with a shared specialty and 
overlapping memberships in the American Medical Association. What is the population of 
potential Wikipedians, though? What about the population of potential Dean campaign 
participants, or Tea Party activists, or MoveOn members? Boundary definition can only be 
determined in retrospect for these groups, rendering social network analysis useful for 
theoretical exercises, but presenting steep data challenges for more quantitative work. For 
this reason, I use the diffusion and social networks literatures as a starting point for my 
descriptive model of institutional development in online communities-of-interest, but do not 
develop the model as a social network study per se. The data problems are, at this juncture, 
insurmountable. 
 
Institutional Development Challenges Present at Each Adoption Stage 
What should be clear from the diffusion of innovation literature is that the 5th Wikipedian is 
substantively different from the 5,000,000th Wikipedian. They have different backgrounds, 
different interests in the site, and different needs of the site architecture. The fifth Wikipedian 
is co-creating the online space. She is likely involved in writing software code or is 
particularly devoted to the creation of an open encyclopedia, an active participant in what 
Kelty refers to as the “recursive public” that participates in the production of Wikipedia. The 
five-millionth Wikipedian is visiting an established online space, looking up information of 
their own, and occassionally finding enough value in the space to add a few edits of his own.  
What’s more, these differences abstracted into a generalized pattern and applied to other 
online productive participatory communities. Effective launch of one of these communities, 
which I will hereafter term “network-enhanced goods” must move through five distinct 
phases: (1) initial launch, (2) reaching critical mass, (3) managing the influx of a mass public, 
(4) defending norms against newcomers, and (5) institutionalizing authority. I will discuss 
each stage in turn below:  
 
Stage 1: Initial Launch 
Recall again Jimmy Wales’s suggestion that the technology behind Wikipedia was both 
simple and available for years prior to the launch of the site. The success of Wikipedia was a 
story of community-building. If Wales and Sanger had announced Wikipedia with an 
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aggressive television and newspaper advertising campaign, the site would have been an 
almost guaranteed failure. The mass audience would have visited an empty vessel populated 
by a few anonymous (and likely erroneous) entries, turned around, and never come back. But 
the initial Nupedia list gave them a small set of highly-motivated participants who could 
choose to contribute to the site because they individually found it a fascinating and 
worthwhile project. Their “adoption threshold” in the language of Valente, was tremendously 
low. The site also had the early blessing of Richard Stallman, founder of the Free Software 
Foundation and legend within the open source software community, and received an influx of 
tech-savvy participants through early discussion on the Slashdot.org discussion forum, 
described by Andrew Lih as “a salon for the technical elite and a grand senate of the 
computing community.” (Lih, pg 67)  
The attention of this lead adopter community is itself a scarce resource: they are, as a whole, 
well educated, urbane technology and academic professionals, with time for a few interesting 
side projects and a dense network of social ties. Benkler and Stephen Weber note that the 
personal incentive for these individuals lies in a combination of reputation-building 
incentives, socio-psychological incentives, and hedonic personal gratification at solving 
interesting puzzles (Benkler 2006. Weber 2004) Any online community-of-interest must 
attract a sizeable number of these lead-adopting co-creators, and that in turn means providing 
them with the freedom to make changes and provide input to the system. Internet 
communication may exist in an environment of information abundance, but the interest of 
these elites is a scarce and valuable resource, best attracted through technology conferences, 
highly-technical listserv discussion groups, and other traditional networking events that 
feature high barriers-to-entry. Though the identity of the lead-adopter community will vary 
from online community to online community (the lead adopters who populated the early 
political blogosphere were not the same people who populated early Wikipedia), they are 
invariably drawn from existing networks of influence – the underdefined “policy networks” 
discussed in the policy agendas literature, for instance (Kingdon 1984). 
 
Stage 2: Reaching Critical Mass 
“User-generated content,” like “web 2.0,” is an internet buzzword coming out of the 
marketing world that has taken on substantial meaning. Web 2.0 can be roughly defined as 
people finding each other online, whereas Web 1.0 consisted of people finding information 
online (“the information superhighway”). User-generated content refers to comments, 
information, conversation, or multimedia content that come not from top-down management, 
but from bottom-up, voluntary production. Several of the major online spaces (circa 2010) 
serve to aggregate and sort such content, including FaceBook (publicly articulated social 
network information), YouTube (video sharing), Flickr (photo sharing), the large community 
blogs, and of course Wikipedia. To the extent that internet mediated political associations rely 
on channeling the participation and interaction of their communities-of-interest, they likewise 
fit into this category. Critical mass refers to the point at which a site is receiving enough user-
generated content that the network externalities produced exceed the interest threshold for the 
mass of less-motivated web surfers. Put another way, at some point Wikipedia has enough 
content to maintain the interest of people who do not self-identify as “techie” or 
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“encyclopedia junkie.” The addition of this larger swath of the public massively expands the 
community. As the nascent version of any of these sites expands into this early adopter phase, 
it must settle a series of technical and normative questions regarding how to handle growth 
and community contribution.  
In Wikipedia’s case, this included some complicated server load issues (Lih, pps 77-79) in 
2004, as the number of total English-language articles surpassed 100,000 (about the size of 
the Encylopedia Brittanica) and increased traffic grew to the point where the site would often 
crash. The involvement of technical elites was critical to solving these problems, and all 
growing online communities must either attract the sustained interest of the open source 
community or maintain a large budget for proprietary software solutions to this aspect of 
scaling. Lih records that, in the same time period, “because the community was growing so 
quickly, the process of forming consensus by email did not scale.” (Lih, pg 95) The 
consensus and co-creation practices that were necessary to attract and keep the lead adopter 
community had to be modified in order to allow for the early adopters, who by and large 
displayed a keen interest in the system, but were less technically experienced and lacked 
deep existing network ties with one another. Wikipedia responded by creating a distributed 
moderation system of superuser “administrators,” moving mailing list-based discussion to a 
separate section of the wiki dubbed the “village pump.” As Wikipedia attracted enough user-
generated content to become self-sustaining, then, the system had to adopt new Code-based 
solutions to the surge of traffic.  
 
Stage 3: Managing the Influx of a Mass Public 
As the site reaches Valente’s first critical mass point (Valente 1995), it must deal both with a 
tremendous surge in traffic/participation and also adapt to a mass public that does not share 
the particular interests of the lead and early adopters. While lead adopters are contacted 
through existing social/professional network ties, and early adopters are contacted through 
niche media outlets (coverage in Wired magazine being particular coveted by many social 
media ventures at this stage), the shift to early majority is often accompanied by coverage in 
traditional media venues. Wikipedia had attracted a few brief mentions in the mainstream 
media during its first few years, but its breakthrough moment occurred during a well-
publicized controversy in December, 2005. John Seigenthaler, former editor of The 
Tennessean newspaper, noticed some incorrect and libelous information posted in his 
Wikipedia entry. Seigenthaler contacted the editors, who immediately changed it and 
apologized, but Seigenthaler went on to write a scathing Op-Ed for USA Today on 
Wikipedia’s unreliability regardless. The Op-Ed produced ripple effects, with other television 
and newspaper outlets writing stories about the story. (Seelye, 2005) For millions of 
Americans, this coverage was their first introduction to the site’s existence, and the negative 
news served as free site publicity that significantly increased traffic and content-creation. 
In the history of Wikipedia, this is referred to as “the Seigenthaler effect.” Figure 2 
demonstrates the growth in Wikipedia page views pre- and post-Seigenthaler Op-ed. The 
upward trend in views continued unabated, as Wikipedia grew to its present-day status as the 
6th most-visited website in the world. This sustained growth would not be possible prior to 
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the normative and technical problem-solving occurring in stage 2 – the site would lack a 
vibrant community and also lack the capacity to deal with the sudden influx of users. As-is, 
the arrival of the early majority signaled a change in the character of the site, as the culture of 
“ignore any rules that get in the way” had to stand up to the rush of onlookers less sure of 
their co-creating skills and more interested in a simple set of guidelines for what can and 
cannot be done. It is generally during this third stage that many of the lead adopters, faced 
with changing community norms and an increasingly noisy environment, depart for some 
new project or create their own sublist, complaining about how the community has been 
degraded by the onrushing newcomers (Shirky 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Growth of Wikipedia Page views pre- and post-Seigenthaler Op-Ed9 
 
Stage 4: Defending Norms Against Newcomers 
As the online community passes Valente’s second inflection point, growth is at its highest 
rate and the network externalities have rendered the space a clear power law hub. At this 
point, the site becomes known as “valuable online real estate.” A new wave of challenges 
comes with such a distinction, as malicious users attempt to subvert the network for their 
own gain. Wikipedia has remained surprisingly robust against these challenges – a credit both 
to the technical solutions it has created and the participatory community it has enabled. But 
two examples of this challenge demonstrate the general point. On July 31st, 2006, political 
humorist Stephen Colbert featured Wikipedia in a segment of his television show, The 
Colbert Report. Describing Wikipedia as a space where, “any user can change any entry, and 
if enough users agree with them, it becomes true,” Colbert told his viewers to go onto 
Wikipedia and edit the article on elephants to say: “Elephant population in Africa has tripled 
over the past six months.” The flood of user-edits forced site administrators to temporarily 
lock the page. In a less congenial spirit, companies and political aides have gotten into the 
habit of anonymously grooming their entries. Zittrain elaborates the tension admirably: “If 
the Wikipedia entry on Wal-Mart is one of the first hits in a search for the store, it will be 
important to Wal-Mart to make sure the entry is fair – or even more than fair…” (Zittrain, pg 
                                                 
9 Data compiled for “History of Wikipedia” by user “TakuyaMurata.”  Image available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Wikipedia under Creative Commons license. 
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139) Likewise, August 2006 saw the launch of MyWikiBiz, a company aimed at creating and 
editing Wikipedia entries on a for-fee basis. Jimmy Wales responded by blocking the 
company’s user account and banning their I.P. address, and this led to a lengthy community 
discussion about how to deal with such new ventures. (Zittrain, pg 140) 
The “valuable real estate” issue has important implications for the growth of online 
communities in areas that have already been identified as valuable. When the L.A. Times 
attempted to embrace the wiki editing concept through the launch of “wikitorials,” the site 
was almost immediately overrun by porn advertisements and was quickly shut down. Clay 
Shirky writes, “in the absence of a functioning community, a wiki will suffer from the 
Tragedy of the Commons, as the Wikitorial did, as individuals use it as an attention-getting 
platform, and there is no community to defend it.” (Shirky, pg 137)  Karpf (2009b) identifies 
a similar trend impeding nascent conservative online political communities in their efforts to 
build parallel infrastructure to the progressive “netroots.” 
 
Stage 5: Institutionalizing Authority 
Throughout the first four growth phases, we see a continuous fraying of the principles of 
openness and co-creation that mark the earliest stages of a participatory community. As sites 
enter the laggard phase (which I will again note, can only be methodologically defined with 
rigor retrospectively), the slowdown in site growth raises inevitable questions of power and 
authority among the now-stabilizing community. Within Wikipedia, one such controversy 
occurred when longtime site administrator “Essjay” was revealed to have falsified his 
credentials. Although Wikipedia is open to editing from anyone, Essjay had claimed on his 
personal page that he held various graduate degrees and a professorship in Theology. He had 
made reference to this educational background when arguing on various “talk” pages over the 
years. In 2007, after Jimmy Wales contacted him about joining a for-profit venture, it turned 
out that Essjay was a 24-year-old editor with no graduate degrees. This led to a long 
community discussion regarding the validity of his edits, the issues of identity-management 
in the online space, and the proper role of expertise in Wikipedia. (see Zittrain pg 141, Lih 
pps 194-200 for further discussion)  
As growth slows in this final phase, when most potential community members have joined 
the site and the remainder of the online population is mostly non-adopters with a few laggard 
adopters still present, the disparity between hubs and niches comes into stark contrast. While 
the periods of rapid growth provide a sense that the entire world is changing, the final phase 
raises questions about who controls the fruits of all this volunteer labor. These changes have 
been somewhat muted in Wikipedia because the site is a nonprofit, nonpolitical venture. But 
in other communities-of-interest, particularly ones where a company or political leadership is 
seen to profit from the voluntary output, the challenges to institutionalized authority can be 
particularly problematic. The differences of scale that have developed become differences-in-
kind, with Larry Sanger’s attempt to start his own equivalent to Wikipedia, Citizendium.org, 
being an instructive case. As internet publisher Tim O’Reilly has put it, “If there weren’t a 
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network effect driving Wikipedia, [Google’s] Knol and Citizendium would be succeeding.”10 
The powerful network effects that define these online spaces also prevent alternative ventures 
from successfully growing to scale. If you don’t like Wikipedia, DailyKos, or Facebook, you 
are free to start your own, but that in itself is problematic. 
If the power law topography creates these differences-in-scale among the sites that allow for 
novel solutions to the collective action problem, then we must wonder about the conditions 
under which a power law hub can fall or be replaced. The next section will discuss how each 
of the five institutional development stages listed above produces a challenge which can lead 
to the failure or replacement of a network-enhanced good, leading to a set of hypotheses 
about the parameters within which potential network-enhanced goods can be developed. 
 
Stumbling Along the Path to Power Law Hub-Status 
Phase 1 
 The first challenge for potential hub spaces lies in attracting a devoted set of lead 
adopters. This problem can come in at least two forms, depending on the availability of a pre-
existing power law hub. In the case of Wikipedia, for instance, the first wave of adopters 
came from the Nupedia list and from the Slashdot community. The Slashdotters were 
particularly attracted to Wikipedia because of its novelty. Likewise, the Howard Dean 
campaign featured the support of dozens of leaders in the field of social technology who 
were attracted by the new opportunity to apply the principles of open source to a political 
campaign and see what happened. Attempts at replicating these successes must find some 
other reason why technological or topical elite networks would choose to engage in peer 
production through that particular venue. 
This point seems lost upon the hundreds of organizations and companies who have decided 
to enter the “web 2.0” age by launching their own social networking sites, for instance. A 
useful indicator is the existence of a McDonald’s social networking site. Millions of 
Americans eat at McDonald’s, but how many of them wish to self-identify as members of the 
“McDonald’s community?” Pushed forward by a consulting industry that has found lucrative 
contracts in supporting the growth of social media, the very real public goods produced by 
online communities-of-interest can be easily obscured if we look at the social media industry 
as a whole. Without a colonizing set of devoted, skilled volunteer participants, the best 
technology in the world will fail to deliver the valuable network externalities that make these 
spaces worth regularly visiting. In a similar vein, Karpf argues in a forthcoming JITP article, 
“Macaca Moments Revisited” that the primary impact of new media on politics is only 
identifiable through the study of large-scale communities-of-interest, rather than the isolated 
study of specific new media tools such as YouTube (Karpf 2010b). The impact of the internet 
on political associations and politics in general comes not through lowered communication 
costs alone, but through the communities-of-interest that these lowered costs enable. The first 
step in building such a community lies in attracting a set of active co-creators, and these co-
                                                 
10 See http://radar.oreilly.com/2008/10/network-effects-in-data.html 
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creators are themselves a scarce commodity. This leads to the first testable hypothesis, which 
could also be termed the “Field of Dreams Fallacy:” 
H1: Successful Web 2.0 institutions must rely upon the early participation of an active 
set of lead adopters, often to be found through existing networks and channels. 
If H1 is correct, then it follows that optimism about “open source politics” must be tempered 
by a recognition of existing power relationships. It simply is not the case that “if you build it, 
they will come.” Rather, existing networks of elite actors must be courted and brought 
aboard. Whether these are members of the “Technorati” or other social, political, or media 
elites, they represent a preexisting set of “haves” whose participation is a necessary condition 
for the success of even such open, egalitarian architectures as the one found on Wikipedia. 
 
Phase 2 
 The move from lead adopters to the larger set of early adopters has a different bundle 
of challenges. Lead adopters are a valuable commodity, but they also have many interests 
that are distinctly different from the rest of the population. Reaching critical mass requires 
that a site not only solve a series of technical and normative challenges; it also requires the 
new community to exist in an area which is attractive to a substantial issue public. Shirky 
writes about a variant on this hurdle in his 1999 essay, “The Interest Horizons and the Limits 
of Software Love.” Responding to Eric Raymond’s then-recent summary of open source, that 
“every good work of software starts by scratching a developer’s personal itch… given 
enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” Shirky notes, “What if you have a problem that 
doesn’t scratch some core developers personal itch?” (Shirky 1999) Within the restricted 
universe of software development projects, some ideas will be more exciting and motivating 
than others. The least exciting ideas may still have a commercially-viable market, but they 
are unlikely to attract a large enough community of motivated developers to be appropriate 
for commons-based peer production. 
This critique holds for the formation of online communities-of-interest as well – not 
surprising, given that Wikipedia and other such communities took inspiration from the open 
source software movement. The lowered transaction costs of the internet help to reveal the 
full demand curve for public participation, but part of what that means is that topics or areas 
that simply aren’t particularly attractive or interesting to any existent or nascent issue public 
will fail to reach critical mass. The first generation of social scientists to study the internet 
were optimistic that, thanks to the falling costs of online engagement, we would see the rise 
of mass deliberative spaces, “online public squares” and other venues for enhanced 
democratic participation. Many such sites have been launched with enthusiasm, only to fail 
to reach critical mass. There are several potential explanations for such failure, but one of 
them is that public interest in lengthy deliberative processes simply isn’t as high as social 
scientists would ideally like. (see Schudson, 1999 for a similar historical discussion) One 
limit of peer production which will hamper communities-of-interest is the inability to attract 
a large enough community to pass the critical mass point where the user-generated content 
itself gives people a reason to regularly return to the online space. This leads to a second 
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hypothesis, termed the “interest horizons” thesis: 
H2: Transition from an active lead adopter community to broader participation is 
limited by existing preference schedules. Where there is little mass interest in a topic 
area, commons-based peer production will remain inferior to other methods. 
If H2 is correct, then this suggests much about the practical limitations on open source 
politics. The Obama campaign, for instance, featured many “open source”-type activities. 
Will the relative successes of a site like My.BarackObama.com be replicable for a local 
county council candidate in 2010, however? H2 would suggest not, for the simple reason that 
presidential campaigns attract much greater public attention than local races. Presidential 
campaigns – Obama’s in particular – are much higher on the demand curve of the American 
public than any other electoral campaigns, and thus there are “open source” activities that can 
only be successfully applied in such settings.  
 
Phase 3 
Often launched by some event that exposes the hub space to the population through the mass 
media, the third phase is where substantial scaling and network effects begin to take hold. An 
important related challenge at this juncture is the availability of a distributed reputation 
system capable of managing this scaling process. As discussed by Benkler (2006), Bruns 
(2008), Resnick (2006), Karpf (2010a), and others, online reputation systems are a necessary 
component of all hub spaces within the power law topography of the internet.  
A “benevolent dictator” such as Jimmy Wales can play a guiding role in the first two phases 
of growth, but in phase three, communities of interest quickly learn that “Jimmy doesn’t 
scale.” (Lih, pg 179) Slashdot’s “mojo” system and eBay’s “feedback forum” are the two 
best-known examples, but Google’s PageRank algorithm has similar functions, drawing upon 
a large set of distributed reputation assessments, then applying some form of algorithm that 
rewards good content or contributions while sanctioning bad content or contributions. Yochai 
Benkler notes in The Wealth of Networks that an effective reputation system is a necessary 
condition of large-scale peer production. He goes on to suggest that the components of peer-
produced systems can be broken down into smaller components (“Modularity”) and that 
these components themselves can then be reduced to tasks that require little time and effort 
(“Granularity”). (Benkler, pg 100) Benkler illustrates these points by drawing upon the set of 
existing online reputation systems, but in so doing he overlooks an important caveat: some 
types of mass collaboration are much more easily reduced to small actions taken in front of a 
computer monitor than others. 
This represents a substantial limitation to the internet’s impact on political associations. 
Wikipedia, DailyKos, MoveOn, and other large-scale communities-of-interest are capable of 
overwhelming growth with low overhead costs because they are asking their community to 
engage in distributed tasks that can occur effectively in front of a computer screen. One 
challenge that internet-mediated political advocacy groups like MoveOn and Democracy for 
America have faced when they attempt to use “online tools for offline action” is that the 
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slight increase in transaction costs – asking people to rate meetings after they return home to 
them, for instance – is accompanied by a steep drop-off in participation.  
Karpf (2010a) argues that these limits are changing thanks to the diffusion of the mobile web 
(internet-through-iPhone), but it is still to early in the diffusion process tell whether that 
hypothesis will be supported by the data. For our purposes here, it bears noting that the 
impact of the internet on offline collaborations is slim when compared with its impact on 
online collaboration. Potential power law hubs can only radically scale up if they adopt a 
system to manage the influx of participation. Such systems of reputation and 
recommendation are not equally applicable to all forms of collaboration and engagement, and 
where they cannot yet be built, commons-based peer production will fail to displace 
traditional modes of association and production. 
H3: Commons-based peer production will be limited to those tasks or activities that 
can be reduced to suitable levels of modularity and granularity. Many complex tasks 
will remain outside of these boundaries. 
H4: The spread of the “Mobile Web” should relax many of these limitations by 
enabling new advances in the field of online reputation systems. 
 
Phase 4 
By the fourth phase, a site has managed to attract mass attention and benefits from substantial 
network effects. What is to stop it from continuing in this regard? The brief history of social 
network sites (SNS) offers a useful illustration. Friendster.com was the first SNS to pass 
critical mass and attract large-scale participation. Danah boyd chronicles the demise of 
Friendster, eclipsed by Myspace.com because MySpace offered a more permissive culture, 
inviting bands to start their own pages and letting users create fake profiles for schools, 
organizations, and celebrities. Friendster had a network externality-advantage, because more 
people were initially on its site, but low online transaction costs meant that people could add 
a MySpace account in minutes, and with greater freedom on MySpace, they eventually 
switched en masse. Boyd attributes the replacement of Friendster by MySpace as an indicator 
of “internet culture.” (boyd 2006; boyd and Ellison 2007) 
MySpace indeed gained millions more users than Friendster, as SNS’s gained further 
penetration among the public at large. Matthew Hindman notes that, prior to June 2007, 
MySpace was stably among the top five web sites in the United States. In his research into 
the stability of power laws on the web, he notes that MySpace precipitously dropped that 
June because the site “became uncool.”11 In the months leading up to that decline, MySpace 
had become barraged by spam solicitations, as pornography marketers took note of its status 
as “valuable online real estate” and began creating fake accounts. Viruses also became a 
problem around this time. Critically, Facebook.com replaced MySpace at this time, and it 
                                                 
11 Research presentation at the Oxford Internet Institute, March 2009.  Available online at 
www.oii.ox.ac.uk  
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remains the SNS power law hub today. Facebook included more limiting user registration 
permissions, and only allowed members of an individual’s school-based or geographic 
network to view their profile. Perhaps more importantly, in May 2007, Facebook unveiled a 
new feature: its open application programming interface (API). The open API allowed 
outside developers to write new programs, including games and information-sharing tools. 
Facebook replaced MySpace as power law hub not because of culture, but because the open 
API gave users something new to do. Failure to respond to the pressures of being “valuable 
online real estate” rendered MySpace vulnerable, and when Facebook gave users new 
engagement opportunities, MySpace was left as a virtual ghost town, with over a hundred 
million registered users, most of whom were suddenly spending the bulk of their time on 
another site.12 (see Boyd 2009 for a more detailed argument regarding the socioeconomic 
effects of this “Myspace flight.”) 
The lesson we should draw from the history of social network sites is that, although power 
law hubs benefit from substantial network effects that render substantial stability in the short 
run, viewed over a long time horizon the hubs seem more fragile. The internet is a fast-
changing environment, and lead adopter communities tend to desert an online space once it 
gets too noisy and crowded, moving on to experiment with the next wave of innovations. Just 
as Compuserv, AOL, and Geocities were once defining features of online “geography,” only 
to be relegated a few years later to the dustbin of history, the changing nature of the internet 
creates room for a host of “disruptive innovations” (see Karpf 2009 for further discussion) 
that can lead to the displacement of existing hub communities. This leads to H5, or the 
“disruption thesis.”  
H5: The displacement of an existing power law hub by a new entrant will be 
facilitated by the development of new capacities, in accordance with Christensen’s 
work on disruptive innovations. 
H6: Viewed as a time series, individual topic areas online will demonstrate 
“punctuated equilibrium” characteristics, with long periods of stability, followed by a 
power law hub being replaced by a new upstart.  
H5 suggests that, as the internet continues to evolve as a medium, power laws may turn out 
to be less stable than they at first appear. New startups invest in capacities of the web at time 
T that were not present at time T-1, and in the lowered transaction cost digital environment, 
this can lead to the replacement of one hub with another. The requirements of the mass 
coordination dilemma require that the environment will continue to only have one central 
hub per area, but those hubs can be replaced in a predictable manner. Likewise, H6 posits 
that the apparent stability found in the online landscape may bear a strong resemblance to the 
stability found in the policy subsystems literature (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). At a single 
point in time, policy subsystems appear stable and unchanging. Viewed over a 30 year 
timeframe, they instead reveal short periods of disruption, followed by the establishment of a 
new systemic hierarchy. 
                                                 
12 This last point presents a host of measurement issues for social scientists interested in the internet.  User 
accounts, once created, are rarely destroyed.  Competition between social networks, community blogs, or 
internet-mediated political associations must be measured in activity, rather than list size.  Unfortunately, 
activity measures are almost universally proprietary data, when they are available at all. 
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Phase 5 
The governance challenges presented in the fifth and final stage are difficult to describe in 
great detail, particularly because of the data limitations present when applying social network 
analysis to online communities-of-interest. I cannot say with certain whether Wikipedia or 
more political hub spaces have actually entered the laggard phase of adoption, because we do 
not know at present what percentage of the online population is “non-adopters” rather than 
laggard adopters. What should be clear, however, is that the slowdown of site growth creates 
pressures regarding who controls the fruits of the community’s labor. As one participant in 
the participatory ratings site Yelp.com explained regarding her superuser “elite” status,” “It 
makes you feel special for about two weeks. Then you either realize you’re working for 
someone else without getting paid, you totally lose interest, or you get really into it.” (Zittrain 
pg 146) 
Sites that fail to effectively manage these governance challenges are at serious risk of “code 
forking,” the term Stephen Weber uses to describe subsets of the open source software 
community who break off from a large project to start their own similar endeavor. (Weber 
2004) Code forking is not inherently a negative attribute – for certain types of community, 
particularly ones whose collaboration is not particularly granular or modular, there exists a 
“crowding threshold” above which additional members detract from the community (see 
Ciffollili 2003 for a related discussion of Club Goods theory). Too much code forking can 
reduce the network externalities produced by the community, and if one of these forked 
communities successfully passes the critical mass point in phase 2, then it begins to present a 
viable alternative to community members who become disaffected over the governance 
controversies. Likewise, the community must deal with these governance challenges while 
also embracing new Code-based innovations, otherwise it runs the risk of being displaced by 
a new entrant that suddenly offers community members an augmented set of opportunities. 
H7: Once the phases of rapid growth have concluded, communities associated with 
“open source politics” will engage in a series of “code forks” in reaction to intra-
network disputes and clearer recognition of the demand curves of the associated issue 
public. 
If H7 is correct, it provides a counterpoint of sorts to Hindman’s suggestion that power law 
hubs reduce the democratizing effects of the internet to “mythological” status. For while 
there can be only one central information hub, audience-share is not the only goal of online 
citizens. If networked publics are able to successfully code fork, and in so doing enable a 
greater number of small- or medium-sized groups to efficaciously engage in collective action, 
then the limitations of power law topology prove a good deal less limiting.  
 
Conclusion 
The central purpose of this paper has been to derive a set of hypotheses about the heretofore 
underdefined field of “open source politics” from the heavily-researched commons-based 
peer production success represented by Wikipedia.org. In the process of developing these 
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hypotheses, the paper has articulated several core concepts about internet-mediated 
communication, and also offered a look at how the standard diffusion-of-innovations process 
influences the institutional development of online communities. 
A key component of the argument lies in the reinterpretation of what power laws in online 
traffic actually represent. Whereas previous scholars have taken the existence of power laws 
to indicate a stark limitation on the democratizing impact of the medium, this paper argues 
that “power law topology” is of critical importance in solving the collective action problem 
under conditions of abundance. Whereas traditional research on collective action and public 
goods problems has focused on the free rider problem, it is self-evident that Wikipedia has no 
problem with free ridership per se. Rather, the problem with online communities of this type 
lies in coordinating activity in an anti-geographic landscape. Preferential attachment serves 
as a solution to that challenge, and when combined with the growth inherent in a diffusion 
process, preferential attachment produces power law distributions. Power laws then serve to 
solve the anti-geographic challenge presented by the internet’s abundance. 
The paper concludes with a series of hypotheses specifically because it is my belief that the 
field of “open source politics” is still in its formative stages. Open source software and other 
commons-based peer production activities can be of great utility in developing this field, but 
only through a process of actively theorizing what elements of those fields should 
realistically be expected to translate over to the political realm. The hypotheses in this paper 
are meant as a challenge of sorts, both to their author and to the research community as a 
whole. Web research faces the challenge and the opportunity of having massive amounts of 
data, much of it noisy. In the aftermath of the Obama electoral victory, there is no doubt that 
“open source politics” will gain currency among the salesmen and hucksters of political 
campaign panaceas. If these hypotheses are right, where should we predict the next wave of 
successes to emerge? If they are wrong, how can they best be improved? In such a fast-
changing landscape, clear articulation of hypotheses is itself a substantial undertaking.  
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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how ‘open source’ works at the level of 
both practice and ideology through detailed analysis of Howard 
Dean’s 2003-2004 campaign for the Democratic presidential 
nomination. Extending an emerging body of work that 
documents the migration of open source practices into domains 
outside of technical production, through interviews with key 
staffers and analysis of public documents this paper shows how 
many of Dean’s technology-proficient staffers used 
collaborative, open source production as a model for their 
campaign practice. In the process, they helped create a series of 
technical and organizational innovations in online fundraising 
and electioneering. At the same time, staffers strategically and 
publicly deployed the frame of the ‘open source campaign’ as a 
cultural resource. Situated within narratives of the new 
economy and participatory democracy, staffers’ framing of the 
campaign as a radical techno-democratic effort provided 
journalists with an interpretive framework for understanding 
Dean’s run and helped mobilize and motivate specialized 
volunteer constituencies. Given that the campaign was not as 
participatory in substantive domains as the open source frame 
suggests, this paper also reveals how actors can use the label of 
open source to elide dynamics of power and interest. 
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During the spring of 2003 a startling new phrase appeared in conjunction with a political 
campaign. Joe Trippi, the kinetic campaign manager for Howard Dean’s presidential primary 
run, told every journalist who would listen – and there were very many – that the campaign 
was a revolutionary new “open source” effort. A couple of months later, in the thick of the 
primary battle, a journalist from Slate noted that: “the metaphor of choice for Howard Dean’s 
Internet-fueled campaign is ‘open-source politics’: a two-way campaign in which the 
supporters openly collaborate with the campaign to improve it, and in which the 
contributions of the ‘group mind’ prove smarter than that of any lone individual (Suellentrop, 
2003).” Just as Linux involved thousands of individuals across the globe working together to 
develop an operating system, Trippi and other Dean staffers and advisors argued that 
supporters independently collaborating powered the campaign. This new spirit of 
technologically-enabled campaigning seemingly promised nothing less than a revolution in 
political life. As Dean advisor and Internet scholar David Weinberger put it: “the campaign is 
willing to be truly democratic in a way that is really different (Tischler, 2003).” 
By the fall even many hardened political journalists breathlessly referred to the campaign as 
a novel, open source effort that was upendeding traditional campaign methods and 
overthrowing party elites. What else could explain how Dean had raised three times more 
money than his nearest rival John Kerry over the summer, despite a lack of elite support and 
name recognition? How were journalists accustomed to big money donations and party 
insiders to explain the fact that 150,000 people either donated to or supported the campaign 
online (Fineman, 2003)? Or the fact that 33,000 individuals across the country came out on a 
Dean “Meetup Day,” facilitated by the commercial Website Meetup.com, one Wednesday 
night in August? There was such little precedent for this shocking demonstration of electoral 
support so early in the campaign cycle that many journalists took Steve McMahon, Trippi’s 
business partner and senior strategist for the campaign, at his word when he declared: “We 
have tapped into a force no one can fully control. I hope you guys remember that when 
something goes wrong (Fineman, 2003).” 
Scholars such as anthropologist Chris Kelty (2008) have powerfully documented 
“modulations” of the open source/free software movement in domains far afield from 
technical production, from the collaborative online encyclopedia Wikipedia to the flowering 
of social expression secured by Creative Commons. Beyond any single project, however, 
practices of openness and collaboration appear to many to be a highly compelling and 
meaningful new model for organizing technical, economic, and cultural production. As Kelty 
reveals, open source is best conceptualized as a movement that has far reaching implications 
for much of political and social life, in both its very form as a set of value-laden practices and 
the products that result from such large-scale, decentralized, and public collaboration.  
This paper shows how many of Dean’s staffers working with the Internet and volunteers on 
technical projects were inspired by the ideals and practices of the open source movement and 
sought to apply them to the domain of electoral politics. The chief architect of the campaign 
was Trippi, a veteran of both political campaigning and the dot.com economy, who described 
his founding vision as wanting “to use the collaborative nature of open source, where more 
people filling holes makes it more stable and effective (Cone, 2003)." Many staffers echoed 
Trippi in citing how open source guided their own work, especially those within the 
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campaign’s Internet Division, the central site for technical experimentation.1 These staffers 
often conceptualized their roles as simply supporting a vast, distributed volunteer community 
engaged in such activities as developing campaign tools, responding to attacks on the 
candidate on blogs, writing letters to voters in early primary states, and raising money for 
Dean’s run. This seemed the very definition of open source. Indeed, Dean’s staffers and 
volunteers even used and developed open source technologies in their work because they 
would “jibe with the movement part of the campaign” (Jerome Armstrong, personal 
communication, November 21, 2008), despite the fact that other campaigns could potentially 
use them. 
As these staffers adopted the ethos and practices of open source technical development for 
their work, the campaign became a site of significant technical and organizational innovation 
in fundraising and electioneering. Online campaigning in previous election cycles was 
generally limited to “brochureware,” static versions of campaign literature designed to sway 
undecided voters (Foot and Schneider, 2006). Yet, this was an ineffective tactic given that 
most visitors to campaign Websites were already sympathetic to, if not supporting, the 
candidate. Given this phenomenon, scholars such as Bimber and Davis (2003) presciently 
suggested that campaigns would increasingly use the Internet as a tool for mobilization. It 
was the Dean campaign that effectively realized this potential. As a number of scholars note 
(Chadwick, 2007; Jett & Välikangas, 2004; Stromer-Galley & Baker, 2006; Wiese & 
Gronbeck, 2005), Dean’s staffers created a campaign blog, the first in presidential politics, 
developed an early social networking platform and personalized fundraising tools, and 
welcomed supporter involvement in many finance and field efforts. For example, the 
campaign provided citizens with digital tools that enabled them to host events, build their 
own Websites, and set fundraising goals and reach out to their friends and family for 
contributions. These innovations, in turn, spread across Democratic electoral politics. Many 
technical staffers founded consulting firms shortly after the primaries, carrying Dean’s tools 
and organizational practices with them to other sites, culminating in Barack Obama’s historic 
bid for the presidency (Kreiss, 2009b). After Dean’s run, Democratic campaigns used the 
Internet as an organizational tool much more fully integrated into campaign operations, 
decentralizing fundraising, voter identification, and turnout.  
At the same time, this paper reveals that open source served as a “cultural resource” (Snow 
and Benford, 2005) for the campaign. Trippi and other Dean staffers and advisors framed the 
campaign’s uptake of the Internet in ways that connected to narratives of the new economy 
and participatory democracy. As they did so, they legitimated the electoral effort for 
journalists and attracted and motivated the labor of Dean’s supporters. Notions of the open 
source campaign, coupled with performances of online politics such as fundraising events, 
served as compelling news hooks that attracted press attention and provided an interpretative 
                                                 
1 The formal Internet Division consisted of approximately twelve staffers within the larger campaign 
organization. There were also a number of staffers’ whose work revolved around the Internet and the 
campaign’s technical systems in other divisions such as Field, Communications, and Finance. These individuals 
often worked closely with the Internet Division, so much so that divisional affiliations and reporting were not 
always clear. When I reference the ‘Internet Division’ in this paper I am referring to this larger group of staffers 
whose job responsibilities primarily entailed working online with supporters or developing the campaign’s 
technical infrastructure. For a fuller discussion of the campaign organization, including an organizational chart, 
see Kreiss (2009a). 
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framework for journalists writing about the campaign. Meanwhile, the symbolic work of 
Dean’s staffers helped the campaign recruit highly-skilled, technical volunteers and 
mobilized supporters. This framing also allowed supporters and staffers to imagine their 
work in ways that elided power dynamics on the campaign. A campaign hierarchy limited the 
Internet Division’s work and much supporter participation to “backend” fundraising and 
voter outreach (Hindman, 2007). This formal organization held centralized control over the 
more substantive aspects of the campaign, ranging from the policy platform of the candidate 
to electoral strategy -- a fact that became painfully clear to supporters after the candidate’s 
disastrous third place finish in the Iowa caucuses (Kreiss, 2009a). In this sense, open source 
served the ideological function of allowing many of Dean’s staffers and foot soldiers to 
imagine themselves as part of a broader movement engaged in a project of techno-democratic 
reform, even as their participation was limited to tasks long institutionalized in electoral 
politics. 
This paper adds to the broader literature on open source as a set of ideals, practices, and 
processes in looking to the ways individuals can strategically claim to represent the 
movement. Scholars such as Kelty and Gabriella Coleman (2009) have revealed the political 
sensibilities that underlie much of the open source movement. Work by scholars such as 
Yochai Benkler (2002, 2006) points to the economic and cultural impact of distributed, 
voluntaristic collaboration, while Stephen Weber (2004), Paul Duguid (2006), Eric Raymond 
(1998a, 1998b), and Clay Shirky (2008) have analyzed the social processes that underlie this 
new form of production. Along with extending this work in revealing how the Dean 
campaign became a site of electoral innovation, this paper draws from a body of movement 
theory to show how social actors utilize frames and technologies as cultural resources. In this 
sense, this paper shows how open source is not the exclusive purview of activists seeking to 
bring about changes in organizational life or intellectual property, but a cultural resource that 
can be appropriated by strategic individuals and enrolled into a number of projects. 
As such, this paper suggests the complexity of “modulations” of the core components of 
open source (Kelty, 2008). The Dean campaign was an entity with competing “institutional 
logics,” or the “belief systems and associated practices” (Scott et al., 2000) of a field. Many 
of Dean’s Internet Division and other technical staffers did indeed see the campaign in terms 
of the open source movement, experimenting with practices of openness, sharing, and 
collaboration in their work. Yet, the Internet Division was embedded within and accountable 
to a formal organization staffed by political professionals with very different understandings 
of how political campaigns should be run and accountable to a different set of external actors 
such as elected officials, party leaders, the press, and governmental agencies. Dean’s 
campaign then reveals how modulations of open source practices can take root in a local 
context, yet still be subject to larger governance structures. Given this, the question of 
whether Dean ran an “open source campaign,” which Hindman (2007) so effectively took up, 
can obscure important nuances in modulations of open source. The more open and dynamic 
aspects of the Internet Division existed inside a hierarchical campaign structure that limited 
these staffers’ work to domains such as fundraising, technical development, and volunteer 
operations.  
I draw my evidence for this paper from open-ended interviews conducted over the last two 
years with twenty-one alumni of the Howard Dean campaign, including staffers of the formal 
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organization, advisors to the candidate and campaign manager, and project-based 
consultants. I also used databases such as Lexis/Nexis and the Internet Archive to gather and 
analyze over 500 documents relating to the 2003-2004 election cycle. These include, but are 
not limited to, professional press articles, blog posts, campaign Websites, and e-mail 
campaign communications. I also utilized the work of a surprising number of bloggers, 
campaign staff, and volunteers that reflected on the campaign in blog posts, articles, and 
books such as Trippi’s auto-biographical The Revolution Will Not be Televised and 
Teachout and Streeter’s edited collection of first-hand accounts of staffers and volunteers, 
Mousepads, Shoe Leather and Hope.  
This paper proceeds in three parts. I begin by showing how the technical and organizational 
practices of many of Dean’s Internet Division staffers were guided by the principles of the 
open source movement. I then turn to the public framing of the Dean campaign as a radical 
techno-democratic effort, showing how it was discursively linked to narratives of the new 
economy and participatory democracy. Finally, I turn to the concrete work that this frame 
performed, showing how it attracted the attention of professional journalists and mobilized 
supporter labor. 
 
Open Source and Electoral Innovation within a Formal Campaign Organization 
Zack Rosen was a sophomore at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in 2003. The 
twenty-year old computer science major spent many of his days reading about the 
implications of the Internet in books that ranged from Weinberger’s Small Pieces Loosely 
Joined and Albert-Laszlo Barabási’s Linked: The New Science of Networks to Lawrence 
Lessig’s Code and The Future of Ideas. Intrigued by these authors’ arguments regarding the 
transformative effects of the Internet on social life, and in the early stages of a presidential 
election, Rosen began doing some research into politics. He found an obscure former 
governor who surprised him:  
I was kind of looking for an avenue to get involved in politics. I hadn't done much 
political work before and I started to read all these books about the future and the 
technological implications of the Web and social organizing in general.... At the same 
time, I started doing political research and I heard about this candidate Dean who was 
doing all this creative stuff on the Internet.... It was kind of a perfect match. I realized 
that all the things I was reading about in these books were coming to life in a 
campaign. And it coalesced a lot of things I was passionate about. (Zack Rosen, 
personal communication, April 7, 2008) 
Soon after this discovery, Rosen reached out to volunteers creating online tools for Dean’s 
effort and launched a mailing list called “Hack4Dean” to coordinate the programming efforts 
happening entirely independently of the campaign. By July, Rosen had dropped out of 
college and, with the help of fellow hackers, created a prototype of “Deanspace,” a toolkit 
built on the open source platform Drupal that enabled supporters to set up their own Websites 
and plan events for Dean. In the months after the launch of Deanspace hundreds of activist 
sites bloomed including “Music for America,” “Seniors for Dean,” and “Catholics for Dean.” 
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Rosen’s story is extraordinary, but it captures the unprecedented technology-fueled 
volunteering that lay behind many aspects of the Dean campaign. From mid-2002 on through 
to the first nominating contests in January 2004, thousands of enterprising hackers, 
technology entrepreneurs, and political activists developed and used a host of new Internet 
tools as volunteers for Dean. As they built Websites, commented on blogs, gathered offline 
using Internet-based tools such as Meetup, and, most importantly, donated small amounts of 
money that rapidly scaled, their work helped propel a virtually unknown governor from a 
small New England state into the lead for the Democratic presidential nomination, right up 
until the Iowa caucuses. 
Although the internal workings of the Dean organization have received relatively scant 
attention in the literature, supporting and coordinating many of these volunteer efforts were 
staffers within the dynamic and creative Internet Division of the campaign. Under Joe 
Trippi’s direct management, the Internet Division encompassed a diverse group of staffers, 
but most had technical and professional knowledges from domains outside of electoral 
politics. For example, many Division staffers were unemployed or underemployed by a 
slowdown in the technology industry or just seeking new challenges and therefore left the 
‘new economy’ to try their hands at politics. Others were programmers, including many 
participants in open source development projects. A number were part of a new generation of 
Internet activists writing blogs and taking online action on behalf of progressive causes. Yet, 
regardless of their varying paths to the Dean campaign, many of these staffers shared a vision 
of a new form of technologically-enabled politics. And, to make it a reality, they pieced an 
amalgam of strategies and ad-hoc problem-solving skills from these commercial, technical, 
and activist domains. For instance, Nicco Mele (personal communication, July 29, 2008), 
Dean’s Webmaster, argues that the Internet Division of the campaign tied together the 
political culture of grassroots progressive organizing and “the open source, collaborative 
world.” 
As an interpretively flexible concept that carried meaning in disparate social worlds, open 
source in particular provided a shared language and set of practices for many Internet 
Division staffers. Indeed, part of what made open source powerful was its ambiguity and lack 
of formal definition, serving as a “boundary object” (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Knorr-Cetina, 
2009; Star and Griesemer, 1989) that offered staffers a shared language to coordinate their 
efforts while enabling them to interpret it differently in practice according to their needs. As 
Jerome Armstrong (personal communication, November 21, 2008), a prominent progressive 
blogger and consultant for the campaign, suggests in relation to staffers’ understanding of 
open source: “nobody in the campaign knew what the hell it meant.” Yet, while it was never 
formally defined, and some had only a vague understanding of technologies such as Linux, 
open source did signify a collaborative organizational model that was both easily transposed 
to the political realm and particularly resonant for Dean’s progressive staffers who valued 
democratic participation. As Rosen (personal communication, April 7, 2008), who was hired 
by the campaign in the fall of 2003, suggests, open source was a model that richly accorded 
with the campaign’s ethos around helping citizens “take their country back,” as the 
ubiquitous slogan proclaimed: 
people really understood bottom-up open source processes. Trippi was very explicit 
about the open source campaign. He described it acutely. I understood open source 
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processes. It really is revolutionary, fundamentally a different way of being effective 
and getting work done. We all shared the theory that it could carry over to politics and 
it was proven out. People understood the implications of this. 
In this sense, the concept of the open source campaign helped guide these staffers’ technical 
practice. In the process, these figures reconcieved the Internet as an organizational and 
mobilizational tool, a significant innovation in electoral campaigning. As detailed above, 
prior to Dean’s run candidates largely used their Websites to provide static, html versions of 
campaign literature.2 Many of Dean’s Internet Division staffers, by contrast, saw the Internet 
as a tool to facilitate distributed supporter participation in the campaign. Staffers, for 
instance, drew on the model of open source to provide supporters with resources to organize 
their communities for Dean and even develop some of the core technical infrastructure of the 
campaign. In inviting this participation, these staffers helped create a national volunteer 
effort that broke fundraising records, turned thousands of individuals out at events for Dean, 
and created novel campaign tools that rivaled even commercial applications such as the early 
social networking site Friendster. 
Many of these supporters, particularly those working on technical projects, in turn saw the 
campaign, and their roles in it, in terms of open source. For instance, the Internet application 
Deanspace, the online toolkit built by Rosen and other members of Hack4Dean, was one 
example of a technology produced by volunteers and utilized by the campaign. These 
volunteers, and the staffers that embraced and encouraged their work, saw the development 
of Deanspace and the online application itself as symbolic of the open source ethos of the 
campaign and, by extension, the candidate. This is suggested by the fact that the Hack4Dean 
group built Deanspace on the open source Drupal platform in large part because it fit with the 
perceived ‘openness’ of the campaign.3 Indeed, even though other campaigns could adopt 
this technology given the underlying public source code, volunteers believed that rivals did 
not have the same open culture of the Dean campaign. As volunteer developer Aldon Hynes 
(personal communication, April 2, 2008) explains: 
it was important that it [Deanspace] reflect the openness of the campaign. We argued 
that the Bush campaign could not use it because their culture could not produce the 
openness. Unlike Dean, Bush was not willing to be open to other people. We believed 
that there was an underlying deep structure to the technology. 
While technical projects such as these received most of the attention in the press and 
academic literature, the formal campaign organization steered much of the electoral 
participation of Dean’s supporters towards ends long institutionalized in electoral politics. 
                                                 
2 This was, in part, due to the fact that the legal questions surrounding online campaigning were unsettled. It 
was only in 1999 – through a petition by George W. Bush to the FEC – that campaigns were allowed to take 
credit card contributions online. During the 2003-2004 cycle there were a host of other legal questions, but the 
Dean campaign was willing to test the boundaries of the law. For example, a former staffer of Al Gore and John 
Edward’s Internet teams describes how lawyers for the 2003-2004 Edwards campaign internally debated 
questions such as the legality of supporters building their own sites for the candidate. The Dean campaign, by 
contrast, with little to lose as a long-shot candidate simply forged ahead with supporter collaborations, with the 
philosophy of worrying about the legal issues later (Aaron Myers, personal communication, May 9, 2009) 
3 David Cohn (2007) argues that the Dean campaign served as the point of diffusion in the United States for 
Drupal after it was used for Deanspace. 
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Supporters across the country used tools such as Deanspace to organize their neighbors and 
fundraise for the candidate, which were novel forms of decentralized field and fundraising 
efforts, yet they had few channels for more substantive forms of participation in the 
campaign (Haas, 2006; Stromer-Galley and Baker, 2006). This highly delimited form of 
participation marks an important distinction between the Dean campaign and many open 
source technical projects. As Weber (2004) notes, large-scale open source technical projects 
tend to have hierarchical decision-making structures that manage complexity and 
coordination. Yet, on projects such as Linux all aspects of the code are open to contributions. 
Even though contributions may be rejected leaders such as Linus Torvalds and his 
lieutenants, who often hail from the community of programmers around an open source 
project, must justify decisions and be responsive to participants. In contrast, Dean’s 
supporters lacked meaningful opportunities for ‘voice’ (Flew, 2009) and had little in the way 
of channels for expressing their policy views. For example, as I detail below, even the 
campaign’s Internet policy was the work of experts, entirely closed to public participation. In 
other words, outside of fundraising and electioneering, much of the campaign simply was not 
open to supporter participation. 
That the campaign directed supporter involvement towards fundraising and organizing 
instead of policy and strategy was the result of the Internet Division being embedded in a 
formal organizational structure. As I have documented elsewhere (Kreiss 2009a), the Dean 
campaign adopted a generally recognized, legitimate organizational form to work with other 
electoral actors such as journalists, political elites, and citizens. Formalized structures helped 
staffers conduct their activities on a routine basis, tasks such as coordinating field operations, 
building relationships with the professional press, reporting to governmental agencies, 
allocating scare resources to third party vendors, and making strategic political decisions 
about where to deploy volunteers and advertising. Meanwhile, Trippi and consultants for the 
campaign devised the explicit strategy of developing tools so as to better channel supporter 
collaboration given the candidate’s position as a party insurgent. Dean’s outsider status meant 
that the campaign needed non-elite bases of fiscal and political support. As Jascha Franklin 
Hodge (personal communication, December 22, 2008), a programmer who worked for a 
number of start-ups before becoming Dean’s National Systems Administrator, explains: 
We had no institutional advantages, not like Kerry or Gephardt. People were just fed 
up. It was an environment where people could overcome a power base, we just need to 
figure out how do we get them engaged enough in political process, in local party 
organizations. How do we insert these people into where we can to have them stand up 
for Dean? 
As such, a formal structure adapted to a competitive electoral environment directed the work 
of the Internet Division staffers and their supporter collaborators towards particular 
instrumental ends. For many of these staffers, then, along with providing a model for 
technical practice the idea of the open source campaign performed “ideological work” that 
maintained “some semblance of consistency, coherence, and continuity” (Berger, 1981) 
between the values of these progressive activists and their actual roles in transactional online 
campaigning. Meanwhile, to overcome Dean’s institutional disadvantages, staffers needed to 
find and create active and engaged citizens. They did so through their cultural work around 
the open source campaign and networked campaign tools that both fashioned and mobilized 
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supporters. As the next section details, staffers such as Joe Trippi were cultural 
“entrepreneurs” (Iacono and Kling, 2001) who rhetorically situated the campaign’s uptake of 
digital media for audiences far beyond the Internet Division within discourses of new 
economy business practices and conceptions of participatory democracy espoused by leftist 
social movements in ways that garnered resources for Dean’s run. 
 
The Dean Campaign, the New Economy, and Participatory Democracy 
With Dean’s run for the presidency, a remarkable array of new terms entered the political 
lexicon. While few seasoned political journalists had even heard of Linux or blogs at the start 
of the primary season, by September 2003 even trade publications such as Campaigns & 
Elections marveled at the campaign’s use of “Meet Up” and quoted Trippi’s proclamations 
that the Dean campaign "isn't top-down organizing; it's really bottom-up" (Mark, 2003). 
Many journalists interpreted all aspects of the campaign through the lens of the Internet, 
including casting the campaign as the political analogue of the dot.com firms of the 1990s. 
And, just as the new economy was supposedly empowering consumers, these journalists 
suggested, so the Dean campaign was using digital tools to realize the 1960s dream of 
participatory democracy.  
This section shows how Dean’s staffers helped conjure up these associations for journalists. 
Staffers articulated the frame of the open source campaign and situated the campaign’s 
uptake of the Internet within larger narratives of the new economy and participatory 
democracy. The elements of this cultural assemblage reflect what social movement scholars 
refer to as the “discursive opportunity structures” during the 2003-2004 primaries, or the 
“institutionally anchored ways of thinking that provide a gradient of relative political 
acceptability to specific packages of ideas” (Ferree, 2003, p. 309). For example, as staffers 
adopted the language of the new economy for Dean’s run, they situated the campaign within 
a set of understandings regarding consumer empowerment and provided a well-established 
trope for journalistic coverage. Meanwhile, ‘participatory democracy’ has long served as a 
powerfully legitimating “master frame” for social movements, particularly for the ideological 
left (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 618). 
For Dean’s staffers, the campaign’s uptake of the Internet resembled a host of shifts that 
pundits and academics argued had come about with the new economy. This was due to the 
fundamental technological changes that were seemingly revolutionizing much of economic 
and social life. Trippi (2004, p. 209-210) and other staffers, for instance, argued that the 
campaign was equivalent to the pioneering business practices of “Amazon.com, eBay, and all 
the online travel agencies.” As such, the campaign resembled the new economy sites where 
empowered consumers bought, sold, and traded their wares. In other words, the same digital 
tools that enabled consumers to book their own airline reservations and create auctions for 
goods without any intermediaries also allowed them as citizens to take democracy into their 
own hands. For example, Trippi (2004, p. 82) argued that there “are not just markets 
anymore. They’re communities. And we’re not just consumers. We’re citizens again. We’re 
looking for the companies, politicians, and institutions that will build the best communities.” 
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This cultural link to Silicon Valley in turn enabled journalists to write about the campaign 
through a well-established story genre: the dot.com start-up. Despite the organizational 
complexity of the campaign and the political professionals who populated much of it outside 
the Internet Division, technology and political journalists interpreted nearly all aspects of 
Dean’s run through the lens of a fledgling Silicon Valley firm. For example, in Fast 
Company Tischler (2003) argued that: “Dean's campaign has all the hallmarks of a startup 
circa 1997. It's getting big fast. It's monetizing eyeballs.” Meanwhile, these characterizations 
of the campaign did not simply appear in the business and lifestyle magazines of the Valley – 
publications that paid scant attention to politics during previous electoral cycles. In an 
expansive profile of the Dean campaign in the New York Times Magazine, Shapiro (2003) 
describes the Internet Division as looking “a lot like a dot-com start-up from the mid-90's: 
preternaturally pale-skinned young men, crazy hours and slightly messianic rhetoric.” Many 
journalists, in turn, read the Dean campaign as the electoral application of the technical and 
business practices of the Valley, in effect legitimating its innovations for a wider audience of 
citizens and political actors. Citing how Internet theorists such as Weinberger, Doc Searls, 
and Howard Rheingold consulted for the campaign, Shapiro for instance interpreted the 
campaign as an extension of the commercial trends that by late 2004 would be called “Web 
2.0”: 
The latest holy grail of the tech industry is the idea that people can fuse the virtual 
communities and digital connections of the Internet with real, human life. Investors are 
pouring money into Web sites and software programs that claim to perform this 
function, like Friendster, which lets users visually represent their real friend networks 
online, and Meetup.com, the site that has helped build the Dean campaign (Shapiro, 
2003). 
 These journalistic tropes are evidence of a long and powerful process of “legitimacy 
exchange” between the campaign and Valley firms and luminaries. As Geof Bowker (1993, 
p. 116) shows, “legitimacy exchange” involves two or more parties gaining rhetorical 
legitimacy by mutually referencing one another to validate their claims. The campaign, for 
instance, legitimated its novel technical practices by pointing to open source projects such as 
Linux and the empowering of consumers by Valley firms. This was all the more crucial given 
that Dean’s Internet-tools and the sprawling volunteer activities they supported were 
innovations in electoral practice on a number of levels and thus involved risk and 
uncertainty. As such, Dean’s staffers and advisors referenced Linux and these firms when 
faced with questions from journalists and political elites regarding the online campaign and 
whether it would be effective. At the same time, given sagging industry fortunes with the 
dot.com bust, the Dean campaign’s success during the summer months offered the possibility 
of affirming the Valley’s social and business vision as well as its firms and technologies. 
Luminaries of the industry were quick to promote this. For example, in February 2004 the 
“O’Reilly Emerging Technology Conference,” one of the consummate industry gatherings 
founded by open source guru and coiner of the phrase ‘Web 2.0’ Tim O’Reilly, sponsored a 
co-located “O’Reilly Digital Democracy Teach-In” that brought together many of the key 
players from the Dean campaign to discuss how “Internet technologies are putting power 
back into the hands of people.” In co-locating these conferences, a material instantiation of 
the legitimacy exchanged between these two professional worlds throughout the 2003-2004 
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campaign, O’Reilly invited developers and entrepreneurs, as well as journalists and the 
public, to imagine a new generation of commercial tools as uniquely democratic. 
Meanwhile, in the political register staffers argued that the technologically-empowered Dean 
campaign realized ideal participatory democratic practices. On one level, appeals to 
participatory democracy simply referred to the increased opportunities for electoral 
engagement made possible by Dean’s uptake of new technologies. In this sense, the ethos 
behind open source technical efforts and the practices of collaboration, openness, and sharing 
central to them fit culturally with ideal conceptions of democracy among Dean’s progressive 
staffers. The language used by staffers to describe the campaign often made this connection 
explicit. The open source model was, for Trippi, nothing short of the realization of egalitarian 
democratic forms. Trippi (2004) dedicated his autobiography of the campaign, for instance, 
“to the six hundred thousand people of Dean for America who relit the flame of participatory 
democracy.” In this sense, the collaborative electoral activities facilitated by networked 
media reinvigorated participation in democratic life. The candidate himself echoed this, 
fostering an “Internet-driven populist energy” with speeches intended to inspire a newfound 
sense of citizen agency: “The biggest lie that people like me tell people like you during the 
election season is 'If you vote for me, I'll solve all your problems.' The truth is that the power 
to change this country is in your hands, not mine” (Singer, 2004). 
On a deeper level, the conceptions of technology and benefits of mediated citizen 
engagement espoused by members of the Dean campaign echoed theories of participatory 
democracy advanced by leftist social movements during the 1960s. While theories of 
democratic participation have a long history in political thought, the origins of its 
contemporary formulation lie with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Michigan 
philosopher Arnold Kaufman first used the specific phrase "participatory democracy" in a 
1960 essay where he argued that “its main justifying function is and always has been, not the 
extent to which it protects or stabilizes a community, but the contribution it can make to the 
development of human powers of thought, feeling and action” (Kaufman, 1960). While at 
Michigan Kaufman taught Tom Hayden, SDS president from 1962-1963, and he served as a 
“free-floating guru” at the famous Port Huron conference in 1962 (Miller, 1992, p. 111). 
Hayden drafted the Port Huron Statement, the founding document of the era that served as 
the intellectual cornerstone for what Todd Gitlin (1987, p. 102-103) described as the 
“metaphysics of participation” among the New Left. 
The Port Huron Statement articulated a powerful discourse of democratic participation, its 
psychological benefits, and its relationship to communication technologies and social forms. 
With intellectual influences spanning from John Dewey, C. Wright Mills, and Erich Fromm 
to Kaufman, Hayden was deeply concerned with psychological alienation. Reflecting this, 
the Port Huron Statement argued that participation in political, social, and economic life 
would produce “communicative beings” that could overcome their alienation from 
themselves and their communities (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 312-313). Participation would also 
help men realize their “potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and 
creativity (Miller, 1992, p. 332).” Hayden, in turn, entwined this ideal psychological 
wholeness with thinking about technology, communications media, and democratic social 
forms. The activists who met at Port Huron believed that “supertechnology” in the hands of 
bureaucratic elites was dehumanizing men and fragmenting communities as it created "mass" 
 Politics of Open Source  43 
society, "monster cities," and "mass labor (330).” The way forward for the SDS was through 
citizen engagement in political, social, and economic affairs using "the media for their 
common participation" and "by experiments in decentralization, based on the vision of man 
as master of his machines and his society (364)." This was a society that should be "broken 
into smaller communities (365)” and arranged to enable “personal links between man and 
man (332).” It was a vision that called for a humanized form of technology that would enable 
men to understand machines and integrate them into the conditions necessary for the 
development of the community and the whole person: "technology, which could be a 
blessing to society, becomes more and more a sinister threat to humanistic and rational 
enterprise (342).” 
Forty years later, staffers on the Dean campaign channeled many of these sentiments as they 
crafted their own brand of open source, Internet-empowered politics to forge a 
technologically-enabled participatory democracy. For many Dean figures, the Internet was 
both a symbol of ideal democratic forms conceived in much the same terms as the SDS even 
as it was a tool for realizing this social vision. Dean technology advisor Howard Rheingold, 
for instance, argued that the Internet inherently had a “decentralized, self-organizing power” 
that was uniquely democratic, even as it facilitated supporters’ use of Meetup to create 
political “smart mobs” that were “returning power to the people (Skinner, 2004).” Indeed, 
these figures believed that Internet, by its very design, supported the ability of individuals to 
take action in political life and challenge elites, political parties, and interest groups. As 
Trippi (2004, p. 102) argued, “the Internet is tailor-made for a populist, insurgent movement. 
Its roots in the open-source ARPANET, its hacker culture, and its decentralized, scattered 
architecture make it difficult for big, establishment candidates, companies, and media to gain 
control of it.” In essence, these figures argued that the Internet was the humanized 
technology that the SDS was calling for, since it supported a decentralized social order and 
the communicative links that realize new forms of political power. 
At the same time, Trippi and others conceived of many of the benefits of this communicative, 
mediated political participation in psychological terms. Just as Kaufman and the SDS posited 
a strong psychological dimension of political participation, so too did Dean figures argue that 
through the renewed democratic participation made possible by the Internet individuals 
developed the self and overcame the psychological alienation caused by the much-maligned 
‘broadcast model’ of political communication. For example, Trippi argued that in this new 
style of Internet politics campaign managers needed to “unleash the power of the people to 
be creative (Tischer, 2003).” Citizens, in turn, would have the means to act as creative agents 
of their own participation, joining not only in electoral activities that they themselves plan 
but expressive forms of communicative engagement given that online everyone can be a 
media producer. All of which, Trippi and others argued, restored the very foundations of 
American democracy itself: “America is built from the bottom up - not from the top down. 
Historically to release this creative energy of the people is to create not a political storm, but 
tsunami of power, purpose, and patriotism (Trippi and Cadell, 2003).”  
This section detailed how Dean’s staffers and advisors situated the campaign’s uptake of 
digital tools within larger narratives of the new economy and participatory democracy. While 
this reveals the broader cultural tributaries to the symbolic work of Dean’s campaigners, in 
the pages that follow I detail how staffers made this frame for the campaign public through a 
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press and public communications strategy. As I show, despite the lack of attention to cultural 
processes among many scholars of new media and politics, the framing of the campaign as a 
radical techno-democratic movement was both deliberate and made a significant contribution 
to the success of the candidate during the summer months. 
 
Going Public and Creating a Movement 
In his classic study of the demise of the SDS Gitlin (1980) provided a powerful account of 
the relationship between professional media and social movement organizations. The framing 
of the movement in media coverage, and the norms of ‘newsworthiness’ among professional 
journalists, not only shaped understandings of the SDS for the public and other political 
actors, but even for activists themselves. Gitlin argued that SDS members trusted media 
accounts of the movement more than their own direct experience and adopted a highly 
performative, mostly symbolic style of protest to garner coverage. 
While much of Gitlin’s account deals with the baleful consequences of journalists’ framing 
of the SDS, suggesting only the limited potential of activists to shape media narratives and 
thus public understandings of social movements, this section reveals how SDS’s ideological 
descendants on the Dean campaign harnessed the power of the professional press – at least 
for a time. I focus here on how Dean’s staffers and advisors used rhetorical claims of the 
open source and technologically-empowered campaign alongside the symbolic deployment 
of digital tools to drive widespread press interest in and shape public understandings of the 
campaign. As Zack Exley (personal communication, January 6, 2009), a staffer at MoveOn 
who consulted for the Dean campaign, argues, for Trippi the Internet “was this huge 
newshook. You could combine the Internet with any old-fashioned campaign story and the 
papers would eat it up. And he rode that wave as a media person and as a communications 
person.” This cultural work, meanwhile, translated into significant resources for the 
campaign, increasing public awareness of Dean’s candidacy, changing the perception of the 
candidate’s chances, and assisting with fundraising and recruiting and mobilizing volunteers. 
Attempts to shape public understandings of the Dean campaign began and ended with the 
packaging of Trippi himself as the embodiment of a radically new style of politics ported 
from open source communities and Silicon Valley. Trippi presented his professional 
biography to journalists as the key to explaining and understanding the innovations of the 
Dean campaign. In this sense, Trippi spoke through many press accounts of the campaign, 
relating how he attended San Jose State University in the 1970s where he began to get 
involved in politics and had his first experience using ARPANET. While in the intervening 
years he launched a full-blown political consulting career – often working on behalf of 
outsider, insurgent Democratic candidates – Trippi told journalists that he always remained 
fascinated by new communications technologies. So much so that while on hiatus from 
politics during the 1990s Trippi (2004, p. 54) ended up consulting for what he referred to as 
“a few brash young companies” including Wave Systems, Smartpaper Networks, and 
Progeny Linux Systems. Trippi meanwhile argued, and journalists related, that these early 
experiences with Linux and quintessential dot.com-era startups provided the model for the 
Dean campaign. 
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The campaign’s uptake of the Internet, which enacted this founding story, served as the focal 
point for journalistic accounts of the campaign. While it is not surprising that many 
technology-oriented magazines embraced narratives of the digital campaign, as Table One 
makes clear even many newspaper political journalists covered Dean’s run through through 
the trope of the campaign’s uptake of the Internet. 
 
Table 1: Newspaper articles about the Howard Dean campaign’s use of the Internet and total 
coverage of the campaign January 2003-February 2004 
 Internet Total Articles Percent of Internet Stories 
January 2003 2 173 1% 
February 4 143 3% 
March 13 113 12% 
April 8 145 6% 
May 16 186 9% 
June 38 205 19% 
July 88 374 24% 
August 71 376 19% 
September 92 692 13% 
October 85 539 16% 
November 109 745 15% 
December 173 1222 14% 
January 2004 268 2244 12% 
February 255 1391 18% 
 Notes: Lexis/Nexus database search of twenty-nine major market daily newspapers 
 
That so many journalists covered the campaign in this way was part of the press strategy 
honed by Trippi. From very early on Internet Division staffers and consultants deliberately 
and constantly pushed “stories around about what we were doing with the Internet (Jerome 
Armstrong, personal communication, November 21, 2008).” One reason staffers were so 
successful at getting these stories in the press was their attention to providing journalists with 
verifiable metrics of the campaign’s online support. For example, as early as mid-March 
2003 the campaign hosted a “Million Dollar Meetup Challenge” for Howard Dean that 
involved supporters adding a penny to their contributions made over the Internet so the 
campaign – and the press – could determine the source of these funds (Annatopia, 2003). 
Meetups themselves served as an important metric that journalists used in assessing the early 
support of primary campaigns, regardless of the fact that many of these gatherings occurred 
in states without important nominating contests. For example, the press widely reported on 
the crowds that the tool helped draw to Dean’s campaign events. A March 2003 Meetup in 
New York that drew over 300 supporters to hear the candidate, for instance, launched Dean 
as the Internet candidate for many journalists. Trippi even made sure the campaign continued 
to use Meetup as an organizing tool throughout the primaries given that it provided a 
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verifiable metric of online support for journalists, despite the fact that the campaign had 
developed better event management tools in-house (Zack Exley, personal communication, 
January 6, 2009). 
Nothing attracted the attention of journalists more, however, than the campaign’s staging of 
high-profile public events that dramatically demonstrated its online organizing and 
fundraising capacity and seemingly embodied the open source campaign. For example, an 
early and important symbolic victory for the Dean campaign came during the “MoveOn 
primary”. On June 24th and 25th, MoveOn.org (2003), the largest and most powerful 
progressive online organization, held what it referred to as “the first online primary of the 
modern age….to determine if there was consensus among MoveOn members for a candidate 
endorsement for the 2004 presidential contest.” For Trippi, this was an important opportunity 
to demonstrate the campaign’s online support – particularly given that it came in advance of 
the public release of the campaign’s second quarter fundraising numbers (which had Dean 
leading both Kerry and Edwards). As Nicco Mele (personal communication, July 29, 2008), 
the campaign’s Webmaster, explains: “Trippi was very focused, MoveOn became a critical 
focal point for Trippi and consequently for the whole campaign….the focus was to impress 
MoveOn, and attract MoveOn’s attention, and to win the MoveOn primary. It really just gave 
focus to the campaign.” Trippi not only saw the organizational strength of MoveOn given the 
317,647 members who voted, but construed, and subsequently framed, this as a key early 
metric for political journalists to judge the strength and support of the primary campaigns. 
Dean won with 43.87% of the vote in a field of nine. While this was short of the 50 percent 
threshold necessary to win the official endorsement of the organization, the primary received 
wide coverage. This included a New York Times (2003) editorial that noted the sheer scale 
of the online primary: “the virtual tally…would top the combined turnouts in Iowa, New 
Hampshire and South Carolina in 2000.” 
The campaign followed up its MoveOn primary victory with online fundraising events that 
both raised significant monies for the campaign and garnered an extraordinary amount of 
media attention. Journalists followed these events closely given their novelty: even during 
the summer of the 2003-2004 cycle fundraising online was not well developed as a campaign 
practice. While the campaign held many fundraising drives, a singular event in July received 
widespread press coverage and became canonic for many who believed the Internet 
revolutionized the political process. During a $2,000-a-plate fundraiser hosted by Vice 
President Dick Cheney the campaign posted a picture of the candidate eating a turkey 
sandwich on the Dean For America Website. Small donations poured in, and Dean out-raised 
Cheney by nearly $200,000. While the amount raised was spectacular for online fundraising 
at the time, as importantly Dean’s feat grabbed headlines on political pages throughout the 
country as awestruck journalists watched the campaign’s stunning success in online 
fundraising. Journalists construed this event as evidence for the innovative, and even 
revolutionary, nature of the campaign, and it became a cornerstone of subsequent campaign 
coverage. Furthermore, many journalists remarked on how they even had to change their 
reporting routines to accord with this new, online campaign (Srupp, 2003). 
This press attention, in turn, heightened the visibility of the candidate and the campaign. Part 
of the power of the idea of the open source campaign, meanwhile, was that it carried meaning 
in simultaneously technical, commercial, and political registers. As such, the campaign both 
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had wide appeal and supporters from different social and professional communities could 
imagine their electoral work in diverse ways. The developer volunteering for the Dean 
campaign, for instance, could see the processes and products of coding as a form of political 
action. Entrepreneurs could see a powerful demonstration of their profit-generating tools 
being put towards progressive and, ultimately, democratic ends. Political activists, 
meanwhile, could invest the often trudging and un-heroic work of politics with the veneer of 
countercultural computing, becoming the hackers of progressive politics as they used 
Meetups to organize their communities. All of which helped recruit specialized volunteers 
from among these constituencies, and constitute a broad-based political movement. 
The rhetorical construction of Dean’s electoral effort as an open source, techno-democratic 
movement helped create and mobilize key constituencies that were central to the campaign’s 
early success. Alongside the strategy of garnering general political press coverage for the 
campaign, for instance, staffers performed symbolic work to attract and motivate the youthful 
volunteers who could engage in specialized technical labor. For many of these supporters, the 
appeal of the Dean campaign lay in the larger socio-technical vision Trippi articulated, not 
just the narrow ends of applying new tools to win the primary. As Streeter and Teachout 
argue: “part of what made the campaign what it was, what attracted a slew of young Internet 
enthusiasts and created an iconoclastic sense of openness, an enthusiasm for experimentation, 
and a new sense of hope, was the way it became associated with the vision of new 
technology and a widespread fascination with the future (Teachout and Streeter, 2007, p. 
28).” In this sense, the campaign’s appeal transcended traditional political constituencies, just 
as staffers such as Rosen (personal communication, April 7, 2008) dropped out of college 
and joined the campaign to pursue the idea that you could “open source the org process.” 
On many levels, Internet Division staffers deliberately articulated this vision and crafted their 
appeals with this technically-skilled community in-mind. For example, the campaign 
developed a formal policy position in support of open source technologies in order to get 
covered on Slashdot, the large, collaborative group blog with the tagline “News for Nerds. 
Stuff That Matters.” Technology industry professionals, hackers, and computer enthusiasts, 
an important potential constituency for the campaign, constituted the core community of 
SlashDot. As Zephyr Teachout (July 10, 2008), the campaign’s Director of Internet 
Organizing, explained:  
we were using it to get Slashdotted. So, it is actually a story about political strategy, not 
about policy creation. It was not an open source created policy platform, it was a policy 
platform about open source…. Half the people who helped write it were wonderful 
lefty San Francisco technologists on the finance team…. I liked the policy, but this is 
not a radical democratic moment. Now, the reason it is radical and important, the 
serious point, is that issues that were otherwise completely off the charts are now 
suddenly important for lots of people. Because suddenly you are responsive to a new 
category of donors including the Slashdotters. And so then you care about things that 
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you didn’t previously care about. Which you wouldn’t have cared about if you were 
just doing high dollar donor stuff.4 
While this was a transactional relationship for the campaign, for the Slashdot community it 
was a validation that a major party presidential candidate heard their concerns. As a 
Slashdotter announced the news: “Regardless if you're for Dean, against Dean, or you're not 
an American, it's great to see an American politician on the national level using and 
promoting free software. I wonder if RMS [Richard Matthew Stallman] thought he'd see a 
U.S. presidential candidate releasing stuff under the GPL when he founded GNU 20 years 
ago! (Michael, 2003).” 
This strategy of appealing to communities on sites such as Slashdot to help garner fiscal and 
other support for Dean’s candidacy, and in the process reinforcing the symbolic validation of 
the Internet campaign, extended beyond technical communities. Given that the framing of the 
campaign had simultaneously technical, commercial, and political dimensions, so too did 
Dean’s advisors and staffers symbolically fashion their efforts as a new economy experiment, 
particularly to legitimate the campaign for political professionals. This is powerfully clear in 
Trippi’s recruiting of David Weinberger, the theorist, columnist, and marketing consultant, to 
serve as the Senior Internet Advisor for the campaign. Weinberger is the co-author of the 
popular dot.com business texts The ClueTrain Manifesto and Small Pieces Loosely Joined, 
books that Trippi made required reading for Internet Division staffers. As Weinberger 
(personal communication, November 21, 2008) describes it, when they were introduced, 
Trippi said he was “looking for a surrogate” to represent the campaign on a panel about the 
Internet and politics in Washington D.C. In this sense, Weinberger brought the cache of the 
new economy to the campaign, and provided a frame of reference for political elites to 
understand Dean’s new media innovations:  
My understanding is that he wanted presence because it was good for the 
campaign…part of the presentation of the campaign. Dean was an unknown governor. 
They wanted whatever publicity and credibility that they could get. So I would go on 
panels for him. 
Trippi also tasked Weinberger (personal communication, November 21, 2008) with 
“drumming up enthusiasm among some Internet people,” particularly those who were among 
the foremost interpreters of digital technologies and social and economic change. To this end, 
Weinberger created Dean’s “Net Advisory Net” (NAN) – an Internet policy group that 
included new media superstars such as Howard Rheingold, Lawrence Lessig, and Joi Ito, a 
prominent venture capitalist, blogger, and authority on the Web. While Dean’s collapse in 
February 2004 abbreviated the NAN’s work, it received considerable attention – particularly 
among bloggers – for the policy positions outlined in Dean’s “Statement of Internet 
Principles.” As a policy document, the Statement reflected the Silicon Valley professional 
and entrepreneurial milieu that the NAN members came from, particularly in the ways that it 
entangled commercial computing, deregulation, and social change. At the same time, 
                                                 
4 The specific policy in question was to release the software the campaign was developing 
under the GNU general public license. This was the Deanspace technology developed by 
Rosen based on Drupal. 
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reflecting the fact that open source was only construed in limited, electoral domains, there 
was no opportunity for public input in the NAN’s work. 
Staffers and advisers also blended the technical and commercial registers with the more 
general terms of democratic empowerment, also framing the campaign’s uptake of digital 
tools in terms of traditional social movement activities. As Trippi put it: "when you looked at 
him [Dean], you were going to think Internet and personal empowerment in the same way 
you thought Vietnam hero when you looked at John Kerry, or Southern optimism when you 
looked at John Edwards (Cornfield, 2004)." On one level, this quote reveals how Trippi 
wanted to fashion Dean into a symbol of the ways the Internet and the open source campaign 
allowed citizens to engage in political action. On another, Trippi connected personal 
empowerment to larger narratives of political community. Publicly citing books such as The 
ClueTrain Manifesto alongside Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone and Benjamin Barber’s 
Strong Democracy as the inspiration for the Dean campaign, Trippi argued that the Internet 
enabled citizens to overcome their alienation from the democratic process and band together 
to create new forms of political association.  
In framing the campaign in this way, Trippi strove to mobilize and motivate those supporters 
for whom the Internet and blogs were more tools for deeper engagement in the political 
process than revolutionary and transformative forces reshaping society. To this end, staffers 
integrated the rhetoric of empowerment into nearly all the campaign’s communications with 
supporters. For example, Dean’s Internet Division developed the insights of MoveOn to 
pioneer the genre of electoral emails – establishing a style that the Obama campaign 
subsequently adopted. As Kelly Nuxoll (personal communication, November 19, 2008), the 
e-mail manager for the campaign, describes, in communication with supporters the 
campaign’s style was to “never say ‘our’ campaign; say ‘your’ campaign.” Staffers used these 
rhetorical techniques to describe how supporters had ownership over the campaign while 
calling on them to take specific forms of action. This was especially so for Trippi, who was 
like a “muezzin” in his inspirational messages to supporters, particularly during fundraising 
appeals. As importantly, staffers adopted a personal style of address, signing their own names 
to emails, to mask the mass-ness of this communication. In doing so, these individuals 
attempted to create and foster feelings of intimacy toward the campaign among supporters 
and increase the likelihood they would become and remain involved. Thus, while e-mail 
communication was only one-way and thousands of people received the same message on a 
regular basis, even a former staffer to Vice President Gore confessed that: 
“We had a fabulous Web page, but basically it just sat there…We had a big e-mail 
network, but there wasn’t the real kind of segmentation that you would need to 
personalize e-mails and to make people feel like they were receiving something 
 special from the campaign." Conversely, with Dean’s campaign…"I feel like I have a 
personal relationship with Joe Trippi (Mack, 2004).” 
At the same time, staffers encouraged supporters to imagine they were participating in a 
revival of participatory democracy as they used the campaign’s Internet tools. The candidate 
himself proclaimed that "we are the great grassroots campaign of the modern era, made of 
mouse pads, shoe leather and hope (Cone, 2003).” In the process, Dean cast Internet-
supported political action as an extension of earlier campaign tactics, such as wearing down 
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shoe leather going door to door for candidates. Meanwhile, supporters responded by donating 
money online, commenting on blogs, and using Meetup to organize their communities. For 
example, leveraging the power of MeetUp, the campaign turned out over 138,000 volunteers 
at 820 locations nationwide to work for the candidate on November 4th, well in advance of 
any primary. All of which translated into incredible supporter engagement in the campaign – 
and deep feelings of ownership and collective identity that translated into active and ongoing 
support. 
 
Conclusion 
Dean’s star rose throughout the summer of 2003, culminating in a $200,000 ten-city, four-
day “Sleepless Summer Tour.” This was the high point of the campaign, when Dean’s 
nomination looked likely to even the most jaded political professionals. In grand style, Dean 
flew the “Grassroots Express” to states that were only important in the general election. At 
stops along the tour journalists marveled at the “staggering, seemingly spontaneous crowds” 
(Wilgoren, 2003) and, above all, the power of the Internet that seemingly made it all 
possible. That was the high point of the campaign. As the improbable frontrunner throughout 
the fall and winter, Dean was a target for his rivals and the press. Dean made their job easier 
with a series of gaffes, and the campaign ended up losing control of the press narrative Trippi 
had so assiduously cultivated. 
These missteps were, perhaps, minor compared to what many staffers roundly described as a 
larger breakdown in the campaign’s management at all levels. One significant failure was the 
on-the-ground field effort in the crucial state of Iowa. In the days before the caucuses the 
campaign devoted much of its resources to massive television advertising outlays that many 
supporters and campaign hands alike described as ineffective, and which nearly bankrupted 
the campaign. However, this may have been the only option left to the campaign at that 
point. Ironically, for all the vaunted Internet-based applications, field staffers lacked very 
basic tools for getting out the vote. As Adam Mordecai (personal communication, January 
23, 2008), an Iowa field staffer, describes it: “Field operations were a total disaster on the 
technology front.” The unique challenges Iowa poses for presidential campaigns, with its 
complicated caucus process and deeply entrenched local traditions, only exacerbated the 
situation. The campaign had no ‘precinct captains’ in half of the Iowa districts and only an 
outdated list of volunteers who had signed up online. With few local volunteers, the 
campaign drew on its significant national support on college campuses, in urban areas, and 
on the coasts in a last ditch “perfect storm” effort, sending 3,500 mostly out of state 
volunteers into Iowa wearing orange hats. The strategy was flawed on a number of levels. 
Not only do Iowans expect local volunteers to contact them, the campaign lacked the basic 
infrastructure to manage and deploy these volunteers. Dean placed third in the caucuses, and 
weeks later he withdrew from the nomination race. 
 While Dean’s downfall suggests that the campaign’s technical and organizational 
innovations did not translate into electoral success, they were hardly insignificant. Drawing 
on models of open source technical production, Dean’s Internet Division staffers used the 
Internet as an organizational tool, decentralizing much fundraising, voter outreach, and even 
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technical development for the first time in a political campaign. Inspired by the collaborative 
ideals of the open source movement, and provided with an organizational space for 
innovation given the need to find resources for the outsider candidate, these staffers built and 
deployed a new set of digital campaign tools that enabled supporters to participate in these 
tasks. As such, the Dean campaign reveals how open source provides a set of value-laden 
practices that can be incorporated into domains far afield of technical projects such as Linux.  
And yet, even as open source guided the internal organizational practices of many of Dean’s 
technically-skilled staffers, it was also a cultural resource that staffers deployed 
instrumentally outside of the campaign for electoral gain. Articulated within narratives of the 
new economy and participatory democracy, the framing of Dean’s campaign as an open 
source and radically techno-democratic movement provided an interpretative framework for 
journalists to understand Dean’s run. It legitimated many of the campaign’s innovations, 
while attracting an extraordinary amount of press coverage. Framing the campaign’s uptake 
of the Internet in technical, commercial, and political registers also appealed to multiple 
constituencies, helping the campaign attract and motivate supporters to perform high-end 
technical labor, donate money, and talk to voters. And yet, even as symbolic work around the 
Internet helped the campaign garner resources and become the center of the political world, it 
may also have led Dean away from the nomination. As Jascha Franklin Hodge (personal 
communication, December 22, 2008), Dean’s National Systems Administrator and co-
founder of the firm that provided much of the online infrastructure for Obama’s campaign, 
argues: 
 there was a bit of a bubble in which a lot of the online volunteers operated.…The 
movement became self-referential to a degree that was probably not healthy for any 
movement. People became so enamored with the idea of what it was that they were 
doing that they sometimes lost the macro-political perspective that is necessary to 
actually get out there and win. 
As Hodge suggests, to the extent that staffers and volunteers understood and experienced 
their online work for Dean as a transformative new way of practicing politics, it may have 
distracted from necessary and difficult on-the-ground electoral activities. This, in turn, 
suggests how open source can work ideologically to elide dynamics of power in 
collaborative, networked forms of organization. While supporters imagined their 
participation in backend electoral tasks as their taking part in a radically democratic 
movement fueling Dean’s run, it became painfully clear after Iowa that the formal campaign 
organization maintained authority over the key strategy, allocative, and management 
decisions that ultimately determined Dean’s electoral prospects. 
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The Internet Age has brought with it unprecedented access to textual, audio, and audiovisual 
information via networked computers. While computer software manufacturers and 
traditional media corporations profited tremendously from these new technologies, they 
almost immediately began forms of legal pushback against rear-guard actions by consumers 
who attempted to expand the availability of this information in ways that threatened 
copyright and other forms of intellectual property. The initial rise of distribution software 
such as Napster and Gnutella in the late 1990’s, for instance, allowed consumers to freely 
distribute copyrighted music and posed a major threat to the recorded music industry before 
they were ultimately disbanded or transformed into legitimate music sellers as a result of 
court action. These initial battles between computer or audiovisual media companies and 
consumers were symptomatic of the challenges to traditional notions of intellectual property 
in an era of digitalization and media convergence. 
In the shadow of these high-profile battles over information distribution via computer 
networks, a small group of dedicated computer programmers and technology enthusiasts 
have been expanding the limitations of proprietary information systems by rewriting those 
systems to fit their own needs. Beneath the radar of the mainstream media in the pages of 
technology-oriented periodicals, online blogs, and Internet chat rooms, a group of libertarian-
minded programmers have joined a debate about how to short-circuit the rising tide of 
closed, proprietary computer code which administers the functions of computers and their 
interactions in cyberspace (Lessig, 2000). The free, open source software (FOSS) movement 
has countered the computer market dominance of corporations like Microsoft and Apple by 
developing and/or encouraging the distribution of alternatives to these closed systems. Some 
of the most successful efforts of this movement have been a rival computer operating system 
(Linux) and other open source software alternatives that are distributed freely over the 
Internet. 
This essay provides a brief overview of the FOSS movement, focusing specially on the 
development of the GNU/Linux operating system in the 1990’s and the creation of a new 
copyright regime to prevent the privatization and corporatization of this new operating 
system. I argue that a number of indicators point to the emergence of a social movement 
surrounding free, open source software advocacy. First, advocacy of open source software 
has expanded beyond the relatively small community of software programmers (or 
“hackers”) who are intimately familiar with the UNIX and other programming languages to 
encompass a larger group of non-expert users and related-organizations. Second, the interests 
of FOSS advocates have begun to merge and overlap with the interests of the free 
culture/digital commons advocates in the past half decade, with increasing cross-fertilization 
across these two groups. While posing a direct challenge to existing copyright regimes 
through its emphasis on the commons, open source software development also marks a 
profound shift away from the dominant mode of capital accumulation points toward new 
modes of cultural production that emphasize collaboration and communal property 
ownership. The production of this software by “hackers” – individuals who write computer 
programs and other code and who are outsiders to institutionalized and corporatized forms of 
software production – also offers a glimpse into a new form of cultural production which 
exists outside of the boundaries of the wage labor system. 
Finally, the initial impetus for the free software movement – preserving the ability of end 
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users to modify and redistribute computer software to suit their individual needs – has shifted 
to encompass a wider array of issues such as free speech and digital commons advocacy. 
These issues more closely align the current aims of FOSS with more free culture and digital 
rights initiatives, suggesting the emergence of a larger umbrella movement for cultural and 
software freedom on the horizon. While I will argue that FOSS advocacy can be regarded as 
a social justice movement, it should be acknowledged that the identity of this emerging 
movement is still in flux and there are a number of actors and organizations whose interests 
in FOSS and in digital freedom in general either overlap or at times conflict.  
 
Defining Movements for Social Justice 
This essay makes two, inter-related claims: first, that FOSS is a social movement and, 
second, that this movement can be broadly identified as a movement centered aroung core 
social justice issues. The definitions of these two core concepts will be briefly explored in 
order to lay the groundwork for the later discussion of the FOSS movement and its links with 
social justice values. There is a vast body of theory and research into social movements 
within political sociology, which has approached the definition of social movements from a 
number of different perspectives (Diani, 2000, p. 157). Turner and Killian (1957, p. 223), for 
instance, conceptualized social movements broadly as “a collectivity acting with some 
continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or organization of which it is a part.” 
This definition accounted for the presence of “movement organizations” but was not 
necessarily synonymous with them (in other words, social movements can exist and thrive 
without existing bureaucratic organizations to represent their interests or support their goals). 
A second, highly influential strand in theorizing social movements called “Resource 
Mobilization Theory” (RMT) focused similar attention on social collectivities, but 
emphasized the special role of organizations and their importance in securing resources for 
the perpetuation of social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & McCarthy, 2002).  
While each of these conceptualizations of social movements places a slightly different 
emphasis on the construction and maintenance of these movements, they all share these 
fundamental components: collective or joint action; change-oriented goals (or the expression 
of these goals at the very least); some degree of organization or non-institutional collective 
action; and some degree of “temporal continuity” (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004, p. 6). For 
the purposes of discussion the FOSS movement, therefore, the following definition will be 
used: 
“Social movements can be thought of as collectivities acting with some degree of 
organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the 
purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or 
culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which 
they are a part” (Snow et al., 2004, p. 11; Emphasis in original). 
This conceptualization of social movements is broad and inclusive, referring to collectivities 
that are both highly bureaucratized and also more anarchic and diffuse. The FOSS movement 
is more on the diffuse end of the spectrum in terms of its organization, but it satisfies one of 
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the primary criteria of Snow, et. al.’s definition: it poses a challenge to “extant authority”. In 
the case of FOSS, as I will demonstrate below, the authority in question is represented by the 
corporatization of proprietary computer software along with the restrictive copyright regimes 
which perpetuate these closed-source software projects.  
A number of social movement scholars have further specified the processes by which social 
movements are created and sustained over time, citing not only access to material resources 
(such as labor, capital, and communication links) but also the types of ideas which serve to 
define and mobilize these movements (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & 
Sasson, 1992; Snow, 2004; Snow & Benford, 1988). This “framing” perspective 
views movements as signifying agents engaged in the production and maintenance of 
meaning for protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders. Like local governments, the 
state, representatives of the authority structures, the media, and interested publics, 
social movements are regarded as being embroiled in ‘the politics of signification’” 
(Snow, 2004, p. 384). 
Framing describes the process by which actors in a social movement “assign meaning to and 
interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize political 
adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to mobilize antagonists” (Snow 
& Benford, 1988, p. 198). The public articulation of these “collective action frames”, argues 
Snow (2004), can have a transformative effect for a social movement in the sense that it 
defines the meaning of the movement for both insiders and outsiders, thereby providing the 
movement with a sense of identity and group cohesion. Framing directs scholars’ attention 
not only to the internal discourses among members of social movements about their own 
activities and motivations, but also to the rhetoric in the media about these movements. In 
fact, as the case of FOSS will demonstrate, attracting the attention of the press is often a 
critical strategy for social movements to gain traction and achieve their goals, though 
inexperience and naivete when dealing with the media can sometimes backfire and hurt the 
movement’s image and viability (see Gitlin, 2003 for a powerful example of this). 
Movements for social justice operate as a particular subset of the types of social movements 
described above. What distinguishes these movements from other types of single-issue ones 
is that they adhere to a set of broad principles that result in a diversity of causes and 
missions. In general, social justice refers to a broad-based cultural, political, and economic 
egalitarianism with a redistributive urge as its ideological centerpiece. Liberal philosopher 
John Rawls’ two-pronged definition of justice provides the conceptual foundation for modern 
notions of social justice. Rawls (1999, p. 48) argued in 1951 that the concept of justice 
required the satisfaction of two basic principles: 
First, each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the 
most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all; and second, inequalities are 
arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s 
advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which 
they may be gained, are open to all. These principles express justice as a complex of 
three ideas: liberty, equality, and reward for services contributing to the common good. 
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The overriding notion here is that justice is defined by the greatest possible equality for each 
individual person, which can only be trumped when the a greater common good is achieved. 
Building upon this notion of justice, Bradley (1996, p. 373) describes social justice as “the 
directing and shaping of society’s laws and institutions (e.g., the economy, medical care, 
social systems, unemployment insurance, etc.) to achieve an equal level of fairness and just 
treatment for all members of society; a system in which just conduct within a society toward 
all members of that society is guided by moral principles of truth, reason, justice and 
fairness.” As I will argue below, the increasing encroachment of digital copyright and the 
anti-competitive nature of proprietary vendor lock-in strategies in the software market work 
against these social justice aims and have become the targets of FOSS activism for change. 
 
FOSS “Hacktivism” and Technological Social Movements 
There is a small but growing corpus of research on technology-centered social movements, 
including FOSS movements. For instance, Dorothy Kidd (2003) has chronicled the 
development of Indymedia.org, a website which operates as a digital commons and source of 
alternative media coverage of events that are important to progressive causes such as 
environmental reform and anti-globalization (see also Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004). 
Similarly, other scholars have noted the efforts of advocacy groups to utilize technology in 
order to thwart the goals of post-industrial capitalism (Witheford, 1997; Wright, 2004).  
These are, of course, examples of technology use among advocates and social movements to 
achieve non-technological aims: to expand awareness of social issues, to galvanize the public 
for action, and to affect change. The case for FOSS as a social movement exemplar has been 
muted by the work of several scholars who have studied specific FOSS communities and 
found them to be mostly apolitical in the traditional sense (Coleman, 2004; Weber, 2004). 
More specifically, open source software developers and hackers are chiefly interested in 
utilitarianism – making sure that the technology is freely available and able to be altered to 
suit their own individual needs and desires (Raymond, 2001), irrespective of larger debates 
about intellectual property rights or freedom of speech. That the broader FOSS movement is 
not necessarily “political” in nature (in other words, closely involved with electoral politics 
or grassroots political organizing), at least in the United States, does not negate its presence 
as a force on issues such as digital software rights and digital commons advovacy. 
In fact, a number of scholars who have conducted in-depth observational analyses of FOSS 
communities have discovered myraid ways in which these collectives have become 
politically mobilized. Perhaps the most pervasive politicized aspect of FOSS collectives is 
simply what we might term “FOSS evangelism” - encouraging individuals, organizations, 
and governments to adopt open source software alternatives. McInerney (2009), for example, 
cataloged the development and expansion of the “circuit riders”, a group of politically 
progressive computer enthusiasts who in 1996 began offering technology expertise and 
consulting to nonprofit grantees of the W. Alton Jones Foundation. As McInerney (2009, p. 
214) writes, these “circuit riders bring F/OSS into their field-level politics by making claims 
on behalf of the software platform, associating certain ideals of the open source platform 
with certain ideals of the nonprofit sector.” Likewise, Hess (2005) concluded that the open 
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source movement worked toward a wholesale shift in property ownership from private-sector 
firms to non-profit and public sector entities. 
Some scholars have investigated FOSS communities as labor forces, emphasizing their 
distinction from traditional wage-labor theories of value and potential for radically altering 
the balance of power between capital and intellectual labor (Banks & Humphreys, 2008; 
Dafermos & Söderberg, 2009; Söderberg, 2008). Similarly, though from the perspective of 
economic analysis, others have noted the unique “networked” characteristics of FOSS labor 
practices, which has institutionalized new, decentralized forms of value creation that are 
more strategically nimble and ultimately more innovative than traditional institutionalized 
forms of capital creation (Benkler, 2006; Von Hippel, 2005, 2009). 
 
The Problem: Proprietary Software, Bundling, and Vendor Lock-In 
Most computer users today regularly utilize proprietary software to help operate those 
computers and perform a myriad number of useful tasks with them. Most of the world’s 
computers run some version of the Windows operating system (see Figure 1 below), with a 
much smaller percentage running Apple’s Mac OS X operating system. Linux, the open 
source alternative to these operating systems, makes up only a tiny fraction of the overall 
total. Microsoft’s dominant position in the industry is not necessarily a sign of the popularity 
of its information products – in fact, Microsoft’s Windows Vista operating system has been 
much maligned in the popular press, becoming a kind of corporate albatross which the 
company hopes to remedy with the most recent release of Windows 7 in 2009. The factors 
most responsible for the ubiquity of proprietary software have to do with the outsized 
influence the companies that manufacture this software enjoy and their close ties with other 
market players to effectively “bind” the software together in packages for sale to consumers. 
For instance, the Windows operating system is often the default operating system included on 
new computers that are sold to consumers because of pre-existing business relationships 
between Microsoft and computer hardware manufacturers like Hewlett-Packard and Dell. 
Along with this operating system bundling, Microsoft bundles its own internet browser 
(called Internet Explorer) in the operating system itself, thereby encouraging end users to 
utilize this browser by default when they start up the computer for the first time. 
This practice is potentially harmful to consumers because it denies them the opportunity to 
decide whether or not to purchase a specific operating system or software package, and it 
makes the potential cost of changing to another software application more difficult because 
of potential incompatibilities with other types of software. Moreover, deals between 
companies to bundle materials for the customer can thwart market competition, because the 
choice of which product to purchase is taken out of the hands of the consumer and placed in 
the hands of the companies making cooperative arrangements in advance of manufacturing 
and distribution to the market. Since so few end users actually modify the default settings of 
their computers, these actions by technology firms may constitute a de facto form of 
regulation (Shah & Sandvig, 2008). This last problem was one of the major anti-competitive 
practices which resulted in the U.S. Department of Justice’s investigation of Microsoft in the 
late 1990’s (McGowan, 2005) 
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Figure 1. Operating System Use in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The proprietary model of bundling software and hardware applications together for sale to 
consumers has begun to extend far beyond the computer industries into other media 
industries as well. Faced with dwindling audience share for mainstream media outlets like 
broadcast and cable television, as well as broadcast radio, media corporations have turned 
increasingly to the Internet to try to re-connect with past audiences and to colonize new ones. 
The problem faced by these companies is that they have had to compete with the sheer 
enormity of offerings available on the Web, many of which have been created by other 
Internet users. Easy distribution of copyrighted content via peer-to-peer file sharing also 
makes the Internet a somewhat unlikely partner for traditional media firms. The solution 
media conglomerates have found for the convergence and digitalization of copyrighted 
content is to slowly absorb important distribution channels on the Internet and then begin to 
exert control over the kinds of information that are found there. This has already happened 
with the popular video-sharing website YouTube, for instance, which was purchased by new 
media giant Google, and MySpace, which was purchased by Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation. The consequence of these moves is the artificial fencing off of separate, 
proprietary realms on the Internet and through software programs that are increasingly 
necessary to productively interface with the Internet.  
This effort of media companies to create these artificial barriers has been likened to a 
“second enclosure movement,” referring to the practice of taking public lands and handing 
them to private interests for commercial exploitation (Boyle, 2008, p. 45). This first 
“enclosure” movement occurred during the emergence of capitalism in feudal Europe, 
resulting in 
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the transformation of the European agricultural system from production for use to 
production for exchange...Throughout Europe, the mercantilist states enacted laws 
privatizing the village commons and depriving the peasantry if its means of subsistence, 
forcing many into wage labor. The enclosures movement, therefore, involved 
tendencies that brought both land and labor into the realm of commodity production. 
(Bettig, 1997, p. 138) 
The goal of restricting access to hitherto public lands was twofold: to amass surplus 
production for the purposes of exchange and to create incentives for wealthy landowners to 
invest in new aqueducts and irrigation systems in order to maximize the productive potential 
of these lands. The artificial creation of private property was intended to ward off the so-
called “tragedy of the commons,” in which lands left to the common interest would lie fallow 
and under-utilized (thereby endangering the full economic potential of such lands) (Boyle, 
2003). 
The “second” enclosure of information materials a trend that has deep historical roots, tracing 
all the way back to the invention of the printing press, when monarchs began granting 
exclusive licenses to printers for specific types of documents, often appropriating as 
proprietary certain plays, poems, and songs that had been popularly available (Bettig, 1992; 
Eisenstein, 1979) This shift – defining information and intellectual products as property akin 
to land – became the core of English copyright law, which was transferred to the American 
colonies in the 1800’s. More recently, the reach of copyright was extended to computer 
software in the Computer Software Act of 1980, which characterized computer source code 
as “a form of writing” and thereby subject to intellectual property protections (M. E. 
Johnson, 1994). This law opened the floodgates for the enclosure of computer programming 
during the deregulatory zeal of the 1980’s. Writing in his 1981 book Who Knows, critical 
scholar Herbert Schiller expressed alarm at the enormous sums of taxpayer funds which were 
poured into research and development in areas such as microcomputing and nuclear power, 
only to see the outcomes of those project immediately transferred to the private sphere. These 
public investments, spurred by Cold War fears, became the private intellectual property of 
Fortune 500 corporations and deprived the public of the benefits of these government-funded 
programs. In Schiller’s (1981, p. 56) words, “The private attack is characterized by an 
insistence that information is a commodity and that those who wish to use it should pay for 
it.” In the 1990’s, the equation of computer software with intellectual property had become so 
ingrained in the legal and political discourse that protecting copyrighted material over the 
Internet emerged as one of the major cornerstones of efforts such as the Clinton 
Administration’s National Information Infrastructure (NII) (Bettig, 1997) 
While the rigorous protection of intellectual property may have spurred new innovations in 
technology, there are numerous potential dangers here for democratic citizenship, the most 
glaring of which is freedom of speech: 
As culture increasingly becomes fenced off and privatized, it becomes all the more 
important for us to be able to comment on the images, ideas, and words that saturate us 
on a daily basis—without worrying about an expensive, though meritless, lawsuit. The 
right to express one’s views is what makes these “copy fights” first and foremost a free-
speech issue. Unfortunately, many intellectual-property owners and lawyers see 
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copyright only as an economic issue (McLeod, 2005, p. 8) 
There are numerous recent examples in which the types of “copy fights” that McLeod 
mentions have boiled over onto the pages of the mainstream media. For instance, users of the 
Amazon.com’s e-book reader, The Kindle, were outraged in July 2009 when the company 
surreptitiously deleted copies of books that users had already purchased due to a disputed 
licensing agreement with the estate of the author (B. Johnson, 2009; Stone, 2009). In this 
case, digital content that end users believed that they owned was re-claimed and deleted by 
Amazon. This copyright tussle was fraught with ironic overtones because the titles that were 
deleted from users’ Kindles were books by George Orwell such as 1984 and Animal Farm. 
Although the company subsequently apologized and agreed to restore the books to readers’ 
Kindle devices, the incident vividly demonstrated the pitfalls of vendor lock-in for the digital 
distribution of media content. Apple’s iTunes software and proprietary audio encoding codec 
(AAC) also exemplifies an attempt to lock users into a particular content delivery system: 
Apple’s iTunes store. Even though other hardware manufacturers such as Palm have 
attempted to link their hardware devices (such as the Palm Pre smartphone) to Apple’s 
iTunes, Apple’s has continually modified its software through updates to prevent this linkage, 
thereby protecting the locked-in nature of the software and hardware ecosystem which is a 
key profit center for the company (Ganapati, 2009). These are but a few examples of issues 
of information control and copyright protection that have proprietary software is designed to 
support. What alternatives, if any, exist to these closed information ecosystems?  
 
What is Free, Open Source Software? 
Despite of the growing popularity of free, open source software in the last 15 years as viable 
alternatives to proprietary programs, the concept of open source is unfamiliar to most. What I 
mean by “free, open source software” is software that reveals its source code to the user. 
Software source code is computer programming language that any experienced user can read 
and understand, and therefore also manipulate and change. Much of the computer software 
on the market today, including widely-used productivity software such as the Microsoft 
Office suite and operating systems such as Windows and Mac OS X are closed or proprietary 
software – they do not allow end users to modify the programs to improve them or 
personalize their uses (indeed, this is also strictly forbidden in the software’s “End User 
License Agreement”, or EULA). The notion of free software originated with an MIT 
computer programmer Richard Stallman (or RMS, the initials of his name which formed his 
login password to the MIT computer systems). Stallman had been working at MIT during the 
formative years of the 1970’s, when other computer programmers or “hackers” were 
experimenting heavily with Unix-based systems and developing software tools which were 
passed around among users, who admired the skill in writing the code and suggested further 
improvements (Levy, 1984). Although the term “hacker” has become something of a 
pejorative, referring to dangerous individual who break into secure computer systems in 
order to steal valuable data, its “old” meaning from the 1970’s and 1980’s was quite a 
positive one, referring to a technologically savvy, intelligent individual who worked against a 
centralized authority and the rigid enforcement of property boundaries (Coleman & Golub, 
2008) As Nissenbaum explains about the early hacker movement, 
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If there is something political that ties together these descendents of early hackers, it is 
protest – protest against encroaching systems of total order where control is complete, 
and dissent is dangerous. These hackers defy the tendencies of established powers to 
overreach and exploit without accountability. With their specialized skills, they resist 
private enclosure and work to preserve open and popular access to online resources, 
which they consider a boon to humanity. Ornery and irreverent, they represent a degree 
of freedom, an escape hatch from a system that threatens to become overbearing. (2004, 
p. 212) 
Stallman and other programmers at MIT embodied these anti-authoritarian and 
communitarian ideals in the work that they performed on the university’ computer systems. 
Each time one programmer came up with a useful program (or “hack”), it was quickly 
distributed to others who would read and admire the code, and then promptly altered it to 
create new software programs that fulfilled another utilitarian need. 
The camaraderie and communitarian ethos at the MIT lab began to unravel, however, when 
the U.S. Department of Defense became interested in utilizing these projects to develop its 
own applications, insisting that these software projects become closed to outsiders to protect 
national security. Additionally, private companies became less interested in sharing their 
source code with university programmers and computer science students since new business 
models for software were emerging, and many of the best minds at these universities were 
being hired by these firms (one of which was Bill Gates’ fledgling startup company called 
Microsoft). 
Stallman worked to preserve the “hacker ethic” he had once experienced at MIT by resigning 
his position there in 1984 and devoting himself to the advocacy of what he called “free 
software”. Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation (FSF) as a non-profit 
organization which would be able to support the development of free software projects. Free 
software, according to Stallman’s vision and the tenets of the Free Software Foundation, is 
comprised of four essential freedoms (Free Software Foundation, 2009a): 
 The freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom 0).  
 The freedom to study how the program works, and change it to make it do what you 
wish (freedom 1). Access to the source code is a precondition for this.  
 The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor (freedom 2).  
 The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements (and modified 
versions in general) to the public, so that the whole community benefits (freedom 3). 
Access to the source code is a precondition for this.  
In essence, then, free software allows users to run, copy, distribute, and change or improve 
existing software without being prevented from doing so by the originator of the software. 
This does not mean, however, that financial transactions are anathema to the free software 
movement: in Stallman’s words, “free” simply meant free as in free speech, not as in free 
beer. In fact, some of the earliest businesses to be created around open source software 
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offered technical support for these tools; something which Stallman himself strongly 
supported. While software companies sometimes charge users money to download and install 
open source software, most free software projects today are distributed without cost to users 
on the Internet, which makes them particularly attractive to computer users in developing 
countries with few financial resources to spend on computer software.  
The primary distinction between proprietary software development and that of volunteer, 
networked hackers has been beautifully explained by hacker activist Eric S. Raymond as the 
distinction between “cathedrals” and “bazaars” (2001). Raymond argued that proprietary 
software is designed from the top-down to meet a specific set of goal identified by a few 
senior managers or organizational figureheads, with the only involvement from the public or 
market emerging when the information product has been fully completed. This is the 
cathedral model. In contrast, open source hacker communities offer an organizational model 
more akin to a bazaar, where individual programmers work simultaneously on different, and 
sometimes interrelated, projects with little or no supervision or input from any centralized 
authority. Often, programmers are motivated to write pieces of software code to satisfy a 
particular need of the moment, such as allowing a specific peripheral device such as a printer 
or scanner to work with another type of operating software. The quality of the finished 
product is then judged collectively by the hackers who download and use the software, who 
then may in turn offer suggestions, file bug reports, or even improve on the code themselves 
and upload the results of their efforts for other hackers to see. Raymond’s notion of the 
bazaar suggests that the more programmers choose to work on software code and improve it, 
the better the ultimate quality of the code will be (and the quicker it will be debugged). 
Participation in open source software projects, therefore, is voluntary. In his overview of the 
sociology of the open source movement, Weber (2004, p. 62) notes that “the key element of 
the open source process, as an ideal type, is voluntary participation and voluntary selection of 
tasks. Anyone can join an open source project, and anyone can leave at any time....There is 
no consciously organized or enforced division of labor.” Voluntary participation, however, 
does not mean that open source projects are anarchic and aimless. Instead, many open source 
projects work continuously and often swiftly toward a common set of goals and purposes that 
are mutually agreed upon by the project participants.1 
Stallman’s orientation to free software was about more than preserving the collaborative 
atmosphere among computer scientists at MIT. Instead, his definition of free software 
outlined the philosophical underpinnings of a larger social movement to transform the tools 
which were to become vital conduits of commerce, information, and artistic expression. As 
Weber (2004, p. 47) describes: 
Software for [Stallman] was not just a tool to run computers. It ultimately was a 
manifestation of human creativity and expression...Traditional, exclusionary property 
                                                 
1 The exact nature of collaboration among open source software developers is the subject of a good deal of 
sociological work.  The form of these collaborations range widely from loose adhocrasies to sophisticated 
democratic projects (such as Debian) with mutually-agreed upon rules for development of software.  Finally, 
some open source projects, like the development of the Linux kernel, are essentially benign dictatorships in that 
they are controlled centrally by a single developer (in this case, Linux founder Linus Torvalds) who personally 
selects each and every individual who contributes to the development of the project. 
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rights do not incentivize people to write good software, as mainstream intellectual 
property rights law would have it. Rather, imposing traditional property rights on 
software makes ‘pirates’ out of neighbors who want to help each other. 
Stallman’s notion here is that digitized information and computer software is not simply 
utilitarian but is instead an outgrowth of the creative capacities of human beings. 
Additionally, as social creatures, it is part of our inherent nature to form collectives and to 
cooperate. These fundamental aspects of the human experience, however, have been 
artificially curtailed by the restrictive code that is inserted into proprietary software, making 
“pirates” out of “neighbors”. 
Stallman’s emphasis on re-invigorating a sense of common good via artistic and other 
cultural expression has become the philosophical foundation for the larger “free culture” 
movement. Indeed, Lawrence Lessig (2004), one of the most visible proponents of the free 
culture movement, credits Stallman as the primary inspiration for his concept of free culture. 
In a passage which directly channels Stallman’s thinkings, he writes: “The opposite of a free 
culture is a permission culture’ — a culture in which creators get to create only with the 
permission of the powerful, or of creators from the past” (Lessig, 2004, p. xiv). Likewise, 
some scholars have associated Stallman’s exhortation to retain access to computer source 
code as a fundamental push to protect freedom of speech from government and corporate 
control. As anthropologist Chris Kelty (2008, p. 8) argues, “Coding, hacking, patching, 
sharing, compiling, and modifying of software are forms of political action that now 
routinely accompany familiar political forms of expression like free speech, assembly, 
petition, and a free press. Such activities are expressive in ways that conventional political 
theory and social science do not recognize: they can both express and ‘implement’ ideas 
about the social and moral order of society.” The FSF argues, therefore, that FOSS 
movements encompass a much broader range of social and political issues such as 
information access and control. 
 
GNU and Linux 
Stallman’s goal, through the FSF, was to develop an entirely free computer operating system 
which could be downloaded, utilized, and changed by anyone. Stallman’s training was in the 
Unix operating system, one of the most widely used operating systems for large mainframe 
computers at universities and government laboratories at the time. The problem, however, 
was that Unix was a proprietary operating system (owned at the time by AT&T) and could 
not be distributed to other users without the threat of copyright infringement. Stallman and a 
group of programmers therefore took it upon themselves to begin re-writing the Unix 
operating system from scratch, one application at a time. Between the 1985-1992 period, they 
succeeded in replacing almost every Unix application that programmers relied upon. 
Stallman playfully referred to this new collection of programs as GNU, which stood for 
“GNU’s Not Unix” - a recursive acronym. Despite the usefulness and popularity of some of 
these re-configured programs among computer hackers and enthusiasts, they remained a 
loose collection of applications that did not cohere together as a full operating system. It was 
a young Finnish computer science student named Linus Torvalds who in 1991 actually 
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finished the GNU operating system by creating the kernel for a version of Unix called Minix 
(Weber, 2004, pp. 54-55) Armed with his new operating system, which he dubbed “Linux,” 
along with Stallman’s GNU tools, he began to distribute an entirely free operating system 
which would develop throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s into a viable alternative to Windows 
and other proprietary operating systems. 
 
Legal Foundations for Open Source: The GPL & Free Speech 
Many FOSS projects, including GNU/Linux, have progressed beyond simple “adhocrasies” 
and bazaar-style organizations to create sophisticated institutional structures of their own. 
These infrastructures have not only regularized the development of open source software, but 
have also provided an organizing structure for nascent FOSS social and political movements. 
A critical aspect of new organizational self-awareness is the self-definition of Linux hackers, 
FOSS developers, and open source software users as free speech advocates in opposition to 
the closed, proprietary software that is in widespread use on personal computers today. The 
legal cornerstone of free speech in open source software communities is the GPL, or GNU 
General Public License. Stallman’s vision for new technologies free from the confines of 
proprietary software would have been only an idealistic fantasy if it attempted to survive 
under existing copyright regimes. Consequently, Stallman initiated a substitute system for 
copyrighting software. Rather than protect the property rights of the individual creator, 
Stallman’s version turns the notion of copyright (which links specific lines of computer code 
with individual property) on its head by keeping software in the public domain in perpetuity, 
something that he playfully refers to as “copyleft”. In essence, the GPL ensured that the four 
essential software freedoms would remain intact whenever free software was modified and 
redistributed by other users. If the end user decides to change GPL-protected software and 
distribute that new software code to others, then another provision of the open source 
definition comes into play: that individual must be distributed under the same terms as the 
original software, that is, with the source code revealed and the opportunity for those new 
users to modify and redistribute the software (Open Source Initiative, 2009). It also 
prevented users from adding proprietary software to GPL’d software and then obtaining a 
restrictive license for the newly-created program, making it impossible to “combine a free 
program with a non free program unless the entire combination is then released as free 
software under the GPL” (Free Software Foundation, 2009b; Weber, 2004). The GPL was a 
major innovation in Stallman’s battle with multinational corporations like AT&T (which 
owned the rights to the Unix operating system) since it turned “copyright law against itself, 
limiting its reach and carving out a legally protected zone to build and protect the public 
domain” (Bollier, 2008, p. 30) 
The GPL and the attempt to redirect the restrictive practices of copyright law as it pertained 
to computer software was the first step in expanding the boundaries of free speech beyond 
the specific interests of computer hackers to encompass much broader concerns about the 
restriction of culture in a networked society. By creating a legal alternative to copyright, 
Stallman “provided the rudiments of a rival liberal legal vocabulary of freedom, which 
hackers would eventually appropriate and transform to include a more specific language of 
free speech” (Coleman, 2009, p. 424). Increasingly, open source communities are also 
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becoming more sophisticated in their facility with the legalities of copyright law, becoming 
ersatz copyright lawyers in their use of various software licensing schemes in order to 
challenge the existing intellectual property regimes. As Coleman (2009, p. 421) explains in 
her overview of legal and political activism among FOSS developers, “developers construct 
new legal meanings by challenging the idea of software as property and by crafting new free 
speech theories to defend this idea of software as speech.” In particular, Coleman describes 
how new developers for Debian, a version of the Linux operating system and the largest open 
source software project in the world, must complete an extensive application which asks 
them detailed questions about different sorts of software licenses under the GPL, including 
how to “correct” some existing software licenses to being them into compliance with the 
Debian Free Software Guidelines (DFSG) or the GPL. These practices not only maintain the 
integrity of the Debian operating system, but they also help to form a coherent social 
movement by “transforming technologists into informal legal scholars who are experts in the 
legal technicalities of FOSS as well as proficient in the current workings of intellectual 
property law” (Coleman, 2009, p. 422)  
Along with these activities among hacker communities, a number of key non-profit 
organizations have taken shape in the last 15 years which have bolstered the legal power of 
open source software licenses, including the GPL. Richard Stallman’s decision to resign from 
the artificial intelligence laboratory at M.I.T. and to start the Free Software Foundation 
(FSF), for instance, gave a public face to the movement and allowed him to begin soliciting 
donations to support the development of free software tools. The FSF has continued to 
support the cause of free software both by channeling donations and by bringing attention to 
some of the perils of proprietary software. Their “Bad Vista” campaign from 2006-2009, for 
example, helped to focus media attention on the fact that Microsoft no longer sold their 
operating system to end users – instead, the software was only “licensed” to these users, 
which gave Microsoft the ability to potentially remotely disable a user’s computer through 
the use of a so-called “kill switch” (Free Software Foundation, 2006). More recently, the 
Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC), a non-profit organization founded in 2005 to support 
FOSS developers with legal advice on software licensing and offers “license defense and 
litigation support,” is in some ways analogous to the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) in that it serves as a watchdog for GPL-licensed software and will file injunctions 
and engage in other court actions to prevent the ‘contamination’ of open source software with 
proprietary code (Software Freedom Law Center, 2009a). In December 2009, the SFLC filed 
suit against major consumer electronic companies and retailers such as Samsung, 
Westinghouse, JVC, and BestBuy for releasing proprietary products which utilized GPL-
protected software called BusyBox (Software Freedom Law Center, 2009b). This action is 
only the most recent in a string of incidents in which proprietary software developers (one of 
them was Microsoft) have been informed by the SFLC that they have violated the terms of 
the GPL. The existence of visible organizations such as the SFLC and the FSF, then, has 
given the FOSS movement a centralized public identity and have protected the existence of 
the digital commons from incursions by profit-driven electronics and software companies. 
These organizations also serve to shape and define the very definition of free, open source 
and act as sources of contact for the media, all of which are critical institutions that fashion a 
notion of self-identity for the FOSS movement. 
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Creative Commons and the Notion of Socially Created Value 
The efforts of software hackers and open source advocates to emphasize the collective, 
communitarian ethos of the Internet has also inspired activists to expand the notion of the 
public domain to include all information and creative works. The rallying cry of free software 
advocates for openness in both the code and the content of new media on the Internet has 
also dovetailed with the broader free culture movement, which has worked to circumvent the 
restrictions of copyright law in order to reserve the rights of individuals to use, modify, and 
redistribute cultural materials. The aims of the free culture movement read like a social 
justice manifesto as well. As Lawrence Lessig (2004, p. 261), one of the key figures in the 
free culture movement, writes: “So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture 
that we don’t even question when the control of that property removes our ability, as a 
people, to develop our culture democratically.” Modeled on Stallman’s GPL, Lessig and two 
colleagues created an alternative copyright regime for cultural materials in 2002, the Creative 
Commons (Creative Commons, 2009). In essence, Creative Commons was conceived as a 
private “hack” to produce a more fine-tuned copyright structure, to replace “all rights 
reserved” with “some rights reserved” for those who wished to do so. It tried to do for culture 
what the General Public License had done for software” (Boyle, 2008, p. 182) 
The ultimate goal of alternative copyright systems such as Creative Commons and the GPL is 
to preserve the ability of individuals to both share and build upon each other’s knowledge, 
artistic creativity, and expertise. This not only reduces barriers for individuals to participate 
with one another in communal projects, but it also works to equalize access to information 
for all members of society, which is a core aim of classic redistribution theories of social 
justice. New forms of value and innovation are created through this new form of networked 
creativity, which have been collectively dubbed “the commons.” The commons is 
a vehicle by which new sorts of self-organized publics can gather together and exercise 
new types of citizenship. The commons can even serve as a viable alternative to 
markets that have grown stodgy, manipulative, and coercive. A commons arises 
whenever a given community decides that it wishes to manage a resource in a collective 
manner, with special regard for equitable access, use, and sustainability. The commons 
is a means by which individuals can band together with like-minded souls and express a 
sovereignty of their own (2008, p. 4) 
New means of modular, collective cultural production thrive on a vibrant public domain. 
Since this is increasingly under threat, FOSS projects which release their software under the 
GPL are advancing a critical 21st Century goal toward collectivism which is at the forefront 
of the social justice purpose. One simply has to look at the motivations behind most forms of 
cultural production to realize the historical shift in perspective. Under the traditional systems 
of copyright, the end goal of artistic and intellectual creation is to generate private property 
which, while it may be experienced by others, ultimately serves to benefit the creator. Under 
“copyleft” regimes like Creative Commons and the GPL, the goal of cultural production is to 
add value and creativity to a set of resources to which everyone has free access. This not only 
encourages more creativity which can then be fed back into the collective commons, but it 
creates new incentives for intellectual production that go beyond the accumulation of capital. 
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As a result of the possibilities for innovation offered by the collective commons, new forms 
of cultural production are also being created, many of which challenge the existing wage-
labor system of post-industrial capitalism. Like software engineers in general, along with 
teachers, artists, and others who work in the cultural industries, open source hackers are 
knowledge workers. What is less obvious about hackers is the fact that their efforts lie 
outside the traditional realm of the capitalist economy, since the goal of the software is to be 
freely available to computer users around the world. Absent the profit incentive, there are a 
number of other motivations that typify hacker involvement in FOSS. Instead of a work 
environment structured by institutional or market-based demands, free software communities 
are often loosely organized and centered around the contributions of lines of code in order to 
solve specific problems. Since the computer code written by hackers is an abundant resource, 
writes hacker anthropologist and spokesperson Eric Raymond (2001), the social and 
economic model of open source communities most closely resembles a gift culture. Raymond 
writes that 
abundance makes command relationships difficult to sustain and exchange relationships 
an almost pointless game. In gift cultures, social status is determined not by what you 
control but by what you give away (2001, p. 81) 
Giving or uploading useful code to the community not only provides others with a gift, but it 
also establishes one’s reputation as a successful hacker through positive recognition from the 
community of other hackers. For Castells (2002), this suggests a “techno-meritocratic” 
culture which develops among online hacker communities. He writes: 
Naturally, money, formal proprietary rights, or institutional power are excluded as 
sources of authority and reputation. Authority based upon technological excellence, or 
on an early contribution to the code, is respected only if it is not seen as predominantly 
self-serving. In other words, the community accepts the hierarchy of excellence and 
seniority only as long as this authority is exercised for the well-being of the community 
as a whole, which means that, often, new tribes emerge and face each other. But the 
fundamental cleavages are not personal or ideological: they are technological (2002, p. 
48) 
In this utopian vein, Castells and other scholars of the post-industrial transition suggest that 
technological prowess creates new possibilities for autonomy, individuation, and freedom 
from wage capitalism which emerges from the networked interfaces of the post-industrial 
economy (Bell, 1973; Hardt & Negri, 2001). FOSS movements fit somewhat naturally into 
this vision because the tools to rewrite the basic operating code of networked computers are 
readily available on the web for anyone with access and patience to master. The power to 
change the technological course of society, therefore, is effectively taken out of the hands of 
industrial elites and reclaimed by individual hackers who choose to work on open source 
projects to fulfill their own goals and desires. This devolution and re-distribution of creative 
power from powerful software corporations to the people is one of the primary social justice 
appeals of the greater FOSS movement. 
For instance, FOSS advocates often point to the Mozilla Firefox web browser as the project 
which most clearly demonstrates the power and value of collective labor in a networked 
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information economy. The Netscape browser, released in 1995 and based upon Mosaic, the 
first graphical browser for the Internet, was a favorite with end users (because it gave away 
its product for free) and was a much faster Internet interface than Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer (IE). To counter this growing threat during the boom times of the late 1990’s, 
Microsoft began bundling IE into new version of its operating system, making the browser 
the default one upon installation and integrating its functions into Windows. Although 
Microsoft was eventually sued by the Justice Department for these actions, the Netscape 
Corporation began to falter in the late 1990’s until it made a fateful decision for the future of 
the free software world in January of 1998: it decided to release the source code for the 
browser and set up a non-profit organization (called the Mozilla Foundation) to look after the 
development of the browser.2 To make the notion of free software more palatable to business 
interests, a number of hacker advocates led by Eric Raymond adopted the term “open source” 
to avoid the misleading term “free” (as in no cost). Along with convincing Netscape to reveal 
the source code for its browser, Raymond urged his compatriots to standardize their 
terminology around the open source moniker, as well as to co-opt the business media such as 
the Wall Street Journal, The Economist, and Forbes Magazine, which predominantly 
reflected the interests of the Fortune 500 (Raymond, 2001, pp. 178-179) The new Mozilla 
browser, nicknamed Firefox, thereafter began a new phase in its development; one which 
took place in the open, and which allowed hackers and end users to understand how the 
software worked in order to write additional “add-ons” to extend the functionality of the 
browser, all under the terms of a license which kept the browser in the public domain. Today, 
Mozilla Firefox is one of the most popular applications for browsing the web and has 
demonstrated the staying power of an open source project in an environment that has hitherto 
privileged proprietary, closed systems. Although the advocacy community began to debate 
the relative merits of “free software” versus Raymond’s “open source” terminology, the 
catalyzing event of Netscape’s re-birth as an open source project crystallized Stallman’s early 
vision into a larger social movement by giving it a recognizable rhetorical frame and by the 
creation of a new non-profit entity to spearhed its public image, the Open Source Initiative 
(OSI). As Kelty notes, “the practice of creating a movement is the practice of talking about a 
movement...It was in 1998-99 that geeks came to recognize that they were all doing the same 
thing and, almost immediately, to argue about why” (2008, p. 98) 
 
Conclusion 
The development of the GNU/Linux operating system and other open source software 
projects in the 1990’s point to some important trends in the networked economy of the 21st 
Century. First, FOSS projects like GNU/Linux and Firefox are mounting serious 
technological and economic challenges to proprietary software such as Microsoft Windows 
and Internet Explorer. As a byproduct of their collective efforts, open source computer 
programmers and users are increasingly connecting their own activities to larger 
philosophical issues of free speech and greater access to information. Indeed, FOSS 
                                                 
2 The Netscape Corporation was purchased by America OnLine (AOL) in November of 1998, but not before 
they had released the source code to their browser under the newly-created Mozilla Public License (which had a 
structure very similar to the GNU Public License). 
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movements have catalyzed interest in issues of excessive copyright protections enjoyed by 
corporations which has expanded the reach of these movement beyond computer 
programmers and technology geeks. The development of FOSS has made significant inroads 
in the last twenty years because of the creation of some core institutions (such as the FSF and 
SFLC) which serve to further the interests of free software, and because of new “copyleft” 
regimes such as the GPL and the Creative Commons. Finally, the free software movement 
has also spearheaded the development of alternative form of cultural labor, one which 
harnesses the power of collective labor via the Internet which exists parallel to, and often in 
opposition to, the wage labor system of post-industrial capitalism. Although the goals of 
these movements have yet to be fully realized, the coordinated efforts of these loosely 
organized volunteers and hackers have already begun to change the ways that we think about 
information and computers in a networked society. 
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“Netcitizens now dispose of research possibilities that used to only be 
accessible to State news services. The internet opens channels for participation, 
creates more transparency and changes the communicative relations between 
actors and institutions. (...) Internet innovation acts as some kind of social 
revolutionary force of our time. That's why electronic media are also the object 
of conflicts of interests, as their regulation decides on the structural change for 
the future.” (Rebentisch 2005, p. 1, italics in original) 
Introduction1 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have come to play a significant role in 
our daily lives and activities. Along with their integration in society comes the dissemination 
of know-how’s, habits and ways of thinking that used to be limited to the domain of ICT 
experts and technicians (Riemens, 2002). Protest groups in particular are increasingly relying 
upon ICTs in order to make their voices heard. Most notably the internet has become a major 
vehicle for political activists of all beliefs. The Net has become an important place for 
activism as well as a “common good” to fight for in itself. 
The conflict between emergent protest actors and established power holders is particularly 
striking in the domain of intellectual property rights. In the past decade, elected bodies in the 
Western world have come under increasing pressure to adopt more restrictive legislation in 
the domains of copyright (e.g. to prevent unauthorized file-sharing) and other forms of 
intellectual property rights (e.g. software patents). “Today, copyright law is no longer a 
complicated issue that is only of interest and concern to copyright lawyers, legal scholars, 
technology developers, and copyright holders,” argues the US law professor Peter Yu. 
“Rather, it is a matter of public significance, affecting all of us in our daily lives” (2003, p. 
909). Internet-based protest groups have contributed a great deal to increasing public 
awareness of copyright issues. Furthermore, they are emblematic of how communities of 
interest are emerging on the internet, and of how some of these become politicized and 
influence traditional decision-making.  
The paper analyzes the case of la Quadrature du Net, a French citizen collective established 
in March 2008 in response to a legislative proposal aiming at introducing the “three-strikes-
and-you're-out-scheme” in France. “Three-strikes” or “graduated response” refers to the 
implementation of a mechanism automatically detecting unauthorized file-sharing, leading in 
its most extreme form to cutting off copyright infringers’ internet connection after two 
unsuccessful warnings. “Three-strikes” is only the latest in a series of battles generally 
referred to as the “copyright wars” in which the entertainment industry uses any possible 
venue in order to counter copyright infringements, including lobbying, litigation, education 
and licensing (Yu, 2003). The intellectual property rights (IPR) lobby has successfully 
established the term ‘piracy’ as a synonym for copyright infringement. ‘Piracy’ is claimed to 
                                                 
1 Replication statement: This paper is based upon twenty in-depth interviews that have been transcribed and 
coded. All transcripts as well as the project’s codebook will be deposited in a public archive as soon as the 
research project is completed (scheduled for October 2011). Confidential information received from 
interviewees will be removed from the transcripts prior to making them public. All interviews are anonymized 
and references that might lead to the identification of participants will be removed. 
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be responsible for a sudden drop in IPR-based revenues over the last two decades. In 2007, 
the Business Software Alliance published a ‘Piracy Study’ reporting a loss of US$29 billion 
due to pirated software (BSA, 2007). “Three-strikes” is intended to become an additional 
weapon in the arsenal of IPR litigation, next to suing individuals and copyright-infringing 
platforms (such as Napster, and more recently, The Pirate Bay) and pushing for national 
parliaments to adopt supranational legislation such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) treaties and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
currently under negotiation.  
Collective action prompted by repressive intellectual property regulations is particular in that 
it mobilizes a constituency of self-baptized “netcitizens” whose repertoire of action and 
underlying philosophy draw upon open source culture. The paper examines the case of a 
French citizen collective, la Quadrature du Net, who successfully intervened in the reform of 
the Telecoms Package, a set of five directives regulating the telecommunications market in 
the European Union. The question we wish to address is in which ways principles of 
freedom, openness, transparency, access to information, participation, creativity and sharing 
inform this type of internet-based activism and are brought into conventional forms of 
decision-making. 
The case study is part of a broader research project that analyzes internet-based campaigns 
aiming to influence EU decision-making in the domains of intellectual property rights, 
internet regulation and digital rights. It draws on a series of twenty interviews conducted with 
two set of actors: core activists from la Quadrature on the one side, staff and members of the 
European Parliament, the main targets of the campaign, on the other side.  
The outline of the next sections is as follows: section 1 examines the particular place of 
collective action surrounding copyright legislation in the light of the current literature on 
internet activism and e-mobilization, section 2 presents the free/libre and open source 
movement and the principles promoted by it, section 3 briefly explains how the data 
sustaining this analyzes has been collected, section 4 analyzes la Quadrature du Net’s 
Telecoms Package campaign, focusing on the ideology of openness and freedom that sustains 
their actions, the campaign in itself and an analysis of the particular action repertoires they 
made use of during the campaign. Finally, the findings are discussed in the light of the 
literature (section 5). 
Internet-based Activism 
Action groups of all types have colonized the internet in order to express their views and 
publicize their political claims. “Cyberspace has become a global electronic agora where the 
diversity of human disaffection explodes in a cacophony of accents,” asserts Castells (2001, 
p. 138). Vegh defines internet activism as “a politically motivated movement relying on the 
internet” (2003, p. 71). This ranges from minorities struggling against oppression, such as the 
Zapatistas (Arquilla and Ronfeld, 2001; Garrido and Halavais, 2003) and more recently the 
Uiygher, to social movements like the global justice movement (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 
2002; Juris, 2005; Mattoni, 2008; Kavada, 2005, 2008), specific anti-corporate or anti-
globalisation movements (Juris, 2005; Kavada, 2005, 2007; Niesyto, 2007; Baringhorst, 
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2008), the feminist movement (Edwards, 2004; Pini, Brown and Previte, 2004), alternative 
media movements such as Indymedia (Kidd, 2003) and digital rights campaigns (Denning, 
2001; Jordan and Taylor, 2004; Jordan, 2008), human rights movements (Lebert, 2003), or 
the anti-war movements (Shaw, 2005; Gillan, 2008). Any minority or oppositional group one 
can conceive of is likely to be present on the internet.  
A substantive part of the literature concurs that the internet transforms collective action. For 
Postmes and Brunsting (2002) the motives underlying collective action are transformed by 
the adoption of internet use and may in turn alter the nature of collective action and protest 
groups. Next to traditional forms of collective action that existed prior to the advent of the 
internet, new online forms unfold, turning the internet in a “new tactical site” (Lee, 2009, p. 
16). An additional layer of internet-based actions complements the repertoire of collective 
action, meaning a set of tactics and strategies consciously chosen by protest actors based on 
their experience in order to act collectively (Tilly, 1984). 
Following Van Laer and Van Aelst, “on the one hand, [the] internet facilitates and supports 
(traditional) offline collective action in terms of organization, mobilization, and 
transnationalization and, on the other hand, creates new modes of collective action” (2009, p. 
3). Internet-supported actions, to employ the terminology put forward by Van Laer and Van 
Aelst, are complemented by “virtual” activities, or internet-based actions, such as email 
bombings, sit-ins in online spaces or hacking Web sites. Vegh (2003) distinguishes between 
internet-enhanced strategies, i.e. the internet serves as an additional channel for protest, and 
internet-based tactics, i.e. the internet constitutes a space for actions that are only possible 
online.  
As the example of la Quadrature du Net’s campaign will show, ‘online’ and ‘offline’ spheres 
are not separate realities. Protest groups generally draw on a variety of tactics both offline 
and online (Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2009). The ‘online’ should be viewed as an extra layer 
of protest actions that sometimes replaces (e.g. emails frequently substitute letters) and 
mostly complement conventional forms. ‘Online’ and ‘offline’ realms are heavily 
interdependent (Bimber, 2000) and their opposition is increasingly rejected as a false 
dichotomy (Kneip and Niesyto, 2007). In the paper, the ‘online’ should not be understood as 
separate from the ‘offline’ but as spheres that are primarily technology-mediated or not. 
Much attention has been paid to the way traditional political actors such as political parties, 
interest groups and social movements are integrating ICTs in their political strategies. 
However, the appropriation of internet-based repertoires by a wide range of political actors 
blurs the traditional distinction between political actors. Chadwick argues that established 
political actors, such as interest groups, political parties and social movements, undergo a 
process of hybridization, meaning the “selective transplantation and adaptation of digital 
network repertoires previously considered typical of social movements” (2007, p. 283). 
Simultaneously, internet-based actors – MoveOn in the US is the most frequently cited 
example - emerge as a new kind of organizational form. These “hybrid mobilization 
movements” mix protest repertoires that used to be associated with established political 
actors. They also take advantage of the complex spatial and temporal interactions engendered 
by digital communication networks (Chadwick, 2007).  
 Politics of Open Source  82 
Internet-based activism should not automatically be reduced to social movements types of 
action. Internet-based activists share common characteristics with social movements: they 
aim for social change, adopt identity-based network structures and the use of 
‘unconventional’ means of protest to challenge established elites (Rucht, 1994). However, 
social movements represent a certain “institutionalization of [a] particular struggles” 
(Cammaerts, 2007, p. 217) while ICTs clearly reduce the incentive to join established 
organizations (Earl and Schussman, 2003). A recurring characteristic of internet activism is 
the great variation in organizational structures relying on ICTs to promote social and political 
change (Bimber et al., 2005). It is therefore more accurate to speak of internet-based or -
supported collective action, which encloses both formalized and informal, established and 
emergent types of protest structures. It is beyond the scope of the paper to argue whether 
internet-based activism constitutes an emergent social movement. In order to avoid confusion 
with the various – and sometimes contradicting - definitions of social movements, we refer to 
the actors examined below as protest groups or activist networks, focusing the attention on 
their claims and repertoire rather than organizational forms. 
 
The Internet as a Resource for Activism 
 
Internet-based protest groups are perceived as emblematic of a general transformation - or 
adaptation - of collective action and more generally political participation in post-modern 
societies. Traditional political institutions such as the nation state and the representative 
system are contested in an era of economic globalisation characterized by dense networks of 
communication. The advent of the internet in the 1990s fostered hopes for an invigorated 
public reconnected to decision-makers thanks to networked communication technology. Such 
expectations have equally emerged with the invention of previous technologies like the 
telegraph, the radio or the television (Vanobberghen, 2007, Hoff and Bjerke, 2009). Whether 
internet use by protest groups actually leads to increased participation, reinvigorates tired 
democracies or leads to important power shifts within society is an ongoing debate in the 
academic literature. For Van Laer and Van Aelst: 
“Political and economical power has gradually moved to the international level. 
The Internet enabled social movements to follow that transition and operate more 
globally. One could state that the Internet made it possible to maintain the status 
quo, but not change it.” (2009, p. 29).  
Next to using the internet to act at a transnational level, internet-based activist groups are 
generally keen on the decentralized structure of the internet that mirrors their ideological and 
organizational needs (Castells, 2001; Bennett 2004; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2009). Internet-
based collective action facilitates individualized forms of protest, embodied by a loose 
network of actors who share a common goal and set of values. Non-professional individuals 
motivated by personal interests and relying on their own skills for undertaking movement 
activity, “Movement entrepreneurs” (Garrett, 2006), emerge as new agents of mobilization. 
This development is in line with a general process of individualization that is shaping 
political practices (Dahlgren, 2009). Citizens tend to make political connections by following 
personal interests and life-style choices rather than overarching traditional ideologies 
(Cammaerts and Van Audenhove, 2005). Issues closer to everyday life, identity-politics or 
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single-issues such as in the case examined here, intellectual property rights, constitute 
important triggers for citizen involvement.  
Thanks to the internet, activists do not need to be in the same geographical location to follow, 
join or oppose other groups or issues (Baringhorst, 2009; Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2009). 
Movement entrepreneurs active on different levels or countries do not necessarily know each 
other personally but observe each other on the internet, developing common understandings 
of a shared political issue (Baringhorst 2009). As such they may act locally but are tied to a 
larger network of activists operating in various countries and on several levels. They conflate 
the local and global, leading to what Wellman et al. (2003) have coined as ‘glocalisation’; 
they bridge scales by ‘thinking globally and acting locally’.  
One of the most salient characteristics of internet-based protest groups is that communication 
becomes the foremost political strategy, making "campaigns, themselves, political 
organizations that sustain activist networks in the absence of leadership by central 
organizations" (Bennett 2004, p. 130). Activists groups exploit the various communicative 
functions of web spaces in different ways. Stein (2009) has proposed a typology of these 
functions that ranges from information provision and fundraising, to enabling dialogue and 
interaction leading to mobilization and facilitating linkages between various groups (see 
section 4). 
Internet-based protest groups adopt “viral politics”, i.e. the rapid sharing of information to 
personal acquaintances across the internet resulting in political mobilization (Gustafsson, 
2009; Breindl & Gustafsson, 2010). Such a practice is not new in itself. “The reason that 
viral politics can be seen as a partly new and potentially transforming factor in political life is 
the increased velocity and scope of the communication,” argues Gustafsson (2009, p. 10).  
The growth of social media has further amplified this phenomenon. Social media or Web 2.0 
applications facilitate more flexible and individualistic protest activities based on user-
generated content. They offer new possibilities, such as the propagation of content over 
multiple applications, rich user experiences on political websites or the creation of small-
scale forms of political engagement through consumerism (Chadwick, 2009). The boundaries 
between producers and consumers of information blur leading to “produsage” (Bruns, 2008) 
or the collaborative creation of content. Individuals themselves generate and control creation 
processes such as posting, classifying or evaluating content online.  
The internet lowers the barrier of entry into political debates and activism. Each participant 
can choose himself how much time, resources and effort he is willing to invest in a particular 
campaign. “Flexible participation” (Joyce, 2007) embraces a wide variety of individualized 
protest activities, such as joining a Facebook cause, signing a standard letter of support or 
contributing actively to the campaign wiki. Internet-based groups. Removing the need for 
large mobilizing structures, the internet allows to efficiently aggregate small contributions 
and lowers the barriers for participation for interested actors. 
The internet and ICTs in general are valuable resources for protest actors. They help build 
their identity, support their organizational forms and action repertoires. However, 
technologies themselves are the terrain of political controversies. For some, “they are viewed 
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as instruments of the dominant power and as responsible for the perverse effects of 
globalization,” write Bucchi and Neresini (2008, p. 454). At the same time, computer 
technologies are endowed with democratic imaginations, and expected to liberate individuals 
from oppression and domination. The relation between technology and protest actors is thus 
far from unequivocal, most particularly in the domain of technonology-oriented activism that 
interests us.  
The Internet: A Contested Terrain 
The internet is a “social structure created through repeated collective social action” 
(Rasmussen, 2007, p. 45). It has been shaped by particular social, political and cultural 
conditions and continues to be shaped by social action. The history of the internet has been 
one of continuous tensions between various groups interested in its development. Prompted 
by the defense sectors' enormous budgets, the early history of the internet took place in non-
commercial spaces in which the creators were also the users. The scientific community 
applied meritocratic values and engineering principles to the construction of a global 
communication network intended for the well being of all humans. At its conception, the 
internet’s architecture was intended to be and perceived as essentially open and thus neutral 
and non-political (Rasmussen, 2007).  
For O’Reilly (2004), the architecture of the internet is inherently participatory: “any system 
designed around communications protocols is intrinsically designed for participation. Anyone 
can create a participating, first-class component. (…) The web, however, took the idea of 
participation to a new level, because it opened that participation not just to software 
developers but to all users of the system,” (O’Reilly, 2004). This ‘architecture of 
participation’ (Lessig, 1999) was inherent to the internet way before the advent of Web 2.0 or 
social media platforms. It designates a system that is “designed for user contribution” 
(O’Reilly, 2004). More generally, the hyperlinked architecture of the internet “ensures that 
the value of the web is created by its users” (Ibid.).  
With the rapid spread of the internet in the 1990s, its architectural openness has come under 
increasing pressure as formal organizations are systematically seeking to reassert their power 
in the digital realm. As Lessig argues, an “extraordinary amount of control can be built in the 
environment that people know as cyberspace” (1999, p. 217). The tension between openness 
and closeness has repeatedly played out “in the construction of the ARPANET, in the 
struggle for an open Internet protocol, in the fight to promote open source code and to 
prevent restrictive forms of copyright and patenting, in the anti-trust cases against Microsoft, 
and in the battle against censorship,” argues Rasmussen (2007, p. 2). 
A particular type of community has taken advantage of the internet’s open architecture at the 
very early stages of its development: hackers. When thinking about hackers, the media cliché 
of a computer criminal often comes to mind. However, “true hackers” are computer 
aficionados who share a common ethic, which promotes open access to computers, 
decentralization, informational freedom, the mistrust of authority, recognizes judgments 
based upon hacking skills alone, encourages the possibility to create art and beauty on 
computers, and believes in the fact that computers can change life for the better (Levy, 1984, 
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p. 27-33). “It is a culture of technological creativity based on freedom, cooperation, 
reciprocity, and informality,” argues Castells (2001, p. 50). The free/libre and open source 
software (FLOSS) movement finds its roots in this “hacker culture” (Thomas, 2002), and is 
arguably one of its most politically oriented extensions.  
 
The FLOSS Movement  
 
Open source software introduces a paradigm shift in software development (O’Reilly, 2004; 
McInerney, 2009). For Weber:  
“collaborative open source software projects such as Linux or Apache have 
demonstrated that a large and complex system of software code can be built, 
maintained, developed, and extended in a nonproprietary setting in which many 
developers work in a highly parallel, relatively unstructured way” (2004, p. 2) 
The participatory development model of open source is generally opposed to traditional, top-
down software designs. Open Source advocate Eric S. Raymond (1999) distinguishes the 
former as the bazaar model, in which the source code is publicly available and where each 
developer chooses what to work on. The latter has been named the Cathedral model in which 
the source code is restricted in the hands of a small group of developers in a hierarchical 
manner. Open source generally adopts the bazaar model whereas proprietary software such as 
those distributed by Microsoft or Apple tends to follow the Cathedral development.  
Two different approaches to property collide: the conventional notion of property as a right to 
exclude versus the right to distribute what one owns, advanced by open source projects 
(Weber, 2004). Free software advocates postulate that software constitutes a public good 
(Williams, 2002 in Rasmussen, 2007), and pursues an inherently political aim: free software 
as a vehicle to spread the principles of informational freedom and a non-proprietary vision of 
society. As such, free software developers are often considered to be political activists. The 
open source community, emerging as a second stream in the larger FLOSS movement from 
1998 onwards, expresses a more technological ideology: the open accessibility of code 
enables the development of better software. Political concerns are secondary or absent to the 
technological progress enabled by open source software.  
FLOSS cannot be said to be one homogenous movement. It is foremost a model for software 
development. Open source is full of nuances as exemplified by the two major streams, free 
software, on the one side, and open source, on the other side. Both “offer poles of attraction 
for the developers” (Berry, 2008, p. 142). Yet, only a minority of programmers sees 
fundamental differences between open source and free software. For most, developing 
software is a similar task in both communities (Infonomics, 2002 quoted in Berry, 2008, p. 
142). 
Politically engaged programmers and non-programmers are often implicitly drawing upon 
open source principles when intervening in political decision-making. One of the 
characteristics of FLOSS is the transpolitical appeal of its messages, attracting supporters 
from across the political spectrum. For Berry:  
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“the key site of contestation and the source of unity for FLOSS developers has been 
their rejection of the use of IPRs to protect or monopolize certain aspects of the 
common use of coding conventions, routines or algorithms” (Berry, 2008, p. 103). 
Changes to copyright law have triggered widespread opposition among FLOSS supporters. 
When the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the United States (1998) or the 
European Copyright directive (2001) criminalized the production and distribution of 
technology bypassing copyright protection, both proposals encountered strong opposition 
amongst FLOSS advocates. 
At present, the FLOSS and hacker discourses have spread from programmers to non-
programmers who sympathize with their core ethics (Rasmussen, 2007). Various activist 
movements found inspiration in values of sharing and openness and applied these to other 
political domains such as human rights, environmentalism and social justice. Lessig's 
Creative Commons licenses or Wikipedia's GNU Free Documentation License are extensions 
of the alternative distributive copyright rules developed for free software with Stallman’s 
General Public License (Jordan, 2008) or the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) license. 
A much broader ‘digital rights movement’ is taking shape across the globe. It draws and 
extends upon the original hacker ethic as laid out by Levy (1984), merges with other civil 
society movements (e.g. human rights) and proposes an original mix of open source, 
enlightenment and libertarian frames. The French internet-based collective, La Quadrature du 
Net, and it’s campaign surrounding the Telecoms Package reform, constitutes an appropriate 
case study for examining the principles behind their discourses and action repertoires and to 
what extent these are affiliated with open source culture.  
Methods 
The analysis of the Telecoms Package campaign is part of a broader research project (cf. 
Breindl & Briatte, 2009; Breindl, 2009, Breindl & Gustafsson, 2010, Houghton & Breindl, 
forthcoming). It has been selected because it constitutes the most recent example of an 
internet-based network of activists campaigning to influence EU decision-making on these 
issues. Collective action surrounding intellectual property tights (IPR) is a fertile ground for 
internet activism. The tools and objectives pursued coincide. La Quadrature du Net is an 
emblematic example of networked, transnational, internet-based activism in a domain that 
has been tremendously transformed by ICTs. 
The paper draws upon a series of twenty interviews with core actors of the Telecoms Package 
reform: on the one side central campaigners and supporters of la Quadrature du Net, on the 
other side parliamentary assistants, political advisors and members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), the main targets of the campaign. The selection of interviewees followed 
a ‘snowball sampling’ strategy: initial contact was made with a leading campaigner, who was 
then asked to suggest further persons to interview. Each interview lasted for about one hour 
and a half. The interview guide consisted of open-ended questions as to the campaigning 
techniques, internet use, the community they stem from, the values they support, la 
Quadrature du Net in particular, the challenge to influence EU decision-making, the different 
stages in the campaign, their vision of internet-related policy issues, and collaboration with 
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third parties. Additionally, EP targets were interviewed on how they perceived the activities 
of la Quadrature, which will be developed in more detail in a future article. 
The in-depth interviews were triangulated with an analysis of la Quadrature’s main campaign 
site2 and wiki3 as well as data consisting of campaign documents generated by the activists 
themselves such as press releases, messages posted on mailing lists and online social 
networks. Additionally, documents and analyzes provided by political staff inside the EP 
were also taken into account. All interviews and data collection were carried out between 
February 2008 and January 2010. The data has been analyzed from a thematic, inductive 
perspective.  
La Quadrature du Net: Promoting Openness by “Patching” EU Law 
La Quadrature du Net (la Quadrature in short) is a French citizen-collective, without statutes 
or an elected board, established in March 2008 in response to president Nicolas Sarkozy's 
announcement to introduce a three-strikes plan, negotiated with the record industry and 
internet providers. The name Quadrature du Net (Squaring the Net in English) originates 
from the mathematical problem of squaring the circle, i.e. the impossibility to construct a 
square that holds the same area as a circle in a certain number of steps with compass and 
straightedge. In 1882, the German mathematicians Lindemann and Weierstrass established 
that  is transcendental, proving impossible to solve the problem of squaring the circle. By 
analogy, Squaring the Net refers to the inadequacy of transposing traditional legislations 
directly upon the digital environment. On their internet site la Quadrature states “we believe 
that it is impossible to effectively control the flow of information in the digital age by the law 
and the technology without harming public freedoms, and damaging economic and social 
development. This is what we call Squaring the Net”4. The group aims at preventing 
legislations that might harm their conception of a free and open internet and promotes the 
respect of fundamental rights and the inherently democratic character of the internet. Just like 
Lindemann and Weierstrass enriched mathematical thinking by establishing the 
transcendence of numbers, la Quadrature considers that regulating the internet poses new 
challenges, which can only be solved by progressive legislation and out-of-the-box thinking.  
La Quadrature du Net is a hybrid protest group (Chadwick 2006) mixing protest actions 
characteristic of social movements - such as demonstrations or alternative media coverage of 
a certain issue – and actions traditionally associated with interest groups – such as legislative 
analysis, lobbying, participating in conferences or organizing events. These actions take 
place both in the online and offline realm, are internet-supported (e.g. fundraising) and 
internet-based (e.g. protest websites). 
La Quadrature defines its activities as advocacy “for the adaptation of French and European 
legislations to respect the founding principles of the Internet, most notably the free 
circulation of knowledge” intervening in “public-policy debates concerning, for instance, 
                                                 
2 http://www.laquadrature.net/ (last accessed 23/10/2010) 
3 http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/Main_Page (last accessed 23/10/2010) 
4 http://www.laquadrature.net/en/faq-0 (last accessed 10/01/2010)  
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freedom of speech, copyright, regulation of telecommunications and online privacy”5. More 
generally, their actions encourage citizen participation and debate on “rights and freedoms in 
the digital age”6.  
The core of la Quadrature du Net is constituted by five founders, four men and one woman, 
all of whom are sensitive to the free/libre and open source software movement. Thanks to an 
annual funding by the Open Society Institute7, one core campaigner and a half-time assistant 
receive a salary for their work. For the rest, la Quadrature operates on a voluntary basis, with 
contributors following and participating in the discussion list and on the Internet Relay Chats 
(IRC). A small group of core activists regularly analyzes legislative texts, works on press 
releases, edits the campaign wiki, translates documents, etc. Profiting from flexible forms of 
participation (Joyce, 2007), la Quadrature is open for any input from occasional contributors 
and counts on the periodic mobilization of supporters to call MEPs or participate in the 
internet blackout8. The group welcomes more active participation in the organization of the 
campaign itself.  
It is difficult to estimate how many supporters la Quadrature can count on. As in most 
internet-based groups, a core of very active members produces most of the content while up 
to 90% are so-called “lurkers” (Nonnecke & Preece, 2000). Nonetheless, the boundaries 
between these various contributors is far from impermeable – core activists can put their 
activities on hold for a certain period of time and become occasional supporters, just as 
lurkers can decide to join the IRC discussions and move closer to the core of the group. The 
rule of thumb is that any person is encouraged to contribute and those who bestow a 
considerable amount of time and show the strongest analytical skills emerge naturally as 
leaders. Additionally most core activists hold a record in past legislative battles surrounding 
intellectual property rights at the national and European level.  
From 1998 onwards, the debate around the possible introduction of software patents in 
Europe generated widespread awareness among the European FLOSS community 
(Karanovic, 2009). It sensitized many supporters about the dangers of repressive intellectual 
property rights legislations as well as the importance to look at the European level, at the 
origin of two thirds of EU member states legislations. The significance to intervene at the EU 
level was confirmed when member states transposed the EU copyright directive9 which 
forbid the production and distribution of devices that circumvent copyright protections. In 
France, the DADVSI law10, transposing the EU copyright directive, led to extensive 
campaigning by free software advocates (on a comparative perspective upon the software 
patents and the DADVSI campaigns see Breindl & Briatte, 2009), many of which now 
support la Quadrature du Net. 
                                                 
5 http://www.laquadrature.net/en/who-are-we (last accessed 23/01/2010) 
6 Ibid. 
7 The Open Society Institute (OSI) is the private foundation of the Hungarian-American businessman George 
Soros, offering grants for the promotion of democratic governance and fundamental rights. 
8 La Quadrature du Net launched an internet blackout, i.e. the voluntary dressing in black of websites, avatars, 
etc., in order to influence the French three-strikes legislative proposal, the HADOPI law. 
9 Directive 2001/29/EC 
10 Loi sur le Droit d'Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l'Information, in English: Law on Authors' 
Rights and Related Rights in the Information Society. 
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Most (but not all) core campaigners and supporters are male, hold a university degree, aged 
between 20 and 35 and live in urban areas. They are technology-savvy, many holding 
degrees in computer science, and showing affinities with the FLOSS movement and free 
culture ideas such as promoted by Lawrence Lessig. 
Their working attitude is very focused, pragmatic and reveals an “engineering philosophy to 
'make things work'” and an “insistence on adopting a technocratic approach to solving 
societal problems and to bypassing ('hacking') legislative approaches” (Berry 2008, p. 102). 
If there are “harmful” amendments within a French legislative proposal or within a set of five 
European directives, everything needs to be done to “patch”11 the texts just as you correct a 
mistake in a computer program. The political process is conceived of as a “technocratic 
system” (Activist, Interview 1, Brussels, February 2008) that can be modified by applying 
reverse-engineering principles, the throughout analysis of its structure, function and way of 
working (Delalande, 2009), and a “pragmatic approach towards implementing stuff, by doing 
stuff and problem solving” (Activist, Interview 1, Brussels, February 2008). 
Most core activists are more or less closely linked to the free/libre and open source software 
movement (FLOSS), either as programmers, free or open source software company owners 
or users. For many activists, the advent of computers and the internet is a revolution that is 
fundamentally altering the current power balance (cf. Rebentisch, 2005 at the start of the 
paper). However, dominant actors, like the entertainment industry, threaten the open 
architecture of the internet in order to secure their profits. Inspired by open source principles, 
la Quadrature du Net wishes to counter such drawbacks. In the next section we will examine 
more closely the Telecoms Package campaign, before analyzing their action repertoire and 
discussing the relations between it and their underlying philosophy of openness. 
 
The Telecoms Package Campaign 
 
The adoption or reform of a European directive, following the co-decision procedure, 
requires the agreement of both the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the EU. On 
November 13, 2007, the European Commission proposed a first set of amendments to reform 
the five directives12, that compose the EU Telecommunications Rules of 2002. The 
amendments were then discussed at Committee stage13 in the EP where new amendments 
were introduced before being voted during the EP’s first reading on September 24, 2008. The 
Council of the EU rejected some of the amendments introduced by the EP, which led to a 
second reading on May 6, 2009 that was prepared by frequent negotiations between the three 
institutions and further committee amendments. On May 6, 2009 the EP adopted the texts on 
which a compromise had been reached with the Council of the EU, except for one known as 
“amendment 138”. Amendment 138 was tabled by MEPs from various political groups and 
countries and adopted by 88% of all MEPs in the first reading. In its original version, it reads 
                                                 
11 “A patch is a small piece of software designed to fix problems with or update a computer program or its 
supporting data.” (Wikipedia “Patch,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patch_(computing) (last accessed March 30, 
2010)  
12 Access Directive 2002/19/EC, Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC, Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, 
Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC and Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC. 
13 The Committees in charge were ITRE, IMCO, LIBE, CULT, ECON and JURI. 
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“no restriction may be imposed on the fundamental rights and freedoms of end-users, without 
a prior ruling by the judicial authorities” (at the time art. 8.4.g, Framework directive).  
From spring 2008 to November 2009, la Quadrature extensively covered the evolution of the 
legislative process and was particularly supportive of amendment 138, presented as 
preventing the introduction of “three strikes” in France where a legislative proposal 
introducing graduated response was tabled at the same time. Further amendments were 
problematic to the principle of net neutrality (the indiscriminate routing of content over the 
internet) or to the respect of privacy in digital realms. Their actions were twofold: at the 
French level with the HADOPI law14, and at the European level with the Telecoms Package. 
On the European level, la Quadrature du Net could count on a wider network of activists 
present in most member states who would engage their associations and networks during the 
various mobilizations. Their overall strategy consisted in striving to stop the French 
HADOPI law by preventing the adoption of any amendment that would allow “three-strikes” 
to be legalized at a European level. If possible, la Quadrature hoped to reject “graduated-
response” at the EU level so as to cut short the French legislative proposal before this one 
was adopted. 
At the outset of the reform, amendment 138 and references to “three strikes” or Net neutrality 
were not supposed to be in the Telecoms Package. The five directives under reform covered a 
wide range of issues aiming at increasing the competitiveness of the EU telecommunications 
market, such as the establishment of a European regulatory authority15, the management of 
radio and television spectrum, the stimulation of next-generation networks as well as issues 
of privacy, security and consumer protection. However, the agendas of the French HADOPI 
draft law and the reform of the Telecoms Package run in parallel and the heated debates at the 
French level soon spilled over to the EU process. 
The adoption of the original version of amendment 138 by the EP’s second reading led to a 
further extension of the legislative process. On November 24, 2009, the EP and the Council 
finally reached an agreement on a modified version of amendment 138 that replaces “prior 
ruling by the judicial authorities “by prior fair and impartial procedure”16. The compromise 
removed the reference to the compulsory implication of a judge, which would have 
lengthened the procedure that can now be carried out by an administrative authority. 
Furthermore a declaration by the European Commission on Net neutrality was added, 
promising to work on this issue during 2010. 
During the eighteen months of the Telecoms Package campaign, la Quadrature launched a 
series of actions. These included for instance frequent press releases, analyzes of the 
contested aspect of the package that were posted online, send to MEPs and to journalists, 
                                                 
14 Loi n°2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet. In English: 
Law n°2006-660 of June 12, 2009 facilitating the diffusion and protection of creation on the internet. HADOPI 
stands for Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection des Droits sur Internet, or High 
Authority of Diffusion of the Art Works and Protection of the (Copy)Rights on the Internet.  
15 After long negotiations between member states, the EP and the Council agreed on the establishment of a new 
EU Telecoms agency, BEREL (Body Regulators for Electronic Communications) 
16 http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/Telecoms_Package_Amendment138_compromise_20091105 (last accessed 
23/01/2010) 
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mobilizations of citizens to contact their MEPs either by phone, e-mail or by a postcard 
action during the 2008 summer months. In order to help and encourage citizens to contact 
their MEPs, la Quadrature provided example letters, questions to ask MEPs and advice on 
how to write to a political representative, insisting on the importance of sending personal 
messages and no standard texts. A benevolent supporter of la Quadrature also wrote a script, 
Political Memory, listing all MEPs and their voting behavior during previous votes 
considered as relevant by la Quadrature (see below).  
Interviews with several advisors and members of the EP showed that these online actions 
resulted in repeated emails, phone calls and letters to MEPs as well as growing media 
attention regarding this particular amendment. All of the persons encountered inside the EP, 
whether allies of la Quadrature or holding opposite views, attested of their influence on the 
legislative project with “reflections of the campaign all over the adopted Telecoms Package” 
(EP committee staff, Interview 32, Brussels, January 2010). A scrutinized analysis of the 
precise effect of this campaign is beyond the scope of the paper. The point we wish to make 
here is that internet-based activism can have a clear impact on EU decision-making. The 
following section will analyze more closely the various tools used by la Quadrature for 
sustaining their claims and analyze the way in which they mirror the culture of open source 
they are part of. 
 
Open Source as an Action Repertoire 
 
Next to mailing lists, emails, and IRC channels, la Quadrature du Net relies primarily on its 
main website (fig. 1) as its central platform for distributing information to interested 
individuals. The website presents the collective, the challenges at stake and offers frequent 
news updates, press releases and analyzes written by la Quadrature activists. The website 
links directly to the wiki via a tab and indirectly via the tools section. A core activist 
distinguishes these sites in the following words:  
“We use two types of sites: production sites, let’s say sites that are content 
management sites for the editorial communication, so that’s where a small number 
of people have editing rights on these sites, and wikis for things that need to be the 
most agile in editing, for example, we use wikis essentially for what we call 
mobilizational pages.” (Interview 13*, Paris, May 200917) 
The website is the primary showcase of la Quadrature and the claims they defend. It lists 
frequent updates concerning the Telecoms Package as well as the French HADOPI law and 
related legislative texts. The website is bilingual, French and English. The organization of the 
campaign the translations are managed via their to-do list18, IRC discussions and frequent 
email exchanges.  
 
                                                 
17 Interview quotes with an * are translated from French by the author. 
18 http://www.laquadrature.net/todo  (last accessed 23/01/2010) 
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the English version of La Quadrature du Net’s website19  
 
In terms of Stein’s typology of communicative functions of web-spaces presented in section 
1, la Quadrature’s website and wiki fulfils most of these: they provide information, promote 
interaction and dialogue, assist action and mobilization, make lateral linkages, serve as 
outlets for creative expression, and aim to generate further resources for the campaign (2009, 
p. 752-753). These functions are interrelated in practice yet gain from being distinguished 
here for heuristic reasons. As generating resources has been largely absent from the 
Telecoms Package campaign20, it will not be examined here along with the five previous 
functions identified by Stein. 
Information: La Quadrature seeks to increase the informational transparency and openness of 
political decision-making. Both the wiki and the website aim to inform citizens about the 
Telecoms Package (and other issues not discussed here). Frequent press releases keep 
interested individuals or groups up to date on the latest developments concerning the 
Telecoms Package. La Quadrature publicizes information they have obtained from inside the 
EP and take position on the process. They also want to ease the access to the Telecoms 
Package text in itself. A benevolent founder of la Quadrature du Net developed LawTracks21 
(fig. 3), an open source tool that allows any internet user to compare different versions of 
Telecoms Package articles considered as problematic by la Quadrature. 
 
 
                                                 
19 http://www.laquadrature.net/ (screenshot taken on 20/01/2010) 
20 Generating resources has not been a central component of the Telecoms Package campaign which was 
supported by an OSI funding as explained above. This aspect will therefore not be developed in more detail 
below. 
21 http://www.laquadrature.net/lawtracks/Telecoms_package/ (last accessed on 20/01/2010) 
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Figure 2: Excerpt comparing the three institutions' changes to the  
Telecoms Package using LawTracks22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A link to the software used for generating this database explains furthermore how it can be 
installed and adapted – freely – for other uses. The original texts of the directives are 
extracted from EUR-Lex, a European platform that provides free access to EU law texts23. 
These texts are available in the four official EU working languages (English, French, German 
and Spanish) but further translations can be added.  
Interaction and dialogue: discussion is at the base of how la Quadrature du Net takes its 
decisions, generally on their IRC channel or on mailing lists. This means that any interested 
individual can intervene in the discussion, propose his analysis of a legislative aspect or give 
an advice on how to lobby a particular MEP. Discussion is not encouraged on the website or 
wiki as no comment places are provided. This is due to the fact that their purpose is mainly 
informational. Nonetheless, contact numbers are provided to reach core campaigners and a 
link invites supporters to join the mailing list or the IRC channel. 
Action and mobilization: Enabling the participation of persons is a central component of La 
Quadrature’s activities. Citizens are asked to participate in various ways. They can contribute 
to la Quadrature by looking at their wiki page ‘How to help’24, which lists the most recent 
tasks that need to be done. These include completing and improving the wiki, updating and 
facilitating navigation, improving the internet site, relay the message by talking to family, 
friends and colleagues about la Quadrature and of course spreading the word on the internet 
via social media icons present underneath each article, contributing to the press review, 
translating pages, taping videos and analyzing them, as well as generating logos, web buttons 
                                                 
22 http://www.laquadrature.net/lawtracks/Telecoms_package/ (screenshot taken on 10/01/2010) 
23 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (last accessed on 20/01/2010) 
24 http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/How_to_Help (last accessed 23/01/2010) 
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or banners25. For more information, visitors are invited to join the discussion on the various 
IRC channels of la Quadrature. 
The wiki offers a central platform for engaging supporters in the organization of the 
campaign. It is licensed under a GNU Free Documentation Licence 1.2 powered by 
MediaWiki (like Wikipedia). It offers latest news on the evolution of the decision-making 
process la Quadrature is interested in. Its main function is however to serve as the resource 
page for preparing the campaign. One core activist explains its use: 
“The wiki is a completely central tool. We use the content management Drupal that 
allows to quite finely pass one after the other to edit, change, make revisions, 
compare revisions, tag, publish the press review in which we put, as you might 
have seen, all the articles. The ones that talk about us, the ones that quote us... that 
helps afterwards to extract the list of the most important stuff for the financials, to 
show them how we work or things like that. And everything is intimately linked of 
course to the use of these web tools.” (Interview 12*, Berlin, April 2009) 
Figure 3: Wiki Site of La Quadrature du Net 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The wiki enables flexible participation (Joyce, 2007) although only a small number of 
persons participate in practice: 
Interviewee: As soon as we have the amendments,... already we have the 
amendments as early as possible,... we hurry to produce an analysis as early as 
possible to put it on the wiki, so that people participate already. In reality, it’s 80% 
ourselves who do it and people will maybe come edit the two things that interest 
                                                 
25 http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/Comment_aider (last accessed 23/01/2010) 
26 http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/Main_Page (screenshot taken on 20/01/2010) 
 Politics of Open Source  95 
them or change a spelling mistake or stuff like that but they have the possibility to 
do it.  
Interviewer: Who? Anybody?  
Interviewee: It doesn’t matter whom. Anyway, we see the modifications so we can 
always come back if it doesn’t please us. 
(Interview 12*, Berlin, April 2009) 
The type of participation promoted by la Quadrature is similar to the collaborative 
development model of free and open source software projects. People with an interest in 
joining are free to do so and a person is judged upon his analyzing or programming skills, not 
on his professional or social status. The result of this collaborative work is then shared with 
any person who would like to access or use it. Sharing is generally promoted by open source 
culture. 
Lateral linkages: La Quadrature du Net uses hyperlinks to refer to various other sources: 
mainstream news coverage of the Telecoms Package and their campaign, and the websites of 
like-minded associations and groups, which support their activities. Their press releases 
always link to the sources where the information comes from, frequently official reports.  
Next to LawTracks, la Quadrature uses another open source tool: political memory accessible 
via their wiki. Political memory started off as a memory-help for one of the activists. The 
tool lists all MEPs and their voting behavior on reports and directives la Quadrature is 
concerned with. Initially designed for personal use, political memory developed into a 
toolbox intended to help citizens to keep track of what each MEP voted and expressed in a 
plenary debate for example, associated with a Quadrature rating on how favorable the vote is 
to their positions. Political memory is intended to help citizens contact their MEPs, listing all 
the necessary contact information and offering a search interface for finding an MEP. Every 
time an MEP is referred to in an online document, a hyperlink connects directly to the 
political memory interface for further information on and contact details of the political 
representative. 
Creative expression: Creativity is an important principle put forward by la Quadrature. 
People are encouraged to contribute as they see fit and by letting their creative expression 
guide their individual actions. In sum, la Quadrature considers itself a “toolbox” as one core 
campaigner explains: 
“Me what I like most actually, it’s to be a toolbox, to allow people to understand what 
is happening and to allow them to act, to give them the tools to act.” (Interview 12*, 
Berlin, April 2009) 
During the Telecoms Package campaign, la Quadrature du Net encouraged citizens to create 
their own banners and spread the message in any form they liked. The claims and tools used 
by la Quadrature reveal an underlying philosophy of doing, as one supporter explains: 
“Tools like LawTracks, comparison tools of the various phases of a text, or tools like 
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political memory that try, let’s say to memorize and to make available the action of 
various members of parliament of different countries... I believe there is an innovation 
component that matches our culture of doing, of action let’s say but not to do whatever 
but to produce, that presumably finds its source in the free software movement but that 
inhabits a wider space today” (Interview 13*, Paris, May 2009). 
The link to the FLOSS movement is also clear when examining the use of so-called Web 2.0 
platforms by la Quadrature activists. There are no overarching guidelines on which tools 
should be used so every supporter can use a variety of different platforms. Some, like 
Facebook, are however contested by core campaigners of the group. The use of personal data 
and the protection of privacy are of concern to various supporters who refuse to create a 
Facebook account. La Quadrature uses a Facebook page, created by a supporter, which is 
regularly updated with their latest news. However, none of the core activists uses it. 
Similarly, the open source microblogging site identi.ca is preferred to the use of Twitter, 
some supporters using both by linking their Twitter profile to identi.ca. For one core activist: 
“Actually, whether it’s for these Web 2.0 tools or even blogs, at the end there is little 
difference with what you can do with the internet since its beginning. Simply, there are 
more tools that make things easier for people who do not know, who do not write 
HTML code or things like that. Then, even for people who know how to write, after all 
it’s more productive to write directly a blog page than to write an HTML page” 
(Interview 20*, Paris, November 2009) 
The philosophy of open source informs the content as well as the tools used by la 
Quadrature. This leads to innovative approaches, such as the creation of tools for facilitating 
the monitoring of the decision-making process, but also leads to the non (or only partial) 
adoption of some applications, such as the social networking site Facebook, considered as 
conflicting with the FLOSS principles that inspire Quadrature du Net activists. 
Discussion 
La Quadrature du Net’s Telecoms Package campaign provides a rich empirical ground to 
further the academic debate on “new” forms of internet-based activism and its relation to 
open source principles. The case study presented in section 4 shows how la Quadrature used 
various internet tools in order to intervene on a complex set of European directives regulating 
the telecommunications market. 
The values of the citizen collective are based on a particular conception of what the internet 
is, a decentralized network enabling citizens to participate and express themselves freely. As 
such it needs to be safeguarded when threatened by legislative reforms such as copyright or 
network regulations. La Quadrature promotes principles of freedom, participation, openness, 
transparency, sharing and access to information that are embedded both in the claims they 
support and the tools they use. 
Regarding freedom, la Quadrature fights against repressive regulations that might harm the 
“architecture of participation” built in the internet. They consider the internet as a revolution 
as important as the invention of the printing press by Gutenberg. For Benjamin Bayart, a 
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supporter of la Quadrature, “the printing press allowed people to read, the internet will allow 
them to write”27. Freedom of expression but also freedom to create and the protection of 
privacy and equality in the access to internet services are core values upheld by la Quadrature 
activists. 
Participation and collaboration are the founding principles of how la Quadrature works. Just 
as many internet-based movements, they take advantage of the internet for reaching out to 
citizens, inform and debate at relatively low costs. Yet, contrary to other protest groups, they 
fully exploit their technological skills in order to involve like-minded people in the very 
organization of the campaign. The majority of the campaign work is however accomplished 
by core activists, most of whom contribute on a voluntary basis.  
An important aspect of la Quadrature’s work is to improve the openness and transparency of 
policy making. They do not only defend principles of openness but work to improve the 
transparency of EU decision-making. Tools such as LawTracks or political memory are direct 
consequences of this aim. This is a particularly important challenge posed to EU decision-
making, often criticized for its inherent democratic deficit. La Quadrature furthermore works 
to sustain the power of the European Parliament, the only directly elected body of the EU, 
towards other entities such as the Council of the EU or the European Commission. 
The action repertoire of la Quadrature is informed by free and open source principles. 
Everything that is produced by the activists is meant to be shared with any interested person 
and thus made widely accessible online. Furthermore, they also publish information that is 
already available elsewhere – on European Union internet sites for instance – and pay special 
attention to the use of open formats. Increasing the access to information of individual 
citizens is an overarching aim of their actions. 
Furthermore, the attitude towards technology defended by la Quadrature activists is close to 
the hacker culture. They have a wide array of digital skills at their disposal and use 
technology as a means to open up the political process. Compared to other forms of internet-
based activism, they represent a particular and rather effective strand. Yet, mobilizational 
challenges are not overcome by the sheer use of the internet. Difficulties to make their voice 
heard and to engage citizens in their actions remain characteristic of any type of activism. 
Their campaigns are not only technology-mediated. Internet use is certainly a central aspect 
of la Quadrature, but being present inside the European Institutions is even more crucial for 
convincing decision-makers and obtaining information that can be redistributed online. 
Finally, the paper shows that the internet has become a central place, tool and object of 
political battles. Activists defending open source principles are eager to defend their 
particular vision of a free and open internet architecture. In order to do so, they intensively 
rely on internet-based tools and arguments that lead to the confrontation of particular know-
hows, habits and ways of thinking that used to be reserved to experts and technicians 
(Riemens, 2002) with traditional decision-making practices. 
                                                 
27 http://www.ecrans.fr/L-imprimerie-a-permis-au-peuple-de,8351.html (last accessed 22/01/2010) 
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Future Research 
This case study has shown how open source informs both the claims and the action repertoire 
of a new type of internet-based activism. Further research is however needed to explore such 
phenomena in more detail. We notably argue for a comparative study of open source protest 
groups in various contexts. Indeed, most Western countries, but also developing ones, are 
confronted to changes in intellectual property rights legislations. The current negotiations 
surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) between various countries, 
the Telecoms Package reform and the French HADOPI law show that such regulations are 
taking place on various levels of decision-making and in various countries. Internet-based 
actors such as la Quadrature du Net are often involved on all these levels, trying to build 
transnational networks with like-minded activists. Research will need to further assess to 
what extent one can speak about a free culture or open source movement regarding such 
activism. La Quadrature du Net’s Telecoms Package campaign is not an isolated event but 
takes place in a larger context of power struggles. Further studies about the philosophy 
underlying such actions, the tools they use, the way they organize and interact with 
“traditional” structures are necessary to understand current trends in ‘glocalised’ societies. 
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Introduction 
Open source software (OSS), also known as Free/Libre/Open Source Software (FLOSS), 
presents an important case of innovation in software production and distribution. The 
voluminous literature on OSS includes Steven Weber’s (2005) The Success of Open Source 
and Joseph Feller et al.’s (2007) Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software in addition 
to various other works (e.g., Hahn 2002, Weber 2005, Dibona et al. 2005, Bitzer and 
Schroder 2006, Ghosh 2006). Raymond’s (1999) seminal work on OSS portrays a dichotomy 
between proprietary software and OSS as a cathedral and a bazaar, respectively. The analogy 
plays on the systematic and revered construction of a cathedral (for proprietary) versus a 
buzzing bazaar full of decentralized activity (for open source). This paper advances 
scholarship on the distribution of the bazaar on a global scale by adding empirical detail to 
the ever-growing literature on both the theory of OSS and its firms and developers. The 
analysis provides more information about the development, adoption, and diffusion of OSS 
technology and methods. This initial inquiry into its prevalence should inform the ever-
increasing debate and scholarly interest in OSS. 
The decision to implement technologies and technological processes is a function of a range 
of social, economic, and political variables. The involvement of governmental policymakers 
and regulators, both at the national and sub-national levels, is a critical factor in the 
deployment and adoption of technologies, both explicitly (in terms of specifications, 
technical standards, requirements for adoption, etc.) as well as implicitly (the apparent 
favoring of a technology by government officials as a “pull” factor). This present inquiry 
maps out the terrain of OSS activity and measures factors that drive OSS potential. 
Developing a standardized heuristic (in this case, an index) for assessing a country’s adoption 
of OSS can inform future inquiries into both the causes and consequences of where a country 
falls on a “cathedral-to-bazaar” continuum.  
To develop an index of OSS, a conceptual model is introduced that draws a distinction 
between OSS activity levels and the potential for OSS development. The conceptual model 
draws on interviews with experts in the OSS industry and numerous studies in the literature 
to identify relevant indicators. Section 2 describes this literature and expert opinion 
underpinning the index framework. Section 3 outlines the data collected. Section 4 discusses 
the construction of indices for robust measurement of OSS activity and potential at a national 
level. Section 5 reports the results for the OSS indices and sensitivity tests. The final section 
discusses the broader implications. 
 
Background 
Literature 
While a variety of different approaches exist for the design of an instrument such as an open 
source index, generally improved validity flows from a systematic examination of supporting 
literature. In order to devise an index, relevant insights and themes were culled from the 
existing literature and interviews with software industry experts who specialize in OSS. The 
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results of this literature review are summarized next. 
In addition to technological issues, social, cultural, and policy issues also impact OSS 
diffusion and adoption (Gosain 2003, Lin 2006, Vaisman 2007, Lewis 2008). The social and 
policy sciences might be said to have arrived relatively late to the “OSS party.” This may be 
due, in large part, to the paucity of relevant data on the OSS. Ghosh (2007) explains why 
little empirical evidence exists for explaining why or how the open source model works. 
Hard data on the monetary value of OSS collaborative development is almost non-existent. 
This limits economic evaluations, and non-economic activity such as the creation and 
development of free software is hard to measure in any quantifiable sense. Ghosh contends, 
therefore, that the lack of objective, “census-type” sources means that many indicators, 
quantitative and qualitative, may require the use of surveys, which can be costly and 
unwieldy. Again, with respect to the development of a robust global open source index, the 
availability of accurate data sources for a wide range of countries is a critical factor in this 
emerging research area. A number of social scientists have observed the critical data 
constraint facing this research area (Van Wendel de Joode et al. 2006).  
The calls for more social science and policy research into OSS have been numerous. Weber 
(2000) identifies three key issues for social scientists to investigate: (1) motivation of 
individuals who develop open source; (2) coordination of activities in the supposed absence 
of a hierarchical structure, and (3) growing complexity in open source projects and its 
management. While the purpose of this analysis is to better portray the landscape of OSS 
activity globally, these issues—in particular the research on motivation (e.g., David and 
Shapiro 2008, Krishnamurthy 2006, Lerner and Tirole 2005b)—indirectly inform the design 
of the indices and the selection of indicator variables.  
Several themes consistently emerge from the literature. First, technology adoption at the 
national (country) level is often emphasized. Second, analyses of public-sector OSS adoption 
usually focus on relevant policy issues. Third, literature on the private sector rarely goes to 
level of the individual firm. Beyond these issues of adoption, the literature routinely 
recognizes developer roles in adoption and use. Finally, and almost universally, economic 
issues pertaining to open source software capture the attention of researchers, but study is 
still impeded by a lack of quantitative evidence. 
Adoption at national (country) level: Scholars have examined the adoption of open source by 
national governments, particularly through the passage of laws and regulations. By 2001, 
Peru, Brazil, Argentina, France, and Mexico all had measures pending that would mandate 
the use of open source software on government computers (Lewis 2008). Other national and 
sub-national efforts were made in countries such as Germany, Spain, Italy, and Vietnam to 
establish official alternatives to the use of closed, proprietary software by government (Lewis 
2008). When considering open source adoption at the national level, one key issue is 
governmental, educational, and “third-sectoral” interests in pursuing this option. 
Public Sector Adoption and Public Policy Issues: Whereas some governments have begun to 
procure open source software, others, such as Japan, Korea, and China, have actually 
channeled public funds to large-scale open source development projects (Chae and 
McHanney 2006). The distinction here, as made by Lee (2006), is that a nation that 
 Politics of Open Source  107 
“considers” OSS signifies its desire to establish a level playing field within the public 
sector’s information technology procurement policies. Such a policy is not necessarily “pro-
OSS” because it neither constitutes a government preference for OSS, nor mandates the 
government to choose it. However, when policy makers decide to “prefer” OSS over 
proprietary software, the decision is likely to be criticized by proprietary software developers 
as procurement discrimination. Other issues germane for policy makers include OSS’s impact 
on e-government initiatives. Berry and Moss (2006) discuss circumstances in which the 
discourse and practice of non-proprietary software contribute to e-government’s openness 
and democratization. OSS can protect and extend transparency and accountability in e-
governments, as well as offer opportunities for citizens, non-governmental organizations, 
public administrators, and private firms to socially shape OSS’s direction. Finally, policy 
issues such as standards settings and open licensing, both of which structure the deployment 
of open source software, are inherently political processes that also impact technological 
choices (Simon 2005, Seiferth 1999). 
Private Sector Adoption and Use: Within national contexts, the private sector, specifically 
any firm reliant on information technology, still remains an important stakeholder group 
when considering the opportunities and barriers to the adoption of open source. Notably, 
Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2006) call attention to the factors informing private sector decisions 
about whether to embrace or reject open source. Considerations include economic (price and 
license constraints), social (conforming to values of OSS community), and technological 
(exploiting feedback and contributions from developers, promoting standardization, security 
issues) motivations. 
Role of Developers in Adoption and Use Decisions: The motivations of open source 
developers in the literature have generally been explained in the literature through a 
taxonomy that considers two components of motivation—intrinsic (e.g., fun, flow, learning, 
community) and extrinsic (e.g., financial rewards, improving future job prospects, signaling 
proficiency to others) (Lerner and Tirole 2005a). Krishnamurthy (2006) identifies four 
important mitigating and moderating factors in the conversation surrounding developer 
motivation: (1) financial incentives, (2) nature of task, (3) group size, and (4) group structure. 
Such issues are important because the motivations of open source developers shape socially 
the adoption of these systems by firms and governmental agencies. Lin (2006) argues that 
open source development entails a global knowledge network, which consists of: (1) a 
heterogeneous community of individuals and organizations who do not necessarily have 
professional backgrounds in computer science, but who have at least developed the 
competency to understand programming and work within a public domain, and (2) 
corporations, which results in a hybrid form of software development and distribution. 
Economic Issues Pertaining to Open Source Software: Much of the literature on OSS 
adoption involves the work of economists, many of whom are intrigued by OSS’s distinctive 
mode of technological development, innovation, and distribution, especially its non-
proprietary and community-based nature. Lerner and Tirole (2005a) suggest four major 
issues of interest to scholars studying open source software: (1) technological characteristics 
conducive to smooth open source development, (2) optimal licensing of open source, (3) the 
coexistence of open source and proprietary software, and (4) the potential for the open source 
model to be carried over to other industries. Forge’s (2006) analysis of the packaged software 
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industry extends Lerner and Tirole’s third point in the context of European economic 
development, where encouraging OSS may provide a strategic counterbalance against 
concerns that a few, select proprietary software firms exert excessive market power. 
 
Expert Interviews 
A series of in-depth interviews with OSS experts and professionals were conducted in order 
to inform the design of an index measuring OSS activity. This critical source of insight was 
gathered from a variety of informant sources via semi-structured interviews conducted jointly 
by the authors. The interviews were performed in person and, for international informants, 
via telephone, and each lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. Over a dozen informants were 
selected from a variety of leadership roles (directors of developer relations, regional markets, 
legal affairs, policy) within a major international open-source software firm. Building on 
their cooperation, the interview team then contacted a dozen foreign IT professionals with 
expertise in the OSS arena, with regional representation including Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, France, Germany, Spain, India, China, the Middle East, Australia and the South 
Pacific. The interviews discussed such matters as what constitutes OSS activity, on what 
scales OSS activity can and should be measured, and what facilitates or hinders OSS 
development and adoption. There was considerable variation in the answers received, even 
from people within the same organization. Follow-up questions helped to reconcile the 
variety of responses and start to build a “modal” conception of OSS activity, what composes 
its critical dimensions, and how to make an index most useful to the professionals and 
experts in the arena. Quite interestingly, there was strong sentiment among stakeholders for 
making the index (of open source activity) itself “open source.” Keeping the construction of 
the index transparent, using only public and accessible data sources, and allowing for 
subsequent modification by the user community were seen as vital elements to any OSS 
index. The authors agree with this rationale on the grounds that the Index described here will 
be open to further study and improvement.  
 
Index Design: Conceptual Issues 
The design of an open source index poses several interesting challenges. First is the tension 
between actual, observed OSS activity and latent, potential OSS activity. Both OSS activity 
and OSS potential have received attention in the scholarly literature, especially whenever 
questions arise about the future of OSS, the success of OSS relative to proprietary software, 
or areas where OSS (or institutions or policies) is seen to lag in comparison to other countries 
or regions. The distinction between active OSS development and adoption versus the 
potential for such also arose during the expert interviews. Hence, the authors have addressed 
this dichotomy by developing two different indices, one capturing “activity” (conceptually 
similar to adoption) and the other capturing “potential” (roughly related to propensity or 
capacity) in OSS. The open source activity index (A) and the open source potential index (P) 
are constructed in parallel fashion. The following section describes the basic construction 
including operational concepts, selection and categorization of variables, and design 
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considerations for modularity and aggregation.  
The open source indices are each composed of dimensions, indicators, and variables. Figure 
1 depicts this generic structure. The three dimensions of both the Activity Index and the 
Potential Index are composed of government, firm, and community categories. Each 
dimension is then operationalized by indicators, which are generated by a transformation or 
aggregation of the actual underlying variables (data). Each variable in the inventory of data 
sets is therefore linked to the dimensions via indicators. Of course, an alternative index could 
employ more, fewer, or different dimensions. These three dimensions1 emerged consistently 
from the expert interviews, and most published research on the social and policy aspects of 
OSS connects closely to at least one of these dimensions. A lengthy candidate variable list is 
based on the theoretical issues from the literature, consideration of insights and observations 
from expert informants, and data availability. To develop a global index (rather than just for 
OECD nations, for instance), with a prerequisite that data be publicly accessible, the data 
availability criteria proved particularly limiting. 
Figure 1: Generic index construction 
  
 INDEX = f1(Dimension1, ..., Dimensioni, …., DimensionI) 
  Dimensioni = f2(Indicator1, ..., Indicator j, … , IndicatorJ)   i=1,…,I 
       Indicatorj = f3(Variablej)   j=1,…,J 
 
A second design consideration relates to both transparency and modularity in the construction 
of the index. Each candidate variable for inclusion in an index must be identified for a 
reason; therefore, it is linked to either the Activity or the Potential index. It is also 
categorized based on one of the three dimensions: government (G), firms (F), or community 
(C). Each variable is further categorized as being either a direct variable (related to or 
impacting OSS specifically) or an indirect, contextual variable (e.g., GDP, employment by 
sector, civil liberties). More direct variables are often preferred because of their closer 
relationship to OSS, although they are scarcer and limited in the number of countries they 
cover. Both academic researchers and expert informants recognize these data limitations and 
regularly employ or recommend indirect variables to describe OSS activity and potential 
until better data is available. The indices here do likewise in a transparent fashion. Finally, 
each variable is also categorized as either a ratio or interval measure, for reasons explained 
below.  
A third major design concern relates to the aggregation and “weighting” of variables. In 
terms of Figure 1, choosing the f1 and f2 functions are critical to the index performance. 
Without some externally validated model to impose structure and weights on the combination 
                                                 
1 The government dimension included issues of policy and procurement, legal standards, property rights and IP 
law, civil liberties and democracy and corruption in governance, R&D funding, treaty participation, and other 
policies. The firms dimension involved commercial enterprises, generally speaking, as well as the broader 
economy, the ICT infrastructure and workforce, prosperity, and de novo economic and infrastructural growth. 
The community dimension includes primarily educational attributes like the human capital of the population, 
computer literacy and training (in CS or in OSS specifically), and the cultural affinity for OSS participation. 
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of the indicator variables, the design choices by the authors may seem arbitrary. This is a risk 
facing all such indices, such as the Human Development Index used by the United Nations, 
the Civil Liberties Index of Freedom House, or the Body Mass Index. In recognition of this 
important concern, the approach here takes several steps to address possible arbitrariness in 
construction. First, the index construction is based on an extensive review of the relevant 
literature and on in-depth interviews with numerous stakeholders. The literature review and 
interviews were conducted to reveal the relative importance and interrelationships of various 
themes identified above. Second, several alternative models for the open source index are 
developed here—each with substantively different designs—allowing for tests of 
correspondence in index values across alternative models (a type of convergent validity 
check). If the alternative models yield largely similar results from the index, this lends 
confidence that the index is not merely an artifact of some arbitrary design choices. The 
alternative models might best be thought of as experimental approaches to designing a 
practical open source index. Third, the index construction is fully transparent and replicable 
by others, inviting everyone to test for sensitivity and make improvements. 
Lastly, the index construction is influenced by lessons learned in the extensive literature on 
environmental sustainability indicators. Like the sustainability indices, of which there are 
over 15 competing and contested variants, the open source indices require constructing novel 
indices of complex phenomena where relative weights of indicators might be contested. In 
particular, care is paid to mitigate the sensitivity of index values to arbitrary weighting and 
aggregation choices made by the researchers, along the lines of Ebert and Welsch (2004). If 
an index’s rankings shuffle greatly because of different indicator weights, variable 
transformation (e.g., log or raw income), or other aggregation rules, then the index itself 
becomes suspect without a credible theory dictating the “appropriate” weight, transformation, 
or aggregation rule in the OSS index. Ebert and Welsch (2004) show how using a geometric 
mean (unlike arithmetic means) of ratio variables (rather than interval variables) in the index 
preserves the rank ordering, regardless of the transformations or weights chosen.2 This 
robustness to arbitrary weighting and transformations is a particularly attractive property of 
the index, and thus geometric means of ratio variables will be preferred as the f2 function (see 
Figure 1) whenever possible. 
Index Construction 
Open Source Index Models 
The following section details the actual construction of the models for the Activity and 
Potential Indices. We also construct a third index to measure a different OSS-related concept, 
the ratio of activity to potential (Ratio = A/P), where the resulting value could be interpreted 
as a measure of “realized potential.” Nations with very large Ratio values will tend to exhibit 
more OSS activity relative to what their contextual or environmental factors would predict. 
(A Ratio is available for each pair of A and P computed.) After some experimentation, 
several alternative models to construct those indices are proposed here. To indicate the 
                                                 
2 Ratio variables are those that have natural zero values, such as “population” or “number of Firefox installs.” 
Interval variables, on the other hand, do not have natural zeros, such as “degrees Fahrenheit” or “a dummy 
variable for whether Linux supports the native language.”  
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differences in how the index is constructed, each index is denoted with two subscripts. The 
first subscript indicates the aggregation rules used (technically, which f1 and f2 functions are 
employed). The second subscript indicates which set of variables is used. Each model 
captures different aspects of the underlying phenomena and consequently has different 
advantages and limitations. We first discuss data limitations, variable coverage of countries, 
variable type designations, and aggregation methods. 
 
Variables and Data Sources  
  Data limitations. 
The OSS indices constructed here employ numerous datasets that are publicly available (with 
one exception). In a perfect world the indices would draw on a wide variety of datasets 
populated with systematically, consistently, and comprehensively measured data. Because of 
the nature of existing international data, however, most variables cover only a limited number 
of countries and years. In practice, there is a trade-off between the number of countries 
directly modeled and the range of variables included that span that in turn cover all the 
countries. Conversely, the larger the number of variables included in the Index the smaller 
the number of countries for which complete and up-to-date data exist. There are of course 
several ways in which to deal with this. Future efforts to develop these indices should 
improve the inclusiveness both cross-sectionally (number of countries) and longitudinally 
(over time) in the dataset. This is particularly important for the variables directly related to 
OSS.  
  Variable coverage (L, S). 
To show this trade-off, this paper reports indices for a “long” and a “short” list of countries. 
Variables are classified according to whether they cover a “short” (roughly N < 100) or a 
“long” (N > 120) list of countries. “Short” (S) variables tend to be of higher quality or more 
directly related to important indicators, whereas “long” (L) variables are more general and 
only indirectly relate. The index construction recognizes this balance and separately creates 
“short” and “long” versions of each index—where the latter sacrifices some variable quality 
in order to obtain greater coverage of countries. In one sense, the comparison is between a 
higher-quality index measuring OSS activity/potential among relatively “elite” countries and 
a lower-quality index measuring OSS activity/potential among a more inclusive group. 
  Variable types (B, R). 
Following Figure 1, indices A and P are computed here using the same general structure: 
combining multiple dimensions, several indicators for each dimensions, and variables 
measuring those indicators. Table 1 first shows the various indicators for each dimension. 
Table 1 also lists the names of the variables chosen for each indicator in the A and P indices. 
(Note that the top variable of each pair in a cell is the “long” variable). Variables are further 
classified according to their nature as interval- or ratio-scale measures and whether they are 
the best available variable for a particular indicator. The best available proxy for each 
indicator is listed under that column in Table 1. More direct measures are preferred to 
 Politics of Open Source  112 
indirect measures of the indicator, when available. The best long or short variable may differ 
for some indicators. Similarly, the best available ratio-scale proxy variable is listed under that 
column in Table 1. Ratio-scale variables possess useful properties for preserving rank-
ordering, as discussed. Logically, the best variable differs from the ratio-scale variable only 
when the best variable is an interval-scale measure. In general, each set of indicators is drawn 
from variables that are either best (B) or ratio-scale (R) and either short (S) or long (L) 
depending on how many missing values it has. Thus, there are several variations of each 
index A or P, denoted with subscripts either BL, BS, RL, or RS to indicate the set of variables 
used in its construction. Many of the variables are shared across multiple models in this 
application. Definitions and sources for the variables listed in Table 13 can be found in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. 
 
 Additional variables. 
Although Table 1 lists the primary variables (those used in all the indices), they are drawn 
from a much larger pool of candidate variables—each of which is classified similarly (i.e., as 
long, short, best, ratio, interval) and associated with an indicator. Additional variables, 
beyond those in Table 1, appear in Table A1. Indices constructed with a weighted average 
make use of additional variables indirectly measuring OSS aspects of a country, as described 
below. For instance, the “Firefox users” variable relates directly and “PCs per capita” 
variable relates indirectly to the household installs indicator (an activity indicator in the 
Community dimension). 
 
  Missing values. 
Missing values are prevalent in the datasets used here and, unfortunately, require difficult 
choices and compromises in order to produce an index. Rather than collect primary data, this 
analysis occasionally imputes missing data. Because many variables were missing values for 
most of the countries, imputation is resorted to only in the rare instances when it was both 
very useful (e.g., imputing a single value meant that the country would not be dropped from 
the index) and when close proxies were available. Generally, rather than mask this tradeoff 
through statistical imputation techniques, the trade-off between data coverage (i.e., more 
countries in the index) and data quality (i.e., more and better variables in the index) is 
handled transparently in this analysis by reporting both L and S indices. 
A major concern in imputation is that the likelihood of a missing value for a particular 
country might be correlated with that (missing) value. Using other countries' values to impute 
the missing value might bias the estimated value if there is something special about the 
country with the missing observation that makes the countries with complete data non-
representative. This is especially likely to pose a problem for international data where, for  
                                                 
3 Notice the grey-shaded cells, where only 6 out of 46 cells do not have a suitable and available variable at this 
time. Filling in these blanks is a task for future research. For now, these gaps are minor and need not preclude 
the construction and testing of these preliminary indices. Only two out of the 23 total indicators have no 
variables available, and neither affect the potential index. 
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instance, a variable might be available only for OECD countries and, obviously, countries 
belonging to the OECD differ from non-OECD countries in numerous ways. Imputation is 
employed here only in instances when a particular county has a missing value in the current 
(i.e., most recent) year for which that variable is collected and there are earlier observations 
for that variable in that country. In these cases, a linear imputation is employed in order to 
estimate what the “current” value for that country would be (using only its prior years' 
values). 
 
Aggregations 
  Transformations (f3) and rescaling. 
Most variables are transformed via the f3 function in order to create the indicators. This initial 
transformation is critical because the index combines heterogeneous variables with widely 
varying units of measurement. Combining count variables (e.g., number of applications to 
Google’s “Summer of Code” program) with indicator variables (e.g., country has an OSS 
procurement policy) and with other types of variables requires transforming or rescaling the 
original input variables into more commensurable indicators. Similarly, scale effects arising 
from the variation in sheer size of countries can demand that some variables (e.g., number of 
Red Hat Certified Engineers) be measured proportional to country size. Without that 
rescaling, these variables would essentially proxy for country size rather than intensity of 
OSS activity or potential. Thus, all variables are normalized (i.e., transformed to a Z-score) 
before entering the index. Any other rescaling is described in the variable definition in Table 
A1.  
  Aggregating Indicators (f2) to obtain dimensions. 
After rescaling and normalization (and the few imputations) are completed, the next step is to 
settle on the f2 functions that aggregate the multiple indicators into single dimension values. 
These functions could include an arithmetic mean (a), a geometric mean (g), a maximum 
value (x), and a minimum value (i). Aggregating across different indicators within a 
particular dimension is also sensitive to instances where a country is missing values for one 
or more of those indicators. For the minimum, maximum, and arithmetic mean aggregations, 
missing values for the constituent indicators are ignored and the operation is applied to the 
remaining indicators (unless fewer than two indicators values existed, in which case the 
dimension value is also missing).  
A fourth type of aggregation function is also considered: the geometric mean. The geometric 
mean aggregation bears some distinction as being the most robust, in theory, to arbitrary 
scaling effects for ratio-scale variables (see Ebert and Welsch, 2004, and others). The 
advantage of geometric mean indices arises when ratio-scale variables are used, thus a g 
index will always imply R (ratio) variables. A trade-off arises here because several 
components of the indices such as measures of “liberty” or “language” are typically only 
found in interval-scale. For aggregation by geometric mean, the dimension value is assigned 
a “missing” value if all or all but one constituent indicators have missing values. This 
geometric aggregation rule limits its sensitivity to holes in the data (although, as a tradeoff, 
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fewer countries can be included in this index).  
  Aggregating dimensions (f1) to obtain indices. 
The last step in initially constructing the indices involves deciding on the aggregation 
function f1 to compile the three dimensions into a single, final index value. Common choices 
for aggregating the dimensions include arithmetic means (a), minimum values (i), and 
maximum values (x). Because the dimensions themselves are aggregates of indicators, this 
‘aggregation of aggregations’ permits a large number of combinations of the f1 and f2 
functions. Five basic combinations are reported here: aa (mean-mean, or arithmetic mean of 
arithmetic means), ag (mean-geometric mean, or arithmetic mean of geometric means), ia 
(mini-mean, or minimum of arithmetic means), and xi (maxi-min, or maximum of 
minimums).4 The first two are our preferred constructions, because they are easiest to 
interpret (aa) and have nice robustness properties (ag). The third is the “weakest” dimension, 
where dimensions are themselves averages. The fourth is the “best” dimension, where 
dimensions are measured by their weakest contributor. Of course, other aggregations are 
possible as well (e.g., ii or “mini-min”, xi or “maxi-min”). The many different combinations 
of aggregation rules (f1 and f2 functions) possible allow us to conduct sensitivity tests for the 
index.5 These sensitivity checks are discussed in Section 5.  
 The preferred constructions (aa, ag), reported in Section 4, highlight three attributes of the 
OSS index: robustness, ease of interpretation, and comprehensiveness. The robust index (ag) 
is an arithmetic mean of geometric means. Using the S (short country span) variables further 
enhances its robustness, while sacrificing some sample coverage. The more easily interpreted 
index (aa) is an arithmetic mean of arithmetic means, which is also the most comprehensive 
if the L (long country span) variable set is used. The index construction described here 
applies to both the activity (A) and the potential (P) indices.  
  Weighted average indices. 
The aa and ag aggregations give equal weights to the three dimensions (government, 
business, and community). Of course, the weight can be readily adjusted to suit other index 
users’ preferences or purposes. Although an equal weighting followed from our extensive 
review of the literature in conjunction with input from various industry sources, a weighted 
average is worth pursuing to check for sensitivity. Unfortunately, any weighting scheme risks 
the appearance of arbitrariness. To mitigate this, we introduce an endogenous weighting 
approach where the weights are based on existing relations in the data. In this approach, all 
proposed variables are classified as either directly related to OSS (e.g., Firefox downloads, 
government OSS policies, number of Red Hat Certified Engineers) or indirect, contextual 
                                                 
4 Just as the indicator aggregations (f2) were sensitive to missing values, so are the index aggregations (f1) of 
dimensions. The indicator aggregation rules described here allow the dimension value to be computed even if 
one or more indicator values are missing. The index aggregation rules used here, however, do not. If a country 
is missing a value for one or more of its dimensions, an index value is not computed for that country. 
5For each of three dimensions (government, firms, community), we consider five different aggregation rules for 
f2, two different sets of indicators depending on data coverage (L or S), and two different sets of indicators 
based on type (B or R). This generates, essentially, some 60 different possible sub-indices for A and 60 more 
for P, which are subjected to a sensitivity analysis. The results reported here are among the least sensitive to 
these choices and the extent of this sensitivity is reported in discussion section. 
 Politics of Open Source  116 
variables (e.g., GDP, employment by sector, civil liberty index). For the A index, dimension 
(G, F, C) values are then computed using the best direct measures of A available and an 
arithmetic mean (or minimum) aggregation f2. Next, each dimension value is regressed on the 
many indirect variables associated with A.6 The fitted values from each dimension's 
regression are then aggregated as a weighted average (f1), where the weights are the R2 
values from the regressions. Thus, the index value is a weighted average score across the 
different dimensions. The weights depend on how well the variables directly measuring OSS 
are explained by the indirect measures. The country's dimension values depend on its 
contextual values.  
Using fitted values to compose the dimension values has the dual advantages of enabling 
greater coverage (a country that has a missing value for the direct variable can still have a 
predicted value) and of purging the dimension values of larger residuals or anomalous values 
in direct measures. Allowing the weights to derive from the auxiliary regressions replaces an 
arbitrary weighting imposed by the researchers with one that directly reflects to the extent to 
which variation in the direct OSS measure is explained by the data at hand. Dimensions that 
are better explained or predicted are thus given greater weight. On the other hand, this model 
reduces the ability of the analyst to apply expert knowledge or to experiment with their own 
weighting preferences. This procedure can be performed with direct variables that have more 
(S) or fewer (L) missing observations. All of this is done separately for activity and for 
potential variables and is denoted with wa for weighted average. There are 26 indicators7 
used to construct Awa and 27 indicators8 for Pwa. Table A1 in the Appendix also contains their 
definitions.  
Finally, the Ratio index is derived directly from a pair of A and P indices’ ranks. As such, it 
reflects the variations in constructions of A and P. It must be emphasized, however, that the 
Ratio index is a distinct index that measures something different than either activity or 
potential. Scaling a country’s OSS activity by its OSS potential allows users to readily see 
which countries are “overachieving” and which are “underachieving” relative to their 
potential. In gross terms, this suggests where OSS growth potential is greatest. Decomposing 
                                                 
6 To construct the weighted averages, direct measures in each of the three dimensions are regressed on the set of 
indirect variables – making for three equations simultaneously estimated using least squares. A seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) framework is employed thereby allowing the error terms in each equation to be 
correlated, which seems plausible a priori because a country's unobservable OSS aspects may be correlated 
across dimensions. The SUR approach proves unnecessary with this data, as the independence of the equations 
cannot be rejected and separate regressions can suffice. 
7 These include: rOSShits, GDPpcPPP, PCpc, XPpGDPm, iServerspc, InternetHostspc, OSSpolNat, 
OSSpolMun, OSSpolNatRD, OSSpolMunRD, dOSSpolNat, dOSSpolMun, dOSSpolNatRD, dOSSpolMunRD, 
OSSpolNatadv, OSSpolNatman, OSSpolNatpre, OSSpolMunadv, OSSpolMunman, OSSpolMunpre, 
dOSSpolNatadv, dOSSpolNatman, dOSSpolNatpre, dOSSpolMunadv, dOSSpolMunman, and dOSSpolMunpre. 
Because the Index C construction uses a linear fit of these variables and individual coefficients are not of 
particular interest, linear rescaling is inconsequential and so the variables enter the regressions in their raw 
form. 
8 These include: Age2529pc, Age2024pc, TVpc, urbanpc, Age1524pc, Literacy, HSenroll, HSvoc, newspc, 
InternetUserspc, Phonespc, Radiopc, Cellspc, PhoneUSA, PhoneLoc, Phonelinespc, Phonelinespworker, 
PhoneWaittime, Phonepc, nNetPrice, GDPpc, TradepGDP, ICTpExport, SciArticlespc, POiGov, POinternet, and 
nWTO. Because the Index C construction uses a linear fit of these variables and individual coefficients are not 
of particular interest, linear rescaling is inconsequential and so the variables enter the regressions in their raw 
form. 
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the index, perhaps by re-weighting the dimensions constituting A and P, can suggest 
explanations for why some countries are over- or under-performing in OSS.  
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics for the Indices 
With so many possible indices to construct given the available data, only some of them can 
be described here for the sake of brevity. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for four 
versions of the activity index (Aaa,BL, Aaa,BS, Aag,RS, and Awa), four corresponding potential 
indices (Paa,BL, Paa,BS, Pag,RS, and Pwa), and two ratios (Ratioag,RS , Ratioaa,BL). While Table 2 
offers little in the way of intuition due to the varying scales across the indices, a few things 
should be evident at first glance. First and foremost, the number of countries (N) for which 
the index is available varies greatly across indices, as expected. Second, the variance in the 
index value differs widely across indices, suggesting that some index constructions involve 
more tightly clustered values than others. Given that the index values themselves have little 
cardinal meaning, we confine our interest to ordinal or rank values. Finally, not visible in 
Table 2 is that the weights across dimensions in Awa and Pwa are not generally wildly 
different.9 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Select Indices 
Variable  Obs (N) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aag,RS  47 0.69  0.66  0.00  2.02  
Pag,RS  105 7.29  6.07  0.98  44.23  
Aaa,BS  47 0.36  0.52  -0.87  1.60  
Paa,BS 60 0.26  0.44  -0.73  1.27  
Aaa,BL 132 0.11  0.58  -0.59  1.78  
Paa,BL 138 -0.01  0.60  -1.05  1.52  
Awa  121 0.00  0.51  -0.68  1.66  
Pwa 74 0.02  0.56  -0.88  1.46  
RatioagRS 42 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.43 
Ratioaa,BL 107 1.59  9.82  -9.78  81.30  
 
Table 3 shows select pairwise rank correlations among the indices reported in Table 2. Each 
cell reports the Spearman correlation (and the number of observations used to compute it) 
between two corresponding indices. In other words, only correlations between activity 
indices or between potential indices are shown. The correlations reported in Table 3 are all 
statistically significant, positive, and in many cases generally quite large. The alternative 
index designs do appear to be measuring roughly the same thing. While some concern about 
the robustness of the activity measures is warranted due to the lower pairwise correlations 
                                                 
9 For example, the weights for the G, F, and C dimensions in Awa are 0.979, 0.896, and 0.818, respectively. The 
corresponding weights for Pwa are 0.833, 0.839, and 0.951. 
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with Aag,RS, this result arises largely because of the particular ratio-scale variables used in the 
Aag,RS index.10 Aside from the weaker relationship between the R and B variable sets for the 
activity index, the correlations range between 0.70 and 0.95 and are all significant at the 1% 
level. For the arithmetic mean indices, the long and short versions are correlated at 0.73 and 
0.93 for the activity and the potential indices, respectively. This suggests that the cost, in 
terms of variable quality, for switching to variables that have a greater coverage of countries 
is relatively small, especially for the potential index. The rank orderings are also similar 
between the arithmetic mean and the weighted average versions. Whether it is 40 or 100 
countries, the simple arithmetic mean generates a rank ordering that is highly correlated with 
the weighted-average approach. Table 3 suggests that the cost, in terms of less intuition and 
perhaps less valid proxy variables, for using the geometric means of ratio-scale variables to 
enhance robustness may be more substantial, however. Correlations in the first two columns 
of Table 3 are weaker, as would be expected given its nonlinearity and the restricted set of 
indicators. 
Table 3: Rank-correlations, selected indices 
 geometric mean 
(Xag,RS) 
weighted mean 
(Xwa) 
arithmetic mean 
(Xaa,BL) 
X= A P A P A P 
Xaa,BS  0.4245* 
47 
0.6966* 
56 
0.7056* 
46 
0.9362* 
40 
0.7314* 
47 
0.9312* 
60 
Xaa,BL  0.4926* 
47 
0.7676* 
103 
0.8958* 
103 
0.9524* 
71 
  
Xwa 0.4606* 
46 
0.7716* 
63   
  
 
Table 4 shows the countries with the 20 highest values in several representative indices. It 
should be emphasized that the pool of countries included differs across indices, which 
complicates direct comparisons between the columns in Table 4. The first two columns 
derive from the geometric mean versions Aag,RS and Pag,RS reported in Table 2. Thus, these 
rankings are based on the index design preferred for its robustness. The next two columns do 
likewise for the arithmetic mean versions Aaa,BL, and Paa,BL. These rankings are based on the 
index design preferred for its ease of interpretation and comprehensiveness.  
 
                                                 
10 As shown in Table 5 in section 5, the rank correlations between the Aag and other versions of A are significant 
and greater than 0.5 when the other versions use the ratio-scale variables or when computing Aag,RL with the 
“long” set of ratio-scale variables. 
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Table 4: Top 20 Countries in Xag,RS, Xaa,BL 
(rank) country 
Aag,RS Aaa,BL 
Pag,RS Paa,BL 
1) Sweden Spain Iceland Sweden 
2) Ireland France Vanuatu USA 
3) France Belgium Latvia Norway 
4) United Kingdom Iceland Croatia Denmark 
5) Finland Brazil Czech United Kingdom 
6) Pakistan Norway South Korea Canada 
7) South Africa United Kingdom Lithuania Netherlands 
8) Paraguay Qatar Poland Finland 
9) Bulgaria Denmark Singapore Switzerland 
10) Vietnam Finland Slovenia Australia 
11) Israel Taiwan Panama New Zealand 
12) China Peru Cyprus South Korea 
13) Norway Australia Germany Japan 
14) Spain Sweden Hungary Israel 
15) Philippines China Estonia Austria 
16) Italy Italy Greece France 
17) Brazil Netherlands Ukraine Germany 
18) Venezuela USA Sweden Belgium 
19) Netherlands Japan USA Iceland 
20) Denmark Estonia Japan Estonia 
 
 
Maps 
Figure 2 depicts maps of three different index values across the panels. Panel A and Panel B 
show the most comprehensive indices Aaa,BL and Paa,BL, respectively, while Panel C shows 
Ratiowa,BL (ratio of Activity to Potential). Higher index values are shaded darker, while 
countries with missing data are not colored in the world map. The maps indicate some broad 
patterns. Africa and the Middle East (and, to a lesser extent, eastern Europe, central America, 
and southeast Asia) lag behind in the OSS activity. South America shows a mix of activity, 
while South Africa stands out as the leading African nation. Solid performances are visible in 
high-profile OSS countries such as Brazil and Peru in South America and China, Japan, and 
Taiwan in Asia. The potential index maps shows a different pattern, one more broadly 
reflective of economic development and prosperity indicators. The ratio index map can be 
viewed, then, as depicting the extent of OSS activity relative to their background level of 
development or potential. Here, the OSS success of some high-profile countries (e.g., Brazil, 
Spain) stands out along with the success of some less noticed countries (e.g., Uzbekistan, 
Bulgaria). The regional patterns evident in Panel A are less distinct in Panel C, representing 
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how the ratio index captures more than just regional patterns in economic development. Each 
continent appears to have considerable variation: some countries with high ratios (e.g., U.S., 
Spain, Oman, Ecuador, Egypt) and some with low ratios (e.g., Mexico, Switzerland, Peru).  
 
Figure 2: Maps of select index quantiles (5) 
Activity Index Map (Aaa,BL) 
 
Potential Index Map (Paa,BL) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Politics of Open Source  121 
 
Ratio A/P (Ratiowa,BL) Index Map  
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
With many candidate indices (and sub-indices), tests for robustness to different aggregation 
rules, sample sizes, and measure types are critical. The primary concern here is with 
correlations in rank-orderings (rather than raw values) derived from each index. Ideally, the 
OSS indices that measured similar things would not vary dramatically across different 
aggregation rules or types of measures. To the extent that the index is sensitive to these 
design choices, the usefulness of the index should be questioned.  
Table 5 summarizes some of the observed Spearman rank-order correlations between 
alternative indices. Some variation is to be expected given that the different indices aim to 
measure different things (e.g., activity vs. potential vs. their ratio) and they employ different 
variables. Overall, a good deal of stability is found across aggregation rules. For the activity 
indices, all rank correlations are positive and nearly all are significant at the 5% level 
(usually at the 0.1% level). Rank correlations across different aggregation rules (while using 
the same indicators) are quite strong. Across 101 countries, the A ranks are significantly 
correlated between the arithmetic mean aggregation and the geometric mean (0.75), the 
maxi-min (0.69), and the mini-mean (0.64). Rank orderings do vary if the A depends on 
averages of indicators or on the “weakest link” of those indicators, but the rankings are still 
closely correlated. For similar index constructions, the correlations are even stronger. Indices 
with the same aggregation rules but different indicators (e.g., Aaa,BL and Aaa,BS), are highly 
correlated; significant Spearman correlation coefficients exceed 0.5 in all but one case. For 
example, the rank correlation between long and short indices is 0.73 when using the best 
indicators and a simple arithmetic mean, and it is 0.90 when using ratio-scale variables and a 
geometric mean. Perhaps the strongest evidence that the A index is robust to aggregation 
rules (and even to alternate indicator variables) can be found in the high rank-correlation 
coefficient (0.82) between the preferred arithmetic mean and geometric mean indices for the 
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“long” indicators (Aaa,BL, and Aag,RL). Somewhat troubling is the weaker rank correlation for 
the corresponding “short” indicators. The short indices, which use better indicators but at the 
cost of a reduced sample, have weaker correlations across aggregation rules (Aaa,RS and Aag,RS 
are correlated at 0.40). Similar results, often even stronger, hold even if the correlations 
reported in Table 5 are computed using casewise deletion (so that the same set of countries is 
used throughout). Moreover, as the lower half of Table 5 indicates, these general observations 
about the strength of correlations hold when looking at the potential indices (P).11 Finally, 
Table 5 shows that the P indices are closely rank-correlated with Pwa. The indices are largely 
robust to alternative weights for averaging. 
 
Table 5: Select index rank correlations 
Activity 
 Aaa,BL  Aaa,BS Aaa,RL Aaa,RS Aag,RL Aag,RS Axi,BL Aia,BL Awa 
1        Aaa,BL  
132        
0.7314* 1Aaa,BS 
47 47       
0.7238* 0.7544* 1Aaa,RL 
101 47 101      
0.5611* 0.8414* 0.8897* 1Aaa,RS 
29 29 29 29     
0.8189* 0.4272* 0.6380* 0.3862* 1Aag,RL 
101 47 101 29 101    
0.4926* 0.4245* 0.4185* 0.3961* 0.8957* 1Aag,RS 
47 47 47 29 47 47   
0.8757* 0.7100* 0.6977* 0.3488 0.6991* 0.1962 1Axi,BL 
132 47 101 29 101 47 132  
0.6074* 0.8111* 0.5649* 0.6471* 0.2364 0.2008 0.8106*Axi,BS 
47 47 47 29 47 47 47  
0.8366* 0.4301* 0.6965* 0.3433 0.8833* 0.8447* 0.7429*Axi,RL 
101 47 101 29 101 47 101  
0.5907* 0.5668* 0.4712* 0.3839* 0.7740* 0.9483* 0.3205Axi,RS 
29 29 29 29 29 29 29  
0.8411* 0.5932* 0.6455* 0.6312* 0.6674* 0.4017* 0.7103* 1Aia,BL 
132 47 101 29 101 47 132 132 
0.4556* 0.6619* 0.6244* 0.5966* 0.4372* 0.4307* 0.5663* 0.7553*Aia,BS 
47 47 47 29 47 47 47 47 
Aia,RL 0.7381* 0.7922* 0.6032* 0.4655* 0.5742* 0.0916 0.7667* 0.7595*
                                                 
11 In many cases, the correlations are even stronger (e.g., Paa,BL has a greater rank-correlation with Paa,BS and 
Pag,RL) but remain generally consistent with the activity variables. One exception is with the Pia,RL index, which 
is generally negatively correlated with other index measures. This surprising result largely follows from a 
negative correlation between the F dimension in the ratio-scale and the C dimension with the best variables for 
this subset of countries. This peculiar result poses only a minor concern because the odd-behaving ratio-scale 
version of P with a mini-mean aggregation is useful primarily for comparison to Pag,RL, especially given that the 
superior Pia,BL index is present. 
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101 47 101 29 101 47 101 101 
0.4409* 0.7138* 0.3222 0.4655* 0.0128 0.1621 0.6112* 0.5264*Aia,RS 
29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
0.8958* 0.7056* 0.6459* 0.5448* 0.7843* 0.4606* 0.8058* 0.7319* 1Awa 
103 46 89 29 89 46 103 103 121
0.8578* 0.8310* 0.6856* 0.6970* 0.7698* 0.4674* 0.8013* 0.7215* 0.9605*Awi 
103 46 89 29 89 46 103 103 121
Potential 
 Paa,BL  Paa,BS Paa,RL Paa,RS Pag,RL Pag,RS Pxi,BL Pia,BL Pwa 
1        Paa,BL  
138        
0.9312* 1       Paa,BS 
60 60       
0.7751* 0.8024* 1      Paa,RL 
77 51 77      
0.9316* 0.8857* 0.7820* 1     Paa,RS 
56 51 56 56     
0.9063* 0.8984* 0.7099* 0.8949* 1    Pag,RL 
111 56 77 56 128    
0.7676* 0.6966* 0.6391* 0.7047* 0.7549* 1   Pag,RS 
103 56 76 56 105 105   
0.8963* 0.8785* 0.8070* 0.9183* 0.8030* 0.7404* 1  Pxi,BL 
138 60 77 56 111 103 140  
0.3913* 0.4903* 0.2588 0.28670.3580* 0.3805* 0.3669*   Pxi,BS 
37 35 32 32 34 34 37  
0.5429* 0.7602* 0.6048* 0.8658* 0.5918* 0.3357* 0.4947*   Pxi,RL 
108 56 70 52 92 88 108  
0.1884 0.2958 0.1151 0.0894 0.16640.3971* 0.2347  Pxi,RS 
37 35 32 32 34 34 37  
0.9490* 0.9440* 0.7307* 0.9012* 0.8923* 0.7459* 0.8676* 1 Pia,BL 
138 60 77 56 111 103 138 138 
0.8442* 0.9042* 0.6943* 0.8144* 0.7682* 0.6460* 0.7928* 0.8575*  Pia,BS 
60 60 51 51 56 56 60 60 
-0.4131* -0.4488* -0.1247-0.3436* -0.4384* -0.0764-0.3619* -0.3731*  Pia,RL 
77 51 77 56 77 76 77 77 
0.6742* 0.5959* 0.6123* 0.6798* 0.7290* 0.4700* 0.6703* 0.6632*  Pia,RS 
56 51 56 56 56 56 56 56 
0.9524* 0.9362* 0.7106* 0.9127* 0.9256* 0.7716* 0.8352* 0.9264* 1Pwa 
71 40 49 38 63 63 71 71 74
0.7607* 0.8906* 0.7327* 0.8602* 0.7355* 0.6733* 0.8016* 0.7801* 0.7348* Pwi 
71 40 49 38 63 63 71 71 74
* indicates significant at the 5% level. 
Top number indicates Spearman rank correlation coefficient; bottom number indicates number of 
observations. 
Shaded cells indicate correlations between indices with similar f1 and f2 aggregations. Dark-outlined cells 
indicate correlations between indices with similar variable sets. 
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Because the open source index is composed of three different sub-indices or dimensions, the 
robustness of the dimensions to alternative approaches also merits some scrutiny. As in Table 
5, Table 6 shows the rank correlations between various constructions of the government (G), 
firms (F), and community (C) dimensions of the OSS indices. The dimension values are 
highly rank-correlated with one another even when produced with different aggregations or 
variable sets. This is especially true for the dimensions in the activity index, where the 
pairwise rank correlations between dimensions that use different aggregation rules or 
different variable lists are typically well over 0.7 and often over 0.95. The G and F 
dimensions for the potential index exhibit somewhat less consistency, where the P·i,BS and 
P·g,RS dimensions are weakly or uncorrelated with other aggregations using similar indicators. 
Although this presents some reason for caution, it bears emphasis that Table 6 shows rank 
correlations for 48 different dimension measures, and a few weak correlations are to be 
expected. 
Table 6: Select Dimension Rank Correlations 
Activity 
 
Government 
 A·a,BL  A·i,BL  A·x,BL  A·g,RL  A·a,BS  A·i,BS  A·x,BS  A·g,RS  
1       A·a,BL  
193       
0.8915* 1A·i,BL  
193 193      
0.9989* 0.8832* 1A·x,BL  
193 193 193     
0.9071* 0.9856* 0.9021* 1A·g,RL  
122 122 122 122    
0.4440* 0.5336* 0.4456* 0.6752* 1A·a,BS  
48 48 48 48 48   
0.5367* 0.6463* 0.4926* 0.7587* 0.7757* 1A·i,BS  
48 48 48 48 48 48  
0.2755 0.3549* 0.3093* 0.5139* 0.9421* 0.5627* 1 A·x,BS  
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
0.6680* 0.7719* 0.6745* 0.8620* 0.7738* 0.6933* 0.6470* 1A·g,RS  
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
 Industry 
 A·a,BL  A·i,BL  A·x,BL  A·g,RL  A·a,BS  A·i,BS  A·x,BS  A·g,RS  
1       A·a,BL  
132       
0.9142* 1A·i,BL  
132 132      
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0.9900* 0.8712* 1A·x,BL  
132 132 132     
0.9756* 0.9651* 0.9547* 1A·g,RL  
132 132 132 132    
1.0000* 0.9142* 0.9900* 0.9756* 1A·a,BS  
132 132 132 132 132   
0.9142* 1.0000* 0.8712* 0.9651* 0.9142* 1A·i,BS  
132 132 132 132 132 132  
0.9900* 0.8712* 1.0000* 0.9547* 0.9900* 0.8712* 1A·x,BS  
132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
0.9756* 0.9651* 0.9547* 1.0000* 0.9756* 0.9651* 0.9547* 1A·g,RS  
132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
 Community, education 
 A·a,BL  A·i,BL  A·x,BL  A·g,RL  A·a,BS  A·i,BS  A·x,BS  A·g,RS  
1       A·a,BL  
190       
0.9607* 1A·i,BL  
190 190      
0.8402* 0.7385* 1A·x,BL  
190 190 190     
0.3268* 0.3307* 0.2987* 1A·g,RL  
190 190 190 190    
0.9472* 0.9048* 0.8291* 0.2870* 1A·a,BS  
190 190 190 190 190   
0.8874* 0.9085* 0.7152* 0.2589* 0.9517* 1A·i,BS  
190 190 190 190 190 190  
0.8378* 0.7387* 0.9627* 0.2916* 0.8380* 0.7181* 1A·x,BS  
190 190 190 190 190 190 190 
0.3323* 0.3410* 0.3067* 0.9978* 0.2905* 0.2653* 0.2998* 1A·g,RS  
190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190
         
Potential Government 
 P·a,BL  P·i,BL  P·x,BL  P·g,RL  P·a,BS  P·i,BS  P·x,BS  P·g,RS  
1       
P·a,BL  
179       
P·i,BL  
0.7388* 1      
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179 193      
0.8361* 0.3456* 1     
P·x,BL  
179 179 179     
0.8229* 0.6995* 0.6678* 1    
P·g,RL  
130 130 130 130    
0.5849* 0.6032* 0.3033* 0.5204* 1   
P·a,BS  
94 95 94 78 95   
-0.1135 0.2312 -0.1724 -0.10430.7047* 1  
P·i,BS  
47 48 47 43 43 48  
0.6136* 0.4162* 0.4428* 0.6029* 0.5572* -0.129 1 
P·x,BS  
94 95 94 78 95 43 95 
0.8229* 0.6995* 0.6678* 1.0000* 0.5204* -0.10430.6029* 1
P·g,RS  
130 130 130 130 78 43 78 130
 Industry 
 P·a,BL  P·i,BL  P·x,BL  P·g,RL  P·a,BS  P·i,BS  P·x,BS  P·g,RS  
1       
P·a,BL  
140       
0.6903* 1      
P·i,BL  
140 140      
0.9314* 0.5026* 1     
P·x,BL  
140 140 140     
0.5995* 0.3892* 0.5655* 1    
P·g,RL  
140 140 140 185    
0.6605* 0.3933* 0.5784* 0.5630* 1   
P·a,BS  
75 75 75 75 75   
0.4235* 0.4661* 0.3194* 0.5047* 0.6986* 1  
P·i,BS  
75 75 75 75 75 75  
0.6016* 0.15410.6613* 0.4253* 0.7962* 0.3199* 1 
P·x,BS  
75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
0.3601* 0.4873* 0.2473* 0.2921* 0.2870* 0.3078* 0.1418 1
P·g,RS  
126 126 126 133 75 75 75 133
 Community, education 
 P·a,BL  P·i,BL  P·x,BL  P·g,RL  P·a,BS  P·i,BS  P·x,BS  P·g,RS  
1       
P·a,BL  
175       
P·i,BL  
0.9584* 1      
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175 175      
0.9783* 0.9025* 1     
P·x,BL  
175 175 175     
0.9246* 0.8845* 0.8984* 1    
P·g,RL  
175 175 175 186    
0.9466* 0.9032* 0.9218* 0.9217* 1   
P·a,BS  
155 155 155 157 157   
0.7705* 0.7905* 0.7107* 0.7332* 0.7954* 1  
P·i,BS  
155 155 155 157 157 157  
0.8864* 0.8166* 0.8930* 0.8574* 0.9570* 0.6481* 1 
P·x,BS  
155 155 155 157 157 157 157 
0.8951* 0.8559* 0.8669* 0.9727* 0.9323* 0.7250* 0.8863* 1
P·g,RS  
175 175 175 184 157 157 157 184
 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
The A and P indices should be considered works in progress. Their purpose is first to spur 
discussion and further development of measures of this important aspect of the global IT 
industry. Second, the indices facilitate for others the exploration of potential impacts of open 
source software and approaches at a country level. An important next step—and test—for the 
index lies in its use by policy makers, industry, and others in crafting strategies and policies 
for the advancement of open source interests and ICT development more broadly.  
Until now, much of the OSS domain is dominated by anecdotal and informal knowledge, 
especially about the state of OSS on a global scale. The A and P indices represent an 
important first step in advancing discussions about global OSS development by providing 
systematic and robust empirical evidence on a global scale. To do so, we confronted head-on 
the difficulties in constructing useful indices for such a tricky concept as OSS activity or 
potential. Our efforts attempt to reflect the openness and transparency of the OSS enterprise, 
thus our methods are described in detail here and the base data are readily available for 
download by the broader “user community” for this research. While we believe that the 
indices presented here provide a good “snapshot” of a country’s open source potential and 
activity, it is worth noting that better data collection—beyond the scope of the current 
project—could improve the index in subsequent iterations. We welcome continued 
improvements to and adaptations of these indices.  
Turning to policy considerations, government commissions and agencies have proposed, and 
in some cases implemented, a variety of measures to encourage open source developers. For 
example, in the United States, the President's Information Technology Advisory Committee 
(2000) recommended direct federal subsidies for open source projects to advance high-end 
computing, and a report from the European Commission (2001) also discussed support for 
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open developers and standards. Many European governments have policies to encourage the 
use and purchase of open source software for government use. As is well known, 
governments can sponsor the development of localized open source projects. Economists 
have sought to understand the consequences of a vibrant open source sector for social 
welfare. Perhaps not surprisingly, definitive or sweeping answers have been difficult to come 
by. But if a tentative conclusion can be made, most analyses have concluded, based on 
limited data, that government support for open source projects is likely to have an ambiguous 
effect on social welfare. 
We hope that these indices are not the end product of research in this area, but rather the 
beginning of an empirical research agenda at the intersection of OSS and public policy. 
Future research could make use of these indices to test a variety of hypotheses about the 
causes and effects of OSS and related policies. Anecdotal evidence, case studies, and 
intuitions pervade the OSS discourse. Thus far, much of the literature has very limited 
generalizability because of the prevalence of case-study approaches. The OSS indices 
presented here can help bring light where there is much heat. For example, the frequent 
claims about OSS's liberating nature and positive implications for social welfare (made often 
by governments themselves) lack a strong empirical basis. Future research can use these OSS 
indices to systematically assess the societal impacts of effects of OSS. The indices can enable 
testing of hypotheses about whether OSS drives innovation, economic development, 
transparency in governance, or other social aims. These indices can also play pivotal roles in 
studies of the rise of OSS activity. Identifying the determinants of OSS activity, and the 
factors that influence which countries achieve more of their OSS potential, merits additional 
investigation.  
If “footloose” developers can participate in OSS projects across boundaries, what role does 
the state and geography more generally have in guiding the evolution of OSS? The OSS 
indices can inform studies of the effectiveness of particular OSS policies and initiatives on 
developing OSS, of strategic interdependence between states in setting their OSS policy 
(akin to trade policy), of the influences of different political and cultural landscapes on the 
popularity of OSS, and of the impact of education programs on OSS. Knowing where the 
cathedrals and bazaars are will hopefully launch a new set of inquiries into the determinants 
of that distribution and the implications of greater OSS activity and potential.  
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Appendix A 
Variable List 
 
Variables in Index A and Index P Indicator Source 
OSSpolNatman Count of policies at the national level 
that mandate open source software 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies “Government Open Source 
Policies” 2008 
GovExppGDP Government expenditures as percent 
gross domestic product 
World Development Indicators 2003 
OSSpolNatRD Count of policies at the national level 
that provide R&D for open source 
software 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies “Government Open Source 
Policies” 2008 
OSSfundng Ratio of national and local R&D 
policies to all national and local 
policies 
derived from Center for Strategic 
and International Studies 2008 
RHCEpc number of Red Hat Certified Engineers Red Hat, Inc. 2008 
LinuxUserspc Number of GNU/Linux users registered 
per capita 
Linux Counter 2008 
GoogleApppc Number of applications submitted to 
Google Summer of Code per capita 
Google Summer of Code 2005 
SchoolNet Percent schools connected to Internet  CIA World Fact Book 2004 
rOSSnews Number of hits for “open source 
software” on Google News archives 
within country during 2008 
Google News 2008 
LinuxLang 1 if native language support for 
GNU/Linux, 0 if otherwise 
Distro Watch 
nPiracy Number of pirated software units 
divided by total number of units put 
into use, negative transform 
Business Software Alliance 2006 
OOXML -1 if country voted for OOXML 
passage, 0 if No, empty if abstained or 
not invited 
Open Malaysia Blog, ISO 2008 
nCivLib Freedom in the World Index of Civil 
Liberties scored 1 through 7, higher 
being worse, negative transform 
Freedom House 2006 
Turnout Percent voters of voting age population 
(1945 to 1998) 
International IDEA 
eGov e-Government Survey Score United Nations 2008 
nTRIPS -1 if participant of TRIPS (Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property) 
World Trade Organization 2008 
nIPRI Intellectual Property RIghts Index, 
higher score indicates more rights, 
negative transform 
Property Rights Alliance 2008 
ICTtop250pGDP Number of ICT firms in the Top 250 
per gross domestic product 
OECD 2005 
ICTexpendpGDP ICT expenditures as percent gross 
domestic product 
CIA World Fact Book 2004 
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newCellGro Growth of number of cell phones from 
1995 to 2001, percent growth over 
baseline year 
World Development Indicators 2001 
TelecomInvestpc Private investment in telecoms (current 
US$) per capita 
International Telecommunications 
Union 2001 
SciArticlespc Number of published scientific and 
technical journal articles per capita 
World Development Indicators 1999 
RnDemploypc Scientists and engineers per capita World Development Indicators 2000 
nNetPrice Price basket for Internet service per 
month, negative transform 
CIA World Fact Book 2003 
inewGrowth Growth of Foreign Direct Investment 
from 2001 to 2006, percent growth over 
baseline year 
United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development 
TVpc Number of television sets per capita World Development Indicators 2000 
Techphob Percent students who consider 
themselves technophobic 
Computers in Human Behavior 1995 
College Percent of college aged population 
enrolled 
World Development Indicators 2000 
GradEngpgrad Graduates in engineering, 
manufacturing and construction (% of 
total graduates, tertiary) 
World Development Indicators 2000 
PCspc Number of personal computers per 
capita 
International Telecommunications 
Union 2004 
InternetUserspc Number of Internet users per capita International Telecommunications 
Union 2004 
Awa Variables   
rOSShits Hits for "open source software" on 
Google by region=country 
Google 2008 
GDPpcPPP Gross domestic product per capita 
adjusted purchasing power parity 
2002 
PCpc Personal computers per capita International Telecommunications 
Union 2004 
XPpGDPPm Cost of Windows XP in "gross 
domestic product months” 
First Monday – Ghosh 
iServerspc Internet servers per capita  CIA World Fact Book 2005 
InternetHostspc Computers connected to Internet per 
capita 
Computers in Human Behavior 2007 
OSSpolNat and (d) 
OSSpolMun and (d) 
OSSpolNatRD and (d) 
OSSpolMunRD and (d) 
OSSpolNatadv and (d) 
OSSpolNatman and (d) 
OSSpolNatpre and (d) 
OSSpolMunadv and (d) 
OSSpolMunman and (d) 
OSSpolMunpre and (d) 
Two variables were created as a count 
of all National and Municipal level 
policies. These variables were further 
subdivided to create counts of policies 
that indicated just Mandates, 
Preferences, Advisorys, or R&D. This 
resulted in 10 variables. For each count 
variable, a dummy variable was created 
indicating 0 if no policy, 1 if one or 
more. Therefore, 20 policy variables 
total were available. 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies “Government Open Source 
Policies” 2008 
Pwa Variables   
Age2529% Persons age 25 to 29 as percent 
population 
CIA World Fact Book 2005 
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Age2024% Persons age 20 to 24 as percent 
population 
CIA World Fact Book 2005 
Age1524% Persons age 15 to 24 as percent 
population 
CIA World Fact Book 2005 
TVpc Television sets per capita World Development Indicators 2001 
urban% Percent population residing in urban 
area 
2002 
Literacy% Percent population 15 and older who 
are literate 
 
HSenroll% Percent eligible population enrolled in 
high school 
World Development Indicators 2002 
HSvoc Enrollment in upper secondary 
technical/vocational programs 
OECD 2005 
newspc Number of daily newspapers per capita 2000 
InternetUserspc Number of Internet users per capita International Telecommunications 
Union 2004 
Phonespc Telephone landlines per capita World Development Indicators 2001 
Radiopc Radio sets per capita World Development Indicators 2001 
Cellspc Cellular phones per capita World Development Indicators 2001 
PhoneUSA Average cost of telephone call to US 
(US$ per three minutes) 
World Development Indicators 2001 
PhoneLoc Telephone average cost of local call 
(US$ per three minutes) 
World Development Indicators 2001 
Phonelinespc Telephone mainlines in largest city (per 
1,000 people) 
World Development Indicators 2001 
Phonelinespworker Telephone mainlines per employee World Development Indicators 2001 
PhoneWaittime Telephone mainlines, waiting time 
(years) 
World Development Indicators 2000 
Phonepc Fixed line and mobile phone 
subscribers (per 1,000 people) 
World Development Indicators 2001 
nNetPrice Price basket for Internet service per 
month, negative transform 
CIA World Fact Book 2003 
GDPpc Gross domestic product per capita World Development Indicators 2003 
TradepGDP Trade as percent of gross domestic 
product 
World Development Indicators 2003 
ICTpExport Communications, computer, etc. (% of 
service exports, BoP) 
World Development Indicators 2002 
SciArticlespc Number of scientific or technical 
journal articles published per capita 
World Development Indicators 1999 
POiGov PO offers electronic services, percent 
of 12 potential services 
Original data collection 
POInternet  Post Office provides public Internet 
access points (1=yes, 0=no)… 
year=2005 or most recent if missing 
Original data collection 
nWTO -1 if member of World Trade 
Organization  
World Trade Organization 2007 
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Appendix B 
Complete Index Values 
 
Table A2: Select index ranks for all countries  
Country Aaa,BL Aaa,BS Aag,RL Aag,RS Paa,BL Paa,BS Pag,RL Pag,RS Ratioa
a,BL 
Ratioa
g,RL 
Ratioa
a,BS 
Ratioa
g,RS 
Awa Pwa 
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Albania . . . . 41 . 9 54 . . . . 93 6 
Algeria 99 . 92 . 86 . 97 94 38 81 . . 88 . 
Andorra . . . . . . 14 . . . . . . . 
Angola . . . . 132 . . . . . . . 99 65 
Antigua and Barbuda . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . 
Argentina 39 42 36 32 49 . 7 21 8 40 . 29 32 30 
Armenia 101 . . . . . . . . . . . 98 . 
Australia 13 10 22 25 10 13 15 29 36 23 13 22 12 9 
Austria 34 16 51 37 15 14 21 43 65 48 18 33 29 13 
Azerbaijan 129 . 47 . 99 . . . 21 . . . . 45 
Bahamas 62 . 33 . . . 17 . . 33 . . . . 
Bahrain 58 . 60 . . . . . . . . . 58 . 
Bangladesh 84 . 87 . 105 58 114 85 64 77 . . 110 70 
Barbados 88 . . . . . 48 . . . . . 52 . 
Belarus 72 . 84 . 28 . . . 87 . . . . 15 
Belgium 3 13 10 23 18 16 25 42 11 14 10 17 1 8 
Belize . . . . 72 . 57 . . . . . 56 . 
Benin . . . . 109 . 121 87 . . . . 108 71 
Bhutan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Bolivia 83 . 45 . 78 43 40 59 29 42 . . 94 49 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Botswana 128 . 86 . 43 . 104 75 102 75 . . 78 56 
Brazil 5 32 4 17 55 46 68 45 2 1 30 15 10 . 
Brunei Darussalam 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Bulgaria 22 23 16 9 47 29 53 56 5 11 5 5 15 26 
Burkina Faso . . . . 124 . 126 82 . . . . 118 . 
Burundi . . . . 129 . . . . . . . . 72 
Cambodia 123 . . . 127 . 102 . 48 . . . 75 . 
Cameroon 107 . 48 . 126 . 113 80 66 43 . . 101 64 
Canada 33 24 53 39 6 8 13 27 76 52 22 35 24 . 
Cape Verde . . . . . . 91 . . . . . . . 
Central African 
Republic . . . . 138 . . . . . . . . . 
Chad . . . . 136 . . . . . . . . . 
Chile 28 . 40 . 48 33 62 50 6 35 . . 20 28 
China, People's 
Republic of 15 22 6 12 66 48 . . 106 . 32 . 28 . 
Columbia 36 . . . 60 27 83 63 103 . . . 25 33 
Comoros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the 105 . 101 . 130 60 . . 72 . . . . . 
Costa Rica 59 44 46 30 52 32 58 58 95 41 31 27 53 32 
Croatia 53 26 58 42 46 . 55 4 85 51 . 40 61 23 
Cuba 68 . . . 98 . . . 70 . . . . . 
Cyprus 50 31 57 41 37 . 44 12 82 50 . 39 48 . 
Czech Republic 47 . 56 . 40 25 60 5 73 46 . . 41 . 
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Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory 
Coast) 108 . 99 . 115 . . . 62 . . . 100 . 
Denmark 9 9 17 20 4 7 8 31 30 21 16 19 4 . 
Djibouti 112 . . . . . 124 . . . . . . . 
Dominica . . . . . . 81 . . . . . 49 . 
Dominican Republic 97 . 79 . 73 . 36 74 15 73 . . . . 
Ecuador 80 . . . 65 54 86 70 10 . . . 87 51 
Egypt 77 . 82 . 64 49 101 88 13 66 . . 89 43 
El Salvador 90 . 81 . 85 45 56 30 42 72 . . 83 . 
Equatorial Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Eritrea 131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Estonia 20 . 30 . 20 . 26 15 27 28 . . 42 11 
Ethiopia 100 . 100 . . . . . . . . . 121 68 
Fiji 118 . 70 . 101 . 90 47 28 59 . . 70 . 
Finland 10 2 18 5 8 6 18 24 26 20 4 9 5 4 
France 2 7 1 3 16 12 23 34 14 2 7 6 17 . 
Gabon . . . . 117 . . . . . . . 82 . 
Gambia 111 . . . 112 . 119 99 61 . . . . 69 
Georgia . . . . 57 . 74 90 . . . . . . 
Germany 21 15 20 28 17 15 1 13 33 24 14 25 27 12 
Ghana 93 . . . 94 . 118 84 53 . . . 72 52 
Greece 61 . 65 . 38 37 46 16 86 60 . . 59 25 
Grenada . . . . 54 . 75 . . . . . 51 . 
Guatemala 91 . . . 95 . 106 89 56 . . . 86 53 
Guinea . . . . 133 . . . . . . . . . 
Guinea-Bissau . . . . 135 . . . . . . . . . 
Guyana . . . . 84 . 80 81 . . . . . . 
Haiti 103 . 98 . 137 . 115 102 78 85 . . . . 
Honduras 104 . . . 96 52 99 86 46 . . . 95 61 
Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hungary 45 . 34 . 29 23 41 14 67 30 . . 50 19 
Iceland 4 1 35 31 19 . 22 1 12 36 . 31 3 . 
India 29 29 27 24 79 59 96 71 98 4 27 11 35 60 
Indonesia 70 41 85 46 81 44 84 78 50 71 1 41 90 . 
Iran, Islamic Republic 
of . . . . 62 57 77 83 . . . . 31 38 
Iraq 71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ireland 23 5 19 2 21 19 31 37 37 16 2 3 13 . 
Israel 38 14 9 11 14 . 28 22 75 12 . 14 30 17 
Italy 16 17 13 16 26 18 27 44 19 15 12 13 16 10 
Jamaica . . . . 75 35 73 68 . . . . 77 . 
Japan 19 . . . 13 4 20 20 43 . . . 22 3 
Jordan 60 . 66 . 77 42 92 46 74 54 . . 84 42 
Kazakhstan 125 . 80 . 67 . 34 36 4 74 . . . . 
Kenya 117 . 44 . 104 50 . . 34 . . . 107 63 
Kiribati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Kuwait 81 . 69 . 51 . 45 67 101 61 . . 62 . 
Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Laos (Lao People's 
Democratic Repub.. 132 . . . 100 . . . 22 . . . 111 . 
Latvia 114 . 68 . 27 . 33 3 93 63 . . 54 16 
Lebanon 85 . 74 . . . 61 . . 68 . . 76 . 
Lesotho . . . . 89 . 94 64 . . . . . 55 
Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Libya (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya) 89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Liechtenstein . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . 
Lithuania 76 . 29 . 35 . 43 7 90 26 . . 46 29 
Luxembourg 44 . 55 . 25 . 35 . 77 49 . . 21 . 
Macedonia, Former 
Yugoslav Republic.. 64 . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
Madagascar . . . . 119 . 105 98 . . . . 114 . 
Malawi . . . . 116 . . . . . . . 120 . 
Malaysia 43 37 23 26 39 21 49 26 40 13 24 23 67 20 
Maldives 74 . 67 . . . 89 . . 55 . . . . 
Mali . . . . 114 . 128 . . . . . 116 . 
Malta 49 . 38 . . . 37 . . 38 . . 45 . 
Marshall Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mauritania . . . . 118 . . . . . . . 106 . 
Mauritius 116 . 64 . 53 . 59 60 105 57 . . 64 31 
Mexico 54 . 42 . 56 38 67 51 100 34 . . 63 36 
Micronesia, Federated 
States of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Moldova 127 . 83 . 33 . . . 97 . . . 105 34 
Monaco 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mongolia . . . . . . 70 41 . . . . 104 46 
Montenegro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Morocco 102 . 93 . 93 55 100 79 45 82 . . 92 44 
Mozambique 124 . . . 113 . . . 41 . . . . . 
Myanmar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Namibia 120 . 78 . 92 . 93 95 20 67 . . 81 . 
Nauru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Nepal 119 . 75 . 110 . 111 96 39 62 . . 117 . 
Netherlands 17 8 11 19 7 11 10 33 47 19 11 18 11 . 
New Zealand 25 . 32 . 11 20 16 32 60 32 . . 19 . 
Nicaragua . . . . 103 . 98 . . . . . . . 
Niger . . . . 134 . 127 105 . . . . 119 73 
Nigeria 115 . . . 120 . 109 91 54 . . . 112 . 
North Korea (Korea, 
Democratic Peop.. 79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Norway 6 4 15 13 3 5 6 28 25 22 8 16 2 2 
Oman 92 . 72 . 68 . . . 9 . . . . . 
Pakistan 42 25 12 6 106 . 78 76 91 3 . 1 36 59 
Palau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Panama 86 . 73 . 71 39 82 11 16 65 . . 66 48 
Papua New Guinea 113 . 95 . 107 . 110 100 57 80 . . 96 . 
Paraguay 55 34 26 8 87 . 88 61 81 5 . 2 33 47 
Peru 12 45 43 34 69 41 71 65 107 39 34 30 7 . 
Philippines 69 46 25 15 76 40 79 73 32 8 33 4 40 . 
Poland 40 21 54 40 30 24 42 8 44 47 6 37 44 22 
Portugal 35 27 61 44 32 28 39 49 35 56 19 38 34 21 
Qatar 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Romania 63 . 63 . 45 26 47 23 89 58 . . 71 . 
Russian Federation 48 . 31 . 34 30 52 48 80 27 . . 79 24 
Rwanda . . . . 131 . . . . . . . . . 
Saint Kitts and Nevis . . . . . . 72 . . . . . . . 
Saint Lucia . . . . . . 51 . . . . . . . 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines . . . . . . 85 . . . . . . . 
Samoa 121 . . . . . . . . . . . 68 . 
San Marino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Sao Tome and Principe . . . . . . 63 . . . . . . . 
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Saudi Arabia 82 . . . 70 . . . 18 . . . 74 50 
Senegal 95 . 90 . 97 . 117 52 52 78 . . 102 62 
Serbia 75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Seychelles . . . . 36 . 64 . . . . . . . 
Sierra Leone . . . . 123 . 125 104 . . . . . . 
Singapore 24 18 52 38 24 . 2 9 31 53 . 36 23 . 
Slovakia 51 30 59 43 31 . . . 83 . . . 43 18 
Slovenia 30 12 49 35 23 . 30 10 55 44 . 34 38 . 
Solomon Islands . . . . . . 116 77 . . . . . . 
Somolia 109 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
South Africa 32 28 7 7 61 56 . . 104 . 28 . 37 40 
South Korea (Korea, 
Republic of) 31 36 14 21 12 1 19 6 69 18 23 24 39 5 
Spain 1 19 3 14 22 17 29 40 7 6 15 12 6 14 
Sri Lanka 73 40 41 33 91 . 95 62 59 31 . 28 57 . 
Sudan 94 . 88 . 122 . 122 103 71 76 . . . 74 
Suriname . . . . 88 . 54 . . . . . . . 
Swaziland . . . . 108 . . . . . . . . . 
Sweden 14 3 5 1 1 2 5 18 51 17 17 8 8 1 
Switzerland 27 20 50 36 9 10 24 38 63 45 20 32 26 7 
Syria 96 . 91 . . . . . . . . . 91 . 
Taiwan (Republic of 
China) 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tajikistan 130 47 94 47 . . . . . . . . . . 
Tanzania 126 . . . . . . . . . . . 73 . 
Thailand 46 43 24 27 74 47 76 57 96 9 3 20 55 39 
Timor-Leste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Togo . . . . 125 . 107 97 . . . . 113 67 
Tonga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Trinidad and Tobago 87 . 71 . 59 34 38 25 3 64 . . 65 41 
Tunisia 56 . 37 . 90 53 87 66 79 29 . . 85 54 
Turkey 67 . 77 . 63 36 69 39 17 69 . . 80 . 
Turkmenistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Tuvalu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Uganda 122 . 96 . 128 . 112 53 49 83 . . 115 66 
Ukraine 78 39 76 45 42 22 66 17 94 70 29 42 60 . 
United Arab Emirates 52 . 62 . 44 . . . 84 . . . . . 
United Kingdom (of 
England, Scotlan.. 7 6 2 4 5 9 12 35 24 7 9 7 9 . 
United States of 
America 18 11 28 22 2 3 11 19 58 25 21 21 14 . 
Uruguay 57 38 39 29 50 31 50 69 88 37 26 26 69 27 
Uzbekistan 106 . . . 58 . 32 72 1 . . . . . 
Vanuatu . . . . 83 . 108 2 . . . . . . 
Vatican City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Venezuela 26 35 21 18 82 51 65 55 99 10 25 10 18 37 
Vietnam 41 33 8 10 102 . . . 92 . . . 47 . 
Yemen 110 . 97 . 80 . 120 93 23 84 . . 103 57 
Zambia . . . . 111 . 123 101 . . . . 109 58 
Zimbabwe 98 . 89 . 121 . 103 92 68 79 . . 97 . 
 
 
 Politics of Open Source  136 
References 
Bitzer, J. & Schröder, P. J. H. (Eds.). (2006). The Economics of Open Source Software 
Development. Elsevier.  
Berry, D., & Moss, G. (2006). Free and Open Source Software: Opening and Democratizing 
E-Government’s Black Box. Information Polity: The International Journal of Government 
and Democracy in the Information Age, 11(1), 21-34.  
Bonaccorsi, A., & Rossi, C. (2006). Comparing Motivations of Individual Programmers 
andFirms to Take Part in the Open Source Movement: From Community to Business. 
Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 18(4), 40-64. 
David, P. A., & Shapiro, J. S. (2008). Community-Based Production of Open Source 
Software: What Do We Know about the Developers Who Participate? Information 
Economics and Policy, 20(4), 364-398. 
DiBona, C., Stone, M., & Cooper, D. (Eds.) (2005). Open Sources 2.0: The Continuing 
Evolution. O'Reilly Media. 
Ebert, U., & Welsch, H. (2004). Meaningful environmental indices: A social choice 
approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47(2), 270-283. 
Feller, J., Fitzgerald, B., Hissam, S. A., & Lakhani, K. R. (eds) (2007) Perspectives on Free 
and Open Source Software. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Forge, S. (2006). The rain forest and the rock garden: The economic impacts of open source 
software. Info: The Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, 
Information, and Media, 8(3), 12-31. 
Ghosh, R. A. (2006). CODE: Collaborative Ownership and the Digital Economy. MIT Press. 
Ghosh, R. A. (2007). Understanding free software developers: Findings from the Floss 
Study. In J. Feller, B. Fitzgerald, S. A. Hissam, & K. R. Lakhani (Eds.) Perspectives on Free 
and Open Source Software (pp. 23-45). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Gosain, S. (2003). Looking through a window on open source culture: Lessons for 
community infrastructure design. Systemes d’Information et Management 8(1), 11-42. 
Hahn, R.W. (Ed.) (2002). Government Policy toward Open Source Software. AEI-Brookings 
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies: Washington DC.  
Krishnamurthy, S. (2006). On the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of Free/Libre/Open 
Source (FLOSS) developers. Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 18(4), 17-39.  
Lee, J. (2006). Government policy toward open source software: The puzzles of neutrality 
and competition. Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 18(4), 113-141. 
 Politics of Open Source  137 
Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2005a). The scope of open source licensing. Journal of Law 
Economics & Organization, 21(1), 20-56. 
Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2005b). The economics of technology sharing: Open source and 
beyond. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2), 99-120. 
Lewis, J. (2008). Government open source policies. Working Paper. Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
Lin, Y. (2006). Hybrid innovation: The dynamics of collaboration between the FLOSS 
community and corporations. Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 18(4), 86-100. 
Moon, N., & Baker, P. (2009). Adoption and use of open source software: Preliminary 
literature review. Working Paper. Center for Advanced Communications Policy, Georgia 
Institute of Technology. 
Raymond, E. (1999). The Cathedral & the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an 
Accidental Revolutionary. O’Reilly Media.  
Simon, K. D. (2005). The value of open standards and open-source software in government 
environments. IBM Systems Journal, 44(2), 227-238 
Seiferth, C. J (1999). Open source and these United States. Knowledge, Technology & 
Policy, 12(3), 50-79. 
Vaisman, D. (2007). Coding a revolution. Foreign Policy, 159(March/April), 93. 
Van Wendel de Joode, R., Lin, Y. & David, S. (2006). Rethinking free, libre, and open 
source software. Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 18(4), 5-16. 
Weber, S. (2000, June). The Political Economy of Open Source Software. BRIE Working 
Paper 140.  
Weber, S. (2005). The Success of Open Source. Harvard University Press. 
 
 Politics of Open Source  138 
 
 
 
 
Collective Ownership in Free/Libre and Open Source Software:  
The OpenSolaris Case 
Maurizio Teli 
University of Trento 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the practices supporting 
collective ownership in a corporate-sponsored Free/Libre and 
Open Source Software (FLOSS) project. The paper focuses on 
the idea that property is shaped by the practices of participants 
in a FLOSS project. Property is not considered in its legal 
status, but as a form of collective ownership, which controls 
and directs the project's future. Drawing on ethnographic 
research, collective ownership emerges as the result of 
practices involving both the corporate environment and FLOSS 
developers. In effect, the practices of the collective redefine 
themselves as the legitimate practices of that collective 
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Collective Ownership in Free/Libre and Open Source Software:  
The OpenSolaris Case 
Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) can be seen as an indicator of deep 
transformations in the modes of production, in both organizational and social terms. This has 
come about because FLOSS has been an example for social arenas other than software 
development projects, such as the construction of collective content (e.g. Wikipedia) or the 
creation of new relationships with the Intellectual Property laws (e.g. Creative Commons). In 
this study, I consider FLOSS as a way of developing software that is protected by a copyright 
license which grants developers access to the source code and the right to modify and 
distribute it.  
Some scholars have pointed out how software licenses can be considered to be moving from 
a regime of exclusion to a regime of distribution, and have indicated that this change has 
transformed some forms of organization towards a more democratic production process, 
reducing the presence of hierarchy in the producers' everyday lives (Shirky, 2008). They have 
characterised such a change (towards a regime of distribution) as a new form of production 
based on peers working together, and have considered this to be a major societal change 
(Tapscott & Williams, 2006). In contrast, some of the literature on FLOSS has pointed out 
that FLOSS projects can be much more “closed door” than expected, challenging the 
assumption of a democratizing process and a societal change in production processes 
(Krishnamurthy, 2002). The current debate is therefore increasingly in need of a focus on the 
processes that allow the inclusion of new participants in FLOSS projects, and the ability of 
such new participants to affect those projects’ futures. In brief, we need to understand the 
construction of boundaries in and around FLOSS projects, and boundary-work is exactly the 
kind of work that defines legitimate and illegitimate participants (D'Andrea, De Paoli, & Teli, 
2009; De Paoli, Teli, & D'Andrea, 2008). The task at hand is part of the phenomenology of 
boundary-work in FLOSS projects. This is particularly important because Intellectual 
Property is, according to the sociologist Scott Lash (2002), the means by which the 
accumulation of capital currently takes place. Comparing it to real property, Lash points out 
that when speaking about real property, "rights" deal with the exploitation of workers in a 
power relationship, whereas "rights in intellectual property rights are rights to exclude others 
from valorizing the objects [...]" and "in intellectual property, it is the property itself that can 
create the surplus value” (2002: 195-196). Researching property and ownership in the digital 
arena is, therefore, a way of contributing to the understanding of value creation and power 
relationships in contemporary society, with a possibility of connecting this understanding to 
domains other than FLOSS. Although that is outside the actual scope of this paper, it belongs 
to the framework supporting it. 
This paper refers to that research on property and ownership in terms of understanding which 
practices and processes create boundaries to participation in FLOSS projects. Moreover, this 
paper starts from one of the key arenas of FLOSS activity, property – in order to show how 
the practices involved in managing something owned collectively are the same practices 
contributing to such boundary-work, and that these practices take place within a collective 
whose characteristics foster the enlargement of future objectives as well as encouraging 
future participants in the same practices. To achieve this aim, this paper is organized as 
follows:  
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(i) an introduction to the issue of property (including Intellectual Property) in FLOSS, 
reviewing how scholars have linked property to deep organizational transformations; such a 
review may lead to the adoption of a practice-based approach which considers  
(a) property and software to be part of a developer's practices, and  
(b) ownership to be an activity that creates the collective;  
(ii) the description of the OpenSolaris case, its history and its most relevant contribution to 
the understanding of the problem of collective ownership;  
(iii) concluding discussions and remarks showing how the collective construction of FLOSS 
practices includes the elements of a possible permanent critique of the status quo. 
 
Intellectual Property and FLOSS 
In the context of studying inclusion and exclusion in contemporary society, FLOSS is quite a 
useful empirical field, especially in relation to property rights and power. In fact, since its 
origin, FLOSS practitioners have rearticulated some fundamental concepts of copyright: the 
issue of intellectual property – and changes in it – has been crucial in FLOSS participants' 
practices since the 1980s. Indeed, the relationship between FLOSS, property, and software as 
goods, has been investigated widely by scholars, and we can find at least three different kinds 
of approach that try to explain changes in the intellectual property regime concerning FLOSS. 
The three approaches are: the ontological approach to software as informational goods, the 
consequentialist approach, and the approach of the practical construction of property. 
In these approaches, the majority of scholars share the political scientist Steven Weber's idea 
(2004) of a movement from a property regime based on exclusion towards a property regime 
based on distribution. Focusing on collective ownership, this paper questions this movement, 
arguing that exclusion is a still a key factor in the current regime of property, and that even 
when the legal regime changes, as with FLOSS, there is still a kind of boundary-work at 
stake, therefore exclusion and distribution should be considered in relation to control over 
any object that is property. However, exclusion and distribution in relation to what? The 
concept of property, to be empirically useful, requires the presence of goods, something that 
is the object of ownership. In this case, the object involved is software, which has been 
conceptualized as a particular kind of commons, a “knowledge commons” (Hess & Ostrom, 
2007), and the characteristics of such an object are the focus of the ontological approach to 
software. 
 
Ontologies of Software as Informational Goods 
Putting forward the hypothesis that software is a “knowledge commons” means, first of all, 
that it is a resource shared or shareable among different actors, due to its intrinsic 
characteristics of being not subject to subtractability and exclusion at the same time (Hess & 
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Ostrom, 2007). Denying the characteristic of subtractability to a collection of goods means, 
mainly, to draw upon its characteristic of immateriality, which makes it possible that one 
individual acquiring a piece of goods doesn't exclude someone else from acquiring the same 
piece of goods – as it does with material goods. Alternatively, while underlining the 
impossibility of exclusion, the focus is on making a piece of goods public: when an object is 
public, nobody can benefit from it in an exclusive way. These two characteristics make the 
“knowledge commons” different from commons made of natural shared resources (e.g. 
pastures) that always, according to Hess and Ostrom (2007), need to be managed by a 
collection of principles, the most interesting of which being that individuals participate in the 
modification of the rules, while working according to those same rules for control over the 
goods (ibidem: 7). In such a context, FLOSS is an innovation, and a model for the new 
“knowledge commons” – for the “cornucopia of the commons” (Bollier, 2007; Schweik, 
2007), in contrast with the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). The particular 
innovation is the absence of natural boundaries, as well as the construction of boundaries that 
are artificial (Ostrom & Hess, 2007). The contribution from these kinds of study starts from 
the point of view of commons being resources, but what if we look at them as the objects of a 
production process? 
Yochai Benkler (2007) proposed a similar analysis, considering software as a piece of public 
goods, the object of a production process. He has underlined how information (and software 
is considered to be a form of information) has two main characteristics: it is a non-rival piece 
of goods and it is an object that is both a resource used in, and a result of, the production 
process. By "non-rival" he refers to the same concept Ostrom and Hess (2007) have 
identified as "non-subtractability", shifting the focus towards the process of consumption of 
the goods: when someone accesses a piece of information, doing so does not exclude 
someone else from accessing the same information. Considering informational goods as both 
inputs and outputs of the production process, Benkler emphasizes that information gets 
produced from the starting point of other information, so the costs someone has to face while 
acquiring information in the production phase have consequences for the amount of 
information that can be produced and, moreover, the costs of acquisition give shape to the 
population of potential producers, selecting who may access the production process. Benkler, 
Ostrom and Hess use the same conceptualization of goods: an ontological one. 
By “ontology of goods”, I refer to a conceptualization of a piece of goods as having some 
characteristics “in itself”, independently from the social practices that surround it. From such 
characteristics, a “right” way of relating to the object can be derived, a way that maximizes 
the possibility of duration in time (if the goods are considered as resources) or quantitative 
production (if the goods are considered to be the objects – or results – of a production 
process). Nevertheless, such an approach is unable to give us the tools for understanding the 
construction of the artificial boundaries around the piece of goods, or to help us describe how 
the process of building rules around the object takes place. 
A slightly different view is the one that starts with production, in particular from the quality 
of production in terms of innovation, and that makes it possible to evaluate the consequences 
of property on the development process. Such an approach is the topic of the next section. 
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Consequences of Changes in Property 
According to Shah and Tripsas (2007), end-user innovation, another of the labels used to 
describe phenomena like FLOSS, is different from the “classic model of the entrepreneurial 
process” (129), because users are closer to their needs and therefore have a competitive 
advantage in terms of access to information when compared to companies, considered as 
institutionalized innovators. End-user innovation has been interpreted as a form of 
democratization of innovation, because it makes it possible for a wider group of people to 
participate in the construction of new technologies (von Hippel, 2004). Here, historical 
examples are connected to a local definition of the costs of innovation, and this definition 
considers them lower than the costs of acquiring a solution from the market (Nuvolari, 2005) 
or waiting until the market develops new solutions (Shah, 2005). Moreover, FLOSS is 
considered to be an example of community-based innovation, as it is an innovation coming 
from groups of users who share information about the changes they have made to the 
products they are using. Innovation communities arise only when two conditions are 
satisfied: “open product design” and “open communication”. In particular, “open product 
design” means that users are able to modify – “tinker with” – the product or service (Shah, 
2005). This is possible, as Shah pointed out, when the intellectual property regulations, the 
institutional and the technological arrangements, allow open product design. The presence or 
absence of open product design is, therefore, a consequence of the intellectual property 
regime, and the open intellectual property regime has two consequences: “(a) user innovation 
will only flourish in open source, and (b) users inclined to innovate will gravitate towards 
open source.” (ibidem). Moreover, community-based innovation seems to be more effective 
and efficient than institutionalized innovation, so according to this approach, it is possible to 
argue that efficiency and efficacy are a consequence of the relationship with property that has 
been established in a certain context. The particular property regime will therefore support 
“peer production”, which can be seen as emerging as “an alternative model of production that 
can harness human skills, ingenuity and intelligence more efficiently and effectively than 
traditional firms” (Tapscott & Williams, 2006: p. 66). In relation to informational goods, such 
success in efficiency and efficacy makes it possible to bypass manufacturers, who are no 
longer required (von Hippel, 2005). Focusing on FLOSS, this leaves three remaining 
possibilities for manufacturers: to provide specific services to specific users; to sell 
supporting tools or to sell complementary goods (ibidem). Therefore, the changes in the 
intellectual property regime entail a societal change that goes deeper into the structure of 
production, almost envisioning new roles for manufacturers, who might be considered as 
unnecessary, at least to the process of producing informational goods. Not only is the role of 
manufacturers changing, but it is becoming necessary that governmental policies on the 
regulation of intellectual property change. Indeed, with this approach, we enter a virtuous 
circle that involves FLOSS and other end-user innovations, the intellectual property regime, 
and innovation again. In one respect FLOSS is the empirical proof of the viability, efficiency, 
and efficacy of end-user innovation processes. The intellectual property regime should 
therefore promote these kinds of innovation processes, which will, in the end, increase the 
efficiency and efficacy of the innovation process in the same way. Nevertheless, the change 
in the property regime is endogenous to development and innovation practices, while forms 
of co-ordination and organization of work are the consequences of changes in the regime 
itself. In conclusion, both the ontological and consequentialist approaches share a view of 
property regulation as detached from the practices of FLOSS: the first starts from the 
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inherent characteristics of the goods, while the second starts from the empirical proof of a 
more innovative model of production. The next section will deal with the approach of 
considering software as a social practice, and will rearticulate that both software and its 
consequences are the result of more finely grained software developers’ activities. 
 
Software as a Social Practice 
Using a different approach from those previously cited, Christopher Kelty (2008) has 
analyzed the birth of the “EMACS commune” and of the GNU (GNU is Not Unix) General 
Public License, showing how the legal system of defining copyright has been reworked and 
reappropriated in FLOSS practices in relation to specific and particular contexts. For 
example, the creation of the “EMACS commune” emerged as the practical solution to the 
presence of bugs in the source code of the EMACS text editor, and as a way of making 
possible its extension, by adding new functions, while the GNU GPL emerged as the solution 
to the contingent intellectual property problems that the GNU project was facing. As an 
American anthropologist pointed out, the GNU GPL arose from a controversy, and it was 
considered a “hack” of the copyright system. Hack, in this context, refers to “work-arounds; 
clever, shortest-path solutions that take advantage of characteristics of the system that may or 
may not have been obvious to the people who designed it.” (ibidem: 182). Property in the 
GNU GPL, in its legal sense, therefore emerged as a practical solution to ownership 
problems rooted in development practices. There was no ontological element to the software, 
and technology was constructed using the same practices instead of being a pre-existing 
element, as in the ontological approach, or a desired outcome of external processes, as in the 
consequentialist approach. 
Looking at entities as being co-constructed during the process of their production means to 
look at them not as discrete objects, but as things produced in such a way that they were the 
“cultural production of new forms of practice” (Suchman, Blomberg, Orr, & Trigg, 1999: 
404). From this point of view, considering software and property as social practices means to 
understand them as producing new forms of practice. But what is a practice? In the field of 
Organization Studies, Silvia Gherardi defined a practice as a way of doing things that is 
“relatively stable in time and socially recognized, for ordering heterogeneous items into a 
coherent set”(Gherardi, 2005: 34). Such a definition of "practice" is useful for facing the 
issues at stake here, because it underlines how practices are the locus where ownership is 
constantly being redefined by doing and in relation to other items while, at the same time, 
creating ownership does not happen in a vacuum, but emerges from a relatively stable and 
recognized set of elements. In this sense, a hack, like the one of writing the GNU GPL, can 
be legitimately conceived of as a practice, because it orders heterogeneous items (property 
and code, together) into a coherent set. At the same time, the social recognition of it as a 
practice shares the same definition of “hack” as recognized by hackers, and is an almost 
stable way of facing problems. 
Looking at practices in this way, and at Free Software from such a practice-based 
perspective, leads us directly to considering ontologies not as fixed elements, as in the 
ontological approach cited earlier, but as emergent in practices. The ontological status of 
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software as a commons or a piece of public goods is therefore a consequence of practically-
based processes. As Annemarie Mol pointed out, questioning the ontological status of a thing 
is almost the same as questioning the different potential performance of an object, trying to 
answer the questions, “Which one is performed? Under which conditions?” (Mol, 1999). The 
different ontologies emerge in different political relationships and carry with them different 
political relationships. In such a perspective, looking at the initial focus of this paper– the 
construction of boundaries to participation in a FLOSS project – property can be seen as an 
ontology under construction, and politics in FLOSS as politics in relation to this ontology. 
 
Property and Ownership in FLOSS 
In relation to the ownership of software, looking at the construction of property as an 
ontology created by practices means, above all, understanding property – in its application to 
software – as a resource and an object of the production process at the same time. If we look 
at "property", we can find at least two different nuances in the meaning of the word. The first 
one can be synthesized by the same word “property”, and could be strictly construed in the 
legal sense of the word, as “the exclusive right to possess, enjoy, or dispose of a thing” 
(Merriam-Webster, property1), while in a wider sense it can be interpreted as “ownership”, 
that is “to have power or mastery over a thing” (Merriam-Webster, to own2). The changes in 
the copyright regime concerning FLOSS have been recognized both in legal literature and in 
the literature focusing on organizational, productive, and cultural dynamics (cf Tuomi, 2001; 
Vaidhyanathan, 2001). Both these bodies of literature stress how property and ownership 
have changed towards a more collective orientation. Take the example of the Linux kernel: 
nobody legally owns the entire kernel, but the GNU GPL v2 is ensuring that participants can 
develop a way of managing the future of the kernel as a collective. Mastery of and power 
over the kernel are distributed, although not equally. 
Moreover, the blurring of the boundaries that protect access to source code has been seen as a 
way of bringing developers and users closer, so that the boundary between them – between 
the ones who refer to software as a "resource" and the ones who refer to it as an "object of 
production" – is dismantled by the law (cf. Rosen, 2005). Although the boundary is legally 
absent, in practical terms the boundary has not blurred homogeneously, so that one person 
will go on considering software as a resource while someone else will participate in the 
production process, for example with access to the Concurrent Versioning System (De Paoli 
& D'Andrea, 2008). The process of being allowed to participate in the production process is 
not easy or linear, as shown by Coleman and Hill (2004), but it is, for the developer, at the 
same time a process of enculturation in a project. Asking a question like “who owns 
software?” (Klang, 2005) is therefore a question of the empirical phenomenology of 
ownership practices, and as such it becomes a fundamental question when seeking to 
understand contemporary society, and also to understand the contribution of FLOSS to 
contemporary politics in the form of rebalancing societal relationships. This kind of 
ownership is legally and institutionally supported primarily as a form of property by software 
                                                 
1http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/property [03/27/2010] 
2http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/owner [03/27/2010] 
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licenses, as mentioned in the GNU GPL preamble: 
“The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed to take away 
your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast, the GNU General Public 
License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change all versions of a 
program--to make sure it remains free software for all its users.” (GNU GPL 3 
Preamble) 
The statement made by Free Software Foundation is clear: the GNU GPL was born as a form 
of legal support to the practices of sharing and modification as a form of software ownership. 
Ontological and consequentialist approaches have almost limited themselves to describing 
this change as a way of transforming the mode of production, in a causal nexus between the 
legal dimension and the organizational one. Such conceptualizations have been connected to 
radical changes, as in the already cited forms of democratization of the production and 
innovation processes (von Hippel, 2005). At the same time, other researchers have underlined 
how FLOSS development does not democratize in a homogeneous way, but that it is 
possible, empirically, to find forms of development that remain closed to a wider 
participation (Krishnamurthy, 2002). 
Ownership as power and mastery therefore remains as a possible practice, but only for some 
individuals, in some contexts. Indeed, the issue at stake, to answer Klang's question, is the 
construction of boundaries to participation in FLOSS production, and the description of 
specific and empirically discovered boundaries that will better rearticulate the exercise of this 
power of exclusion in terms of software production. In this sense, answering this 
fundamental question means answering two deeply sociological questions: who and what is 
included in, or excluded from, such a group? How does the group take shape? 
 
Collective Dynamics in FLOSS Projects 
Some scholars in different fields have already tried to answer these questions, for example 
O'Mahony and Ferraro (2007). Discussing “how social collectives govern, organize, and co-
ordinate the actions of individuals to achieve collective outcomes” (1079), they argued in 
favor of an analysis of the construction of governance and the characteristics of leaders. In 
their analysis of the Debian project, what emerged clearly was the role of crisis, in particular 
a crisis of authority, in defining the characteristics of leaders, who had to be more and more 
able to align “both organisation-building and technical activities to the project’s vision and 
goals” (1091). This happens in a group of people that “sets a formal bureaucratic basis of 
authority to reinforce its meritocratic norms. However, this approach depends upon 
democratic mechanisms that not only limit that basis of authority, but also allow the system 
to adapt with members’ changing interpretations of leadership” (1079-1080). While the 
contribution of these authors is extremely valuable in understanding the processes internal to 
a project, it is not able to show how the same processes construct boundaries to participation 
in the same project – only that the project is flexible enough to adjust to changes. 
A similar limitation, in relation to the question posed by this paper, affects the study by 
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Gabriella Coleman and Mako Hill (2004). Their work is also related to the Debian project, 
and their question is related to “the rise and cultivation” (ibidem: 275) of ethics in the project 
itself. The ethical commitment of developers is therefore a result of their participation in the 
project and not just based on an initial, clearly defined set of values. As they write, 
“participation in FLOSS projects like Debian contributes to the solidification of a pre-
existent ethical commitment to information freedom” (ibidem: 278). In their contribution, the 
practical construction of ethics is inscribed in procedure and artifacts, as is their case study, 
the Debian New Maintainer Process, and it is rooted in a context in which “institutional 
independence, volunteer labor, and networks of trust can act as key elements in facilitating 
moral development within occupational groups” (275). Coleman and Hill's work certainly 
helps in understanding how the practices of FLOSS and their artifacts construct the discourse 
on ethics and legitimate behavior but, at the same time, does not investigate how some 
practices and discourses are excluded by a FLOSS project. 
Both these papers (O'Mahony and Ferraro's, and Coleman and Hill's) stressed the inherent 
technosocial perspective of FLOSS developers and projects, as also strongly emphasized by 
Christopher Kelty (2008). His analysis of co-ordination in the Linux and Apache projects, of 
the “meaningful technosocial practice of managing, decision-making, and accounting”, 
stresses how the key is “adaptability over planning” (ibidem: 211). Adaptability is, in this 
account, an incremental process of implementing changes, and it is stronger in its effects 
when it relies upon crisis or controversial issues. Adaptability becomes particularly political 
because it configures itself as an infrastructure and as “the province of critique” (ibidem: 
222), when it provides “the ability to critique existing designs and to propose alternatives 
without restrictions” (ibidem: 235). Putting together the three contributions analyzed here, 
the picture that emerges is of FLOSS projects as involved in co-ordinating themselves 
through a technosocial perspective, that includes both the infrastructure for co-ordination and 
adaptability and the social processes connected to it, in terms of leadership, enculturation, 
and decision-making. Nevertheless, these accounts still consider what takes place within a 
FLOSS project, while almost completely dismissing how the same projects give shape to 
what remains excluded from the FLOSS dynamics. 
In a series of papers written with colleagues, I have discussed exactly this kind of problem, 
the double-sided issue of boundary-work, as including and excluding at the same time (De 
Paoli, Teli & D'Andrea, 2008; D'Andrea, De Paoli & Teli, 2009). In these studies we have 
relied on actor-network theory accounts of group formation, in order to show how FLOSS 
artifacts and controversies “participate in the construction of both relational ecologies and 
political and technical boundaries” (De Paoli, Teli & D'Andrea, 2008). In this paper, I wish to 
further the study of specific artifacts, in order to grasp the relational ecologies that legitimate 
the participants in a FLOSS project, in other words those exercising collective ownership of 
the software. In conformity with the stance of considering that “the free/open character of 
FLOSS should not be assumed as an a priori explanation” (ibidem), I draw upon the same 
theoretical standpoint, the actor-network theory, in order to understand how ownership is not 
only the result of social practices but “also affording the construction and reproduction of 
these practices” (ibidem). In actor-network theory, one of the most comprehensive accounts 
of group dynamics and collective construction is Bruno Latour's “Politics of Nature” (Latour, 
1999). According to this French author, collective construction and dynamics are built around 
four different kinds of practices: those that introduce perplexity about the actual composition 
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of a collective, those that evaluate the pertinence of possible new participants, those that 
construct a hierarchy among the legitimate participants, and those that support the 
institutionalization of the collective constructed in this way, in some sense stabilizing it, at 
least temporarily. The goal of this paper is precisely to understand the practical construction 
of a collective form of ownership in a FLOSS project. 
 
Corporate FLOSS: The Opensolaris3 Case 
As I have already mentioned, FLOSS has been studied a lot, and most of what has been said 
focuses on it as the organization of volunteers' work. Despite all this, Kelty (2008) has 
pointed out that FLOSS is a set of practices “neither corporate nor academic, neither profit 
nor nonprofit, neither governmental nor nongovernmental” (211). At the same time, little has 
been said on the FLOSS relationship with the corporate world, and in particular on the 
practices emerging when a for-profit organization decides to “open source” one of its pieces 
of software with a FLOSS license, although there are more and more cases like this, 
including Microsoft Inc., the standard-bearer, in FLOSS rhetoric, of the proprietary software 
companies. 
A case of the “open sourcing” of code is particularly interesting for the aims of this paper, 
both for the relevance of the phenomenon and for the new questions that it presents. When a 
corporation decides to “open source” one of its software products, we can see the process of 
the construction of collective ownership in its ecological relationship with its previous 
proprietary status. Moreover, if something about FLOSS practices is inherently able to 
democratize the production process, these elements should also be found in the case of a 
previously hierarchical organization. Indeed, the elements of adaptability need to pursue the 
same goals as the previous practices and should be able to question them, moving issues like: 
“Who and what is included in or excluded from such a group? How does the group take 
shape?” towards an understanding of the elements that sustain the potential shift. 
This happens in a social context that contrasts FLOSS with the concept of “proprietary 
software”, underlining how the difference between the two ways of creating software exists 
in their usage of the legal concept of property. While we can take for granted such legal 
differences, it tells us nothing about how the presence of a corporation shapes the practices of 
collective ownership. In this paper, therefore, I will focus on the specific case of such an 
encounter, the OpenSolaris case. The OpenSolaris project was launched after an initiative by 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. (from now on referred to as Sun4), the launch configuring itself as an 
action inside the software industry, with the necessity of being accountable to Sun's 
shareholders and investors. Starting from this point of view, after a brief historical 
introduction to Sun, Solaris and OpenSolaris, I will describe how the choice of “open 
sourcing” some of the software produced by Sun (above all, the famous Java technology) can 
be connected to a vision of the evolution of the software industry and of all of society that 
Jonathan Schwartz, Chief Executive Officer at Sun, described as a shift toward the 
                                                 
3Solaris, OpenSolaris, Java and Sun are registered trademarks owned by Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
4Sun Microsystems has been recently acquired by Oracle Corporation. The data used in this work do not include 
this recent acquisition, on which I am planning future work. 
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“Participation Age”. This is connected to a vision of business opportunities based on the 
business model of “Radio Antennas”. The narrative on FLOSS as a strategic business choice 
has been constructed by two Sun engineers, Richard Gabriel and Ron Goldman, who 
dedicated a book to it: “Innovation happens elsewhere” (2005). This trajectory underlines the 
importance of aligning different social practices, those of the corporate world with those of 
FLOSS. These practices will be the focus of the next section. Before that, it is necessary to 
describe the research methodology. 
 
A Cyberethnography of FLOSS 
Cyberethnography, as opposed to ethnography without attributes, seeks to underline how 
ethnography is able to grasp the hybrid, fluid and unfinished character of the entities 
involved (Teli, Pisanu, & Hakken, 2007), as well as the fact that the boundaries of the 
community being studied are not fixed, but emerge from the act of observation, as 
remembered by Katie Ward: “Cyber-ethnography differs from regular ethnography as it 
avoids holding any preconceived ideas concerning the existence of community.” (1999: 96). 
This method is therefore the one best able to understand groups in their construction, 
focusing on the practices involved in that construction. Moreover, Cyberethnography is 
concerned with non-modern epistemologies (Latour, 1993), avoiding assumptions about the 
relevant elements, human or non-human, in the theoretical and methodological account. 
The OpenSolaris project was followed ethnographically from June 2005 to March 2007, 
when the Constitution of the project was approved by a vote taken in the OpenSolaris 
Community. During that period, the data sources were the project mailing lists, the Internet 
Relay Chat channels, and the developers' blogs. In some cases, a few interviews by email 
were carried out, although the prevalent approach was one of passive observation. This is to 
be distinguished from archive research through the practice of observation, which was 
performed daily and almost in real time. (The observation, data archiving and taking of field-
notes took between two and three hours a day throughout the whole period.) Observation was 
aided by the analysis of natural documents, both those produced by Sun, before and after the 
start of the project, and those produced by the participants themselves after the start, whether 
legal (Charter, Constitution, license) or technical (Developers' Reference, How-Tos, etc.) in 
nature. Data was then analyzed by means of grounded theory techniques (Dey, 2004; Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967) in order to grasp inductively the processes of collective construction taking 
place in the project. As stated before, the first questions arising when looking at collective 
construction are questions of perplexity and pertinence, and this story should start with an 
understanding of those elements from the corporate point of view, by trying to investigate 
under what conditions a corporation ended up considering FLOSS to be a legitimate choice. 
"Perplexity" means questioning the current composition of the collective and its current 
practices, so the first part of this story talks about the history of Sun, Solaris and 
OpenSolaris. In particular, what will be shown is how the practices and events in the software 
industry and in Sun's own history created perplexity among the corporate owners, which 
resulted in a movement towards FLOSS as a way of controlling software. 
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Sun, Solaris and Opensolaris 
On 24 February 1982, four former students of computer science, Andy Bechtolsheim, Vinod 
Khosla, Scott McNealy and Bill Joy, joined forces to create Sun Microsystems. In a short 
period of time other programmers joined Sun, among them John Gage. John, who was Chief 
Researcher and Vice President of the Science Office during my fieldwork (he is now retired), 
is famous because he created, in the 1980s, the slogan “The Network is the Computer”, 
referring mainly to distributed computing as a way of processing information that involves 
several computers connected in a network, executing different parts of a program. Since then, 
the slogan has characterized Sun, and is still used today, framed as the “vision” of the 
company: 
“Since 1982, Sun has maintained that the network is the computer. Sun's vision is to 
see everyone and everything participating on the network. Sun's mission is to create 
technologies and fuel communities that enable sharing and participation. Sun's cause 
is to eliminate the digital divide. Eliminating the digital divide allows everyone to 
take part in opportunities and contribute to solutions regardless of their geographic 
location or economic situation.” (www.sun.com/aboutsun/company) 
The technological narrative, “the network is the computer”, has become a social narrative 
that states as its own objective the enlargement of participation in sharing practices. 
Nevertheless, for a long period of time this vision and slogan were associated with the sale of 
proprietary software, as in the case of Solaris, the operating system developed by Sun. In 
June 2005, Solaris was released under the Common Development and Distribution License 
(CDDL), a FLOSS license, and the OpenSolaris project started. How did it happen that a for-
profit corporation questioned its own practices, moving from a proprietary software model 
towards a FLOSS strategy? It was after the economic crisis of 2000, when the so-called “dot-
com bubble” burst, that Sun management started questioning its own practices in relation to 
software development, as remembered by Simon Phipps, Chief Open Source Officer at Sun: 
“Sun had a sort of near-death experience, when the [dot-com] bubble burst. It saw its 
stock price go down to a tenth of its previous value, and it saw the need to dismiss 
large numbers of staff. It became suddenly very obvious that lots of the people who 
didn't share Sun's values didn't belong here anymore; it also became very obvious that 
some of the approaches to software that Sun had been taking weren't actually in 
keeping with Sun's long-term values.” (Moody, 2007). 
On one hand, the critical situation can be seen to have caused some perplexity about practices 
that had already become consolidated, while on the other hand, the slogan “The Network is 
the Computer”, gave the incentive to align software development practices with company 
strategy. FLOSS, which is based on Internet collaboration, became a pertinent response to a 
critical situation. This alignment, in its turn, introduced perplexity into a different social 
arena and context, that of the investors and shareholders. The previously existing, stabilized 
practice of dealing with crises by means of management discourseprovided the tool to face 
this new source of perplexity: the business model. 
FLOSS as a Business Model 
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I have already mentioned how changes to Sun’s software distribution model − with the 
option to release Solaris as OpenSolaris − necessitated Sun having to sell this strategy to 
investors and shareholders. Managers needed to show investors and shareholders that FLOSS 
was pertinent to Sun's business strategy. This was particularly important because although 
Sun was releasing software like OpenOffice.org and NetBeans with FLOSS licenses before 
Solaris/OpenSolaris, these were fringe markets for Sun, whose core business was selling 
hardware, particularly servers and the services to support them. By contrast, Solaris is a key 
component, being the operating system for those servers. Sun needed to show, therefore, that 
FLOSS was as pertinent as Solaris to its core business. 
The notion of this connection between FLOSS and Sun's core business did not arise from a 
vacuum, but had been developed over quite a long period of time, both before and after the 
launch of OpenSolaris. In 2004 Sun's Chief Executive Officer, Jonathan Schwartz, described 
for the first time the societal changes that allowed the combination of Sun, a FLOSS-based 
strategy and the “The Network is the Computer” slogan, to appear in alignment with social 
processes. This is how he described the shift from the “Information Age”, the rhetoric 
supporting the dot-com bubble, to the “Participation Age”, defined as a societal phase:  
“… in which an open and competitive network fuels growing opportunities for 
everyone − not simply to draw data or shift work around the world, but to participate, 
to create value and independence. If the Information Age is passive, the Participation 
Age is active” (Schwartz, 2004). 
This background forms the basis for subsequent problems, and for their solutions, and in it 
FLOSS has had a key role, allowing Sun to “lower the cost of computing, lower barriers to 
entry, […] fuel the communities that give rise to the next era of network computing” 
(ibidem). With such a societal shift, the issue remained one of creating economic value for 
shareholders and investors. Responding to this issue, Schwartz, during the Sun Analyst 
Summit (Schwartz, 2007), made explicit Sun's strategy, which was that by increasing value 
they could increase their market share: “Volume drives Value”. Using an analogy with the 
radio market, Schwartz compared Sun to the producers of radio antennas, who benefit from 
the growth of the radio audience. Reducing the barriers of entry to the use of information 
technology, with FLOSS being one of the main elements in achieving this, is therefore part of 
a business strategy aimed at increasing the number of users (volume). Attracting new people 
and enlarging the boundaries of potential participants led to the transformation of a business 
model and the development of operational guidelines on how to build a FLOSS project in a 
business environment. This is the subject of the next section. 
 
FLOSS as the Enlargement of Participation 
The opportunity and necessity of involving more participants external to the company was 
the starting point for the book “Innovation Happens Elsewhere” (2005) by two Sun 
engineers, Goldman and Gabriel . In it, they mention facing the problem of describing 
FLOSS as a business strategy, based on the notion that “business is changing after the 
expansive thinking of the late 1990s followed by the lessons learned in the early 2000s: It no 
longer makes sense for every company to make and own every aspect of its business” (p. 1). 
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Sun shipped this book free of charge to anybody who registered on the Sun Developer 
Network, making it a reasonable source from which to evaluate Sun's view of FLOSS as a 
business strategy. According to the two authors, and taking for granted the need to include 
others in the development of their technology, the main advantage for those who decide to 
include FLOSS in their strategy is an increase in innovation capacity, which engenders 
increased productivity. This resembles the consequentialist approach discussed earlier. 
Goldman and Gabriel not only indicate the potential positive outcomes of following this path, 
but also the elements that should be considered when doing so: “Engaging in an open-source 
project requires understanding the community, its culture and customs, its tools, and its way 
of working [...] the work involves community building, politics, citizenship, principles, and 
governance.” (ibidem: 7-9). This has consequences for the company's internal organization 
because, according to the two engineers, “An open-source project breaks down 
organizational boundaries both within your company and between your company and the 
outside world” (ibidem: 273). 
This path involves giving away part of the control over software as property, and the 
construction of an almost independent governance structure, although the consequences of 
this shift and the changes resulting from the development of a collective form of ownership 
are at this point still not clear. 
 
Governing the Future 
The role of Sun was questioned extensively in relation to the structure of the Community and 
the decision-making process. This email extract gives another glance into the problems that 
arose: 
“>5 I asked the then-CAB-now-OGB to bias against new community 
proposals in favour of 
 > projects, so that new technical efforts start as projects. 
This is IMO a good start to address barrier-to-entry, but it doesn't address my 
overall concerns I've tried to articulate above around who will own the 
strategy and roadmaps of which these technical efforts are necessarily a part. 
Having projects which are not under the guidance of a community seems to 
indicate an unspoken presumption that the strategy and roadmap are 
controlled by some external organization (e.g. Sun!). That's IMO not the right 
thing to do, because it relinquishes control of the eventual destiny of the 
technology to a body other than the OpenSolaris community itself, which 
deserves the stake.” 
[EL, cab-discuss, 23 Mar 2007] 
Here we have a clear articulation of the need for a way to foster the “sense of ownership” that 
                                                 
5The symbol “>” is opening the rows part of messages quoted by the writer. 
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AH was talking about before: controlling the technical choices. This, in the process of 
building a collective, is a way of defining a hierarchy among different choices, and is 
therefore crucial to the future development of the project. The structure of the OpenSolaris 
collective is organized as “Communities” and “Projects”, the former supervising a general 
area of software development, while the latter are specific software development efforts. 
Indeed, with Communities, we have formal ownership, which has the power to decide the 
future of parts of the OpenSolaris project, while the Projects are explicitly connected to work, 
to production. Therefore, as EL pointed out, to strengthen the sense of ownership it should be 
clear who is in charge of future development, and of the roadmap for the project, while 
strengthening projects alone could suggest that someone else is running the entire 
OpenSolaris effort. Nevertheless, until now it has not been clear “who” is a legitimate 
participant in the OpenSolaris project, while “what” can participate has become clearer: an 
open source control management system, an open website, and a clearly defined distribution 
of competences and roles among communities and projects. Understanding who can 
participate in the social processes of collective ownership means, from this point of view, 
understanding who can participate in communities and projects in the OpenSolaris 
organization. 
The OpenSolaris Constitution tries to answer such questions. Article number 2 elucidates the 
broad responsibilities of the Community, taking all the decisions regarding OpenSolaris, and 
how this Constitution relates to these responsibilities, defining the procedure for decision-
making in order to sustain itself as a self-governing organization. In particular, the 
OpenSolaris Community is considered to be an organization that comprises volunteers who 
may vote on decisions involving the whole community, the most prominent of which is 
considered to be the election of the OpenSolaris Governing Board. The right to participate in 
such decision-making processes is restricted to a select group of people, the “Core 
Contributors”. To gain the status of Core Contributor, an individual needs to be recognized 
by at least one Community Group as someone contributing to the achievement of the goals of 
that Community (Article 3). To obtain this recognition, an individual must participate in 
discussion and development. Participation is restricted to those who have registered through 
the OpenSolaris website. There is, therefore, a social process of mutual recognition that 
creates a foundation for controlling the future of new development efforts and for the project 
organization. Nevertheless, the future of code is regulated by other means as well, mainly by 
the license, and understanding the controversies around the license can help with 
understanding the future, not only of the OpenSolaris code, but also of the relationship 
between such code and other entities in the software panorama. 
 
Shaping the Software Panorama 
At the beginning of 2007, while the GNU GPL v3 was under development, a debate emerged 
in the OpenSolaris community about whether to change the license of the project to the GNU 
GPL v3 or to a dual licensing schema. The current license of the project is (and was) the 
Common Development and Distribution License (CDDL), based on the Mozilla Public 
License, and therefore incompatible with the GNU GPL. As highlighted in other studies, this 
is a crucial political issue in defining which are to be the legitimate participants in a FLOSS 
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project (De Paoli, Teli, D'Andrea, 2008), but what is important in this context is how the 
controversies about licenses shape the whole software panorama. In these controversies, the 
software panorama is part of the practice of debating as an element of proof, and its nature as 
an element of proof supports one group or another in the software panorama. Take the 
following example of a discussion about the GNU GPL 3 versus the CDDL as the right 
license for the project: 
“Wrong. Apple, FreeBSD and other projects are *proof* that the CDDL provides 
benefits. We do not have "just opinions, emotions and fear." I mean really, that's just 
an ungrateful and untrue thing to say. 
Debian doesn't even accept some of the Free Software Foundation's licenses, so 
what's your answer to that? Sorry, but Debian is unreasonable in their demands in 
many people's opinions. Why do you think Ubuntu is succeeding where they 
*failed*?” 
[SW, osol-discuss, 31 Jan 2007] 
“It is? When I see changes from Apple that get put back into the source base, I'll 
believe it. As it is, Apple is good about sucking the living daylights out of the open 
source community and putting nothing back, it's mostly a one-way street. I'm not 
saying their way is bad, it's just not open and free.” 
[AD, osol-discuss, 31 Jan 2007] 
Debian and Apple are redefined with regard to the legitimacy of their practices: if Debian can 
be considered unreasonable, Apple is described as benefiting from FLOSS without giving 
back, thus not being legitimate. When the practices and histories of these entities are given as 
proof supporting the views of one of the debating factions, they are at the same time being 
evaluated in ethical terms, and their legitimacy as participants is hierarchically dependent on 
their ethical legitimacy, i.e. on their being “open and free”. This series of controversies ended 
with a document by the OpenSolaris Governing Board, entitled “Topic: Should OpenSolaris 
be dual licensed via CDDL and GPLv3” that states, among other things: 
“Further discussion on GPL* is merely a diversion and distraction that should be 
discouraged, so as to allow the community to concentrate on the higher priority action 
items - especially those that will improve developer mindshare.” 
[AH, osol-discuss, 7 Feb 2007] 
As we see, here the controversial issue about the GNU GPL is dismissed in favour of getting 
other things done, with the aim of establishing an agreement among developers. 
Nevertheless, it is the same position paper that is questioned later on: 
“I support the OGB issuing position papers on behalf of the OpenSolaris community, 
and I think many people in the community welcome the board's view. I certainly 
respect the OGB and the individual members as well. However, I disagree with some 
elements in this OGB Position Paper. 
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In parts, this document attempts to thwart conversation on OpenSolaris, and I don't 
support that strategy under any circumstance – especially since so many of us have 
worked so hard to have /open/ conversations. Also, the OpenSolaris Community is 
nascent, and I believe we should /encourage/ conversation, not /discourage/ it – no 
matter what the issue is as long as the conversation is respectful.” 
[JG, osol-discuss, 10 Feb 2007] 
Here, what is at stake is the possibility of continuing with the discussions – not the final 
decision, but the supporting arguments. The ability of participants to introduce perplexity 
should be preserved, although there is a recognition of the institutionalized authority of the 
OGB to make decisions about hierarchy. 
 
FLOSS as Collective Ownership 
While telling the story of Sun, Solaris and OpenSolaris, and talking about some of the 
controversies that emerged in the first two years of the project, I have underlined the process 
of defining legitimate participation in a FLOSS project in the context of a corporation. Some 
of the practices have been shown to be relevant in revising the boundaries of the legitimate 
participants and in defining which should be the legitimate aims for the project. These can be 
seen as “practices of freedom”, things necessary for a group of people in order for them to 
define legitimate forms of existence for themselves and their political society (Foucault, 
1984). In such practices, what is at stake is the construction of the OpenSolaris project as a 
collective, an ensemble of human and non-human entities, shaped by the processes of 
perplexity, evaluation of pertinence, construction of a hierarchy, and institutionalization. 
In considering the issue of perplexity, I have pointed out at least two important elements in 
introducing perplexity to the process of constructing a collective: crisis and an environment 
that supports discussion. Whereas Sun was almost forced to rethink its own software 
development and distribution practices after an economic crisis (the bursting of the “dot-com 
bubble”), once the OpenSolaris project was launched, the practices of perplexity moved to 
the mailing lists. Here, the introduction of perplexity happens through two main channels: the 
role of artifacts and the initiative of a participant. In the discussion about the Charter and the 
Constitution, it was the nature of these legal artifacts that put Sun's behavior under scrutiny. 
By contrast, a question about the GNU GPL was transformed into a big controversy, and 
ended only with authoritative action from the OGB, the group of people formally in charge. 
Nevertheless, the same concluding document was questioned through the mailing lists, and 
the fact that this happened undermined one of the basic elements of the argument by the 
OGB itself. In the end, an open mailing list can become a key element in introducing 
perplexity, but it is still unclear what is relevant when evaluating pertinence. 
As the history of Sun and the slogan “The Network is the Computer” show, the historically 
stabilized discursive resources are probably the key elements in defining pertinence. The 
connection with the idea of distributed computing, the presence of other examples of 
networked phenomena, and the possibility of finding a similarity for the proposed business 
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model were crucial in enabling Sun's managers to promote the FLOSS option. This is also 
crucial when dealing with creation of a hierarchy: in the GNU GPL/CDDL debate, the 
presence of stated aims, like producing software, is the key in the discussion about the OGB 
position paper, as well as the main resource for the critique of the same position paper.  
With regard to institutionalization, I showed how it can cause conflict, even generating such 
conflicts, as in the cases of the Charter and the Constitution. Moreover, the power to interfere 
with this project is institutionally granted to a restricted ensemble of people, the Core 
Contributors, while existing institutions (for example, the stock market, shareholders and 
investors) affect the way in which perplexity and pertinence may also enter into the process 
of constructing the collective known as the OpenSolaris Community. In fact, some elements 
were excluded during the process of alignment among the different participants, like the 
GNU GPL v3, proprietary parts of the technological infrastructure (for example, the source 
control management system and the website), the unbalanced relationship between Sun and 
non-Sun engineers, the absence of a shared roadmap, and unhelpful discussions. 
In conclusion, the process of construction of the collective that exercises ownership over the 
OpenSolaris code is a process based on a number of elements: (i) historical events (the dot-
com bubble bursting and the creation of GNU GPL v3), (ii) artifacts (legal documents), (iii) a 
technological infrastructure (the mailing lists) to support the critique of its current status, (iv) 
the existing documents, narratives, and the surrounding software panorama (other companies 
and other open source projects) in order to establish pertinence and hierarchy, and (v) 
existing institutions that support the same process of institutionalization of the collective, 
undermining the claim of radical innovation in favor of defining it as a form of improvement 
on the existing one, by means of perplexity. 
 
Conclusions 
At the beginning of this paper, I described how many researchers agreed on identifying 
FLOSS as an example of radical innovation in contemporary production processes, in 
particular in relation to the concept of property. After that, I explained the causal relationship 
between property and the organisation of production that the literature on FLOSS has 
developed, identifying three approaches: the ontological approach, the consequentialist 
approach, and the practice-based approach.  
Starting with the subject of property, I have shown how property in the legal sense, and 
ownership as a form of power and control, should be separated, giving new meaning to the 
question “who owns software?”. In order to give an answer to this question, I have drawn 
upon the idea that ownership in FLOSS is shared among different people, who can be 
considered as a collective, i.e. a group formed as a result of practices of perplexity, 
pertinence, hierarchy, and institutionalization. 
This theoretical framework was adopted to deal with the case of a corporate FLOSS project: 
the OpenSolaris project launched and backed by Sun Microsystems. Interpreting the 
empirical case, it has emerged clearly how a “sense of ownership” is something that is looked 
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for by the developers, and that this sense of ownership should be shared among the collective 
entity known as the OpenSolaris community. Therefore, to answer the question “who owns 
software?” means to answer the question “who and what are the legitimate participants in 
it?”, in other words, who and what are included in the collective. 
In this case, the answer resulted in a group with unclear boundaries, which are continuously 
being challenged by the introduction of perplexity about the components of the collective. 
Moreover, the previously existing artifacts, institutions, and discursive resources have been 
crucial in supporting the practices of pertinence, hierarchy, and institutionalisation, favouring 
an incremental critique of the status quo rather than a radical change to it. Future critical 
research might, therefore, start from this point of view: identifying the panoramas that may 
be affected and changed by FLOSS development and practices, while the possible pertinence 
of FLOSS practices to such panoramas should be evaluated in order to obtain an effective 
critique. 
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Abstract 
The paper aims to discuss and analyze the adoption of Open 
Source model of economic value creation in the biomedical 
research domain. It starts by evaluating the needs for open and 
collaborative models in biomedicine. Initial experiments using 
open and collaborative research methodology are discussed. 
The paper analyzes how open source design principles are 
suitable in the case of drug discovery. Two important initiatives 
of drug discovery (Tropical Disease Initiative and Open Source 
Drug Discovery) were studied under various open source 
design perspectives. The paper concludes that the open source 
biomedical research model is worth pursuing.  
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Introduction 
 
The concept of Open Source Software (OSS) has been gaining heavy attention predominantly 
in the last 10 to 15 years. In brief, the term “open source software” refers to software 
products distributed under terms that allow users to use, modify and redistribute the software 
without requiring that they pay the author of the software any royalty for engaging in the 
listed activities.  
Products such as the Linux operating system, the Apache web server, the Mozilla web 
browser, the PHP, or Perl programming language, the MySQL database, and the OpenOffice 
productivity suite are well known examples of this kind of software. Popular open source 
project sites such as Sourceforge (www.sourceforge.net) and Freshmeat (www.freshmeat.net) 
have amassed a large number of licensed user-base along with a significant number of OSS 
projects. Sourceforge has more than 170,000 projects and more than 1,000,000 licensed users 
while Freshmeat has more than 45,000 projects with about 400,000 licensed users. 
Formal definitions relating to the term “open source” are maintained by the Free Software 
Foundation (FSF) and Open Source Initiative (OSI). The definitions given by both the 
organizations are identical except for a minor difference in their emphasis. The FSF prefers 
the use of the term “free,” which explicitly refers to freedom, while OSI emphasizes the 
availability and modifiability of the source code. Both the definitions put equal emphasis on 
the way the OSS community views the term “property.” The notion of property in OSS 
parlance is built around the right to distribute instead of the right to exclude. 
The success of open source has significant implications for economic growth and the 
development of the software industry. However, the notion of open source is not just limited 
to software. If the open source process has more general characteristics, as a generic 
production process for knowledge that can spread beyond software, then the implications 
would be considerably larger.  
The present paper is a discussion and analysis of the generalization capabilities of the OSS 
phenomenon. For this purpose, applications of Open Source principles in the area of drug 
research have been studied in detail through different perspectives. The domain of drug 
research was especially chosen mainly due to the fact that, in the last decade, many different 
open and collaborative experiments, based on open source principles, have been carried out 
in this domain. This paper is based on substantial literature reviews, which studied the 
various facets of open source drug research. This paper also poses various questions related 
to the applicability of the OSS phenomenon in areas other than software, some of which have 
been partially answered while for others the answers are yet to be found.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections: the first section discusses the need of 
open and collaborative research in biomedicines with the changing pharmaceutical industry 
as the backdrop. The next section defines open source for biomedical research. The third 
section looks at recent biology collaborations which represent some characteristics of open 
source. The next section looks in detail at two applications of OSS principles in drug 
discovery viz. Tropical Disease Initiative (TDI) and Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) 
using different perspectives of OSS phenomenon and how these nascent initiatives are 
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addressing the needs of society, which big pharmaceutical firms have failed to address. The 
fifth section assesses the generalization potential of the open source phenomenon, based on 
the open source biomedical study. Finally, the last section contains concluding comments.  
 
Biomedical Research: Analogies with Software Development 
The Open Source movement in software has been become quite strong in the last several 
decades. In the literature, various attempts to explain its enormous success have been made. 
Different researchers in the fields of political science, law, human relations, sociology, and 
economics, amongst others, have dealt with issues such as: motivation, collective action, 
network formation, peer reviews, user innovation, and economic logic.  
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether and how the core open source principles are 
generic enough to be translated into a new context and new domains. For the purpose of this 
study the area of biomedical research has been examined as an example of the generalization 
potential of Open Source.  
A cursory analysis of the two fields is enough to show that there exists a strong analogy 
between software and biomedical or biotechnological research. Both disciplines have 
enormous potential to help solve critical problems of humanity. This potential can only be 
realized if a parallel innovation system can be built along with the current industry 
participants. Both industries are largely concentrated with the existence of oligopolies (few 
large corporate controlling majority of the industry). This implies that a disruptive innovation 
can threaten the existence of these large corporations (Hope, 2008). Both industries are 
dominated by the strong existence of IP regimes: patents in the case of biomedical research 
and copyrights in case of software. 
These similarities lead us to delve deeper into the analysis of the applicability of the open 
source principles in biomedical domain. 
 
Open and Collaborative Research in Biomedicine 
It has been observed by industry pundits that the pharmaceutical industry is facing a 
productivity crisis. The rate at which the industry generates new products, specifically, the 
new molecular entities (NMEs) approved by U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
appears to be shrinking. This decline occurred despite a doubling of  research and 
development (R&D) spending by U.S.-based pharmaceutical companies (Cockburn, 2004). 
The big pharmaceutical companies have failed to address the vaccines needed to address 
third world diseases, such as neglected or tropical diseases as well as orphan diseases. This 
turned out to produce a market failure, as no firm has any monetary incentive to develop 
drugs for consumers who can’t afford to buy them. Also, over the years, biomedical research 
has become increasingly proprietary and secretive. As the general nature of the research is 
cumulative, such a trend may impede future progress due to access and licensing difficulties. 
To understand the reasons behind these issues and how open and collaborative research is an 
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apt solution, as it is necessary to understand the different aspects and trends prevalent in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
Market and State Failure 
There is a clear evidence of market and state failure in the production of third world diseases 
such as tuberculosis and Malaria. Market failure is evident because the patients in the third 
world countries do not have the resources to buy costly drugs that the large pharmaceutical 
firms might produce. Hence, even though the market (in terms of number of patients) is quite 
large, the limited purchasing power of this market makes this market non-lucrative for the big 
pharmaceutical firms and discourages any form of research. 
The state has also not able to find any kind of solution to this problem. This might be 
partially because of a lack of will and interest, and partially because of a lack of resources 
and pharmaceutical infrastructure in the concerned third world country. 
The unfortunate existence of market and state failure in the production of drugs to address 
third world diseases makes a compelling case for analyzing different, innovative approaches 
to drug discovery and to biomedical research in general. 
Changing Nature of Patent Structure 
For much of the twentieth century, biopharmaceutical innovation largely comprised trial and 
error by large, vertically integrated pharmaceutical firms. Through a combination of size and 
monopoly-conferring end product patents, these firms hedged the risk associated with their 
trial and error-based innovation. 
In the mid to late 1970s, the advent of recombinant DNA and monoclonal antibody research 
caused the conceptual gap between research science and the therapeutic products of interest 
to industry to shrink. U.S. Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which was aimed to 
encourage downstream commercialization by allowing patenting and exclusive licensing of 
federally funded discoveries. Before 1980s, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) had a policy of refusing applications for patents on living organisms. From 1980s 
onwards, according to a historic result by the United States Supreme Court, living organisms 
that had been modified by genetic engineering or other means could now be regarded as 
inventions for the purposes of patent law. Combined with the Bayh-Dole Act, the effect of 
these judicial developments was two-pronged: on one hand, the biotechnology patents 
become easier to obtain and on the other, scientists were encouraged to seek patent protection 
for the research conducted with public funds. Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has further encouraged proprietary trends in basic 
biomedical research by penalizing severely for any kind of IP infringement.  
Due to this, universities as well as small firms could start patenting upstream research; that is 
the publicly granted research being performed at the university labs by research scientists. In 
the case of universities, licensing upstream research produces revenue. For small firms and 
startups, upstream patents – or exclusive licenses to upstream university patents – appear to 
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be important for attracting venture capital and for securing revenues when licensed to large 
pharmaceutical firms. Thus the large pharmaceutical firms must now negotiate with a large 
number of universities and small firms due to their proprietary claims on the research inputs 
provided. This vertical disintegration in the pharmaceutical industry (with the addition of 
small biotech firms between academia and big pharmaceuticals) has created a heavy increase 
in downstream competition while increasing transaction costs substantially.  
Tragedy of the Anticommons 
A tragedy of the commons occurs when a common resource, such as air or water, is 
destroyed through overuse because no individual user has sufficient incentive to conserve it. 
According to Heller and Eisenberg (1998), a tragedy of the anticommons happens in the 
exact opposite case: when property rights on multiple components of a single technology are 
held by a number of separate individuals or firms. The development of a new product 
requires coordination among many different players. Due to the existing transaction costs, as 
the number and complexity of the negotiations increases so do the transaction costs.  
This issue is highly applicable in the case of biomedical research because, due to a heavy 
increase in patent filing, fragmented ownership of patents in any innovation means that there 
is a significant requirement of coordination of property rights on multiple technology 
components owned by a number of separate entities. 
The combination of these three trends -- the market and state failure in the production drugs 
to address third world diseases, the changing nature of the patent structure, and the 
pharmaceutical industry’s increasing transaction costs which lead to the tragedy of the 
anticommons -- imply strongly towards a different innovative paradigm which is parallel to 
the current one. The paper further delves deeper into one such paradigm: an open and 
collaborative model of biomedical research. This is a model which makes scientists work 
outside their own lab or firm in an open environment, without secrecy and exclusionary 
proprietary rights. 
According to Rai (2005), the rise for the need of open and collaborative biomedical research 
has coincided with two phenomena: 
 Increased importance of computation in this research 
 Emergence of Open Source methods of innovation in complex and computationally 
heavy areas such as software.  
The next sections delve deeper into the various facets of open source drug research.  
 
Defining Open Source for Biomedical Research 
Specifically, for software, the term open source is limited to the software code. It simply 
means that the software code is bundled along with the application for the user to debug, 
change or redistribute.  
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To define open source for processes apart from software, this paper uses the definition of 
open source given by Benkler (2001): 
(a) “Open Source” is a method of producing complex economic products;  
(b) capable of supporting medium- to large-scale collaborations, potentially including 
thousands of people; and  
(c) organized according to signals that are neither hierarchical commands (as in firms or 
academic laboratories) nor prices (as in markets) but voluntary or social. 
This definition states that open source production needs focus – focus to produce an 
economic product, not just knowledge. It also involves large scale voluntary contributions 
from thousands of people and a that system facilitates such collaborations. The definition 
specifically does not emphasize intellectual property structure as such a structure varies for 
different groups which produce open source products. Applying a direct analogy, a drug 
candidate is an apt example in open source drug research which is being produced by 
thousands of collaborators voluntarily.  
Keeping the above Open Source definition in perspective, we discuss recent attempts to 
import at least some open source features into biology.  
 
Open and Collaborative Biomedical Research – Initial Steps 
This section describes various efforts in open and collaborative biomedical research. 
Bioinformatics Software 
Many bioinformatics software projects, particularly small software projects, operate under an 
open source model. Some of the significant examples include Biojava, BioPerl, BioPython, 
Bio-SPICE, BioRuby, Simple Molecular Mechanics for Proteins, and Generic Software 
Components for Model Organism Databases (“GMOD”). These projects use a wide variety 
of licenses. Some include “copyleft” elements that require users who develop improved 
versions to share their code free-of-charge. 
One important difference between most open source software and open source bioinformatics 
software is that the latter is publicly funded. Moreover, because most research universities 
require that employee rights to software developed using university resources be assigned to 
the university, the policy of universities towards open source software development becomes 
quite relevant. In many cases, these funding agencies (mainly universities) specify a single 
best license for the software. 
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Genomics Database and Alliance Projects 
A second set of examples consists of large hierarchical team projects designed to acquire key 
data for an entire community.  
The first open and collaborative genomic database project was the publicly funded project to 
sequence the human genome. The Human Genome Project (“HGP”) was, from the outset, a 
collaborative endeavor. The intensity of the collaboration increased in 1998, after the project 
was faced with a challenge from Craig Venter, the leader of a private effort to sequence the 
genome. To meet this challenge, the public project streamlined the number of participants 
and further integrated its operations. The major sequencing centers – the so-called “G-5” – 
were required to report their progress in weekly conference calls with the funding entities, 
principally the National Human Genome Research Institute (“NHGRI”). 
True to the nature of the open and collaborative model, the producers of the human genome 
sequence did not simply put the raw data into the public domain. Rather, as the data were 
being produced, an open source software program, known as the distributed annotation 
system (DAS), was set up to facilitate collaborative improvement and annotation of the 
genome. DAS was designed to facilitate comparisons of annotations among several groups. 
The idea was that an annotation that is similar among multiple groups will be more reliable 
than an annotation that is noted by one group. 
An extension to the HGP was the International Haplotype Mapping Project (“HapMap”). 
This project aims to catalog haplotypes -- patterns of genetic variation -- and link such 
patterns to disease phenotypes. The only structural difference with HGP is that unlike HGP, 
HapMap is based on copyleft licensing policy. The HapMap project is releasing individual 
genotype data as soon as it is identified. Before haplotype information has been assembled, it 
may be possible for those who access the data to take this data, combine it with their own 
genotype data, and generate enough information to file patent applications on haplotypes of 
interest. To address this possibility, the project has set up a “click-wrap” license that requires 
those who access the HapMap database to agree that they will not file product patent 
applications in cases where they have relied in part on HapMap data. 
The HGP’s legacy is also visible in The Alliance for Cell Signaling (“AfCS”), a government-
funded consortium of nine academic laboratories working together to map the chemical 
inputs and outputs that control cell behavior. Cell Signalling, which is relevant to many 
complex diseases, is a much more complicated process. No single laboratory has the 
resources to address the complexity involved, making the collaboration of these laboratories 
essential. AfCS members are allowed to keep data confidential to preserve publication 
priority. But, members are required to place all data in the public domain as soon as their 
main major findings are accepted for publication. AfCS members also waive patents for any 
discovery that results directly from Alliance funds. The stated purpose of this clause is to 
enhance openness between members and eliminate administrative delays related to 
intellectual property protection. 
In several respects, an open and collaborative approach to database generation and 
improvement has value. The approach allows for comprehensive database annotation and 
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also provides an infrastructure of freely available scientific information that all researchers 
can use. But, unlike software, database generation requires substantial capital investments 
hence even though open and collaborative, database generation needs some kind of 
restriction on participation and also public funding. The need of public funding does 
undermine the ability of private businesses to form around databases. Unlike software, it is 
unlikely that private database businesses can be built on a services model. 
In contrast with initial data generation, data annotation comes closer to the open source 
model. In many cases, annotators will be using publicly available computer algorithms to 
search existing databases for comparable sequences of known function. Thus, just as with 
software, the major expense associated with annotation is labor (Rai, 2005). 
 
Open and Collaborative Biomedical Research – Applications in Drug Discovery 
As we see in the section above, the existing biology collaborations either fail to fit the 
definition of open source previously mentioned or are too preliminary to evaluate. To assess 
whether the drug discovery process in biomedical research can be open sourced, we begin 
with the understanding of drug discovery pipeline and at what points the open source 
principles can be applied along the pipeline. 
As detailed by Maurer (2005), the drug discovery pipeline consists of various tasks as 
mentioned below in that order: 
 Basic Research: Undirected, curiosity-driven research into the mechanisms that cause 
disease. 
 Finding Targets: Exploiting research to find a gene location, metabolic pathway, or 
other point where drugs can intervene to disrupt disease. 
 Validating Targets: Using multiple, additional lines of evidence to see whether they 
support or discredit the hypothesis that a given target can be used to disrupt disease. 
 Finding Lead Compounds: Testing chemical compounds to see whether they bind to 
an existing target and otherwise possess the properties needed to make an effective 
drug. 
 Optimizing Lead Compounds: Systematically modifying and testing lead compounds 
to increase their effectiveness as drugs. 
 Process Development: Developing procedures for making candidate drug in large, 
affordable quantities. 
 Pre-Clinical Testing: In silico and animal testing to determine candidate drug’s safety 
and efficacy. 
 Phase I to Phase III Tests: Testing the candidate drug on humans to search for side 
effects, efficacy and optimize delivery methods and doses. 
 Approval: Paperwork and hearings to obtain FDA approval of the candidate drug for 
specified uses. 
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 Phase IV Tests: Testing on patients to confirm pre-approval test conclusions; 
demonstrate drug’s efficacy in applications not previously approved by FDA. 
After closer observation it can be noted that the tasks identified above can be divided into 
two groups viz. Knowledge based work and Rule based work (Munos, 2006). 
Knowledge based work requires lots of intelligence and intuition, but little infrastructure. 
Examples include identifying targets, finding leads, and designing clinical trials or 
computerized disease models. It is about scientists leveraging each other’s ideas, and using 
tools to gain deeper insights that might lead to breakthroughs. It can be thus seen that this 
work is ideally suited to the open-source model. 
Rule-based work requires physical assets (laboratories, equipment, patients and so on) and 
money. It is tightly scripted and must conform to rigid regulatory requirements. Examples 
include toxicology studies, Chemistry Manufacturing and Controls (CMC) studies, and the 
conduct of clinical trials. Rule-based work is ideally suited to outsourcing, and much of it is 
already outsourced to contract research organizations (CROs). 
Such division of labor suggests a business model where part of the drug discovery pipeline is 
open-sourced, while the rest is outsourced. 
Before getting into the details of such business model, we note the similarities and 
differences in Open Source Software and Open Source Drug Discovery. 
Similarities: 
 Biology, like software, is an information oriented science. Drugs or pills like software 
consist largely of information. 
 The R&D cost for drug development is considerably high. Per-pill R&D expenses are 
roughly the same as that of its manufacturing costs. With collaboration, the R&D 
expenses can be shared. 
 Biology and computing are converging in recent years. In tasks such as lead 
generation, lots of computing power is indeed needed for processes such as data 
mining and visualization. The advances in these technologies make these tasks 
possible in silico. 
 Tasks such as finding drug targets and identifying leads can be effectively done 
collaboratively. 
Many authors such as Maurer (2008), Rai (2005), DeLano (2005) have studied the 
similarities. Along with these similarities, there are many differences, few subtle while few 
major, in the open source drug discovery and software processes as detailed below: 
 Economic: For open-source software one needs only a laptop and an internet 
connection. With drug research, there are huge costs involved (more than US$800 
million in some cases) for laboratory expenses and clinical trials. 
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 Research dynamics between the two industries also differ. Software development 
does not have a discovery phase. Once the objective is set, programmers set to work 
and make steady progress towards their goal. By contrast, drug discovery cannot 
flourish until a certain amount of knowledge about the target disease has been 
accumulated. That knowledge acquisition can take years or decades, with no way to 
know at the outset whether the store of knowledge at hand is nearly sufficient or not.  
 Software development is also simpler: it spans only a few disciplines and has no 
equivalent to clinical trials. By contrast, drug development requires coordination of 
multiple specialties with little overlap. 
 Drug R&D can go off-track more easily than software programming. 
 In contrast to drug developers, software publishers are lightly regulated. They do not 
need FDA approval. One sloppy programmer seldom jeopardizes the achievements of 
others, and errors can be patched without requiring the rewrite of the whole program. 
With drugs, one careless worker can compromise years of work costing tens of 
millions of dollars. 
 The two industries follow different intellectual property regimes. Software is 
protected by copyrights that arise automatically as code is written, even if nothing is 
filed. Drug research is protected by patents that are costly to file and maintain. 
 Culture: Software industry has much open culture from the beginning while 
pharmaceutical industry has followed more of proprietary and secretive culture. 
 
Drug Discovery for Neglected Diseases - A Case of Market Failure 
We also examined one important observation regarding open source drug research. The 
pharmaceutical industry is averse to open source drug discovery, as it has incurred huge costs 
in discovering a given drug, for which it can charge minimal returns, as the drug production 
license is in the public. These huge costs are due to significant transaction costs and licensing 
fees that have simply become part of the cost of doing business. Although these costs have 
probably reduced profits, foreseeable sales revenues have been sufficiently high that the 
profit incentive has not been eliminated.  
In contrast, according to Rai (2005), when follow-on research is conducted by a university or 
by a non-profit institutions that target the developing world, foreseeable payoffs are either 
highly uncertain or are clearly small. In these contexts, large transaction and licensing costs 
may pose a more pressing problem. On the other hand, at least in the context of low-margin 
research, it can be argued that an open source model of drug discovery may actually work. 
When the follow-on research in question is of demonstrably low commercial value, there is 
no reason for upstream researchers to fear that they are foregoing large downstream rents. 
Thus, even though conditions in the biotechnology sector may work against collective action, 
low-margin research may be an exception. Additionally, such a model is not a threat to the 
conventional big pharmaceutical firm’s model as these niche markets are not the target 
markets for such firms. 
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In the context of all these observations, the paper enumerates two distinct initiatives being 
started in the last few years that adopt open source principles for drug discovery viz. Tropical 
Disease Initiative (TDI), and Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD). Their business model is 
based on a mix of open-sourcing and outsourcing as mentioned previously. 
Tropical Disease Initiative (TDI) 
TDI is a decentralized, web-based, community-wide effort where scientists from laboratories, 
universities, institutes, and corporations could work together for a common cause (Maurer, 
Rai, Sali, 2004). The initiative was formulated to tackle the market failure for the tropical 
diseases. Only about 1% of newly developed drugs are for tropical diseases, such as African 
sleeping sickness, dengue fever, and leishmaniasis. The commercial model of big 
pharmaceutical firms only works if companies can sell enough patented products to cover 
their R&D costs. The model fails in the developing world, where few patients can afford to 
pay patented prices for drugs.  
TDI’s Model 
The structure of TDI consists of a Web site where volunteers use a variety of computer 
programs, databases, and computing hardware. Just as most open source software projects 
start with a preexisting code base, TDI starts with a kernel of possible targets supplied by a 
core group of researchers. Individual pages would host tasks like searching for new protein 
targets, finding chemicals to attack known targets, and posting data from related chemistry 
and biology experiments. Volunteers could use chat rooms and bulletin boards to announce 
discoveries and debate future research directions. Over time, the most dedicated and 
proficient volunteers would become leaders. The drug leads which are an output of the TDI 
system would act as an input to the Virtual Pharma firm which would then choose the best 
candidate to work on it further with the help of corporate partners.  
The model of TDI is cost effective. First, TDI would ask volunteers to donate their time (and 
any patentable discoveries) to the collaboration.TDI would offer non-monetary rewards to 
the contributors. TDI would restore competition which is curbed by the patent regime by 
making drug candidates available to anyone who wanted to develop them. Thus the R&D and 
manufacturing costs reduce. Also, the absence of patents would continue to keep prices low 
once drugs reached the market similar to that of generic drugs. 
Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) 
Similar to TDI, OSDD is a CSIR Team India Consortium with Global Partnership with a 
vision to provide affordable healthcare to the developing world by providing a global 
platform where the best minds can collaborate and collectively endeavor to solve the 
complex problems associated with discovering novel therapies for neglected tropical diseases 
like Malaria, Tuberculosis, Leshmaniasis, etc. It is a concept to collaboratively aggregate the 
biological and genetic information available to scientists in order to use it to hasten the 
discovery of drugs (Source: OSDD website). 
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OSDD Objectives 
The Open Source Drug Discovery initiative would establish the open source platform to 
make drug discovery for infectious/ neglected diseases, cost effective and affordable to the 
people of the developing world. OSDD has independent biologists freely sharing their work 
through the internet. As a first phase, drugs against Mycobacterium tuberculosis including 
drug resistant and latent tuberculosis are undertaken with the following major objectives: 
 Development of a web-based portal for data deposition, exchange, evaluation and 
tabulation for analysis 
 Collaborative sharing of know-how for the entire spectrum of processes in drug 
discovery-- ranging from identification of drug-able nontoxic targets, in-silico 
screening of small molecules, lead optimization, pre-clinical toxicity and clinical 
trials  
 To create a comprehensive Systems Biology approach for drug discovery 
 Human resource development with emphasis on encouraging young minds 
 Intellectual property protection to the extent it supports public good - One can apply 
for the Intellectual Property Rights, but these would be shared among the open 
source community. 
OSDD’s Model 
In OSDD, the larger complex problem is broken into simpler, smaller set of activities which 
have a clear and well defined scope and deliverables. The smaller sets of activities are termed 
“work packets” or “work packages (WPs)”. This would enable to clearly specify the task to 
be carried out during the implementation of the project along with responsibilities for the 
respective WPs. The connections between the WPs describe the conceptual connections and 
the timings for their execution. Examples of WPs include Target identification, Screen 
development, Lead generation and optimization among others. 
In OSDD, the entire process of drug discovery is divided into problems open for the entire 
community to contribute. An idea, software, data, an article or molecule(s) that help in 
expediting the process of drug discovery is treated as a contribution. The challenges 
pertaining to drug discovery are well-defined problems posted on the website. Anyone can 
solve these problems. Each of the solutions to these problems would be peer-reviewed. 
Appropriate rewards may be announced for solving them, similar to the innocentive model.  
 
Rewards 
A micro-attribution system is followed for all contributions. Based on the peer-review, 
contributors get rewards in form of credit points. Each activity or a defined problem has a 
pre-determined set of points or rewards associated to it. All probable prospective activity 
would be given prior points in terms of weightage, for example, lead optimization would 
have higher weightage than protein expression. The points can be accrued over time for all 
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the contributions to the project. Based on the points accrued by the contributors they would 
be awarded four levels of membership cards (Blue, Silve, Gold and Platinum). Each type of 
card entails a certain sets of rights, privileges and responsibilities in the entire process. 
OSDD – Computational Resources 
OSDD aims to create a collaborative online platform for exchange of ideas, data and 
resources using web 2.0 technologies. Currently, in OSDD following web 2.0 tools have been 
identified: 
 Sysborg 2.0: A Wiki based genome annotation service. 
 Computational Resources for Drug Discovery (CRDD) which is a platform for 
interaction of open source tools for drug discovery. 
 Open Access Archive for TB related research and documents 
 Social Network for people who are a part of open source drug discovery. 
 Eduspace: An online course portal on topics related to drug discovery. 
 
Analyzing Open Source Drug Research under OSS perspectives 
Motivational Aspects 
General observers of OSS phenomenon are startled by the simple fact that large numbers of 
highly skilled software developers and users dedicate tremendous amount of time and effort 
to the creation, expansion and maintenance of OSS often for no monetary rewards. As 
explicitly detailed in the literature (for e.g., Sanders 1998, Perkins 1999, and Weber 2004), 
some people value non-cash compensation more than money. They volunteer their expertise 
to satisfy idealism or curiosity, seek new challenges, hone skills, build a reputation or 
enhance careers.  
To understand whether similar motives are at play in the case of drug discovery, we look at 
various incentives for which an OSS developer puts his time and energy. According to 
Maurer (2008), there are certain typical incentives that are known to drive open source 
collaborations in software production as depicted in Table 1. 
A few of these (e.g. production for the inventor’s own use, production to sell a related good 
or service) seem to lack clear analogues in drug discovery. However, many other incentives 
do apply. For example, it is quite possible that biologists would join collaborations to learn 
new skills (education), demonstrate those skills to others (signaling), or donate their services 
from a sense of altruism. 
In the world of software, companies are learning to use open source to their advantage, and 
many now allow their employees to participate in company time. They might use it to gain 
market share against entrenched competitors, or to entice developers to create applications 
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for their product, possibly in the hope of turning it into a ‘platform’ as successfully shown by 
Red Hat. In the case of drug discovery, similar argument can be given. For drugs with 
commercial potential, employers could also pay employees to volunteer for sheer business 
reasons. For example, a firm could decide that open source collaborations were a good way 
to share costs with companies that do not produce competing products. Or it could decide 
that an open product would make its own proprietary inventions more valuable. 
 
Table 1: Typical Incentives driving open source collaborations in software production 
Incentives Description 
Own Use (Personal) Writing software for one’s own use and enjoyment. 
Examples include hobbyists, developers (LINUX) 
Own Use (Corporate) Producing an open source product used by one’s 
employer. Examples include corporate webmasters’ 
creation of the Apache web server 
Education Producing an open source product in order to learn 
from experience and peer review. 
Signaling Producing an open source product in order to 
demonstrate competence to others. 
Shared R&D Costs Firms that do not compete with one another frequently 
use open source to share R&D costs. 
Related Goods & Services Producing an open source product which is needed to 
sell a separate, proprietary good or service. Examples 
include hardware (IBM) and customer training and 
programming services (Red Hat) 
Social Psychology Working for non-material rewards including reputation, 
altruism, and collective solidarity, among others. 
 
Operating Principles 
The above two initiatives viz. TDI and OSDD follow a hybrid operating principle of that of 
open-sourcing clubbed with outsourcing.  
 
Open-sourcing 
The open-source part of their model allows anyone who can contribute to join. Volunteers log 
on to a website, find the pages that matches their area of expertise, pursue challenges to be 
solved, review others’ contributions, download computerized tools and start working towards 
contributions of their own. All the initiatives are currently in nascent stage but it can 
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definitively be argued that as the collaboration activity rises, more the volunteers can publish 
their findings in scientific journals and discuss their insights in on-line forums. Over time, the 
better ones will gain authority and become the leaders of their open-source community. 
 
Outsourcing 
The outsourcing part varies for each initiative. In TDI, the manufacturing part is outsourced 
to Virtual Pharmas while in the case of OSDD; the same is outsourced to CROs in the 
developing countries. 
Business Model 
Currently, both the initiatives are highly dependent on private, public, or government 
funding. TDI as well as OSDD can be highly productive if sponsors back them. In case of 
OSDD, the Government of India has committed Rs. 150 crores (US $38 million) towards this 
project. An equivalent amount of funding would be raised from international agencies and 
philanthropists. About 46 crores (US $12 million) has been already released by the 
Government of India. In both the cases, corporations could also help by donating funds, 
laboratory time, or previously unpublished research. 
Unlike that of software industry, open source drug discovery depends heavily on funding at 
least in its formative years. Hence, sustainability of their business models still is an issue. To 
survive, they would have to replenish their portfolios and ensure that there is always a sound 
pool of contributors to perform the work that must be done. 
In the light of these developments, there is a need for the pharmaceutical industry to review 
its business models. For the last few years, the traditional Risk-Innovation-Reward model 
followed by the pharmaceutical industry has stopped fetching timely rewards. Further to this, 
the concept of personalized medicine is slowly evolving in the pharmaceutical industry and is 
catching up fast in the healthcare industry. Decision-makers in the healthcare industry are 
seriously evaluating patient-centric strategies and in the not too distant future, these strategies 
will be implemented industry-wide. As a consequence, developing drugs customized to target 
populations and genetic traits will soon become the norm.  
In such a scenario, the current "one-drug-fits-all" concept would be outdated and the 
traditional innovation-based business model will no longer hold good. Therefore, in 
enlightened self-interest, pharmaceutical majors will need to give serious thought to the open 
source model, and tweak it to suit their requirements.  
Open source drug discovery brings with it many advantages to pharmaceutical companies 
and patients alike. The biggest advantage of this model being huge cost reductions, 
pharmaceutical companies can leverage the open source model to outsource the drug 
discovery process and save a fortune in the process. Some costs thus saved could be passed 
on to produce and market the final drug at much lower prices. Thus, open source proves to be 
the most viable model for discovering life-saving drugs. Further, the model can also be used 
to discover lifestyle drugs that pharmaceutical companies develop and market enduringly. 
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Reward Structure  
According to Lerner and Tirole (2002), the OSS phenomenon has demonstrated that non-
monetary incentives such as ideological satisfaction, the acquisition of new skills, 
enhancement of professional reputation, and the ability to advertise one’s skills to potential 
employers are a good way to attract and motivate programmers. With the argument that 
similar incentives should work equally well for biologists, chemists, and other scientists, TDI 
offers similar non-monetary incentives. 
OSDD has gone one step ahead in providing an additional monetary component along with 
the non-monetary benefits mentioned above. A micro-attribution system is followed for all 
contributions. Based on the peer-review contributors would get rewards in form of credit 
points. Based on the points accrued by the contributors they would be awarded four levels of 
Memberships cards (Blue, Silver, Gold and Platinum). Each type of card entails a certain sets 
of rights, privileges and responsibilities in the entire process. 
Scope 
In software domain, any open source project is focused on a particular specific problem 
which it tries to address. All the three initiatives in open source drug research focus on single 
disease or related illnesses. For example, OSDD is focusing on drugs against Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis including drug resistant and latent tuberculosis in the first phase. TDI focuses on 
different tropical diseases, it plans to establish separate website for each one. 
Intellectual Property Ownership 
Open source software licensing is based on some variation of the viral license called General 
Public License (GPL) that requires volunteers to offer any modified code on the same open 
terms as the original software. Traditionally, these licenses have been based on copyright. 
The situation becomes much more complicated, however, when one tries to build viral terms 
into a patent license. Also, in case of open source drug research unlike OSS, most open 
source activities occur at a pre-commercial R&D stage, when the ideas and hypotheses 
debated fall short of the legal standards that define inventions in patent law.  
Hence, the licensing schemes do differ for each of the two initiatives. TDI has defined four 
possible licensing styles (Maurer, Rai, and Sali, 2004) as below: 
 A public-domain license that permits anyone to use the information for any purpose. 
 Licenses similar to the Creative Commons Attribution License that permit anyone to 
use the information for any purpose provided proper attribution is given. 
 Licenses such as the General Public License that prohibit users from seeking 
intellectual property rights. 
 Licenses that permit commercial companies to obtain and exploit patents outside the 
developing world.  
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In the case of OSDD, in contrast, the drugs developed would immediately become generics 
and hence the question of IP and patents does not arise. The licenses in the case of OSDD are 
similar to GPL license of OSS where there is an obligation to any user to contribute any 
addition or improvements made to the collective information back to OSDD. 
Benefit for the society 
OSS phenomenon has become hugely beneficial to the society. This relates to erosion of 
value of software product as the source code is openly available making the software product 
a commodity. This value erosion was indeed possible as the inefficiencies in the system have 
been squeezed out (O’Reilly, 2005). With commoditization of software, there is more and 
more competition. When the competition drives down the prices, the efficiency and average 
wealth levels go up. OSS phenomenon also helps customers in removal of lock-in and the 
problem that comes with proprietary technologies.  
In case of open source drug research, consumers benefit chiefly by (a) low prices, which 
facilitate the widest possible consumption, and (b) increased transparency, which makes it 
easier to judge the quality of both existing and proposed products (Maurer, 2008).  
Open source software also has disadvantages, most notably in its tendency to decouple 
product creation from the price signal and, hence, consumers’ needs. Ironically, this is not 
always a disadvantage for drug discovery. Indeed, efforts by Western governments and 
foundations to find cures for neglected diseases normally assume that market-driven R&D 
signals are hopelessly inadequate and should be overridden (Maurer, 2008). Thus we can 
conclude that these initiatives would organize science in such a way that looks very different 
from today’s commercial pharmaceutical world full of proprietary and secretive values.  
Challenges to Open Source Drug Research 
Despite the promises given by these three initiatives in Open Source Drug Research, there 
are various challenges that could affect their success (Maurer, 2008, Munos, 2006) 
 
Availability of talent 
Typical open-source software projects do not require a large number of contributors. Data 
from the software industry suggests that the ideal number ranges from 6 to 20 people. Yet 
much of the drug R&D expertise resides in an industry that has a strong proprietary culture. 
This could stifle talent supply in important areas of drug discovery pipeline. 
An argument in favor of the availability of talent can be that a commercial pharmaceutical 
firm might encourage a researcher to contribute to open source drug research project if there 
is no conflict of interest as the firm might gain valuable goodwill by doing this.  
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Availability of data and standards 
Open source scientists cannot accomplish much unless they can access data. Biological data 
is plentiful and getting richer, with terabytes of genomic and metabolic data continuously 
being added to the pool. Chemical and structural data, on the other hand, are scarcer. In 
addition, the formats used to handle these data are still evolving. 
 
Availability of tools 
Open source scientists need open source tools to practice their craft. Until recently, such tools 
were plentiful in bioinformatics, but less so in chemistry, which has long been dominated by 
commercial software. With the advent of PubChem in 2004 - 05 the scenario is changing. 
PubChem has brought online a powerful suite of tools that allows scientists to connect 
chemical information with biomedical research and clinical information in an unprecedented 
way. Other tools such as eMolecules, Jmol or the Chemistry Development Kit are adding 
powerful chemical search and visualization capabilities to the open source scientist’s toolbox. 
 
Architecture for participation 
The design of the project’s website is crucial. It must be engaging and appeal to visitors’ 
curiosity. They must be able to quickly find the pages that match their interests, start 
collaborating. The architecture of these tools should be such that it facilitates participation 
from the users. 
 
Quality assurance/quality control 
For something as complex as drug research, quality assurance can become an issue. 
Oversight, due-diligence, audits, good practices and prior experience can be used to ensure 
quality.  
 
Intellectual Leadership and Momentum 
Enticing people to join is a challenge. A good website helps, but it’s not enough. It takes a 
sustained effort to build trust with stakeholders. It also takes a leader who can connect with 
people, understand their motivation and foster trust. Linux attracts thousands of contributors 
because they identify with Linus Torvalds’ ideals and trust him to do the right thing. Open 
source drug research needs to build such leaders. 
 
Control of Intellectual Property (IP) 
The entire momentum of the initiative, its current development thrust for a drug and the 
possibilities of follow-on research depend largely on the way its licensing policy has been 
formulated. Careful formation of licensing policy which determines who controls the IP is 
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thus essential for the success of open source drug research. 
 
Sustainability of the business model 
As previously noted, the open source drug research is entirely a funded activity and its 
sustainability as a business model is in question. This is not the case in OSS as many open 
source business models have been tried and successfully tested. 
 
Cultural Issue 
The culture of the pharmaceutical community is not as open as is the culture of the computer 
science community. The same underlying norms of sharing that software developers built up 
and have are not available within the pharmaceutical community. Thus the researchers in 
drug discovery need to import these ideas from outside. Such cultural change might take 
significant time and energy. 
After analyzing the open source biomedical research in great detail it can be safely concluded 
that even though the question of whether such open source model is likely to promote 
socially desirable biomedical innovation remains unanswered, the model is worth pursuing.  
Because the model is quite fresh, and the time delay before research on this model can be 
translated into end products is long, empirical demonstration of the model’s virtues and vices 
is, at this stage, practically difficult. Additionally, this model has produced software and 
genomic data that is usable, but the resulting public domain status for this software and data 
can reduce transaction costs and secrecy that may impede the follow-on research that leads to 
end products. 
This model, far from being a threat to conventional drug research, could be a way to leverage 
big pharmaceutical’s capabilities in order to tackle challenges that the blockbuster model 
cannot address economically, such as neglected or tropical diseases. This model is also a way 
to address the market niches that cannot support blockbuster drugs. 
 
Assessing the Generalization Capabilities of Open Source Phenomenon 
As we analyzed in the previous sections, the OSS phenomenon has clearly shown that there 
exists a complementary mechanism of economic value production which is governed by a set 
of rules and principles different than that of a firm. The reasoning behind the motivation and 
creative expression in OSS is vastly different than what exists in any firm driven by market 
forces. Firms and markets only tap into a piece of human motivation, a small part for any 
individual that makes him create.  
OSS as an experiment has been successful in tapping a greater percentage of human creative 
motivation than is generally found in a firm setting. Thus it becomes highly interesting to 
understand how this phenomenon can be generalized and its scope can be expanded beyond 
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software. To get a better understanding of this, we need to answer some of the following 
questions: 
 How portable are OSS motivations and practices in other domains of economic 
activity and social organization? 
 Do the OSS processes have general characteristics that can spread beyond software? 
 What are the key criteria that need to be met for successful application of OSS 
principles in other domains? 
 How can analytical models be built that try to specify conditions that favor or hinder 
the open source experiments in other fields?  
 What is the nature of tasks where the open source process is more likely to work 
effectively? 
 Under what conditions does the application of the OSS model obtain the best results 
in other domains? 
 Whether the application of the OSS model replaces the existing paradigm or acts as a 
complementary, dual paradigm, which co-exists along with the old paradigm? 
Apart from Open Source Drug Research, there are many experiments in various domains 
other than software which have taken place using the open source philosophy as mentioned 
below: 
 Open Access (OA) is a parallel movement in the publishing industry where the open 
access literature is digital, online, free of charge, and free of most copyright and 
licensing restrictions. The movement, which was started in 2001, has grown 
significantly and now there are more than 10000 journals which publish their articles 
under open access licensing. 
 Some other experiments on the lines of open source have happened such as “open-
cola” alternative to Coke and Pepsi, an “openmusic” registry, an “openlaw” project at 
Harvard Law School, and other “open content” projects to build mass encyclopedias.  
 Some other successful experiments which share one or more common properties with 
the open source process are Wikipedia (user collaboration), Amazon (user content and 
reviews), Innocentive (motivating the larger audience to work on a common 
problem), Google (PageRank algorithm built on the wisdom of crowds), 
SETI@HOME, Napster (peer to peer file sharing) and experiments in citizen 
journalism to name a few. 
Many of these are simply open forums, in the sense that anyone can contribute anything they 
wish to a mass database. These projects gain their ideological inspiration from the open 
source process and tap into some of the same motivations. They also make good use of 
internet technology to organize voluntary collaborations. But these experiments are not 
organized around the property regime that makes the open source process distinctive. So, the 
experiment’s alignment with the property regime is critical in building the generic models as 
necessary condition under which open source process would be favored. 
The next step for the research in this area can be to initially study the domains in detail where 
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the OSS principles have been adopted and make case studies, then identify the similarities 
and differences, strengths and weaknesses in those approaches. This would finally lead to 
building analytic models that try to specify conditions that favor or hinder the experiments in 
open source. Such a model needs to focus on few key factors which the transaction cost 
economics does not emphasize. These factors are detailed below: 
 Relation between the problem solving innovation and the location of tacit 
information: If the information about the solution to a problem becomes more fine-
grained, is individually differentiated, and hard to communicate, then there are higher 
incentives to shift the locus of innovation closer to users by empowering them with 
the tools for collaboration and easier modification. (Weber, 2004) 
We see this factor in action in the case of software where the programming logic is 
individually differentiated and also hard to communicate. This is also true in case of 
drug research where the range of knowledge required is vast and hardly overlapping, 
is individually differentiated and hard to communicate till the pre-clinical stage. 
Hence, if the tools are provided to the users for easy collaboration and modification, 
then it can act as a motivation to produce a valuable economic good. 
 Need to solve a key market demand: Open Source models try to address certain 
critical and unfulfilled market demand for which the traditional approaches are 
deemed insufficient. In the case of software, open source models address the needs of 
the industry for the availability of source code along with the software for quick bug 
fixing, and removal of vendor locking. In case of drug research, open source models 
were adopted to address the market failure in manufacturing of drugs to treat 
neglected diseases.  
 Cultural ethos: Cultural ethos plays a very important role in the success of any open 
source initiative. More the culture of sharing and collaborating imbueed in the 
contributing volunteers would invigorate such an experiment. In computer science, 
the culture of sharing and collaborating has been present since the UNIX days. 
Hence, adopting an OSS philosophy did not take much time. On the other hand, in 
drug research, the culture is mainly of a proprietary and secretive nature, making OSS 
model adoption voluntarily a time consuming job. Hence, we see many funded open 
source experiments in drug discovery but hardly any voluntary ones. 
 Possibilities of network enabled collaborations and distributed innovation where a 
common good can be developed by discrete and disaggregated contributions spanning 
across geographies. 
 Nature of tasks: The open source process is more likely to work effectively in tasks 
(or products) that have the following characteristics: 
o Contributions can be derived from the accessible, non-proprietary knowledge 
o Product perceived to be valuable for critical mass of users 
o Tasks are such that they require mainly two resources from the contributing 
volunteer, his time and energy. 
o Peer attention and review form the key elements in making the product better 
in terms of quality (efficient error correction) and faster in terms of its release. 
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o Product or task is benefitted from the positive network externalities. 
o An individual or a small group can take the lead in building the initial core 
product around which a voluntary formation of community would take place 
for building the product further. 
The tasks involved in Open Source Drug Discovery encompass many of the above 
characteristics. The development of drugs for neglected diseases is highly valuable to 
a majority of tropical countries. With the advent of various open biological databases, 
non-proprietary knowledge is available. Positive network externality exists as the 
drug candidates and annotations are improved by peer review and contribution. As all 
the steps in drug research cannot be entirely done by voluntary group of researchers, 
especially the ones after in-silico trials, large amounts of investment and funding are 
needed for any small group to put the initial efforts in building the community.  
 Volunteer Costs and Aggregation Capabilities: As argued by Benkler (2001), the open 
source model can be suitably applied in the areas where the cost to volunteers of 
contribution is low and such contributions can be readily filtered and aggregated. 
Projects with these characteristics are likely to be superior to firms and markets in 
allocating human creativity. 
In biomedical research, data annotation in databases such as genome database 
or haplotype database is the right projects which have these characteristics. 
 Motivations of participants: The open source process is more likely to work 
effectively when participants have the following characteristics: 
o The participants are well informed and knowledgeable so as to judge with ease 
the viability of the product being developed 
o The participants are driven by motivations beyond simple economic gains and 
have readiness for the reward cycle which is not extremely short. 
o The participants learn by doing and there is natural give and take of valuable 
information which benefits every participant. 
 Formal architecture for participation: The contributions should have a legal structure 
in terms of its licensing scheme or property regime, which empowers users by 
providing equal access to all and also constrains anyone from putting restrictions on 
others in ways that would defeat the original goals.  
 Business Models: Forming viable business model is of paramount importance for the 
sustenance of any activity, and open source is no exception. In the OSS arena, many 
business models have sprung up (of service and support providers, trainers, and value 
added resellers to name a few) which helped strengthen the adoption of OSS model. 
In drug research, as the open source initiatives currently are funded, and as the 
initiatives are in nascent stage, such models are not yet fully developed. Such public 
funding undermines the ability of private businesses to form around databases. Thus 
it is unlikely that in case of biomedical research, private database business can be 
built around services model. One area where the business models needs to get 
developed is the area of low cost clinical trials for drug candidate testing and 
approval.  
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These are just few of the indicative factors which might be helpful in performing detailed 
analysis of various open source experiments and to judge whether these experiments would 
indeed remain only experiments or they have the potential to shift the current paradigm. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper is a detailed discussion of the successful application of open source model to the 
domain of biomedical research. This paper studies areas in biomedical research where open 
and collaborative models have been adopted; either merely as an experiment or as a serious 
attempt to foster an adoption of open source philosophy and principles. This paper evaluates 
the needs for such adoption, its similarity as well as differences with that of open source 
adoption in software and various challenges. It also attempts to assess the generalization 
potential of the open source phenomenon in other domains. 
It can be concluded that the open source biomedical research model is worth pursuing. 
Because the model is quite fresh, and the time delay before research on this model can be 
translated into end products is long, empirical demonstration of the model’s virtues and vices 
is, at this stage, practically difficult. This model has the potential to act as a complementary 
drug discovery model along with the traditional one in order to tackle challenges that the 
traditional model cannot address economically, such as neglected or tropical diseases. A 
detailed empirical study of such model with reasonable amount of data is needed to conclude 
further. Finally, after the detailed study of open source biomedical research, the paper 
concludes that open source models have the potential to get adopted effectively in other 
industrial domains if certain criteria are met. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, a radical change in the organization of information production has been 
observed. The Open Source (OS) model has been of interest as an alternative mode of 
immaterial production (i.e. information, knowledge and culture) to scholars and practitioners. 
The online free encyclopedia Wikipedia, which manages information and knowledge, and the 
applications of FLOSS, i.e. Free/Libre/Open Source Software (for instance Linux and Mozilla 
Firefox), are considered as successful examples that follow an Open Source Approach (OSA) 
in their production and governance mode.  
In this paper, the OSA has a twofold connotation. Firstly, it is related to the use of OS 
software applications, such as Sugar (One Laptop per Child XO-1’s software) or the OS 
video format Ogg, in public policy issues. Secondly, it refers to new modes of socioeconomic 
organization that share characteristics with those followed in the production of OS projects, 
i.e. collaboration; sharing; networking; use of legal forms like the Creative Commons or the 
General Public licenses; emergent consolidation of producer and user; and autonomy. The 
OS process, putting it into Weber’s (2005, p. 14) words, is “a bet on the idea that just as 
important as the code itself and probably more fundamental is the process by which the code 
is built.” This paper will try to take the point further and investigate how an OSA could 
influence the current public policy making, illuminating the politics of OS, based on two 
cases from Greece: the One Laptop per Child (OLPC) initiative and the case of the public, 
national broadcasting network ERT.  
 
OSA and the Greek crisis 
It is obvious that lately Greece has been facing serious socioeconomic problems. The 
national debt (rising from 216.9 in 2005 to 299.4 billion euros in 2009) is 12.5% of the 
National Gross Product while net revenues have decreased by 10 billion euros and 
expenditures have increased by 4.3 billion euros. Black economy; lack of transparency and 
subsequent corruption; bureaucracy; and nepotism, dominate the social, economic and 
political scene, tainting the internal legitimacy of the system. The private sector is closely 
connected with state activities, setting barriers to a creative and socioeconomically efficient 
competitive market. The interwoven problems of poverty; unemployment and 
precariousness; overlending; ineffective education, ineffective health and insurance systems, 
all need broad solutions and synergetic coalitions. It can be claimed that unless innovative 
approaches are adopted, the crisis will become deeper and deeper. What this essay argues – 
amongst others things – is that the OSA to public policy, although not a panacea, can offer 
certain solutions and serve as a stepping stone towards the betterment of not only of Greek 
society, but also of other countries facing similar problems. It can be argued that education, 
culture, and knowledge are the fields on which OSA can have the greatest impact. The OSA 
to information production and distribution can lead to economies of scale, and support the 
aggregation of sources in several fields of the economy, redistributing the surplus use value. 
However, it is evident that all the aforementioned ideas predicate strong political accord: 
failing to do so, the country will face the possibility of being marginalized in the processes of 
globalizing; countries with a level of development similar to Greece are in serious danger if 
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they do not follow far-sighted policies in due course. 
As mentioned above, the distribution of resources constitutes a fundamental aspect of an 
OSA. It has been claimed that such a mode of production, based on participation, 
collaboration and inclusion, can secure a more sustainable civilization (subjectively, 
concerning the consumption of cultural and knowledge goods; and objectively, i.e. where the 
physical Commons have become quite topical, especially with the emergence of the 
immaterial Commons sphere and the environmental crisis). The mode of production followed 
in OS projects (i.e. peer production) stems from modern productive forces which made 
possible, arguably for the first time in history, the wide distribution of the material means of 
production, and the chance for mass communication and collaboration among the 
consumers/users/producers, without the mandatory mediation of third parties. The OS 
movement is forming and is simultaneously formed by a new ethos of creation and 
collaboration: technological progress and the revolutionary element in the shift of the 
productive forces give rise to new relations of production. Surely enough, the OS movement 
is in its very beginning, but according to some analysts, it constitutes a revitalized 
continuation or a transcendence of the past emancipatory movements of the industrial age. It 
shows us that a new alternative mode of socioeconomic organization can exist beyond the 
state and the free market dogma, which, however, can co-function in a creative way with the 
former in a state of synergetic empowerment. 
Next, the cases of the Greek television and radio public broadcaster ERT, and what is 
globally known as the OLPC movement are examined, where activism and civic mobilization 
have still not succeeded in transforming their rhetoric and initiatives, inspired by an OSA, 
into fruitful, large-scale results having a greater, more generalized impact on Greek society. 
However, the lessons learned and the ideas introduced by and through the experience of these 
cases can shed light on the strands of the politics of OS. 
 
The ERT case: “Set it free” 
ERT is the national television and radio broadcaster of Greece, for the moment part of the 
public sector and sustained by a form of obligatory taxation (incorporated within the 
electricity bill). In late 2007, the initiation of a project regarding the digitization of the old 
archives of ERT was announced; this project was completed1 a few months ago. Although 
this move had been considered as a significant first step towards the public availability of a 
unique cultural wealth, the decision to stream the material over a proprietary, commercial 
product incited open/free, participatory/Peer to Peer (P2P) and Commons-oriented 
communities to protest. According to them, there is an “innocent fraud” behind this initiative: 
the digital archives remain an exclusive property of ERT. The story goes on as the patented 
formats Flash Video and DV have been selected to support the digitization of the archive, 
which is actually a Commons that Greek residents have been supporting both economically 
and creatively. In addition, supposing that ERT turns into a private company, then a 
                                                 
1The web platform, which contains the digitized archives, can be found at http://www.ert-archives.gr/ (retrieved 
30 November 2009). 
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Commons may fall into private hands. 
The Greek department of P2P Foundation (an Amsterdam-based open network of scholars, 
with the aim to research and document the open source/free/P2P alternatives and 
infrastructures, of which myself I am a member) took the initiative and with the support of 
several individuals and other open/free participatory communities, conducted A Text of 
Propositions and a Starting Point of a Social Dialogue (Papanikolaou, Stavroulakis, and 
Kostakis, 2008) asking for an open source, free archive. The full text/manifesto/petition 
follows, as it summarizes the main arguments for an open archive and, arguably, effectively 
conveys the feeling and the essence of such a mobilization: 
Let’s set the ERT audiovisual archive free 
[A text of propositions and a starting point of a social dialogue] 
Greek citizens, but also citizens of other countries, we jointly sign this text on the 
occasion of ERT’s choice to distribute its audiovisual archive non-freely to the public. 
Our aim and ambition is to publicize our propositions so that they become the starting 
point of an open dialog among Greek society, the European and global public audience 
and to signal the revision of backward policies and the creation of common political 
wealth. 
Few days ago, the ERT administration presented the beginning of the availability, only 
via Internet streaming, of a part of its audiovisual archive. This move constitutes an 
important first step, which, however, in our opinion, is tarnished by the fact that the 
public availability of the archive is not made free, although the Greek and European 
citizens have paid their money to make the production and digitization of the archive 
feasible. 
If today, you store in your computer, or send to a friend, or allow your children to make 
a creative montage for their homework in the history course, using material based on 
this archive, you will have committed a list of offenses regarding the protection of 
“intellectual property”. It is supposed you should not feel by no means proud for the 
creative concern of your children, who searched and reassemble the sources, because, 
from a legal viewpoint, they have committed a crime against the ERT archive. In fact, 
you are liable for the deficient parental responsibility that you have shown in 
upbringing your children. 
Don’t you think this absurdity should stop? 
If you own an apple, you can decide either to eat the whole apple or to cut it in small 
pieces and share with friends. If you choose the former, your friends will not eat, but if 
you share the apple, all of you may remain hungry. This situation occurs in the case in 
which the material goods are limited with respect to the amount of needs. However, this 
cannot happen in the case of the immaterial and digitizable intellectual goods, including 
information that exists in abundance. 
If a large number of people, including you, have paid with your own money for the 
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production of a television or radio show, you surely have your say for how this show 
should become publicly available. If it is freely available to anyone who has got an 
interest in it, this does not make you by no means poorer, since it does not deprive you 
of the possibility to enjoy the same privileges with others. The nature of those kind of 
goods makes the competition among us nonsensical. To legally cast this modern reality, 
new forms of property have been established, whose main feature is that they are not 
exclusive, that is they allow the sharing of goods and at the same time defend in a 
better way some rights of the original authors. In modern legal terminology, these 
forms of property are shaped as licenses like the Creative Commons or the General 
Public License (GNU GPL). 
All of us who sign this text believe that: 
The ERT archive that was produced with the contribution of Greek citizens and today is 
digitized with the money of European tax payers, should become freely available to all 
the residents of the planet via the Internet. The availability of the archive suggests the 
availability of a precious cultural treasure. 
Anyone should have the right to store, to copy, to modify and to redistribute this 
material freely without royalties or being obstructed by bureaucratic processes. The 
derivative products of this creative process are supposed to be freely available under 
the condition that these products will not become the exclusive property of anyone, but 
they will abide by the same legal status of free use. In this way, innovation and 
collective creativity are strengthened. 
That such a choice better protects the public character of this wealth and brings the 
Greek culture to the public attention. In our times, in which the citizens concerned 
about the future, the defense, the depreciation and the sale of the public wealth to rich 
individuals, such a choice is the only alternative solution for guaranteed protection and 
efficient economic utilization. 
That such a choice creates the yeast of growth in a pluralistic economy of private 
individuals, small and big companies and public institutions (local government, 
universities, research institutes, etc.), extends the market and cancels the entertainment 
and news update monopoly of those who possess a lot of money so that they can 
maintain big infrastructures and pay rights for utilizing the material. Such a choice 
constitutes, accordingly, an opportunity for empowering democracy in Greece. 
That the release of public information creates multiplied economic dynamics that are 
distributed more equally for the citizens. It is a development opportunity for the Greek 
economy, much more important than the uncertain income ERT will enjoy if they 
choose to strangle themselves on the plea of exclusive property. 
That it creates the best conditions for the dissemination and promotion of the Greek 
civilization that constitutes a pylon of the modern European and world civilization. 
That such a prospect creates multiplied derivative benefits for all economy sectors, 
particularly for tourism and the artistic and intellectual production. 
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That the form used for the sharing of information should not rely upon proprietary 
models of digitization that make the public property dependent upon private interests, it 
should rely upon free and open standards to ensure full access to that information for 
all citizens. 
That in a modern democracy, such that Greece claims it is, the final decisions in critical 
issues that concern all citizens, or involve multiple partners with various interests, 
political parties or social movements, should be the result of an open public 
consultation. We ask that such process, although delayed, should begin today, in order 
to jointly shape decisions that can mark the prospects of our society in the long run. 
The struggle for free and full access to the public information is fair, insistent and 
global. 
The digitized archive remains in the proprietary hands of ERT. However, in an era where new 
regimes of property, such as the Creative Commons (CC) or the General Public License 
(GPL), have been developed, the aforementioned enclosure sounds problematic. The citizen 
has limited access to the archive; although it is possible to see it, he/she is not allowed to use 
it freely, even for non-commercial purposes, without the written permission of ERT. This 
constitutes a typical case that reveals the essence of state/public property in modern Greek 
society. The property is exclusive and a bureaucracy manages it, while citizens have no 
authority in it. In the name of the so-called common property, the object is detached from its 
natural subjects. Often, as numerous cases have shown in the recent past, the state/public 
property, covered by the obscure veil of bureaucracy, becomes prey to some specific 
dominated interests. Nowadays, new property regimes exemplified by CC and GPL 
differentiate from the traditional concept of state property. These Commons-based property 
forms are against the private appropriation of the commonly created value, trying to create 
the widest possible usage while keeping the sovereignty with the individual (Bauwens, 2005a 
and 2005b). These new forms inaugurate the concept of common property; very different 
from the private property which is exclusionary (following the token: “what is mine is not 
yours”), and from state property, which, although a collective property, is also exclusionary 
(“it is ours, but the sovereignty is regulated by a bureaucracy or representative democracy”) 
(Bauwens, 2005a and 2005b). The nature of the digital archive of ERT allows its 
reproduction and distribution via Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) with a 
marginal cost. The decision not to distribute the archive under Commons licenses imposes an 
artificial scarcity in a cultural wealth, which could be freely distributed to everybody and 
constitues a positive externality. Individuals would have the chance to use parts of the 
archive and creatively mix it, and redistribute it, under the same legal forms, to the Commons 
sphere.  
The ERT archive was considered as the “Elgin marbles of modern Greek culture” 
(Papanikolaou, 2007) and the open/free, P2P communities in Greece tried through this to 
promote the discussions about an OSA to public policy. They asked for a generalized 
Commons licensing of all public data and information which is produced with public money; 
warned of the danger of archives’ privatization; called for the adoption of OS software 
applications in the public sector; and denounced the then recent deal between the Greek state 
and Microsoft for covering the ICT needs of the public sector. After posting texts in several 
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Greek and foreign blogs and sending emails to many relevant email lists, the Greek activists 
tried to create a web platform at setitfree.gr, which, however, never went officially online, 
because when it was completed, people and mainstream media had already forgotten the ERT 
case; so, it was decided to quit such an initiative. In spite of the fact that this activist 
movement was ultimately unsuccessful, the message that it carried is arguably of a special 
interest to the scholars of OS politics.  
Next, the OLPC case is investigated which shares some characteristics with the ERT case. 
The activists and the Non Government Organizations (NGO) behind OLPC initiative are still 
trying to transform it into a generalized movement with very interesting, though, for the 
moment, small-scale results. 
 
The OLPC Project: EEL/LAK, Re-public and Two Schools 
The OLPC XO-1 
According to the official website of the non-profit organization OLPC Association Inc. 
(2009) the mission of the initiative is: 
to create educational opportunities for the world’s poorest children by providing each 
child with a rugged, low-cost, low-power, connected laptop with content and software 
designed for collaborative, joyful, self-empowered learning. When children have access 
to this type of tool they get engaged in their own education. They learn, share, create, 
and collaborate. They become connected to each other, to the world and to a brighter 
future...It’s not a laptop project. It’s an education project. 
The XO-1, known also as the $100 laptop, is the OLPC laptop (subnotebook type) with OS 
software. It is not just a cheap laptop: it is a tool for children (approximately of the age of 6-
12 years old) that arguably leads to a new educational paradigm. It is based on an educational 
theory, called “constructionist learning” and developed by the computer scientists Seymour 
Papert and Alan Kay, which proposes the “learning by doing” educational process in a 
student-centric model instead of the traditional teacher-centric practices. The OLPC XO-1 
intends to foster individual and collective creativity, and to emphasize the value of the 
underestimated children’s intellectual, learning and creative abilities. As Pavlos Hatzopoulos 
(interview, 2009), who is an OLPC activist and the managing editor of the online political 
journal Re-public, said: “the OLPC XO-1 re-frames the role of the teacher as a collaborator of 
the students and a catalyst for creative learning”. The XO-1 is shipped with a Fedora 
GNU/Linux version and a set of applications called Sugar, that enables collaboration amongst 
students. Next, based on interviews with some of the initiators of the OLPC movement in 
Greece as well as building on various theories about the OS model, the OLPC project is 
analyzed in its three main political dimensions: the access dimension; the educational 
dimension; and the FLOSS dimension.  
According to Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Thanasis Priftis (interview, 2009), the editors of Re-
public journal – which has taken the initiative in cooperation with EEL/LAK (the official 
institution for FLOSS in Greece) and has organized several relevant workshops freely 
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providing schools with OLPC XO-1 – the XO-1 is not just an inexpensive notebook; it 
inaugurates a new educational paradigm while it offers ICT to every single child. Moreover, 
one basic principle of OLPC XO-1 is the OS software it contains, making the child 
responsible for the maintenance, development and modification of its own laptop system.  
Initially, OLPC was launched to provide children from the developing world with the basic 
ICT so as to be able to experiment, explore and learn. Therefore, one obvious dimension of 
the initiative is that it tries to fill the gaping chasm between the digitally illiterate developing 
world and the developed one, by providing access to ICT. This is the first and the most 
obvious dimension. However, in this paper, the analysis is concentrated on two other, less 
evident, political dimensions: the new educational paradigm on which OLPC is based and 
tries to promote, and the use of OS applications.  
 
Open Sourcing Education: Towards a New Educational Paradigm? 
The OLPC project is based on the educational theory of constructionist learning pioneered by 
Papert, and later by Kay. This theory views learning as the reconstruction rather than as the 
transmission of knowledge, and maintains that learning is most effective when the student 
experiences part of an educational activity as a meaningful product construction (Papert and 
Harel, 1991; Papert 1990a and 1990b). In constructionist learning, students draw their own 
conclusions through creative experimentation and the role of the teacher is that of the 
mediator, who assists them to understand the problems; and that of the learning catalyst, who 
guides them provoking individual and collective creativity (Papert and Harel, 1991; Papert 
1990a and 1990b).  
In the industrial production of the 20th century, the dominant educational model was 
engrained with similar “industrial” principles: leader(teacher)-centric, strict hierarchies with 
pathetic students-workers-objects. According to Hardt and Negri (2001), society, thus the 
educational system as well, reproduced the figure of the factory which was the representative 
agent of the dominant mode of production, i.e. massive industrial production. In the era of 
information production, where immaterial value is of a great importance and is produced (not 
solely) through OS modes of production, new educational paradigms are emerging. Their 
application now seems more possible than ever. It can be said that the 19th-20th century’s 
typical classroom followed an industrial organizational mode, with most of the children 
feeling unease when going to school (like the industrial worker who dislikes his/her work) 
and enjoying a small degree of autonomy and cooperation (alienating from each other, many 
times, in the competitive strive for grade chasing). Today, what OLPC could lead to, is an OS 
educational paradigm which enables the co-existence and experimentation with different 
learning practices – say, learning from the teacher, learning by doing and P2P learning 
(learning from the fellows students) – while it is built on the idea that just as important as the 
knowledge (code) itself and probably more fundamental is the process by which the 
knowledge (code) is built (in all, fostering critical thinking and individual and collaborative 
learning).  
Next, I consider the cases of Florina and Sminthi schools, both frontier places in Greece, 
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where efforts to apply some of the practices of constructionist learning with the help of 
OLPC XO-1 shed light on what is the potential of the OLPC vision. 
 
The Cases of Sminthi and Florina 
To begin with, it is important to say a few words about Florina and Sminthi in order to have 
an idea about the essential socioeconomic background. Florina is a small city whereas 
Sminthi is a mountainous village, both in the frontline of northern Greece. Greece – although 
having made significant progress in Internet access and ICT infrastructures during the last 
years (indicators concerning individuals, enterprises, and state are available at the 
measurement of eEurope/i2010 by the Observatory for the Greek Information Society) – still 
has a long way to go in reaching the EU standards. Sminthi and Florina, as frontier, often 
unprivileged places, are below the Greek average level. Further, it should be mentioned that 
all the information about the experience of OLPC in Sminthi and Florina was drawn from 
interviews with Yannis Kaskamanidis from Florina, Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Thanasis Priftis 
of Re-public journal, and relevant workshops held in 2009, organized by Re-public and 
EEL/LAK (I was also responsible for the organization as Re-public’s external collaborator), in 
which teachers from the aforementioned primary and junior high schools participated and 
shared their experience. 
The students of the public junior high school of Sminthi are all members of the Muslim 
minority population and their native language is Turkish or Pomak (a Slavic dialect). The 
demographics of the school, which is not an international school but a national, Greek one, is 
of special interest: amongst 140 enrolled students, who come from 15 adjacent villages, there 
are only a few girls, as their families do not allow the latter to go to the junior high school. 
Most of the students have very serious problems in reading and writing in Greek whereas 
their teachers are Greek and do not speak Turkish or Pomak. Thus, the language barrier had 
to be transcended by alternative teaching methods and approaches. “Students accept us”, said 
the high school teacher of Mathematics Dionysia Psychoyos, during her speech (2009a) in a 
small-scale workshop in Athens, before her school gets the OLPC XO-1, “because they 
consider us as something strange from the outer, modern world”. “Even having a ruler or a 
bow compass is a big deal for students there”, she complained, “so, we, teachers, have to 
bring them all those things...even to provide them with papers and notebooks!”. Psychoyos 
highlighted that what was needed was not new content (say books) or other particular tools, 
but a kind of platform that would allow for improvisation and adaption to the conditions each 
time. “I think that a computer, like OLPC, can serve as the platform which I refer to... and, 
after all, the IT course is a students’ favorite. Moreover, I already know how to use OLPC 
XO-1 in lessons such as Geography or Mathematics”. On September the 15th, 2009, several 
OLPC XO-1 arrived at Sminthi school and, as Psychoyos (2009b) wrote the very first day to 
the Re-public team: “I won’t say that there was a fuss; on the contrary, students were 
speechless. They didn’t know about that and it was hard to believe that they would own those 
laptops for one school year! It was really amazing how quickly children became familiarized 
with them... When the bell rang for break, Cezer, who is the naughtiest student, cried: “What 
a pity that the bell already rang”... Tomorrow, we are going to form the plan according to 
which the laptops will be used”. After some weeks, Psychoyos (2009b) wrote again about her 
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first impressions: “Children are passionate about their new laptops, exploring XO-1’s 
features... They search for wifi networks, which unfortunately are very hard to be found here, 
and have tried all the applications of XO-1 so far... In addition, they have learned how to 
delete and restore the applications... The laptop has created a collaborative environment and 
surprisingly the class is more concentrated on the lesson and much calmer”. And the 
highlight, according to Psychoyos (2009c), is that one day when she was late in class, 
students complained because time was lost from their course. 
The case of Florina is different and much simpler. The primary school of Florina, which 
could be characterized as ordinary school of the Greek countryside, in terms of 
demographics, but above the average, in terms of equipment, had already made significant 
steps concerning technological tools (such as the interactive board or some simulated 
animations via Internet concerning physics experiments) already in use by the time the OLPC 
laptops arrived. This means that – as Yannis Kaskamanidis, the IT teacher of the school, 
pointed out – apart from the students, who were already familiar with ICT in class, “before 
we get the OLPC, we already had a well-educated and informed teaching staff which had 
been collaborating with parents; the schedule was flexible and carefully formed... So, the 
OLPC did not suddenly fall from the sky (2009, interview)”. The first reactions of the 
students, when they received the computers, were the same as those in Sminthi, as the IT 
teacher stated (2009, workshop). In his presentation at the Goethe Institute in Thessaloniki 
(2009) as well as in our interview (2009), Kaskamanidis explained more about the operation 
of OLPC outside and inside the classroom: “The XO is not a laptop for students, but a student 
laptop... They [the OX laptops] have been successfully used for reading, text editing, graph 
understanding, drawing, video and photographs viewing, memorization, chat and 
communication... Children are passionate about applications such as the Turtle, eToys, Pippy, 
Scratch; they realize the potential of each tool and together we configure it according to our 
needs; that’s one of the reasons why I am a strong supporter of OS”, he would contently add 
with a low, but confident voice. “Some of the conclusions, so far, are that children are more 
enthusiastic about going to school... more concentrated on the lesson... they are not late... 
they want to get the XO at home... children’s spelling and writing skills have been improved 
in a short time... they enjoy creating contextual maps like the application Labyrinth... (and) 
children have developed a collaborative mentality”. When asked for the (new) role of the 
teacher and the (new) relations of the students in a constructivist learning paradigm, which 
the OLPC projects tries to propagate, Kaskamanidis (2009, interview) replied that the issue is 
actually political, because while living in the Greek society that faces a deep crisis, children 
should not be asked to reproduce its images. There new roles for everyone: “firstly, a new 
role for the teacher in an effort to create a scientist, a scholar, say, a “mature kid” whose role 
is to catalyze learning... and then, the spirit of cooperation that this new educational paradigm 
gradually fosters seems to enable the “weakest” to participate in a collaborative process; say, 
the editing of a text”.  
In general, beyond the mentioned problems of familiarization; some worries and doubts from 
a few parents and from sections of the local societies; occasional exploitation of the new type 
of (more equal) relations of the student and the teacher; both cases prove that, for the 
moment, the introduction of OLPC is successful and has been embraced by students. The 
next section discusses the third dimension of the politics of OS, i.e. the adoption of OS 
software (FLOSS) applications in education. 
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FLOSS Software in Education 
The adoption of FLOSS in the processes of all levels of the education system is undoubtedly 
political: one could argue that, for two main reasons (the reason why, in this paragraph, the 
word FLOSS is used instead of OS software, is in order to stress its, in parallel, political, 
ideological and technical dimension).  
Firstly, it is obvious that the dependence upon proprietary software creates dangerous 
monopolies for the benefit of monopolistic producers, who own and manage the source code. 
In a world where there would be no alternative to these, the adoption of proprietary software 
is, although problematic, inevitable. Nowadays, however, with the myriad of OS applications 
available, the adoption of FLOSS in education is not only a cost-saving step (evidently 
saving considerable amounts of money for governments, individuals and enterprises), but it is 
an investment in society, as FLOSS is a good produced for and by the Commons sphere. 
Extensive argumentation for FLOSS, and against proprietary software has been developed 
elsewhere in the literature (see for instance the papers of GNU - Free Software Foundation2). 
Hence, when children will be nurtured in a FLOSS environment, then the problems 
encountered while trying to shift from proprietary software to FLOSS disappear (for 
instance, many face serious problems when trying to move from Microsoft Windows to, say, 
Ubuntu and as a result they remain trapped into a proprietary operating system; most of them 
do not even try such a change).  
Secondly, there is another reason why the adoption of FLOSS is political, which is not of an 
ideological, but of a pedagogical and social capital nature. Pedagogical because the student, 
from an early age, is responsible for the maintenance, development and enhancement of 
his/her own FLOSS equipped computer (see the above section about OLPC). Arguably, the 
aforementioned is a long-term boost for knowledge economies and simultaneously elevates 
and enriches self-expression, creativity and independence in a highly inter-connected world. 
It becomes evident that the ability (and the right if seen from a more ideological perspective) 
for the student to modify, collaboratively or individually, his/her software is a social capital 
investment, which fosters the ground for future social innovation. 
It is worth mentioning the words of Yannis Kaskamanidis, the IT teacher of the school of 
Florina, during our interview (2009) when discussing about the FLOSS in education: “The 
XO and the FLOSS illuminate the essence of the common/voluntary labour. Students realize 
that amongst the firms and the individuals who strive for financial gains, there are also 
communities consisting of volunteers that create superb educational software. This [he means 
the FLOSS and the OLPC project] serves as an ideal opportunity to spread the ideas of 
solidarity, reciprocity and voluntarism... [and] to show them [the children] that although 
happiness is experienced on an individual basis, it a social issue”. It can be argued that the 
main vein of Kaskamanidis’ articulation comes in accordance with several scholars (see for 
instance Benkler, 2006; Bauwens, 2005a and 2005b; Lessig, 2004) who maintain that the 
case of FLOSS and Commons-based peer production should be seen in the broader spectrum 
                                                 
2The webpage of GNU Free Software Foundation at http://www.gnu.org/ (retrieved 6 December 2009). 
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of a new social, economic and political paradigm.  
 
Conclusions 
The title Open Source Approach to Public Policy is used to capture the political issues related 
to the adoption of OS technologies and of those modes of organization which are based on 
collaboration, individual and collective creativity, sharing, openness, and autonomy. The ERT 
case contributes to the redefinition of the state/public property in the light of the Commons-
based property regimes concerning public goods. In the former, although allegedly “public”, 
the property is exclusive while in the latter, the individual has sovereignty. Moreover, as 
explained through the narration of the first case study, the adoption of Commons licenses for 
an immaterial – thus in abundance, with zero marginal costs for reproduction – public good 
can create several positive externalities and empower social production. The case of the 
OLPC project in Greece serves as a chance to discuss the political dimensions of this 
international initiative. The access, educational, and FLOSS dimensions are seen under a 
political spectrum. Firstly, the OLPC project contributes to lessening the gap of access to ICT 
between the developed and the developing world, and enhances digital literacy amongst 
children worldwide. Secondly, the use of the XO-1 in class leads to a new educational 
paradigm, named “constructionist learning”, in which the roles of teacher and student are 
redefined. The cases of Sminthi and Florina schools prove that the OLPC project can 
effectively transform the education process by “open sourcing” it. And last but not least, the 
adoption of FLOSS in education damps the dangerous dependency on proprietary software, 
invests in human capital and creates a sense of autonomy and solidarity. However, initiatives 
like OLPC or the adoption of Commons-based property forms should be part of a far-sighted, 
broader political strategy; for countries like Greece, which are in a deep socioeconomic 
crisis, a generalized OSA to public policy may offer chances for innovation, recovery and 
development. 
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Abstract 
Open source software has long been used by government 
agencies, and prospects for increased use have been greeted 
enthusiastically by both knowledgeable government employees 
and open source communities. But mobilizing the necessary 
forces in government to procure open source software has 
proven difficult. Instead of a vague statement of principle or a 
naïve focus on cost reduction, government agencies should 
review and focus on core responsibilities to the public: access 
for all, vendor independence, archiving, special government 
needs, and security. Managers promoting open source should 
gain insight into how it is produced and what its adoption 
entails, while a statement explicitly political goals provides the 
necessary motivation to carry through with the project. This 
paper also shows the relationship of open source software to 
open government, discuss the importance of open standards to 
the adoption of open source, and stress the importance of a 
robust requirements assessment, highlighting models from the 
Department of Defense, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
and the city of Munich, Germany. 
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Open source software1 has long been used by government agencies, and prospects for 
increased use have been greeted enthusiastically by both knowledgeable government 
employees and open source communities. But mobilizing the necessary forces in government 
to procure open source software has proven difficult. This paper explores the reasons so 
many efforts have stalled, and the lessons taught by the successful efforts. It will cover: 
 Reasons for adopting open source software that are particular compelling in a 
government setting 
 The relation of open standards to open source software and the importance of 
standards to the adoption of open source software 
 The importance of starting with a profound insight into the community and 
development processes for open source 
 The value of explicit political goals 
 Processes for establishing government agency requirements 
Widespread enthusiasm for the use of open source software already exists in federal 
agencies, often invisibly to the public. The movement for open source software enjoyed a 
publicity boost when the White House launched its recovery.gov Web site on the open source 
Content Management System called Drupal (Scola, 2009), but countless earlier examples of 
its use abound, such as Department of Energy's Open Energy Information (OpenEI) platform 
(Department of Energy, 2010), the Department of Homeland Security’s Virtual USA 
information sharing site (Department of Homeland Security, 2010), and the Veteran 
Administration's release of its VistA health record system (Veterans Health Administration, 
2010). 
Yet most departments still lack an understanding of fundamental goals in open source 
software adoption and a path toward making decisions in keeping with core government 
responsibilities. Cost savings, the naive enticement, doesn't provide good enough motivation 
in the end. Although proprietary software (the complement to open source software) tends to 
come with high licensing fees, whereas open source software can be downloaded without 
payment, monetary arguments for deploying open source software are usually unsuccessful 
because the high costs of conversion, retraining, and developing an adequate base for support 
can postpone the potential savings of open source software for many years. 
Experiences both positive and negative show that managers interested in open source must 
back up their commitment with explicitly political goals, while offering arguments that are 
more subtle than cost savings and that cite the public interest. 
 
                                                 
1 Surveys have shown that developers of open source software prefer the term “free software,” but 
because the term “open source” is ubiquitous in the United States federal government, that term 
will be used in this paper. 
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Reasons for Adopting Open Source Software in Government 
As open source proponents never tire of pointing out (but business and policy decision-
makers rarely grasp), the key trait distinguishing open source software from proprietary 
software is not its availability free of cost, but its provision under a license that allows 
anyone to alter it and redistribute the altered form. Freedom to change, improve, and extend 
the software—that is the trait that draws a hard and fast line between software that can be 
defined as open source and software that remains locked in to a particular developer. 
Revealing source code to a particular customer or even to the general public is not enough to 
define a product as open source; it must also have a license that allows unlimited changes and 
redistribution by anyone. 
The advantages this trait of open source software offers are well cataloged—the ability to 
continue support and development if the original developer goes out of business,2 the ability 
to extend it in ways that the original developer does not find worth its while, the community 
involvement in finding and fixing bugs quickly, and other advantages—but governments are 
mandated with several responsibilities that make open source software particularly necessary: 
1. Access for all 
If sharing documents or interacting with an agency requires a software purchase, the 
agency effectively discriminates against some of its constituents on economic or 
technological grounds. 
2. Vendor independence 
To require software from a particular source, whether or not the source charges for it, 
is a form of unfair favoritism. In addition, dependence on the vendor increases risk in 
the event that the vendor goes out of business, stops supporting a product, or makes 
changes that leave documents incompatible with earlier ones. 
3. Archiving 
Agencies must preserve many documents for periods measured in decades. A vendor, 
at its own discretion, can stop supporting a non-open format at any time. Even 
vendors who commit to supporting their formats can upgrade them in ways that 
render old documents unmanageable. Large institutions consequently spend large 
sums to copy documents to new formats (both hardware and software) in a Red 
Queen's race to simply maintain a consistent level of access to these documents. 
Many institutions require documents to be put on paper merely for archival reasons, 
but the paper obviously lacks the digital formats' advantages in searchability and 
computer processing. 
4. Special government needs 
                                                 
2 Open source advocate David López points out that open licenses have permitted Brazil to develop 
educational content in Portuguese, and Spanish agencies to translate software into languages not 
supported by vendors, such as Catalonian, Vaskish, and Galician. 
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Governments have special requirements, notably regarding privacy, that vendors need 
not respect. This conflict came up recently not with licensed software, but with the 
federal rush under the Obama Administration to use popular online media and social 
networks such as YouTube and Twitter. After complaints from privacy activists that 
the YouTube video service was recording visits in cookies on visitor browsers, 
YouTube actually created a special viewer for the White House site that lets the 
visitor view the site without receiving a cookie—but a cookie is still downloaded if 
the visitor plays the video (Grove, 2009). 
5. Security 
As shown by the previous item, private firms can insert features into software that 
may be detrimental to safety or organizational practices. Many private software 
solutions, for instance, use fragile encryption mechanisms and other poor security 
features; the users cannot even assess the vulnerabilities without access to the source 
code, and cannot fix them because they lack the legal right to alter and redistribute the 
program. Governments have procedures for doing assessments of critical software, 
but open source software provides a guarantee, unmatched by any closed source 
software, that users can find and fix security flaws without waiting for the vendor. 
One international survey of open source in government (López et al., 2010) divides the 
reasons for adoption into three categories: strategic, feature-oriented, and cost-oriented. 
Strategic considerations correspond essentially to the five reasons just listed. Feature-oriented 
considerations select open source software that works better than proprietary alternatives, or 
that offers features not found in any proprietary product. Cost-oriented considerations adopt 
open source to save money. The primacy of strategic considerations will be seen in the 
examples cited in this article. 
 
The Role of Formal Planning and Organizational Change 
The cases cited in this paper demonstrate that new organizational initiatives often spawn an 
interest in open source: 
 A Peruvian law mandating open source sprang from attempts by a software architect 
to rectify ambiguities and inconsistencies in the application of tax codes (Chan, 
2008).  
 The U.S. state of Massachusetts reached the decision to allow open source software 
when required to make a strategic plan for government software use (Updegrove, 
2007b). 
 The city of Munich opened up an inquiry leading to the adoption of software when it 
had to face the end-of-life announcement for its Windows software (Schießl, 2009). 
The migration to open source, in turn, often reveals structural or policy ambiguities and 
inconsistencies that require repair. 
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A recent policy letter from the CIO of the state of California, meant to "[f]ormally establish 
the use of Open Source Software (OSS) in California state government as an acceptable 
practice," provides a worthwhile reminder that all agencies considering open source software 
do so as part of their routine Software Management Plan (State of California, 2010). 
 
The Importance of a Profound Understanding of Open Source 
The adoption of open source software is more than a technical matter, or even a policy 
decision. It imposes new tasks on management and staff alike, requiring a heightened 
engagement with the software development process: 
 Merely learning about the existence of appropriate open source software can be 
difficult, because most projects lack marketing staff. 
 Installation often requires many manual steps and the integration of several different 
software packages, tasks simplified in the case of proprietary software because 
vendors provide a turn-key procedure of send staff to the agency site to perform 
installation. 
 Open source software tends to be updated more frequently than proprietary software 
and may require agency staff to explicitly check for updates, in contrast to proprietary 
products that roll out official upgrades. 
 Open source software provides valuable opportunities to collaborate with the 
community that builds up around the software, but this requires an understanding of 
the dynamics of such communities and dedication of agency staff to maintaining a 
relationship. 
 Licensing of open source software, although intended to promote free exchange, 
embodies restrictions of its own that agencies must understand if they plan to 
distribute it publicly. 
Hence, management and staff must possess an understanding of the open source movements 
and its communities that goes beyond what they can learn merely by reading about it in the 
press or talking to advocates. 
 
Political Will 
Government agency managers like to think of themselves as rational actors who weigh 
courses of action objectively. In reality, of course, prejudices and simple inertia dog every 
decision. Resistance to major changes such as the adoption of open source software can often 
be blamed on vendors of the products in current use. But before they even face such 
lobbying,managers and advocates for open source software must recognize and counter 
resistance that develops naturally within an agency. When all stakeholders inside the agency 
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are firmly committed to a course of action, outside pressures can be more successfully 
parried. 
Joseph Reddix, an entrepreneur with forty-two years of experience both inside and outside 
government, notes that the major barriers to change are cultural. These include:3 
 Familiarity with current software.  
 Fear of failure, which reduces willingness to undergo risk. 
 Lack of knowledge about open source, which requires the kind of direct experience as 
described in the previous section. 
 Concerns about the maturity of software that is newer than the proprietary products in 
current use, as open source tends to be. 
Other issues in government IT are double-edged: they can either retard or motivate the 
adoption of open source. These issues include: 
 Security. Some managers with a poor understanding of open source accept the canard 
that it is inherently less secure. Those with a stronger understanding realize that they 
can evaluate its security directly by having knowledgeable staff or outside experts 
look at the source code and do white box testing. 
 Integration. Most software must exchange data with other, existing programs, often in 
other agencies or with outside partners. When such programs are proprietary and fail 
to adhere to standards, they impede the adoption of any new solution, whether 
proprietary or open source. But integration works in favor of open source in 
departments willing to take on the costs of large-scale migration, because open source 
solutions can be integrated more readily. 
Proponents of open source therefore perform a delicate balancing act. They need to follow 
formal guidelines by producing objective justifications for a move to open source. But the 
inner fire that will actually make migration successful has a political basis. 
Peru provides a good example. Chan reports the public agitation that saved the Law for the 
Use of Free Software in Government Agencies, Proposition 1609 (Chan, 2008): 
...the proponents of Peru's FLOSS bill had to undertake various forms of local and 
non-local work to advance their interests. Their practices departed from the language 
of technical and economic rationality that is repeatedly invoked to explain FLOSS' 
adoption. They insisted instead on a new framing of FLOSS as necessarily engaged 
with governance and political reform.... 
                                                 
3. Personal conversation with Joseph Reddix. 
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...the bill was not motivated by economic rationales but by the state's "fundamental" 
political obligation to citizens. These [sic] included ensuring citizens free access to 
public information and ensuring the permanence of public data. 
The bill favored the use of open source in public agencies, stating the explicitly political 
justification of eliminating Peru's dependence on foreign software. A later letter from 
congressman Villanueva, the bill's sponsor, added to its goals (Greene, 2002): 
 Free access to public information by the citizen 
 Permanence of public data 
 Security of the State and citizens 
Even more insistent political goals drove the civil society support for the bill (Chan, 2004): 
the demands for open formats and protection of data as a way to secure the rights of citizens 
vis-a-vis their own government. It was the General Manager of Microsoft Peru, in opposing 
the bill, who called for decisions to be made on consideration of technical requirements 
alone. 
It cannot be overstated how important the public mobilization in defense of the Law for the 
Use of Free Software in Government Agencies—a mobilization that had overt political goals 
and took on an international character—was for the ultimate passage of the bill. Proponents 
helped Villanueva fashion his responses to critics and created a groundswell of public 
opinion in favor of the originally obscure measure. 
Other governments have also mandated the use of open source software on the grounds of 
principle. An official announcement in Venezuela came straight from the President, Hugo 
Chávez, in 2004 (Wilpert, 2004). Although proponents cite cost savings and (in many cases) 
the higher quality of open source software, the most effective and enduring reasons for 
adoption are the non-negotiable government responsibilities cited in the previous section. 
Such high-level support for open source can improve the general atmosphere for discussing 
its adoption, but to make it happen, the management of particular agencies must be firmly 
committed to it—and must understand the efforts needed to fulfill the commitment. No 
pronouncement by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Vivek Kundra in the U.S. can by itself 
bring open source into agencies; it is the local management and staff that will install it, 
resolve interoperability problems, provide training, and interact with the community 
surrounding the software. 
 
Open Source and Open Government 
The kind of fundamental dedication to change described in the previous section reaches its 
clearest expression in the movement known as open, transparent, or participatory 
government. This movement has been growing rapidly for the past several years. The best-
known example comes from the most powerful body in the world, the U.S. Federal 
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Government, where President Obama released a Memorandum on Transparency and Open 
Government on his first day in office (Obama, 2009). On December 8, 2009, the Office of 
Management and Budget pressed on with the initiative, issuing a directive to executive 
departments and agencies with steps to take toward openness (Orszag, 2009). 
The open government movement tends to release information in digital form and to exchange 
digital information over the Internet to draw on public input to government decisions and 
projects. The new forms of public participation in government spread across a broad range of 
activities. A few examples include: 
 Expansion of the conventional “notice and comment” period for government 
regulations 
 Crowdsourcing, or requesting information about living conditions directly from 
ordinary citizens “on the ground” at a much lower cost and with much more accuracy 
than the agency could achieve by assigning staff to the task 
 Public monitoring to avoid fraud and waste, exemplified by the IT Dashboard 
(Federal IT Dashboard, 2010) tracking federal IT project progress and expenditures, 
which Vivek Kundra, the first CIO of the U.S. federal government, unveiled shortly 
after his appointment 
 The creation and release of computer programs to collect and upload data from the 
public or to process mass downloads of data in program-friendly form provided at 
locations such as the U.S. government agencies' data.gov site (Data.gov, 2010) 
These initiatives provide new imperatives for open source software, because the open 
government movement relies and thrives on access by all and on the transparency of the data 
and software tools used to implement public interaction. Much of the information exchanged 
in the open government efforts comes in documents, audio files, or videos, running into the 
responsibility for access discussed earlier in this paper. Open formats, the topic of a later 
section, should be a requirement for any outreach to the public. 
 
The Relation of Open Standards to Open Source Software 
A standard can be established many ways—there are de facto standards as well as de jure 
standards, and the de jure standards can be established in a more or less open fashion—but 
open standards provide the most chance for wide-spread participation for setting the standard 
and the most opportunity for competitive implementations. Standards that are not completely 
open make it difficult or even impossible for anyone to provide working alternatives to the 
implementations currently in use, and any element that hinders competition in this manner is 
inimical to the impetus to create the standard in the first place. 
A trivial but highly relevant example is the licensing that encumbers all popular digital audio 
and video formats. A open source MP3 player cannot legally be distributed in the United 
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States and many other countries, because MP3 uses patented techniques whose owners insist 
on royalties (Thomson, 2010). 
Robust and rich-featured standards exist for audio and video and are supported by many 
players, both proprietary and open source. But the proprietary software and hardware vendors 
prefer the encumbered formats and promote their use. The general public does not understand 
the complexity of patents and licensing and are generally shielded from their consequences 
because companies such as RealNetworks, Inc. (the distributors of RealPlayer), Microsoft, 
and Apple usually absorb the royalties and offer players for no cost. But unless the vendors 
choose to offer players for alternative operating systems such as Linux, no legal options 
exist—and even if players are offered, the encumbrances prevent them from being open 
source software. 
The World Wide Web Consortium, which is led by Tim Berners-Lee and maintains the most 
basic specifications for the Web (starting with HTML and HTTP) came to a major fork in the 
road in 2001, when they were pressured to standardize technologies covered by patents and 
requiring royalties for use. The Consortium tried to create a pathway for royalties using the 
common language of "reasonable, non-discriminatory royalties or fees" (World Wide Web 
Consortium, 2001). They were quickly inundated by outcries from the Web developer 
community, pointing out that once technology requiring royalties became deeply embedded 
in Web technologies, individual companies could restrict activities on the Web. Royalties 
imply conditions for use, which in turn imply limitations, and because the way intellectual 
property limitations operate is that anything not explicitly permitted is forbidden, these 
limitations will at some point inhibit the rights of users and opportunities to innovate on top 
of the patented technologies. 
The final policy upheld the principles of open standards and required all technologies to be 
royalty-free (World Wide Web Consortium, 2004). The W3C thus avoided the risk of 
promoting policies that could fence off key Web technologies. (Given the workings of the 
patent system, the principle applies only to those who participate in setting the standard—
outside parties can still pop up to assert patents and try to exert control over commonly used 
technologies.) 
More troubling is the famous case of the Microsoft Office formats, which went through a 
standardization process at Ecma (known for standardizing JavaScript, among other computer 
technologies) and the International Organization for Standardization, one of the world's 
premier standards institutions. The story made headlines in the mid to late 2000s. A bit of 
history concerning this standardization process and the attempt of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts to adopt open source software shows why governments must be cautious in 
endorsing standards. 
 
Open Formats and the Massachusetts Migration Experience 
In the mid-2000 decade, Massachusetts hosted what probably remains the most far-reaching 
attempt in the United States to deploy open source in government. A secretary of finance and 
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the state's Information Technology Division planned and began a massive move from 
Microsoft Office to OpenOffice.org. The experiment ended only when the state legislature 
defunded the project without explanation or justification.4 
To understand how open source got as far as it did, we must start in 2003 when Governor 
Mitt Romney brought Eric Kriss into government as Secretary of Administration and 
Finance. Romney, as most Americans remember, is no political Hugo Chávez; rather, he is 
part of a multi-generation Republican family and holds socially and fiscally conservative 
values. The key factor was not ideology but information: Kriss came with some technical 
background in computing, which in turn gave him an appreciation for the achievements made 
by open source software and its potential in government (Updegrove, 2007b). 
Reasons Kriss initially put forward for using open source included: 
 Cost savings. The ITD demonstrated that using OpenOffice.org would save money 
over time. The legislature challenged their claim and even had the state auditor make 
a special assessment, an almost unheard-of intervention into administrative affairs. 
The auditor upheld the ITD's evaluation. 
 Taking advantage of the high quality of open source software, where pertinent. 
 Using open formats to protect access to information by public and by agencies 
themselves over time. 
 Promoting competition and breaking de facto monopolies of software vendors in 
certain state functions. 
Until 2003, the government of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had no policies or 
standards regarding software procurement. Although a few people in the administration knew 
of open source, there was no organized movement for it in the government. 
The movement toward open source began with the passage of a state law that said nothing 
about open source and that the legislature could not have imagined would have any impact 
on open source. The law simply ordered a strategic plan for technology and the adoption of a 
set of best practices, and set up an IT commission to implement this initiative. 
While working on the state technology plan, Secretary Kriss and state CIO Peter Quinn 
noticed that Microsoft held a patent on aspects of the XML format in its Office 2003 product. 
They were concerned about ways it might leverage its patent to demand fees or terms that 
they didn't consider in the public interest. For instance, Microsoft could theoretically charge a 
fee for every document issued by the state. 
Kriss and Quinn met with Microsoft managers, asking them to give up rights to the patent. 
Microsoft refused, never even explaining why they had obtained the patent. 
                                                 
4. Material in this section that is not accompanied by citations comes from personal conversations between the 
author and participants, notably former CIO Peter Quinn. 
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Thus, while we have seen that Kriss was predisposed toward open source already, the patent 
irritant contributed to his statement in the official Enterprise Technical Resource Model in 
2003 that the state would seek to use software and formats conforming to international 
standards. The model also indicated that open source would be preferred where it met the 
state's needs. 
After a number of CEOs from computer companies, as part of the Massachusetts Software 
Council, pressured the administration, Kriss and Quinn retreated slightly and said simply that 
open source would get fair consideration. 
In 2005, Kriss and Quinn put the ETRM into effect by determining which employees using 
desktop computers would migrate to OpenOffice.org. The goal was to use OpenOffice.org 
wherever feasible. 
At that particular time, Excel was superior to OpenOffice.org's corresponding spreadsheet 
tool, and OpenOffice.org does not support Excel macros. Therefore, finance department staff 
who created spreadsheets were kept on Excel. A few other departments with similar needs for 
Microsoft software were given dispensations to keep using it. However, Quinn found that 
most state are just consumers of data or creators of very simple documents; all they need are 
a generic office suite and a web browser. Thus, 50,000 office workers in the Massachusetts 
state government were designated to move to OpenOffice.org. 
Public debate arose over the issue of accessibility, particularly for the visually impaired, 
which Quinn had not considered. Massachusetts did not have an accessibility law, as the 
federal government does in the famous Section 508 of the 1998 revision of the Rehabilitation 
Act (IT Accessibility & Workforce Division, 2010). 
Microsoft Office did not support accessibility until the community pressured it in the mid-
1990s, but currently has that support. Microsoft noted OpenOffice.org's lack of accessibility 
features and organized representatives for visually impaired to protest the adoption of 
OpenOffice.org. Quinn admitted he had made a mistake and said OpenOffice.org would not 
be deployed until it incorporated that support. This incident highlights the importance of 
understanding open source software thoroughly during the evaluation process. 
However, the true barriers to adoption of open source came from special interests and from 
intenrnal inertia. Lobbyists for commercial software vendors prevailed on the legislature at 
every juncture. The conservatism of government agencies described earlier in this paper also 
came into play. 
 
The Battle Over Standards 
Initiatives such as the one in Massachusetts to adopt ODF were launched in many U.S. states 
but ultimately defeated after sustained lobbying by Microsoft (Lai, 2007). One result of the 
budget cuts and political fighting in Massachusetts was the departure from government of the 
original backers of OpenOffice.org migration, a vacuum that set up a reversal of its 
principled demand for an open format. 
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As the Massachusetts administration was formulating its policy on open formats, Microsoft 
at first fought and failed to get the administration to accept Microsoft Office formats in the 
initiative (Berlind, 2005), then developed Office Open XML (OOXML), an XML 
implementation of its Office formats, and presented it to several government bodies as well 
as to Ecma and ISO for approval. 
Critics of the Microsoft bid raised numerous grounds on which the Microsoft Office formats 
do not constitute a standard (ODF Alliance, 2008; Groklaw, 2010). Even topping 6,000 
pages, the Microsoft specification for what they called OOXML did not fully specify the 
behavior of their office suite and could not serve as the basis for an alternative 
implementation. Even Microsoft Word in its different versions are incompatible. For 
instance, documents created with the current Windows version might not display properly on 
the current Macintosh version, or change tracking might cause corruption when documents 
are exchanged. 
OOXML passed through Ecma quickly. This credential, giving Microsoft a claim to 
credibility in the standards space, played into an announcement by Massachusetts' IT division 
in 2007 that OOXML was acceptable along with ODF as an open format (Johnston, 2007). In 
practice, of course, this announcement represented an acceptance of the status quo and an 
admission that the state would not switch any systems to ODF or OpenOffice.org. 
Given the funding cutoff, the IT department had no recourse except to stick with Microsoft 
Office, but along with Ecma, they helped to blur the definition of an open standard. If 
practical necessities require a government agency to set aside its commitment to archival 
security, open access, and related responsibilities, this should be stated candidly. Abatements 
can be changed later when financial or technical improvements make it possible to use open 
standards. But to declare something open when it is not does more than sow distrust—it 
pollutes future debate and perpetuates public ignorance. Furthermore, agencies should not 
accept uncritically a moniker of “openness” from other institutions, even highly regarded 
ones such as Ecma and ISO, when these institutions take a lax attitude toward the traits held 
important in the open source movement. 
ISO also turned down OOXML at first, one of the grounds being that it duplicated the 
functionality of the already adopted ODF standard. The debate led to an unprecedented 
politicization of ISO, as numerous members took advantage of loose membership rules to 
join at the last minute and vote on the issue, usually taking Microsoft's side (Updegrove, 
2007a). The administration of ISO also seemed determined to give Microsoft what it wanted, 
and managed to reverse the vote six months later, amid widespread accusations of arm-
twisting and despite several appeals (Jones, 2008). 
The purpose of this abbreviated history of the OOXML standard has not been to denigrate the 
use of Microsoft Office. Millions of office workers and ordinary computer users around the 
world depend on Office, and the creation of OOXML was a boon to developers who can use 
widespread XML tools to manipulate Office documents. Competition with ODF did in fact 
make Microsoft more open—though not in the rigorous sense described in the previous 
section—and create, in the end, more opportunities for Office users. 
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We can thus congratulate the open source software community for promoting competition—
and Microsoft for improving its product in response—while holding aloft the ultimate goal of 
a truly open format, just as we can congratulate government agencies who have threatened to 
adopt ODF and have used that tactic as leverage to win lower license fees from Microsoft, 
but hope that the agencies reconsider ODF in the future. 
What then constitutes an open standard? A good definition is fairly complex. One excellent 
example was developed by a European Union task force called Interoperable Delivery of 
European eGovernment Services (Final European Interoperability Framework, 2004). In 
addition to various common-sense prerequisites and an insistence that patented technologies 
be available on a royalty-free basis, version 1.0 of the document calls for the standard to be 
maintained by a not-for-profit organization open to all parties. This is not an iron-clad 
guarantee of openness, because an open body can be captured by biased leaders and its 
membership can be manipulated. But at least the definition precludes a vendor from simply 
declaring its product a standard. It is now the responsibility of IDABC to maintain the 
uncompromising clarity of this definition, and not to contribute to the same dilution of 
language and the public interest that can be laid at the feet of Ecma, ISO, and the state of 
Massachusetts. 
 
Processes for Establishing Government Agency Requirements 
The last section of this article offers some models and points to resources for government 
agencies committed to fulfilling the fundamental public responsibilities listed in the first 
section. 
 
What the Department of Defense Can Teach: Stakeholder Engagement 
The Department of Defense, generally considered a conservative and cautious institution, has 
sought out open source software for its reliability for many years. A recent memo from the 
CIO's office states (Wennergren, 2009): 
To effectively achieve its missions, the Department of Defense must develop and update its 
software-based capabilities faster than ever, to anticipate new threats and respond to 
continuously changing requirements. The use of Open Source Software (OSS) can provide 
advantages in this regard. 
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the government's largest software 
development group and IT department, exemplifies a Department of Defense culture of 
innovation. One of its best examples is the Forge.mil development site, where vendors 
collaborate to produce software, some restricted to DoD use and some freely downloadable 
as open source. (Forge.mil, 2010) The project benefited from several forward-thinking 
decisions: 
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 Management did not cut off the original proprietary vendors, but required them to 
work within the new paradigm. This allowed organizational knowledge to be 
transferred smoothly to new, open source participants. Such a decision is probably 
easier for the DoD to enforce than smaller agencies, admittedly. 
 DISA worked with a respected and highly experienced company, CollabNet, to set up 
an Agile software development environment. CollabNet specializes in combining the 
efforts of multiple independent developers (CollabNet, 2010a). 
 Management brought major stakeholders in early, both people inside the DoD who 
were needed to carry through the implementation, and outside vendors. Everyone 
made a commitment and was given tasks to do. This collaboration allowed them to 
learn each other's issues and abilities as they went along. 
 Management ensured security on Forge.mil. 
DISA required only 180 days to set up the first component of Forge.mil (SoftwareForge), an 
unheard of achievement in government. This engendered trust in the system and kept 
stakeholders engaged. Guy Martin of CollabNet, the award-winning lead community 
manager for Forge.mil (CollabNet, 2010b), has described their work as a model for the 
Obama administration's goals in transparency and open data (Martin, 2009). 
 
What Munich Can Teach: Goal Analysis and Determination to Succeed 
One fine model for open source planning is provided by a European Research project called 
"Consortium for studying, evaluating, and supporting the introduction of Open Source 
software and Open Data Standards in the Public Administration" (COSPA, 2005). (In Europe, 
the term "public administration" is generally used for an institution that in the United States 
is called a "government agency.”) COSPA starts by asking not what kinds of software an 
agency needs, but what core computing activities or business processes it performs. 
The emphasis on business processes is crucial to undercut historical assumptions that limit 
the possibilities for future evolution. As a trivial example, consider asking an agency IT 
manager what software they need for document creation and exchange. The IT manager 
might reasonably respond, "We need software to create and edit PDF files," because they 
currently exchange and release a lot of documents in that format. This kind of assessment 
locks the agency into historic practice, and probably into a proprietary product. But what is a 
PDF after all? A format designed specifically to produce printed pages. As documents are 
exchanged and collaboratively written online, PDFs become less and less relevant. 
PDFs are particularly inappropriate for much of the information released by initiatives in 
open government. These initiatives tend to involve large data sets appropriate for searching, 
filtering, and automated processing. For instance, people who visit an agency's Web site for 
crime statistics might want to compare the number of crimes reported in different counties or 
city districts. Governments typically release this information in tabular form in a Word or 
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PDF file, making it extremely hard to extract in a form amenable to searching and statistical 
analysis. 
In the COSPA framework,5 a better starting point for discussion is the question, "How do you 
create, exchange, and review information?" The IT manager would list the kinds of 
information each department works with and the types of work done by employees with that 
information. It may then emerge that the department's needs are best met by a wiki, an online 
service such as Google Docs, or some other system focused on storing and exchanging 
documents online. 
Such a conclusion still leaves several tasks to the agency. It must determine whether it can 
afford a move to more appropriate formats and software packages, and must develop a 
transitional program such as the one created by the Massachusetts IT division. 
One valuable historical precedent for this task is the assessment of costs and benefits done 
for the city of Munich in Germany (UNILOG Integrata et al., 2003). Tellingly, the city 
adopted Linux even though the assessment showed that the transition would cost more than 
an upgrade to new Microsoft products. Conversion costs would, in the time frame feasible for 
financial planning, exceed Microsoft licensing fees, especially given aggressive cuts in 
pricing that Microsoft offered to maintain its contract (Best, 2004). 
Like other projects described in this article, the Munich decision was the culmination of a 
more general inquiry—in this case, the need to replace Windows NT 4, whose end-of-life had 
been declared by Microsoft. City regulations required the staff to consider alternatives to a 
simple Windows upgrade (Schießl, 2009).  
The Munich experience provides a lesson to other government bodies in determining their 
true values and requirements. Their research balanced a "Cost-effectiveness analysis" against 
a "Qualitative-strategic analysis" that reflects some of the responsibilities in the first section 
of this article, along with other strategic considerations such as employee satisfaction and the 
ability to work with other organizations. (As the IDABC document illustrates, inter-agency 
cooperation is a key motivator for re-examining software use in European governments.) 
A staff person coordinating the migration therefore defends the pragmatism of the decision: 
"it's not a kamikaze mission by some crazy free software enthusiasts." (Schießl, 2009) 
Nevertheless, the decision ultimately was based on political considerations, specified in one 
document (Schießl, 2010b) as: 
 Independence and increased flexibility for decisions about software and architecture 
 Sensible and sustainable use of taxes 
 Strengthening of Munich as an IT location 
                                                 
5  COSPA's process is echoed in the recommendations “WiBe-Framework - WiBe 4.1 methodology: 
Economic Efficiency Assessment in Federal Administrations (in particular with regard to the use of 
ICT and eGovernment),” WiBe, http://www.eu.wibe.de/wibe_framework/wibe_framework.html, 
retrieved March 31, 2010. 
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Another statement of the city's goals was (Schießl, 2010a): 
 Freedom of choice: increased independence from software vendors, consultants, 
platforms, and timelines 
 More competition in the software market: increased equality of opportunities for the 
SMEs to participate in the market 
 Cost reduction in the mid term: more options for deciding about costs 
One of the key considerations I mentioned earlier that can impede the adoption of open 
source, the difficulties of interoperability, became very evident in Munich. Schießl reports 
that Munich started the migration with the following environment: "More than 300 apps, 
many of them redundant...21 different Windows clients, different patch levels, different 
security concepts." (Schießl, 2010c). Taking control of this gangly IT creature took 
precedence over the migration itself. 
The IT staff wisely allowed five years for migration. Three years were devoted to setup, 
customizing, and prototyping. This period included setting standards, determining migration 
paths, identifying the potential for consolidation, and building knowledge. Two more years 
were allocated for migration to OpenOffice.org, followed by rollout of Linux on all desktops. 
This period included training and quality assurance. It was necessary to expand technical 
support and put it on a firmer footing by such means as formalizing expertise and creating 
self-paced training materials. For a substantial period—all during the migration—Microsoft 
Office was still the standard. (Schießl, 2010d) 
As of December 2009, the migration effort had accomplished the following: 
 All 15,000 workplaces use free software (presumably OpenOffice.org) 
 Open Document Format is the standard for exchange 
 All employees are trained to use OpenOffice.org 
 2,500 workplaces use the Debian GNU/Linux operating system 
Coordinated efforts to share best practices around open source software in Europe have led to 
an Open Source Observatory and Repository for European public administrations, which 
describes itself as “a platform for exchanging information, experiences and FLOSS-based 
code for use in public administrations” (OSOR, 2010). Two other European projects using 
robust analytical frameworks include Eurostat's data interoperability project (Bierhals, 2009) 
and an open source migration project by Finland's Ministry of Justice (OSOR, 2008). 
An analytical framework allowed these agencies to determine what was really important to 
them, and to balance financial against non-financial goals. If agencies adopt the course 
followed by Munich—a robust methodology for determining their software requirements 
combined with the political will to carry through migration in the face of multiple barriers—
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the path to open source can be taken by government agencies in the United States and around 
the world. 
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Introduction 
 
 This article examines the adoption and implementation of Free/Open Source Software 
(FOSS) among local governments by considering the experiences of three German cities at 
the forefront of FOSS adoption. Research on FOSS in the public sector finds that the 60,000 
localities in the United States could experience cost savings (Titterton, 2003; Enav, 2003), 
intergovernmental cooperation (Gehring, 2006; Weber, 2004), independence from 
monopolistic software providers (Waring & Maddocks 2005), increased flexibility 
(Krishnamurthy 2003), innovation and security (Carnall 2000; Rapoza 2002), and local 
economic development benefits from adopting FOSS (Simon 2005; DiBona et. al 2006; Enav 
2003). Despite these potential benefits, and despite high levels of satisfaction in the case 
study cities, American cities have been slow to adopt FOSS. A survey of medium-sized local 
governments throughout the US found that 40 percent report using some form of FOSS 
application (Ward & Tao, 2009). A recent survey conducted by Kent State University’s 
Center for Public Administration and Policy found that of the 428 local governments in 
northeast Ohio, only 15 percent of governments who responded to the survey reported using 
some FOSS application. Preliminary findings from the northeast Ohio survey appear in a 
forthcoming chapter by Cassell and Hoornbeek (2010). 
 
At the heart of this study is the following question: If local elected officials or information 
technology (IT) administrators are interested in migrating to FOSS, what should they keep in 
mind when deciding whether and how to make the technological transition? The question is 
addressed by comparing the experiences of three local governments in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, all of which adopted a policy nearly a decade ago to migrate their entire IT 
systems (including desktop operating systems) from proprietary systems to FOSS. The focus 
here is on the adoption of FOSS operating systems and desktop applications as opposed to 
backend infrastructure such as servers. The three cities – Treuchtlingen, Schwäbisch Hall, 
and Munich – represent the most advanced migration to FOSS among local governments in 
the world. Table 1 provides background on each city in the study including their size and a 
selected list of FOSS applications used by each city. The cities vary in size from a population 
of 13,000 in Treuchtlingen to 1.3 million in Munich. The local governments also vary in the 
degree to which they have implemented their migration policy; Treuchtlingen and 
Schwäbisch Hall have completed migration but Munich’s migration is only partially 
complete. And while each city followed its own path toward FOSS, they overcame a similar 
organizational and personnel challenges that shed light on what local governments in the 
United States should take into account as they consider a similar policy.  
 
Germany and the United States obviously differ in a number of important ways that may 
illicit skepticism about the benefits of such a cross-national comparison. However, the two 
countries share a federalist system that cedes considerable fiscal, political and administrative 
responsibility to local governments (Gunlicks 2008; Conradt 2009; Derlien 1996). Home 
Rule in the United States and the German constitutional provision known as Kommunale 
Selbstverwaltung (“city and county self-administration”) means that local governments in 
both countries are administratively independent of other governments and, more importantly, 
are on their own when it comes to e-government. Pressure to modernize, intergovernmental 
competition, lack of IT expertise, and lack of funding are challenges cities and counties in 
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both countries confront. Moreover, the federal system in both countries ensures that local 
governments have a similar set of tools to address their IT needs. Thus, notwithstanding 
significant differences between Germany and the United States, the experiences of three 
German cities offer potential insights for their American counterparts.   
 
The following outline is used to present the research. Following this introduction a second 
section reviews what we know about the challenges local government face in adopting and 
implementing FOSS. An account of the methodology and design of the case studies is offered 
in a third section. The fourth section reports the results of the case studies along with some 
concluding remarkets.  
 
 
 
 
FOSS and Local Governments 
 
What is FOSS? 
 
FOSS is a generic term for software that is non-proprietary, can be reviewed by large 
numbers of users, and can be revised and shared free of charge. FOSS differs from software 
in the public domain such as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) that 
allows networked computers to connect to each other. Instead FOSS describes software that 
Table 1: Cities in the study 
City Population Interviews Selected FOSS applications in each 
city 
Treuchtlingen 13000 2 IT administrators 1 elected official 
Sun Enterprise 450 Server. 
Sun Ray 1 Clients 
KDE Desktop 
SMB (Server Message Block) 
MySqul 
Star Office Suite 
 
Schwäbisch Hall 36,000 
1 IT administrator 
1 elected official 
 
SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10/11
CentOS 
Debian 
SuSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 10 
Ubuntu 9.10 
OpenOffice Suite 
Gimp Document Imaging System 
Firefox 
MySQL 
 
Munich 1.3 million 2 IT administrators 2 elected officials 
Debian GNU/Linux 
OpenOffice Suite 
KDE 3.5 and Xorg 
Mozilla Thunderbird 
Firefox 
 
 Politics of Open Source  223 
imposes legal conditions on users through licensing. Specifically, FOSS are programs whose 
licenses permit users the freedom to run the program for any purpose, to study and modify 
the program, and to freely redistribute copies of the original or modified program. A 
discussion of specific types of FOSS licenses, how they have evolved, and the distinction 
between “free software” and “open source software” can be found elsewhere 
(www.fsf.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html).  
 
The use of FOSS is widespread in the public and private sector. A recent survey of 328 IT 
and business executives found that 53 percent use FOSS software and an additional 10 
percent planned to use FOSS in the next 12 months (Schindler 2008, 46-47). A 2007 survey 
of 113 million websites by Netcraft finds that Apache, a FOSS web server, is the most 
widely-used web server with 58 percent of the market share (Netcraft 2007). The FOSS web 
browser, Firefox, continues to gain market share on Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, 
particularly among users who have a choice of browser. Large portions of the US government 
including the National Security Agency, the Defense Department, and the Department of 
Energy also use FOSS to some degree (Weber, 2004; Schearer 2008; Wheeler 2007). Further, 
65 percent of all active websites use open source code to run their sites.  
 
Local governments as diverse as Largo, Florida and Paris, France have opted to migrate at 
least some of their cities’ computer operating systems and software applications to FOSS. 
The survey by Ward and Tao (2009) found that 39.6 percent of US cities use some form of 
FOSS. There is currently no accurate survey of how many local governments have turned to 
FOSS. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that a growing number of local governments 
are considering, and even adopting and mandating policies to migrate from proprietary 
software to FOSS alternatives. Yet studies of the role of FOSS within US local governments 
are rare. This is surprising in light of the significant attention devoted to the topic of e-
government in local governments by public administration and management scholars. FOSS, 
I suggest, should be understood as a fundamental part of e-government because, at its core, 
adoption and implementation of FOSS is about how local governments manage, use and 
control their technological infrastructure. 
 
 
What Factors Influence Adoption and Implementation of FOSS by Local Governments? 
For governments, the major challenge in migration to FOSS is found at the intersection of 
desktop operating systems and software applications. An operating system is the software 
that manages the resources of the computer. It serves as the platform on which word 
processing, spreadsheet and other applications run. The most commonly used operating 
system is Microsoft Windows. But there are others including Linux and Mac OS X. 
Applications, on the other hand, are computer programs designed for the end user such as 
Microsoft Word, Turbo-Tax or Eudora. Applications run on the operating system. Most 
governments (like most firms) already use some form of FOSS to manage computer 
networks. But the decision to switch to FOSS operating systems such as Linux is wrought 
with challenges. There are technical issues of compatibility and interoperability since many 
popular applications are designed for the proprietary software operating systems, Windows 
and Mac OS (Waring & Maddox 2005; Holck, Larsen, & Pedersen 2005).  
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And as with any new IT application or system, there are significant personnel challenges 
associated with training, accepting, and adjusting to new systems and different ways of doing 
things (Davis 1989; Gallego et al. 2008). Ward and Tao’s (2009) study of local governments’ 
adoption of FOSS argues that migration is a function of the level of knowledge and 
understanding of open source technologies and their alternatives. Ward and Tao’s research 
fits within a broader literature on innovation that suggests that public sector leaders are 
important for innovation to occur (Borins, 2008; Yapp 2005). Others note that public 
employees on the frontline must accept the new technologies (Davis 2008) and that 
employees must see evidence that the new technology adds value before they accept its 
adoption.  
Organizational factors also affect adoption and implementation of FOSS. Ward and Tao 
(2009), for example, note that migration to FOSS is a technology transformation problem. 
The challenge, they argue, is less technological than developing an organizational culture 
willing to change. They write, “An organization with a culture that embraces change will be 
more successful at adopting new technologies than an organization with a strong status quo” 
(Ward and Tao 2009, 2).  
Cost is another factor that influences implementation and adoption. Cost-savings is the 
primary factor that motivates local public administrators to consider FOSS (Titterton 2003). 
At the same time, scholars point out that migration to FOSS, as with any change in 
technology, is often costly particularly in the short run. The Free Software Foundation’s 
famous phrase “Free as in ‘free speech’ not as in ‘free beer’,” captures the notion that while 
the license for FOSS is free, there are significant costs associated with writing and cleaning 
up code, training, purchasing expertise, and maintaining new FOSS-based IT systems.1 
Governments that are financially strapped will find it more difficult to follow a new IT 
course.   
Finally, the research on FOSS and e-government more broadly, suggests there are political 
challenges to the adoption and implementation of FOSS. Elected officials, particularly in the 
United States, often express skepticism toward new software particularly non-proprietary 
software (Seifert 1999). And local governments confront external pressure from software 
vendors to continue with existing (proprietary) systems. Government IT is an enormous 
business for software firms and consulting companies. Any change of direction, particularly 
one that sets government on a new IT path, is likely to be met with opposition and 
skepticism. 
In short, the scholarly literature on FOSS in the public sector suggests that adoption and 
implementation of FOSS are influenced by a range of factors including: technical feasibility; 
employee expertise and knowledge of FOSS; organizational adaptability; availability of 
financial resources; and political support. Before taking a look at three cities that committed 
themselves to full migration to FOSS, the following section discusses the methodology used 
to conduct the study. 
 
                                                 
1 Free Software Foundation. “The Free Software Definition” Retrieved March 26, 2010. 
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Research and Methodology 
 
The research draws on three case studies of municipalities that decided nearly a decade ago 
to fully migrate their cities’ IT infrastructure from proprietary software to FOSS. The cities 
include Munich, Schwäbisch Hall, and Treuchtlingen. They range in size, organizational 
structure and complexity. All are in the southwest region of Germany. Each city had 
previously used a version of Microsoft Windows. Each city adopted a policy that committed 
the municipal government to migrate to the Linux operating system along with FOSS 
applications.  
 
The case studies were originally conducted in 2006.2 During a two-month period in May and 
June 2006, I visited these cities, researched their stories, and interviewed leaders responsible 
for adopting and implementing the changes. I conducted semi-structured interviews in 
German and translated them into English. The interview instrument consisted of a set of 
identical questions related to motivation, implementation, and results. Each questionnaire 
also contained a set of questions specific to the position of the interviewee (see Appendix A). 
A breakdown of who was interviewed (elected official/IT administrator) is presented in Table 
1. To facilitate coding and analysis of the interviews I used N-Vivo, a qualitative analysis 
software program. In October 2007, I followed up with each of the interviewees and asked 
for an update on implementation, and any outcomes or outputs that had resulted from their 
migration decision. I also relied on internal reports, audits and news releases published by 
each city to develop the necessary background for the research and to substantiate 
information collected through interviews. In January 2010, I conducted a series of follow-up 
interviews with IT managers in each of the three cities to get an update on the status of the 
migration and ask about lessons they might offer for American officials or IT administrators 
considering FOSS (See Appendix B). 
 
While illustrative of FOSS adoption, it is important to note that the cases were selected on 
the dependent variable (adoption), not on variations of independent variables, since there are 
no cases of non-adoption or failed adoption efforts. As a result, the research is exploratory 
rather than explanatory. The case study approach is appropriate since the research seeks to 
understand complex social phenomena – in this case adoption and implementation of FOSS 
(Yin 2003). The case studies should be understood as complements to the large-N work by 
Ward and Tao (2009). 
 
 
Lessions from Germany: Three Case Studies 
 
This results section is presented in two parts. The first part offers a summary narrative of 
each city’s decision to migrate to Linux. The summaries are based largely on newspaper 
accounts, press releases, other scholarship, and government reports. Part two reports results 
from the semi-structured interviews. 
 
                                                 
2 Results from the original case studies were published previously  (Cassell 2008, 2009). 
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Three Narratives 
Schwäbisch Hall.  
Schwäbisch Hall is a medium-sized picturesque city located in the federal state of Baden-
Würtemberg not far from Stuttgart. Approximately 36,000 residents live in the city, and the 
city government consists of 225 networked workplaces (Bräuner 2005, 37; Nagler 2005). 
When it announced its decision to migrate all its servers and desktops to Linux and FOSS in 
2001, it became the first city in Germany to adopt such a policy. Two external factors are 
important for understanding the context of such a policy innovation. First, in 2001 
Schwäbisch Hall’s support contract with Microsoft was running out, and there was 
uncertainty about whether Microsoft would continue to support the older operating system or 
whether the city would be compelled to upgrade. Second, at the point the city was required to 
make a decision about which operating system it would use, local tax revenues experienced a 
sharp decline. The drop was felt by all local governments in Germany and was triggered by 
changes in federal law. A final internal contextual factor is also relevant: Schwäbisch Hall 
had been using FOSS to run its administrative servers since 1997, and therefore the city’s IT 
staff was familiar with it. In response to the two externally-imposed constraints, the city’s IT 
department launched “Linux im Rathaus” (“Linux in the City Hall”) in 2001. By December 
2001, Schwäbisch Hall, with the help of two companies, Suse/Novell and IBM, had put in 
place a plan to migrate the city’s servers3 and desktops to FOSS. Migration began in 2003 
and was completed by the end of 2004. The migration of servers covering administration, 
email, printers, files, and group calendars occurred incrementally. The migration of software 
used by employees at their workplaces occurred simultaneously with introduction of Open 
Office groupware. The IT department was able to locate most software application 
alternatives that could be used under Linux. In those select cases where a required 
application could only be run in a Windows environment, the IT department kept a 
Microsoft-Terminal server.4 
During the migration period there was some opposition among city personnel. To reduce 
anxieties, the IT department employed two approaches. First, it proactively engaged the 
public-sector labor union and consulted with union leaders about the migration. A female 
union leader gave the first demonstration of the new FOSS systems to a large gathering of 
city employees. This had the two-fold effect of showing union support for the migration and 
demonstrating to a somewhat sexist audience that a woman was comfortable with the new 
technology. A second strategy employed by the IT department to reduce concerns was to 
encourage employees to take the new software home and install the systems on their home 
computers. Since there was no licensing fee, the city could encourage home use without any 
additional cost. This both showed the value of the IT innovation and helped personnel feel 
comfortable with the changes.  
It has now been ten years since the migration was completed. The central administration and 
all technical departments use open source based systems. Schwäbisch Hall has also 
                                                 
3 A server is simply a computer program that provides services to other computer programs. A server typically 
fulfills requests from other computer programs like printing a document or downloading a webpage. 
4 A terminal-server is a program that provides terminals (PCs, printers, and other devices) with a common 
connection point to a local or wide area network. 
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developed a number of FOSS applications to enable its government to operate more 
effectively including software to support the work of parliamentarians, a program to archive 
documents, and a document management system. Each of these innovations was done under 
a GNU General Public License (GPL), which not only enables Schwäbisch Hall to share its 
innovation freely with other governments but also requires that new users of the innovation 
agree that if a modified versions of the code is redistributed, it is done under similar license 
terms. The city is also consulting with smaller governments in its surrounding area; providing 
technical support and sharing FOSS innovations. 
 
Treuchtlingen.  
Like Schwäbisch Hall, the city of Treuchtlingen is a small quaint community with a 
population of 13,000, located in southern Germany between Nürnberg and Augsburg. The 
local government employs approximately 400 people working in traditional areas of finance 
and planning as well as non-traditional areas such as administering a hospital and a large 
thermal bath center. The city decided to migrate all desktops and servers to FOSS in 2001. At 
the time the city was using 25 desktop computers running Windows NT and using a variety 
of proprietary applications. Treuchtlingen’s servers used Novel/Linux.  
Like Schwäbisch Hall, Treuchtlingen suffered a drop in tax revenues as a result of federal 
reform of the tax system. The IT department (consisting of two people) and all other 
departments were asked to cut their budgets. Unlike Schwäbisch Hall, however, 
Treuchtlingen was not forced to switch because of an imminent loss of technical support 
from Microsoft. Instead there was an internal impetus to rationalize the city’s entire IT 
system in order to standardize operating systems and software applications. In 2001 
workplace computers suffered from a lack of compatibility. An ad-hoc approach to IT had led 
to employment of different versions of the Windows operating system, word processing 
software, and other applications. The result was that documents produced by employees 
within the same office could not be easily shared. The drive to centralize and rationalize the 
city’s IT system thus motivated the IT director to innovate and migrate all servers, operating 
systems, and software to FOSS. After the IT department tested the FOSS options, they 
consulted with city staff in selecting which operating system and applications should be used. 
The aim was to increase compatibility, reduce support costs, and centralize the system. To 
facilitate centralization, Treuchtlingen took a more radical step than just migrating to FOSS. 
The city also replaced all its clients or desktops with Sun-Ray Thin Clients, which allow end 
users to access all their documents and applications from a server rather than from a single 
individual computer. 
In 2010, Treuchtlingen remains highly satisfied with its decision to switch from proprietary 
to FOSS. Not only has the migration saved the city money, it has made the city less 
dependent on proprietary software, and it has stimulated innovation in the city. Like 
Schwabisch Hall, Treuchtlingen has created a number of software applications on its own 
including an application that calculates labor time on specific city projects.  
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Munich.5  
Few governments have received as much attention regarding migration to FOSS as Munich, 
the capital of Bavaria and, with 1.3 million residents, one of the largest cities in the world to 
commit itself fully to migrating to FOSS.  
The process of migration is ongoing and has occurred in phases. The first phase began in 
2001 after Schwäbisch Hall’s decision to migrate. Gerd Bauman, a city council leader 
(Stadtrat) and member of the ruling Social Democratic Party (SPD), requested city officials 
to conduct a study of the costs and benefits of the various software options available to the 
city. The city contracted to have the study done by a private consultant. At the time, the city 
had 14,000 desktop computers with approximately 16,000 users. All of the client computers 
used Windows NT 4 for their operating systems and Microsoft Office 97/2000 for their word 
processing applications. The server software used Novell Netware, an open source product.  
A year later, in 2002, the study was released comparing the costs and benefits of five 
alternative configurations, matching different operating systems with various office products. 
In addition to costs and benefits, the study also included in its assessment the technical 
feasibility and strategic long-term effects of each configuration.  
During this period of assessment, Munich’s IT plans had largely gone unnoticed by the press 
and the general population. That changed, however, when Steve Ballmer, Chief Executive of 
Microsoft, broke off his ski vacation in the Alps to pay a personal visit to Christian Ude, 
Munich’s mayor. Ballmer’s visit – designed to offer Munich a better bid and negotiate a deal 
for Microsoft – had the opposite effect. First, it led the other companies in the bidding 
process (IBM and Novell/Suse) to improve their bids. And more importantly, Ballmer’s visit 
reaffirmed a stereotype many Germans hold of the American business executive ignoring 
local rules and tradition in order to get a deal done. The SPD party in the city council was 
particularly incensed by what it perceived as the arrogance of Ballmer to assume he could 
avoid the council and discuss a deal directly with the mayor. In May 2003 the council passed 
a resolution committing the city to migrate its operating systems and software applications to 
FOSS.  
At the time of its decision Munich was also struggling with the dual external pressures of 
falling tax revenues and the imminent loss of technical support for its Windows NT operating 
system. Like Schwäbisch Hall, Munich was in a position where it was forced to make a 
choice to upgrade or change to FOSS.  
The migration process in Munich has been considerably slower than for Treuchtlingen and 
Schwäbisch Hall. Following the council’s resolution, 18 months elapsed as the city 
developed, with assistance from IBM and Novell/SuSe, a prototype for the new system 
software and a plan for implementing the policy. In this detailed plan, the city first took stock 
of what types of software applications were being used, the availability of FOSS alternatives, 
                                                 
5 Munich has published a significant body of reports on every stage of the migration process.  For a recent 
profile of Munich’s progress see the case study by Karsten Gerloff (2008).  In addition, Munich has placed a 
great deal of material about its migration to FOSS on-line.  Much of it is in English [see 
http://www.muenchen.de/Rathaus/dir/limux/english/147197/index.html].   
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and staff training needs. By the end of 2004, the city had finally established a new IT 
department charged with implementing the migration policy. Migration began in early 2005. 
Since then, the migration process has moved forward incrementally. Some city personnel 
were resistant to the changes. Migration was plagued by legal problems. And, there have 
been unforeseen technical issues associated with the city’s new computerized accounting 
system developed by SAP.  
An additional contextual variable relevant to understanding Munich’s migration experience is 
its organizational structure. The city is organized into 17 departments, each with its own IT 
personnel. The Linux transition department was the first separate “corporate” IT department 
ever created. In May 2006, when I did my field research, the first city department was just 
beginning to roll out the new FOSS software. By November 2007, three of Munich’s 17 
departments had been converted to Linux. By July 2009 100% of work stations were using 
Firefox and Thunderbird, 12,000 work stations had switched to OpenOffice.org, 2,000 work 
stations in four departments had migrated to a version of Linux developed specifically for 
Munich known as LiMux, and all other departments were scheduled to migrate fully by 2011.  
In sum, Treuchtlingen, Schwäbisch Hall, and Munich represent the most advanced migration 
to FOSS among local governments in the world. The following turns to the lessons they offer 
to American officials and IT personnel considering the switch to FOSS. 
 
Lessons from Three Cities.  
IT directors in each of the three cities were each asked the following question: “What 
suggestions would you give to a manager or IT director in an American city considering the 
switch to FOSS?” The following summarizes their answers. 
Political backing and leadership are essential. The adoption of new technology is difficult 
under any circumstances, whether proprietary or FOSS. The FOSS literature argues that 
political backing is an essential ingredient to a successful migration since IT managers need 
the freedom to take risks. The experience of the three cities confirms this. In each case, the 
mayor and the parliamentary majority supported the shift to FOSS. As one IT director put it, 
“The political leadership must embrace the change to FOSS in order to give the IT 
administrator the freedom to make mistakes and try new things.” He added that in the case of 
FOSS, one should expect criticism from private vendors and some resistance from 
government employees to the change.  
In Munich a high-level member of the administration took a leadership role to shepherd staff 
through the process. In practice this meant the administrator did several things: made the case 
for adoption; took the political heat when the migration process hit a glitch, thereby shielding 
the IT staff; and consistently communicated to the parliament and the public the rationale for 
the migration, thereby controlling the terms of the debate around FOSS.  
Cost arguments should be secondary. Scholars note the importance of cost savings in the 
motivations of local governments to consider FOSS. The experience of the three German 
cities supports this view generally. However, the story is more interesting than is often 
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portrayed in the literature. Each of the governments turned to FOSS not when surplus funds 
became available to try something new and innovative. Instead, FOSS became an option 
across all three cities at the moment a change in federal government’s tax system triggered a 
sudden budget deficit. The federal change served as a triggering event (Kingdon 2002; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005); one that directed the attention of public officials to the need to save 
money and to be self-sufficient. It was in this new environment, created by the change in 
federal tax law, that FOSS found fertile ground. A lesson offered by the experiences of the 
three German cities is that while leadership, knowledge and expertise are important, an 
unexpected event or crisis is often needed to create an opportunity to redirect organizational 
attention and behavior in a new direction.  
FOSS not free. While a decline in tax revenue created an opportunity to adopt FOSS, each of 
the IT administrators echoed findings in much of the FOSS literature, namely that adoption 
and implementation of FOSS is costly. As with any new technology, FOSS requires a 
significant investment in training, implementation, service and maintenance to succeed.  
In addition, the IT administrators acknowledged that it is easy to manipulate the Total Cost of 
Operation (TCO) of any type of technology. As a result they stressed that while cost savings 
are important, an IT director needs to make the case for FOSS on other grounds as well, 
including increased cooperation among governments; greater independence from 
monopolistic software providers; greater flexibility and security; and increased local 
economic development. Thus, the two takeaway lessons from the three cities are 1) to be 
successful, FOSS is likely to be expensive in the short-run; and 2) while cost-savings are 
important, officials should strive to make the case for FOSS on other grounds.  
Take incremental steps but with an overall strategy. IT directors in all three cities said that it 
was unusual for a municipality to completely switch to FOSS in a single step, particularly if 
the governments have little experience with FOSS. The directors suggested incremental steps 
or “soft migration.” They recommended beginning with common software applications like 
the Firefox browser, Thunderbird email program, and the Open Office Suite (an equivalent to 
Microsoft Office). In Schwäbisch Hall and Treuchtlingen, city employees were given free 
programs on a single disk and encouraged to install and use the software on their home 
computers. As mentioned, such steps reduced the anxiety of city employees to the new 
software. A second step is for the city to develop macros, templates and forms in the Open 
Document format, and set up pilot desktop stations that run on Linux-based operating system 
in each department.  
While they suggested an incremental approach, the IT directors also stressed the need for an 
overall strategy. “You have to know where you are going. Incrementalism is fine but there 
needs to be a clear idea of the end goal. Otherwise you could find yourself going nowhere or 
in the wrong direction,” commented one director.  
Practical experience trumps theory. Interviews with IT directors confirm Ward and Tao’s 
view that knowledge of FOSS and its proprietary alternatives is important for migration. 
However, the directors underscored the importance of experience over theory. Just knowing 
about FOSS was not enough, they argued. Instead the IT directors suggested that any local 
government considering migration to FOSS should spend time in a government that uses 
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FOSS, learn first-hand what they are doing, and collect information from line employees who 
are using FOSS. One IT director also suggested that local governments consider hiring a 
college intern with computer science training and no bureaucratic experience. He noted, “It’s 
important to get someone with the latest technical knowledge. But you also want someone 
who has not been infected by the ‘bureaucratic virus.’ You want someone who will look at a 
problem with eyes unencumbered by the bureaucratic culture. A university student is often a 
good resource.”  
Organization matters. Scholars including Ward and Tao note the importance of 
organizational flexibility for technological innovation, “an organization with a culture that 
embraces change will be more successful at adopting new technologies than an organization 
with a strong status quo bias” (Ward and Tao 2009, 2). The experience of the three German 
cities paints a slightly more subtle and complicated view of the relationship between 
technological change and organizational structure. 
First, none of the IT administrators identified organizational culture as important. Instead 
they identified organizational structure as important. In many local governments the IT 
infrastructure is decentralized so that each department has its own IT person. In some cases 
this may simply be an employee with a particular interest in IT, who became the “go to”-
person for matters of technology over time. In other cases, the person or people may be IT 
professionals, or even IT contractors hired by the department for a specific support task. 
Officials in the three German cities stressed that a change as fundamental as migrating to 
FOSS is easiest with a centralized IT department. Based on their experience with migration, 
the directors reported that a decentralized IT structure creates cultural and structural barriers 
in the organization that make it difficult to adopt a government-wide strategy.  
In Munich, for example, prior to migration to FOSS, IT was highly decentralized. More than 
850 IT professionals were scattered across 17 departments. The departments did not resist 
change per se. Instead, when migration to FOSS was proposed, the city departments were 
reluctant to give up what they perceived as their IT professional(s) or expertise. This 
significantly slowed the migration process since migrating to FOSS required taking stock of 
the government’s entire IT infrastructure, identifying FOSS alternatives, and then 
standardizing the operating systems and software for the entire government. Such a change is 
made easier by a centralized IT structure, regardless of the organizational culture in the city. 
IT directors in all three cities argue that a centralized structure improved migration to FOSS. 
The three cities’ experience with migration to FOSS also demonstrates a more complex 
relationship between organization and technological change than what appears in the 
scholarly literature. While technological change is often viewed as the product of 
organizational characteristics, the three case studies point to an inverse relationship: new 
technology changes the organization.  
Respondents in each city explained that migrating to FOSS led to virtual and physical 
organizational changes. Virtual organizational change refers to how the cities managed their 
computer software systems. The policy to migrate to FOSS forced each city to take stock of 
its IT hardware and software because without such an assessment it would not have been 
possible to implement thee migration policy. In some cases cities conducted the assessments 
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on their own. In other cases, cities relied on assistance from private sector partners such as 
IBM and Novell. As cities addressed their virtual organizations, several also made changes to 
their physical organizations. In one case, a respondent described the organizational change 
and its connection to FOSS, “One saw during the process of migrating to Linux how 
decentralized the IT landscape in our city had become. Something had to change.” With the 
implementation to FOSS, cities took stock of their IT staffs, identified redundancies, and 
moved the city toward a more centralized IT support structure.  
Finally, respondents in the three cities reported that the switch to FOSS improved their 
internal capacity and increased employees’ willingness to innovate. Because the benefits 
from FOSS derive from being able to work with computer code, the advantages of open 
source increase as the IT staff’s expertise increase. While two of the cities (Schwäbisch Hall 
and Munich), relied on contractors to assist in the implementation process, all three cities 
were and are committed to doing as much of the IT work in-house as possible. And, as the 
skill level of the IT professionals increased, the motivation to innovate also increased. Each 
city reported developing new programs and applications, which were shared with other cities 
as well as the broader open source community. Schwäbisch Hall, for example, just developed 
a new council information application to provide materials and minutes to city 
parliamentarians.6 Munich and Treuchtlingen have also developed dozens of new 
applications. And Munich was recognized with the European E-Learning Award in 2007 for 
the learning platform the city developed to teach staff how to use the open source software. 
 
Conclusion 
Surveys of American local governments done by Ward and Tao and more recently by Kent 
State University’s Center for Public Administration and Policy underscore an enormous 
opportunity to teach local officials about FOSS. Knowledge and awareness of FOSS remains 
low among American elected officials and administrators. One model to teach local 
governments about FOSS in the US is the Linux Solutions Group, an organization based in 
Stuttgart, Germany.7 The group is funded by members that include the state government of 
Baden-Wuertemberg, private firms, universities, and local governments. The group holds 
conferences, encourages networking and sharing of ideas, and develops software solutions 
useful to all local governments. The IT directors of the three German cities each 
independently pointed to the Linux Solutions Group as a model that state or regional 
governments could employ to create an environment that would foster the adoption of FOSS 
among local governments.  
The three case studies underscore the challenges involved in migrating to FOSS. However, 
they also offer steps local officials should consider before embarking on migration. The 
suggestions underscore: the importance of goals besides cost-savings; the need to get 
politicians and employees to embrace the move to FOSS, the importance of an incremental 
approach within a broader strategy, and the necessity for centralized IT organization 
                                                 
6 The website for the new application is in German.  Information for downloading the city council application 
can be found at: http://www.schwaebischhall.de/en/welcome/linux.html. 
7 The Linux Solution Group’s website is: http://www.lisog.org/. 
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implement the policy. Finally, what stands out in these three cases is that while technological 
change is often a function of organizational characteristics, we should be open to the 
possibility that FOSS will change the structure and culture of an organization.  
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Appendix A 
 
The following semi-structured survey instrument was used to conduct the first round of interviews 
with elected officials and IT administrators in the three cities. All interviews were conducted in 
German, transcribed in German, and then translated into English. Slight adjustments to the instrument 
were made to account for the position (administrator or elected official) and location of the 
respondent. 
 
I. The Decision  
1. You give three reasons for the migration:  
a. more independence from producers; “grosssere Herstellerun abhaengigkeit” 
b. increase the competition in the software markets; “mehr Wettbewerb im software 
market” 
c. fulfilled the strategic aims of the city. “Strategische Ziele für Muenchen besser 
erreichbar”  
Could you elaborate on each of these? 
2. What groups or actors supported the decision? (ask about each of them) 
3. What groups or actors opposed the decision? 
4. What was your experience with Windows NT, and was there resentment among yourself and 
the council at Microsoft’s decision not to support NT any longer? 
5. Was there one event that convinced lawmakers of the decision? 
6. Was there a sense that Munich was showing the rest of Germany what could be done, that it 
was breaking new ground? (Follow-up) Why was it necessary for the city to be a pathbreaker 
in this regard? 
 
II. Implementation 
7. What are the main risks that you face with the use of Open Source? Was there an 
understanding at the time of the decision that a certain amount of risk was acceptable? 
(Follow up) What amount? 
8. In the conceptual phase, what factors that made acceptance difficult? 
9. Was there a particular model of a city or organization you wanted to emulate?  
10. The project’s organization seems complicated. Could you explain why it developed in the 
way it did? How much latitude did the team have? 
11. What administrative processes or structures needed to change (if any) in order to use OSS? 
12. What role if any did the union or works council play in the transformation?  
13. How do you manage the problem applications? 
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III. Outputs 
14. By being one of the first major cities to embark on OSS, you bear a great deal of the cost of 
innovation. Other communities and cities are learning from your experience. Was there ever 
any effort to work with other governments in the region to share some of the costs? 
15. Have you allowed other governments or agencies access to your code? Is it possible that [city 
name] might sell its expertise to other cities? 
16. One of your stated goals was greater independence from software firms. Given that many 
firms still do not have non-Microsoft applications, do you feel more independent? 
17. Has [city name] increased its administrative capacity by adopting OSS or has it been 
weakened? 
18. Are there any questions you believe I should ask? Have I missed anything important? 
  
 
 
Appendix B 
 
The following semi-structured questionnaire was used in follow-up interviews with IT directors in the 
three German cities. The interviews were conducted over the phone in December 2009. The 
interviews were conducted in German, and lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
 
1. How has [city name] IT system developed in the past two years? 
2. What changes, if any, have occurred since you first adopted FOSS? 
3. What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of FOSS in [city name]? 
4. Have you conducted any analysis of the benefits of FOSS? 
5. Have you worked with other localities to developed their information technology? 
6. What policies can state governments pass to further FOSS in local governments? 
7. What lessons do you take from your experience with FOSS? 
8. What recommendations would you offer American administrators interested in migration to 
FOSS? 
9. Are there any questions you think I should ask? 
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Insurgent Expertise: 
The Politics of Free/Livre and Open Source Software in Brazil 
Aaron Shaw 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Abstract 
Under the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva, the Brazilian state has advocated the use of Free/Livre 
and Open Source Software (FLOSS) throughout the public 
sector. How did FLOSS adoption gain traction as a 
developmental strategy across a large federal bureaucracy that 
had embraced information technology policies supporting 
export-oriented growth and market liberalization during the 
1990's? In an historical case study, I argue that the FLOSS 
agenda emerged as a result of the actions of a network of 
insurgent experts working within elite political, technical, and 
educational institutions. I trace the history of this mobilization 
and show how a dedicated network of experts brought about 
conditions for institutional transformation that contradicted 
prevailing neoliberal policy proscriptions. The Brazilian 
FLOSS insurgency offers insights into the means by which a 
group of elites endeavored to reframe debates about 
technology-driven economic growth around questions of state-
led access to source code and knowledge 
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Introduction1 
Profound inequalities characterize the global trade in informational or knowledge-based 
economic goods. Since 2000, $97 of every $100 in revenue from licenses and royalties has 
gone to an OECD country; whereas less than $0.05 of that same $100 has gone to a country 
in Latin America or the Caribbean (World Bank, 2008). Influence over the Intellectual 
Property (IP) laws and governance arrangements applied to these intangible assets also 
remains grossly concentrated in the Global North (Shadlen et al., 2005). Critics describe a 
"new enclosure movement" whereby Northern states and multinational corporations have 
sought to expropriate the global knowledge commons (Evans, 2005). Similarly, they contend 
that the situation presents obstacles to the use of informational goods to promote sustainable 
economic growth and improvements to human welfare in low and middle income regions 
(Benkler, 2006, pp. 308-320).  
In search of knowledge-based economic equality, governments, firms, and social movements 
have pursued a range of strategies (Evans, 1995; Evans, 2005; Kapczynski, 2008; Ó'Riain, 
2004; Shadlen, 2004). A growing number of these efforts have turned away from export-
oriented strategies and neoliberal intellectual property rights regimes to embrace the 
emergence of an economy in “non-proprietary” informational goods (Benkler, 2006).2 Brazil 
has actively pursued this path under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, advancing a 
knowledge economy policy agenda built around “commons-based” strategies for industrial 
and human development.3 This effort has entailed the widespread promotion of non-
proprietary information goods and regulatory reforms across state, national, and 
multinational levels.  
As one of the most contentious and high-profile aspects of the knowledge-based economy 
agenda, the Lula administration has advocated the use of Free/Livre and Open Source 
Software (FLOSS) in Brazil's federal bureaucracy and many of its semi-autonomous state 
firms. However, the emergence of FLOSS adoption initiatives within the Brazilian state 
                                                 
1. The data collected for this paper consisted of open-ended interviews, fieldnotes, and a number of textual 
sources. While the author does not have the permission to publish audio files or transcripts of the interviews, 
individuals interested in obtaining access to any specific interviews should contact him by email. All textual 
sources are listed in the bibliography. Those interested in details on how to obtain copies of any documents that 
may be obscure or difficult to locate should also email the author. 
 
2. I use the term “regime” here to refer to the bundle of legal and institutional arrangements that govern a given 
sphere of activity (in this case, intellectual property). A thorough discussion of contemporary intellectual 
property rights and their application to information technology is beyond the scope of this paper (see Benkler, 
2006: 1-35; Samuelson & Davis, 2000). In general, I use the schematic label “non-proprietary” to refer to 
informational resources that are shared in some non-exclusive manner. In the case of software, this usually 
entails the release of source code under a “free” or “open” license. For sensitive discussions of these terms see 
Kelty (2008) and Coleman & Hill (2004). 
 
3. By “commons-based,” I refer to models of informational production and exchange rooted in the construction 
of a “knowledge commons.” Several scholars of information technology and FLOSS have applied this idea to 
make distinctions between the optimal governance arrangements for abundant, non-rival, informational 
resources versus scarce, rivalrous physical resources (see Benkler, 2006; Evans, 2005). 
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presents several historical puzzles. During the decade prior to Lula's election, Brazil's IT 
industry and state IT policies had been dominated by export-oriented, neoliberal development 
policies designed to support the privatization of knowledge-based goods as well as the 
growth of multinational firms holdings in the domestic market. In addition, neither Lula nor 
any of his closest advisors entered office with the intention to advocate for alternatives to 
proprietary information technology production; and yet within three months of the 
inauguration they became strong supporters of the most ambitious commons-based 
development policy in the world. How did such politicized support for commons-based 
strategies emerge and take root across the notoriously fragmented Brazilian state apparatus? 
Once in office, how did FLOSS supporters within the Lula administration endeavor to 
"mobilize the state" and the Information Technology (IT) sector behind their new agenda 
(Abers and Keck, 2007)? Which policy-making tools and organizational levers made it 
possible for this agenda to gain traction among state elites? 
I address these questions through an historical case study of the rise of the FLOSS agenda 
and the early years of its implementation. Brazil's federal FLOSS agenda emerged when and 
how it did as a result of the actions of a network of like-minded elites, who I characterize as 
insurgent experts. Since the late 1990's, this group of technological and political experts has 
mobilized to promote FLOSS through the Brazilian state. In the process, they capitalized on 
the institutional structures and organizational capacities of the state and the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (Worker's Party or PT) as well as their own shared history in the country's 
leftist movements. They also benefited from the broader shift in the global IT industry away 
from proprietary knowledge and towards "open" technologies. Once in power, these FLOSS 
advocates sought to implement a variety of projects and initiatives. To do so, they utilized a 
radical discourse aimed at re-politicizing the role of the developmental state in the 
knowledge-based economy. 
It is important to underscore that while the FLOSS advocates identified as members of the 
PT, the PT party leaders were not the source of these initiatives. Linkages between the 
FLOSS agenda and the PT's policy programs had to be actively constructed and maintained 
over time – they were not somehow inherent in either the nature of FLOSS or the political 
positions of the PT. The FLOSS advocates ability to integrate their agenda into the Lula 
government resulted from many years of movement building in the urban centers of the south 
and southwest of the country. The leaders of this movement then used their professional and 
personal connections to bridge the relatively narrow gap between their own networks and 
those of the PT party hierarchy. The result was a FLOSS adoption effort that, to many 
outsiders and international observers, appeared seamlessly integrated into the broader 
developmental and knowledge-based economy agenda of the Lula government. Nevertheless, 
both the historical processes and the structure of the relations that led to this integration were 
in fact much more ad hoc and contingent. Framed as radical responses to the neoliberal 
technology and development policies, the mobilization for national FLOSS adoption 
reinforced the leftist, progressive image of Lula and the party. However, the work of the 
FLOSS advocates was, for some, a frustrated response to what they saw as PT leaders' lack 
of vision when it came to information technology and post-industrial social change (Branco, 
2007; Teza, 2008). Reflecting the interests of both groups, the resulting FLOSS agenda took 
on a shape broadly consistent with the public image promoted by Lula and the PT as well as 
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with the vision promoted by the FLOSS advocates.4 
I characterize the mobilization of the FLOSS advocates in Brazil as an example of insurgent 
expertise for two reasons. First, the term reflects the modes of self-representation and self-
conception that many of the movement's participants communicated in interviews, 
publications, and public statements. This sort of self-representation is strategic and idealized 
in many ways, but it nevertheless forms a real and significant characteristic of this group of 
FLOSS advocates as well as their efforts to frame their agenda. At the same time, merely 
proclaiming yourself an anti-neoliberal insurgent does not make it so. Therefore, the second 
reason I use the term insurgent expertise derives from the FLOSS advocates' position as 
politically-empowered experts utilizing technocratic governance institutions to re-politicize 
information technology and informational capitalism. This effort to capture and re-fashion 
state institutions of technocratic development and technology policy in opposition to 
proprietary information technology production represents a self-conscious reaction against 
neoliberal development policy agendas, which sought to depoliticize the role of expertise in 
policy-making (Ferguson, 1994; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002; Woods, 2006). Yet, a 
number of theoretical and empirical analyses of neoliberal development expertise and 
governance either do not address the existence of such elite-led efforts at resistance or 
explicitly argue against their potential (Ferguson, 2006; Harvey, 2005; Li, 2007; Mitchell, 
2002). As a result, the primary contribution of this paper to the study of "actually existing 
neoliberalism" (Ferguson, 2006) consists in an empirical analysis of a recent situation in 
which counter-hegemonic elites sought to use a neoliberal tool-kit to dismantle a neoliberal 
policy paradigm.5 As I discuss later, the case of the FLOSS mobilization in Brazil is neither a 
unique, nor representative example of insurgent expertise, but it is useful for thinking about 
the phenomenon in broader terms. 
The success or failure of the FLOSS mobilization (either as a set of policy programs or intra-
state political shifts) remains uncertain and is not the focus of my analysis. Instead, I argue 
that the Brazilian FLOSS insurgency offers insights into the means by which a group of elites 
endeavored to re-frame and re-politicize debates about technology-driven economic growth 
around questions of state-led access to source code and knowledge. I therefore emphasize the 
conjunction of institutions, ideologies, and rhetorics around which the FLOSS advocates 
oriented their struggle. My account contrasts with existing analyses of the role of 
technocratic initiatives which have focused exclusively on the depoliticizing effects of 
governmental expertise. In addition, the case also illustrates some of the challenges that the 
FLOSS advocates encountered in their attempt to implement state-led FLOSS adoption as an 
alternative to the industrial upgrading and development strategy of export-oriented software 
production that prevailed in the 1990's. In this, the FLOSS mobilization demonstrates how 
transformations in elite ideologies and networks may underly comparable shifts in 
developmental and technology policy. 
                                                 
4. In the words of one the anonymous JITP reviewers, “As a result this article addresses both how IT influenced 
politics (and policy) and how politics influenced IT.” 
 
5. I use the term “elites” here (and elsewhere) somewhat loosely to describe individuals with access to the 
intellectual, economic, political, and social resources to participate in organizational decision-making, policy 
creation, and other activities characteristic of many institutional fields of power. In this regard, I draw somewhat 
haphazardly on Bourdieu (1996). 
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States, Development, and Insurgent Expertise 
The significance of the FLOSS mobilization in Brazil stems from the nature of their political 
project within the Brazilian state and the position of Brazil within the neoliberal 
informational economy. Previous sociological research into high-tech developmental 
policymaking and industrial transformation emphasizes institutional explanations for policy 
success or failure (Guillén, 2001). Within this paradigm, high-tech industrial transformation 
is the by-product of ideal-typical institution-building undertaken by elites working within the 
state bureaucracy (Ó Riain, 2004). The state bureaucracy performs a managerial role vis a vis 
society, striving after desirable institutions and integration into global markets (Evans, 1995). 
Managed properly, developmental strategies produce “multidimensional conspiracies” that 
bring economic growth and enhanced well-being for the population (Hirschman, 1977, p. 
96).  
I extend these arguments by re-introducing a critical dimension to the analysis of 
developmental state bureaucracy: elite ideology. The politics of FLOSS in Brazil demonstrate 
how the mechanisms of policy agenda setting are often driven by cultural forces beyond the 
scope of existing comparative institutional studies. Empirical analysis of these cultural forces 
and their articulation with the organizational, economic, and regulatory aspects of state 
bureaucracies complements existing scholarship by explaining how one set of ideas about 
developmental policy may enjoy greater support than another. 
My argument also responds to a growing body of research on the dynamics of hegemony and 
counter-hegemony in the context of neoliberal globalization. By "neoliberal globalization," I 
refer to the combination of economic and political processes brought about through the 
spread of finance capital, service work, free market ideologies, and improved 
communications and transportation technologies that coincided over the final thirty years of 
the twentieth century (Harvey, 2005; Robinson, 2004). These changes have provoked a shift 
in the thinking of scholars and policy-makers about developmental state politics and 
industrial transformation. The spread of neoliberal ideologies among elites and policy-makers 
has drawn attention to the role of experts in the practice of governance (Mitchell, 2002). 
Furthermore, the institutionalization of neoliberal policies has inspired research on diverse 
forms of counter-hegemonic resistance.  
This historical case study lies at the intersection of these debates. The experience of FLOSS 
politics in Brazil demonstrates how a group of insurgent, counter-hegemonic technology 
experts attempted to advance a vision of post-neoliberal development in the knowledge 
economy. Ideologies of the free market played a central role in empowerment of neoliberal 
policy agendas and the concomitant spread of intellectual property rights laws around the 
world (Harvey, 2005; Sell, 2003; Woods, 2006). Evans (2000; 2005) has depicted resistance 
to these efforts as examples of Counter-hegemonic Globalization. For Evans, Counter-
hegemonic Globalization represents a Polanyian (2001 [1944]) backlash against the tyranny 
of the free market. As he describes it, this process frequently involves the participation of 
cultural, political, and economic elites, who can play an important strategic role in the 
elaboration of alternative governance arrangements and policy projects. The status of these 
elites and their relationship to hegemony is often complicated by power dynamics the 
potential for movement co-optation (Thayer, 2010). However, within this literature, few have 
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analyzed the role or position of technical elites. The experience of FLOSS in Brazil shows 
how challenges to the neoliberal status quo can arise within elite spheres of power and bring 
about concrete institutional transformation in alliance with more traditional kinds of social 
and political movements, such as the PT. Indeed, I show how key FLOSS advocates drew on 
their experiences, resources, and social networks developed in the powerful Brazilian labor 
and democracy movements of the 1960's-80's in order to bring a FLOSS agenda into the 
political mainstream. 
What, if anything, differentiates the group of technology-savvy elites involved in the FLOSS 
mobilization from other networks of technocrats promoting their preferred set of policy 
interests in Brazil or anywhere else for that matter? In some ways, very little. In crafting a 
particular vision of domestic IT policy, the FLOSS mobilization drew heavily on the rhetoric 
and ideas of an existing transnational community of technological elites. The individuals 
involved also capitalized on their personal and professional networks to advance their 
agenda. In these aspects, they resembled more famous networks of technocrats closely.6 The 
difference, I argue, stems from their oppositional stance towards hegemonic, neoliberal 
ideologies of the free market and exclusive, proprietary informational goods. Drawing on the 
notions of the insurgent architect (Harvey, 2000) and insurgent citizenship (Holston, 2007), I 
therefore describe the group of people driving the FLOSS mobilization as insurgent experts. 
Working inside bureaucracies, agencies, firms and organizations, these insurgent experts 
worked to create counter-hegemonic alternatives to neoliberalism. They undermined the 
ideological orthodoxies that structure fields of political and economic power. Strategically 
committed to the exercise of authority, insurgent experts nevertheless resisted the uncritical 
reproduction of capitalist structures of social domination. As a result, they occupy a 
contradictory position within social space, transcending the binary of hegemony and counter-
hegemony. As Ananya Roy (2006) has put it, an insurgent expert might best be described as a 
sort of “double agent,” marked by “the simultaneity of complicity and subversion” that 
defines their political role. 
As I discussed in the introduction, I adopt two criteria in my analysis of the Brazilian FLOSS 
advocates to characterize them as insurgent experts. First, the individuals involved in the 
mobilization framed their own actions in ways consistent with the theoretical propositions of 
Harvey (2000), Holston (2007), and Roy (2006) outlined above. Second, they sought to 
utilize technocratic governance institutions to advance an agenda that ran counter to some of 
the core tenets of neoliberal development policies around information technology and 
knowledge-based industries. In many ways, these insurgent experts share much in common 
with other thought leaders or “epistemic communities" of policy elites who are highly 
motivated to shape policy transformations (Haas, 1992). However, the distinctions I use to 
define insurgent experts underscores the ideological and practical dimensions of their 
opposition to neoliberalism as a mode of governance and economic production. 
The FLOSS policy mobilization in Brazil offers an example of an elite insurgency against the 
foundations of the neoliberal knowledge economy. At its core, FLOSS represents a radical 
departure from traditional software production models as well as the restrictive forms of 
                                                 
6. For example, see Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb's (2002) discussion of the role of the “Chicago Boys” in 
promoting economic liberalization in Chile in the 1970's. 
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intellectual property that dominated the IT industry during the 1980's and 90's (Weber, 2004). 
In the past decade, FLOSS has emerged as an alternative to the proprietary software sold by 
multinational giants like Microsoft. Instead of hierarchical firm-based projects and “closed” 
IP, FLOSS is based on “open” licenses that allow sharing and collaborative, decentralized 
production over the Internet (Benkler, 2002). As a result, FLOSS has enabled some of the 
most sophisticated challenges to neoliberal IP regimes as well as corporate monopolies on 
knowledge-based goods (Lessig, 2004a; Sell, 2003). This has led a number of scholars to 
argue that FLOSS and other “commons-based” production models could enable high-tech 
development across the Global South (Benkler, 2006; Evans, 2005; Weber, 2004). The 
actions of the Lula administration and the FLOSS advocates in Brazil represent the largest 
state-led attempt to advance this agenda.  
Although it is too early to draw conclusions about the long term impact of FLOSS in Brazil, 
the emergence of these policies as well as the process of their implementation demand further 
consideration. Through a qualitative, historical analysis of the rise of Brazil's FLOSS agenda, 
this paper identifies two factors that enabled a group of insurgent experts to promote 
widespread institutional transformation: social networks and discursive mobilization. The 
following account analyzes the experience of the FLOSS advocates within the Lula 
administration and demonstrates why these factors played such a central role. Using archival 
analysis, I draw on a variety of primary and secondary sources, including newspapers, 
magazines, official statements, government documents, public financial records, academic 
publications, personal weblogs (of key informants), Web sites, and industry reports. I also 
supplement this data with 40 open-ended key-informant interviews conducted in São Paulo, 
Porto Alegre, and Brasilia during 2007 and 2008.7 
The rest of the paper follows a chronological organization: The next section provides a brief 
history of the Brazilian IT sector and state technology policy. The fourth section details the 
rise of the politicized branch of the FLOSS movement in Brazil by tracing the professional 
and political trajectories of a core group of the movement's leaders. I also consider the 
reasons why the politics of this group enabled them to integrate themselves and FLOSS 
technologies into the platform of the Worker's Party. In the fifth section, I examine the 
implementation of the FLOSS agenda during Lula's first term in office and explain how 
social networks and discursive mobilization figured centrally in this process. Finally, I offer a 
preliminary assessment of the impact of the FLOSS mobilization and consider its 
implications for the future of informational capitalism and developmental politics in the 
Global South. 
 
                                                 
7. My selection of subjects and sources followed a case-based logic (Small, 2009). I do not claim to draw 
generalizable conclusions from an unbiased or representative sample of documents, interactions or exchanges 
among Brazilian technologists and policy-makers. Rather, I contend that my extended engagement with the 
individuals and texts relevant to the topic of FLOSS politics in Brazil has provided sufficient evidence for me to 
describe the perspectives, mechanisms, institutions and relationships involved in these processes. 
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Informational Capitalism and the Brazilian Developmental State 
In Brazil, economic globalization has transformed the IT sector and the state. Since the 
1950's, a profound tension between global integration and national autonomy has framed 
Brazil's developmental politics as a whole. National IT policies have embodied the 
vicissitudes of these ideologies. Brazilian state elites have alternately approached digital 
Information Technologies as tools of high-modernist industrialization and (simultaneously) 
economic weapons of anti-imperialist liberation. 
Prior to Lula's inauguration in 2003, Brazilian state interventions in IT had occurred in three 
distinct phases: weak custodial protectionism; strong custodial protectionism; and 
liberalization. The first of phase of weak custodial protectionism lasted from the mid 1970´s 
until 1984. During this period, no specialized policy towards the information technology 
sector existed, but rather a de facto regulatory framework (Evans, 1995, pp. 116-120). While 
this arrangement led to the creation of some domestic IT companies, they remained small, 
geographically concentrated, and technologically unsophisticated. The state also began to 
create its own IT firms – o Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados (SERPRO), a 
Empresa de Tecnologia e Informações da Previdência Social (DATAPREV), and Cobra 
Tecnologia) to manage its internal needs. 
The second phase of strong custodial protectionism lasted from 1984-1991 and was defined 
by a so-called market reserve policy. In this period, the técnicos succeeded in erecting a 
legislative greenhouse around the nascent Brazilian IT industry. This market reserve 
established strict quotas on foreign hardware imports, promoting the growth of a number of 
domestic IT firms. This national industry remained incapable of sustained innovation and 
competition at the global level, however. At the same time, the rapidly expanding banking 
and state-owned sectors fueled an expansion of the national IT market and industry as a 
whole. The situation produced steady profits and opportunities for the Brazilian subsidiaries 
of IBM and Unisys, two of the largest multinational IT companies at the time. As a result, 
these two firms dominated much of the Brazilian market and undermined the supposed aims 
of national technological autonomy the market reserve was intended to realize. 
After the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, Brazil's leaders abandoned long-standing 
policies of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in favor of market liberalization (Tigre 
& Botelho, 1999). As part of this process, a new technology law passed under the presidency 
of Fernando Collor de Melo in 1991 dismantled the market reserve policy, opening the 
Brazilian IT industry to international competition. Restrictions on imports were replaced by 
incentives to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and human capital development in the form of 
tax breaks. Several years later, still in the throes of liberalization, President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso accepted a package of structural adjustment loans from the IMF which 
required additional telecommunications liberalization. As a result, the federal government de-
regulated its communications infrastructure and sold off the former state telecom monopoly, 
Telebrás (Afonso, 2007). The state also reduced its investments in the two largest state-
owned technology enterprises, SERPRO and Cobra Tecnologia. Finally, conditionalities 
attached to the loans also specified that Brazil bring its intellectual property laws into 
compliance with the World Trade Organization (WTO) standards specified in the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement (Sell, 2003). Two pieces of 
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legislation sponsored by the Cardoso administration – the national patent law (1996) and the 
national software law (1998) – achieved this aim (USTR, 2007, p. 30). While the IT industry 
as a whole grew during this period, the resulting wealth flowed mainly to multinational 
subsidiaries. 
In the beginning of 1999, a devaluation of the Real on global markets caused a sharp 
contraction of the economy. Brazilian computer programmers suddenly became some of the 
cheapest talent in the world, driving a surge in outsourcing and customization work. This was 
reinforced by the first dot-com bust in the United States, leading investors to expand foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the BRICS and other so-called emerging markets. Services and 
outsourcing markets boomed, creating a strategic incentive for large IT multinationals to 
invest in FLOSS adoption and services. While a few large firms – in particular, IBM and Sun 
Microsystems – had invested in FLOSS projects since the mid 1990's, the post-dot-com 
slump attracted increased attention to non-proprietary technologies (Capek et al., 2005). With 
the exception of Microsoft, whose leadership at the time treated FLOSS as a threat to the 
firm's core business model, the industry rapidly expanded its use and support of “open” 
technologies. 
In Brazil, the shift towards open source combined with the dot-com economic turmoil to 
bring rapid recovery in the IT industry. Increased FDI and services revenue contributed most 
to this resurgence as the market as a whole returned to growth in 2002 (Anuário Informática 
Hoje, 2005-2008) . This growth, and especially the rise of the services sector, would 
contribute to the viability of the FLOSS agenda. A resurgent IBM led the recovery, and with 
it the shift towards FLOSS. At the time, IBM had only recently incorporated Linux into its 
business model, but, FLOSS quickly became central to the firm's expanding services division 
and global strategy. By 2002, IBM was investing over US$2 billion in Open-Source projects 
and its services division accounted for approximately 50% of the firm's global revenue 
(Benkler, 2006, pp. 46-7). For the company's Brazilian subsidiary, this meant a rapid 
expansion of investments in Linux initiatives and a doubled workforce within five years 
(Valor Econômico, 2004). According to Haroldo Hoffman (2007), the executive in charge of 
IBM-Brasil's Linux strategy from 2003-2007, this also meant increased lobbying for state 
Linux adoption and legal support. Hoffman, who previously worked in IBM-Brasil's 
government relations office, noted that the firm had been making the case for public sector 
Linux adoption to state officials and political leaders “for several years” before the Lula 
administration entered office. These efforts would pay off later, in the form of alliances with 
the network of FLOSS advocates and lucrative government contracts for IBM as federal 
FLOSS adoption projects gained traction. 
The debt crisis had also opened up a political opportunity for the leftist Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT). In past elections, PT leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had failed to 
convince voters that he offered a viable alternative to the economic liberalism. However, 
Lula's 2002 campaign capitalized on the collapse of the Real and the flagging confidence in 
the Washington Consensus. Promising “a return to development” and “the priority of the 
social,” Lula and the PT brought together an impressive alliance of civil society movements 
in support of his candidacy. Uncertainty and fear among international investors forced Lula 
to make a series of public declarations affirming his commitment to honor the national debts 
and integrate prominent business leaders into his cabinet (da Silva, 2002). While such 
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maneuvers provoked accusations of hypocrisy from the left (Sader, 2005), they preserved the 
viability of Lula's candidacy. He went on the win the election, claiming over 60% of the 
popular vote in the second round. 
 
The Rise of the FLOSS Advocates 
During the same period in which Lula and the PT rose to power, FLOSS acquired a strong 
following among Brazilian programmers. However, the adoption of pro-FLOSS policies by 
the Lula government emerged from the experience and mobilization of a specific cohort of 
highly-skilled individuals based in a few of Brazil's largest industrialized cities. The members 
of this group shared a history of participation in large scale social movements and many also 
had careers in the public sector. Leveraging these experiences in common, they built a 
network of associations and affiliates dedicated to the promotion of FLOSS across the 
country. Together with other movements allied with the Worker's Party, these FLOSS 
advocates coalesced around the time of Lula's election, facilitating the integration of a 
FLOSS agenda into the policies of the new administration. 
Demographically, the programmers that became involved with FLOSS in Brazil had much in 
common with their peers around the world. Concentrated in urban centers of the country 
(particularly in the wealthier cities of the south and southeast), they tended to be highly-
educated, well-off, professional men who understood some English (Sociedade Softex, 
2005). Many were employed in the IT industry, the state, or institutions of higher education. 
These settings provided easy access to technological infrastructure as well as to social 
networks of early adopters through which knowledge of new technologies spread quickly. 
Within the global FLOSS communities, Brazilian FLOSS developers were also an anomaly 
in some important ways. Most of the contributors to large-scale FLOSS projects around the 
world lived in wealthy, Northern, and anglophone regions (Ghosh et al., 2002). Brazil did not 
account for an especially large number of FLOSS contributions among the non-English 
speaking regions of the Global South, but a disproportionate number of prominent 
contributors to some early FLOSS projects were Brazilian.8 As a result, FLOSS acquired 
exceptional visibility among the Brazilian programming community. In addition, many 
Brazilian FLOSS programmers had a distinctive political experience in comparison with 
other FLOSS contributors around the world. The computer-savvy men passing through 
Brazilian universities, technology firms, and public sector institutions as FLOSS spread 
during the mid 1990's, had all come of age under the military dictatorship. The dictatorship 
had alienated and politicized millions of people, leading to the rise to massive, leftist 
movements including the PT. These oppositional movements and their ideologies also had 
exceptional traction among the graduates of the country's elite universities. Leftist politics 
and activism thus diffused into the Brazilian FLOSS community more widely than in some 
other settings.  
                                                 
8 The most well known projects with Brazilian programmers in leadership roles were: Conectiva (Arnaldo 
Carvalho de Melo), Java (Bruno Souza) and Debian (Fernando Ike). For a recent ethnography of the culture 
of Brazilian programmers, see Takhteyev (2009). 
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One prominent individual whose personal trajectory exemplifies the process by which 
FLOSS was absorbed by members of the Brazilian left is Mario Teza.9 Born in Porto Alegre 
in 1964, the same year that Brazil's military took over the state, Teza has spent his 
professional life working in state-owned technology firms. He locates the beginning of his 
identification with the left in the 1979 labor strikes that eventually led to the formation of the 
PT. Only fifteen at the time, Teza went on to attend college in Porto Alegre where he came 
into closer contact with the labor movement and acquired some technical training. In 1984, 
he joined a union, the Federação dos Trabalhadores em Empresas de Processamento de 
Dados (National Federation of Data Processing Workers, FENADADOS) in his first job at 
the state-owned software firm, SERPRO. Teza then rose rapidly through the FENADADOS 
hierarchy. Following Lula and the PT's 1995 electoral defeat at the hands of liberal Social 
Democratic Party (PSDB) candidate Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Teza left his position in the 
national FENADADOS leadership out of frustration with the labor movement, returning to 
SERPRO. 
A few years later, in November, 1998, Teza found himself browsing an airport newsstand on 
his way to a national SERPRO workers' salary negotiation in Brasilia. By chance, he came 
across an article in O Estado de São Paulo (dos Santos, 1998) about the Conectiva 
distribution of Linux, the only version of the Linux operating system developed by 
Brazilians. Conectiva inspired Teza, and, upon arriving in Brasilia, he immediately showed 
the article to Djalma Valois, the FENADADOS technical director and an old friend from Rio. 
For Teza (and Valois), the appeal of FLOSS lay in its technical and cost advantages, as well 
as its potential as a counter-hegemonic tool of anti-capitalist resistance. Looking back at his 
career, Teza (2008) explained the connections to me: 
By 1989, the labor movement was in crisis - it's still in crisis! But let's put it this way, 
for some people, we weren't satisfied with the labor movement and beyond that with 
the democratization - the unions also entered into a system - a status quo, let's say. 
[The labor movement] didn't subvert the social order after the creation of democracy, 
and for many of the activists at that time this was not enough. We wanted to do more. 
And for many of us, software livre has enabled us to do more. We are able to take 
direct action, break paradigms. The labor movement is incapable of this - it raises 
salaries, but it's a whole corporatist thing, its still very out of date...it doesn't 
overcome capitalism. In as much as software livre, without perceiving it, begins to 
transcend, at least challenge capitalism, the ownership society, and intellectual 
property. 
The idea of transcending property, and with it capitalism, was not new within the global 
FLOSS community. However, Teza's stance diverged from those of prominent North 
American and European FLOSS adherents. International Free Software advocates such as 
movement founder Richard Stallman employed rhetoric loaded with anti-capitalist 
implications.10 Yet, most of the North American and European programmers involved with 
FLOSS shared an apolitical or libertarian professional culture. Those among them that 
                                                 
9 This biographical account draws on Teza (2000a; 2000b; 2004a; 2004b; 2006 and 2008). 
10 See Stallman's provocative arguments on freedom and property in “The GNU Manifesto” (2007 [1984]). 
Stallman may or may not have intended his arguments to be anti-capitalist, but that they can be (and have been!) 
read that way. Thanks to Johan Söderberg, who pointed out this distinction. 
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articulated explicit political views tended towards Anarchist, Libertarian, or Liberal positions 
that, while explicitly political in a number of ways, did not always lend themselves to 
institutionalization (Coleman, 2009; Coleman & Golub, 2008). As a result, none had 
endeavored to create a formal, political mobilization around FLOSS. 
Contrastingly, for people like Mario Teza and Djalma Valois, the talk of freedom and 
autonomy permeating the global FLOSS community resonated with the ideologies of the 
radical left. When I later asked Valois (2007) why he thought the FLOSS movement in Brazil 
was so different from the United States, he told me about an encounter he had with one of the 
most famous North American Linux evangelists, Eric Raymond. Like the two of us, they had 
been discussing politics: 
Raymond told me he had a gun to protect himself from the government. At this point, 
I smiled and asked him, 'Eric, how big is your gun?' and Raymond spread his arms 
wide, like this. [pause] Then I asked, 'and Eric, how big are the government's guns?!' 
[laughter] For me, who has worked in state agencies for years, software livre always 
had to do with politics and the public sector... possibly because of the history of the 
syndicalist movement here, it has also always had to do with socialist politics. 
Valois found the notion of single-handedly resisting the state absurd. His idea of effective 
political action implied a larger scale mobilization of people and resources. Valois then went 
on describe how the communist cells of the anti-dictatorship movement had inspired his 
thinking about FLOSS adoption. Such cells, he pointed out, were created with the objective 
of seizing state power. 
Looking to promote FLOSS in the public sector, Mario Teza set about mobilizing within the 
state technology firms of Rio Grande do Sul. He contacted Marcelo Branco, an old friend 
who had recently become the Technical Director of PROCERGS, the data processing firm of 
the state government. The two men had known each other for years as a result of their 
involvement with leftist movements around the city during the 1970's and 80's. Branco, 
previously a technical manager with the federal telephone monopoly Telebrás, had entered 
the local state administration with the election of Porto Alegre's popular PT mayor Olivio 
Dutra to the office of Governor in 1998. Branco liked the idea of putting together a FLOSS 
adoption project. Together, he and Teza brought a proposal to the PROCERGS President, 
Marcos Mazoni, who was also a childhood friend of Branco's. Mazoni gave preliminary 
support for the project and the burden was now on Branco and Teza to prove that FLOSS 
could generate tangible advantages for the public sector. 
Teza had also started discussing FLOSS with his technician friends and public employees 
around the state capital. These included Clarice Coppetti, the PROCERGS Commercial 
Director as well as a former student activist with the PT; and Ronaldo Lages, a PROCERGS 
technical manager. In addition, Teza contacted Linux user groups and informatics 
departments at local universities. Within a short time, he had generated enough interest that 
he organized several meetings to discuss software livre and generate ideas about how to 
implement it in the public sector. Teza, together with Branco and Ronaldo Lages, facilitated 
these gatherings, the first of which took place in the PROCERGS auditorium on July 30, 
1999, with about 40 attendees. They called themselves Projeto Software Livre - Rio Grande 
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do Sul (the Rio Grande do Sul Free Software Project ) or PSL-RS. 
In its early days, the PSL-RS focused on spreading information about FLOSS and conducting 
technical trainings in Linux. Teza invited his old union friend Djalma Valois from Rio to lead 
classes every week at PROCERGS (Teza, 2008). Demand grew quickly, as did interest in the 
political philosophies behind non-proprietary technologies, which resonated among the group 
members. One day during this period, Marcos Mazoni and Marcelo Branco had planned a 
lunch with another old friend, Walter Pinheiro. A fellow labor activist and former 
telecommunications manager, Pinheiro had gone on to become a federal representative 
(deputado) with the PT in the northeastern state of Bahia. After a conversation with Branco 
and Mazoni, Pinheiro expressed an interest in creating a national law based on the 
PROCERGS FLOSS experience and he convinced Teza (2008) to draft language and send it 
to one of his aides later that afternoon. The proposed law (number 2.226/1999) - called for 
preferential FLOSS purchasing in all public agencies and marked an early turning point in 
the scope of the PSL movement. More than two years before the arrival of the Lula 
government, the personal and professional networks of the PSL-RS leaders had already 
succeeded in laying the foundations for a national political debate over proprietary software 
purchasing. While the federal bill would not garner enough votes in the congress, copycat 
legislation gained passage through the state legislature of Rio Grande do Sul in 2002. 
The impact of the conversation with Pinheiro encouraged Teza and the other FLOSS 
advocates to pursue more support from the local government. Through the involvement of 
the PSL-RS, IT managers at many of the state and municipal agencies had already created 
FLOSS adoption proposals. The PSL leaders also had preliminary meetings with Governor 
Olivio Dutra to explore the possibility of a statewide FLOSS mandate. Looking to promote 
the issue, Teza (2000b) wrote a short polemical essay in which he outlined the potential cost-
savings that FLOSS could generate for the state, comparing it to expenditures on social 
welfare in the state budget. Dutra responded by lending additional support to the PSL-RS 
experiments. 
In 2000, the members of the PSL-RS built on their early success and transformed themselves 
into a national organization. Marcelo Branco became PROCERGS Vice President and 
created a formal working group within the company to focus exclusively on FLOSS and 
PSL-RS initiatives. These included the existing Linux training classes and experimental 
software migrations as well as the organization of an international event to promote FLOSS. 
Branco and Mazoni hired Teza to join PROCERGS full-time, where he took over the event 
planning. In May, 2000, The first Fórum Internacional do Software Livre (International Free 
Software Forum, FISL) was held at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul 
(UFRGS). Over two thousand people attended, including free software pioneer Richard 
Stallman and Governor Olivio Dutra. The FISL helped expand the PSL network by attracting 
participants from the wider Brazilian and global FLOSS communities. Several elite 
programmers brought connections to top international software firms and FLOSS projects. In 
addition to Stallman and the Free Software Foundation, these included the Debian Linux 
community; Sun Microsystems; IBM; Red Hat; Curitiba-based Linux firm Conectiva; as well 
as several universities with strong computer science departments such as UNICAMP and 
USP.  
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The first large-scale Linux event in Brazil, FISL also brought international attention to Rio 
Grande do Sul's FLOSS adoption initiatives. The state claimed vast savings in licensing costs 
and increased technical stability thanks to FLOSS adoption. The positive attention helped the 
PSL-RS confirm Dutra's commitment, making him the first of the senior PT leaders to 
become a strong supporter of public sector FLOSS adoption. Information about the Dutra 
administration's programs also spread through the FISL network, and other public firms, such 
as the social welfare administration in the state of Paraná, soon sought to imitate their 
success. Within a couple of years, PSL's appeared in almost every state and also a number of 
the larger cities around the country. The movement developed a strong online presence with 
numerous mailing lists and message boards through which members continue to transmit 
information. 
Around the same time in late 2000, an unconnected FLOSS initiative emerged in the São 
Paulo government under the new PT mayor Marta Suplicy. In São Paulo, Suplicy had 
appointed a young professor named Sérgio Amadeu da Silveira to coordinate several projects 
including the municipal “electronic government” program. Amadeu's trajectory had 
significant parallels with Teza's and the other PSL leaders. Amadeu was born in São Paulo in 
1961 and had joined the PT during the Direitas Já! (Rights Now!) campaign of 1984 
(Amadeu, 2008). An activist with more militant leanings during the dictatorship, he then 
worked with the PT's São Paulo political offices from the mid 1980's into the mid 1990's. 
During this time, he developed personal ties with the highest echelons of the PT leadership. 
Like Mario Teza, Amadeu reduced his formal involvement with the party after Lula's 1994 
loss to Fernando Henrique Cardoso. However, whereas Teza had gone back to a career in 
technical management, Amadeu pursued post-graduate studies in politics and journalism at 
the Universidade de São Paulo, where he specialized in the politics of networked 
communications and the Internet. He also continued his work as an assistant and analyst for 
the PT in the state parliament. 
Amadeu learned of FLOSS through his research and, like Teza, Valois and their peers, he 
understood non-proprietary technologies as strategic tools for combatting inequality in the 
network society. In his academic work, he discussed how networked information and 
communications technologies reinforced social hierarchies, resulting in “digital exclusion” 
for the majority of the poor in a country like Brazil. He wrote, “As happened with mass 
public education, digital inclusion will not be the work of an 'invisible hand'” (Amadeu, 
2000, p. 24). Amadeu claimed that a benevolent developmental state was needed to 
universalize access and to help break the monopolistic grip of foreign software firms and 
products on low-income computer users. He undertook to implement his vision through the 
São Paulo government. 
Following Suplicy's inauguration in 2001, Amadeu and his staff initiated various digital 
inclusion projects using FLOSS to improve Internet accessibility for the city's poor 
neighborhoods. The largest and most important of these, the São Paulo municipal telecenter 
network, would eventually offer free Internet access in over one hundred locations on 
computers running only FLOSS operating systems and applications. With registered users 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands, the project was the largest municipal FLOSS 
telecenter network in the country and possibly the world. 
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During the first year of Suplicy's administration, Amadeu remained unaware of the PSL and 
its activities in Rio Grande do Sul. However, the geography of the Brazilian left and the 
small number of state IT projects involving FLOSS quickly brought the two groups into 
contact. At the end of January, 2002, the city of Porto Alegre hosted the second World Social 
Forum (WSF). Amadeu had come to participate in the event for the first time and he met 
Branco and learned of the projects of the PSL as well as their annual forum. A few months 
later, in May, Amadeu returned to Porto Alegre to participate in the FISL, which by then was 
in its third year. He gave a presentation on digital inclusion in the São Paulo telecenters and 
met the rest of the PSL leadership including Teza, Lages, Coppetti and Mazoni. 
Less than a year later, Amadeu and the cohort of PSL leaders would become instrumental in 
the Lula administration's FLOSS policies. By the time Lula won the 2002 election, a public 
sector FLOSS mobilization had become possible. The Projeto Software Livre had national 
membership numbering in the thousands. A group of executives and administrators at several 
state IT firms had experience managing large-scale FLOSS migrations. The federal congress 
included several senators and representatives who supported FLOSS adoption. The PT could 
even claim successful examples of FLOSS policy implementations in Porto Alegre and São 
Paulo. Furthermore, the spread of FLOSS within multinational IT firms such as IBM and Sun 
Microsystems had legitimized FLOSS in the eyes of the global market. 
In this early period of the mobilization, a peculiar constellation of ideological and political 
currents had brought an experienced group of technicians and activists together around a 
vision of state-led FLOSS promotion. Exogenous factors such as the dot-com slump, the rise 
of open source in the global IT industry, the debt crisis, and the collapse of the Washington 
Consensus had facilitated the rise of FLOSS and the PT more generally. However, the PSL-
RS and the FISL lay the groundwork for a national project by institutionalizing a network of 
persons and ideas oriented towards the use of FLOSS in the public sector. Among the group's 
founders, involvement in the labor movement and the PT as well as executive experience in 
multiple public IT firms provided the basis for a shared political vision. A number of the 
early leaders would go on to play central roles in the FLOSS mobilization under Lula. The 
conjunction of leftist social movements in Porto Alegre and São Paulo at the end of the 
twentieth century also catalyzed the process by which these persons and ideas coalesced. 
 
FLOSS Advocates in Power 
For the PSL, Lula's 2002 victory brought a unique opportunity to take their agenda to federal 
level. However, an important question remained: how would they carry out the FLOSS 
agenda in the fragmentary and decentralized context of the Brazilian state? FLOSS advocates 
needed to “mobilize the state” from within for their new agenda to succeed (Abers & Keck, 
2009). I argue that they adopted a multidimensional strategy divisible into three areas: 
network mobilization; discursive mobilization; and institutional transformation. The first two 
of these (network mobilization and discursive mobilization) facilitated the third (institutional 
transformation). This section provides an overview of these three areas of the FLOSS 
mobilization during the first years of the Lula administration. 
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Network Mobilization 
Despite Lula's victory, the 2002 elections brought uncertainty for the PT in Rio Grande do 
Sul. In a surprising shift, Olivio Dutra had lost the governor's seat at the same time as the 
party also lost the Porto Alegre mayor's office. Teza and the other PSL organizers had relied 
on PROCERGS, the municipal IT departments, and the governor for event funding and 
administrative support. Said Teza (2008), "nobody knew if there was going to be a FISL or 
not since there wasn't any more [support] from the city or state." 
Meanwhile, in São Paulo, where the core of Lula's organization was based, the outlook was 
positive. The PT victory meant that he needed to fill thousands of appointments in the federal 
bureaucracy and local staff and affiliates got first priority for these jobs (c.f., Evans, 1995, 
pp. 60-66). Many of these hiring decisions fell to José Dirceu, Lula's most trusted aide and 
co-founder of the PT. Dirceu was known as Lula's “Superminister,” and in his new role as the 
chief of the Casa Civil (comparable to the United States' White House Chief of Staff), Dirceu 
oversaw the executive branch. Among the dozens of agencies under Dirceu's authority, the 
Institute for Information Technology (ITI) was a low priority. The Cardoso administration 
had created the ITI to manage the state cryptographic and certification systems. As such, it 
was one of the many unelected posts through which the administration exercised influence 
over the semi-autonomous ministries and public-owned firms. Without a clear idea of what 
this entailed and short on time, Dirceu called Sérgio Amadeu. While Amadeu had no 
cryptographic training and less than two years experience in public administration, Dirceu 
offered him the presidency of the ITI. Amadeu told Dirceu he would consider the post. 
A few days later, Amadeu traveled to Porto Alegre, where the World Social Forum was again 
taking place. In Porto Alegre, he met with Marcelo Branco and Mario Teza. According to 
Branco (2008), Amadeu told them, “they've offered me a position as President of the ITI. I 
don't know exactly what the ITI is, but I'm going there to implement software livre.” Amadeu 
wanted help locating competent personnel for the ITI and crafting a national FLOSS strategy. 
Said Branco (2008), “we decided to put all our support behind him.” Amadeu (2008) then 
returned to Brasilia, where he offered Dirceu and Lula a deal: “both of you support me with 
the software livre implementation, and I'll make sure this thing, the ITI, works out.” The 
party leaders agreed to this proposal. Amadeu's appointment to the would shape the federal 
FLOSS agenda during the rest of Lula's first term. 
Dirceu then created a high-level Committee for the Implementation of Software Livre (or 
CISL) to form a national FLOSS action plan and named the President of the ITI – Amadeu – 
to chair it. When it met for the first time in mid-2003, the CISL served an explicit agenda-
setting function and helped to activate the network of FLOSS advocates. The meetings 
gathered representatives of over forty government offices, firms, and agencies. Special 
invitations were also extended to a handful of participants from the PSL community in Rio 
Grande do Sul, including Teza, Branco, and Ronaldo Lages. Following several meetings, the 
CISL issued a strategic planning document to guide the subsequent actions of the 
administration and the state agencies (CISL, 2003). Lula officially endorsed the plan in 
October (da Silva, 2003), issuing a decree that created eight committees to oversee federal IT 
 Politics of Open Source  254 
policy implementation. Not surprisingly, the first committee on the list was dedicated to 
implementing FLOSS adoption across the state agencies and fell under the authority of the 
ITI president – Amadeu. 
As Amadeu set out to implement FLOSS-based reform, the PSL network served as a crucial 
resource. Many of the PSL members had extensive experience in the IT industry and in state-
owned technology firms and Amadeu appointed some of them to join him at the ITI, in state-
owned firms, and on various inter-agency committees. For example, Renato Martini, a PSL 
ally from Rio, became the ITI Vice President and Djalma Valois was hired to lead the ITI's 
new FLOSS training programs. Amadeu also brought most of his staff from the São Paulo e-
government programs to join him in his new agency. In addition, the growing need for 
FLOSS expertise in government IT departments increased demand for administrators and 
programmers experienced with FLOSS. Logically, many of these individuals were drawn 
from the PSL community's ranks.  
Beyond Amadeu's efforts, several of the core PSL-RS leaders also received appointments in 
other federal agencies. The former PROCERGS executive Clarice Coppetti became Vice 
President in charge of technology at the second largest national bank, the Caixa Econômica 
Federal. Prior to her arrival, a few mid-level managers and technicians had experimented 
with FLOSS. Under Coppetti's guidance (and in response to the explicit agenda set in motion 
by Amadeu and the ITI), these experiments were expanded. In addition, the Caixa migrated 
thousands of workstations and the technical backbone of the national lottery system to 
FLOSS platforms (Maia, 2007). 
At the same time, some participants in the government's FLOSS adoption projects did not 
share the politicized views of Amadeu or the PSL leaders. In the largest state-owned bank, 
the Banco do Brasil, a small group of high level technicians had initiated the firm's FLOSS 
migrations independent of the PSL. For them, FLOSS had more to do with technical stability, 
security, and flexibility than national sovereignty or a critique of multinational capital. They 
described how the PT's new initiatives had created an opportunity for them to promote ideas 
they had been pursuing for years (Pena, 2007).  
Other members of the IT industry without strong political or public sector affiliations also 
played an important role in the mobilization process. FLOSS advocates held positions in 
multinational tech firms, small local consultancies, and NGO's and in many cases, the rise of 
FLOSS within the federal government presented a business opportunity for them. 
Consequently, the PSL drew larger and larger numbers of participants to the annual forum, its 
regional conferences, and numerous email lists. At the same time, “buying in” to the vision of 
the leadership of the PSL or of the PT was not a salient concern for some of these new 
participants. One IBM executive told me he had begun attending the FISL in 2005 because of 
its significance for the company's FLOSS initiatives. With a wry smile, he added that he 
always made sure to wear his oldest jeans, “the more holes the better” and did not shave for a 
few days prior to the event, so that he could blend in with the crowd (Hoffman, 2007). For 
him, integration into the PSL community was a profitable tactic in the new political 
environment. 
Together, the mobilization of personnel behind the FLOSS agenda enabled Amadeu and the 
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other leading advocates within the administration to consolidate support for their projects. 
The shared commitments and existing social ties between these individuals (through the PT, 
the PSL, or the state administration itself) reinforced the organizational capacity of the 
FLOSS mobilization as a whole. They were also able to use the existing PSL network and 
infrastructure to recruit new members and spread information. The election of Lula created 
political conditions within which peripheral networks of FLOSS sympathizers outside the 
core of the PSL and the PT could activate in order to advance the government's agenda 
indirectly. 
 
Discursive Mobilization 
The mobilization of the network of FLOSS advocates encountered resistance and outright 
opposition among some of the state elite. A number of Lula's senior ministers did not agree 
that non-proprietary production was an effective economic strategy. In particular, Luiz 
Fernando Furlan, the Minister of Industrial Development, defended the proprietary, export-
driven model of growth pursued by the Cardoso administration. In this context, Amadeu 
looked to convince federal administrators and politicians that the switch to FLOSS offered 
sufficient political and economic benefits to offset the costs. To do so, he pursued an 
aggressive discursive mobilization, depicting the national ICT policies in normative cultural 
and political terms. 
A charismatic public speaker, Amadeu quickly became the spokesman of the FLOSS agenda 
within the administration. His arguments served as “the point of a spear” behind which the 
FLOSS agenda could advance (Cassino, 2007; Martini, 2007). In numerous interviews and 
editorials, he articulated a grand, radical vision of the developmental politics of software, 
knowledge, and digital networks. Drawing on the ideas of scholars such as Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos, Manuel Castells, Yochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig, he painted a stark 
picture of the network society, defending the government's preference for FLOSS: 
Brazil has more than the right, it has the need to utilize technologies that enable 
the growth of its technological autonomy, its participation as a developer of 
solutions in the information society, the reduction of costs and the expansion of 
its independence in the face of international monopolies. (ComCiência, 2004) 
From Amadeu's (2001; 2003) point of view, state-led FLOSS adoption was not at odds with 
the logic of the market, but rather a tool that could enhance the distributive function of the 
market and promote national economic growth. In this way, Amadeu argued that the licensing 
royalties charged by wealthy Northern firms (like Microsoft) represented an exploitative tax 
on knowledge-based digital goods. According to him, state-led FLOSS adoption would 
enable the Brazilian economy to wean itself off these expensive technologies and, in doing 
so, promote national education, economic growth, autonomy, and development. The adoption 
of non-proprietary technologies within the public sector would (in theory) reduce foreign 
intellectual property dependencies, and catalyze innovation and industrial upgrading among 
domestic firms. Not only would the resulting savings on licensing costs enable Brazil to 
spend more on closing the digital divide, but the preference for FLOSS would prevent lock-
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in to proprietary products, the costs of which would rise over time. The state and its citizens 
would benefit from the enhanced transparency and security provided by programs written 
with non-proprietary code. Furthermore, by embracing collaborative knowledge-production 
over the Internet, Brazil's citizens would benefit from and contribute to the information 
commons. FLOSS would thus serve as the foundation of a competitive ICT economy in the 
global market; an educated, digitally-connected citizenry; and a well-ordered and sovereign 
nation-state. It would facilitate comparative advantage without compromising national 
security. Furthermore, the spread of FLOSS would strengthen Brazil's terms of trade as well 
as its non-proprietary trade agenda. 
Amadeu's discursive offensive generated political leverage for the FLOSS advocates. He 
attracted domestic and international press attention to the PT agenda. The idea of a state-
mandated FLOSS migration caught the eye of editors in Washington, New York, and London, 
who characterized Amadeu as the latest radical Latin American politician to reject 
multinational corporate influence (Benson, 2005; Clendenning, 2003; The Wall Street 
Journal, 2003). These articles, disseminated an image of Amadeu (and Lula) as the leaders of 
an anti-imperialist, anti-corporate vanguard. This image reinforced the PT's efforts to position 
itself at the forefront of the Latin American left at the same time as it brought global 
recognition to Brazil's FLOSS stance. 
Amadeu argued against the inherent benefits of the market or technological progress, 
rejecting the terms in which strong IP rights advocates discussed informational goods. 
Instead, he situated the political economy of networks in a broader history of global capitalist 
hegemony: 
If the market had the capacity to include people in the information society, it would 
have already done it because to do so would produce a lot of money. It is not capable 
of doing it because the market, in and of itself, is exclusive. Brazil is a country with 
highly concentrated wealth. People don't have a computer in their home, they don't 
have a telephone line...The market is not going to resolve the problem. (Portal do 
SERPRO – Notícias, 2004, emphasis added) 
According to this view, information technologies could produce repressive or egalitarian 
social orders – the outcome depended on the relations of knowledge production within a 
given society. The state, Amadeu claimed, had the responsibility to defend citizens' access to 
public goods. This was a harsh rejection of the the Washington Consensus view that had 
dominated public debates about technology and development in Brazil throughout the 80's 
and 90's. By relentlessly connecting the arcana of operating systems to the circumstances of 
children in favelas, Amadeu framed the digital divide as a moral and political problem, rather 
than a technical one. 
Amadeu did not act alone in spreading this politicized vision of the knowledge economy. In 
the national congress, Walter Pinheiro (2005) – the representative from Bahia who had 
attended FISL years earlier – argued in favor of new legislative measures on the basis of the 
digital inclusion agenda. Sérgio Rosa (2004), a Vice President of SERPRO, likewise 
undertook to revitalize the aging firm's operations by offering increased FLOSS services in 
an effort to catalyze FLOSS demand throughout the IT industry. Similar events occurred at 
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DATAPREV and Cobra Tecnologia (Cassino, 2007; Teza, 2008). Amadeu's rhetoric provided 
a shared language for justifying these initiatives. 
Amadeu's sheer vehemence contributed to his prominence during this time. Frequently, he 
characterized Microsoft as a rapacious, anti-democratic, corporate villain. Representatives 
from Microsoft-Brazil usually responded to these attacks indirectly, defending the quality of 
their products and asserting the importance of “free choice” for all software consumers 
(Braun, 2006). On one occasion, however, the verbal sparring between the two parties 
escalated. A March, 2004 article in the popular Brazilian magazine Carta Capital, quoted 
Amadeu accusing Microsoft of “drug dealing practices” for distributing software at no cost to 
poor Brazilians (Marques, 2004). In response to this provocation, Microsoft-Brazil sued 
Carta Capital and Amadeu for defamation. The defamation case legitimized Amadeu's 
claims and increased his international status as FLOSS supporters (and Microsoft detractors) 
from around the world rallied to Amadeu's support (e.g. Lessig, 2004b). Brazilian courts 
eventually dismissed the charges. 
The “digital drug dealing” incident illustrates how Amadeu's discourse produced concrete 
impacts on the political environment. He gave the FLOSS agenda a recognizable public face 
and popularized the issues at stake. Influential technologists, executives, and politicians felt 
obligated to justify themselves on Amadeu's terms.11 At the same time, members of the PSL 
and the PT recognized that Amadeu's strength lay in his ability to shift public debate. Few of 
them harbored illusions about his lack of administrative experience. Renato Martini, 
Amadeu's successor at the ITI, said: 
Sérgio did not come here to make his career in the government, to stay here forever. 
He said to me when he arrived and we were talking, 'I'm a professor. I came here to 
create confusion, create a tumult, and go home'...in truth, the Software Livre project 
in that era was the discourse of Sérgio Amadeu and it was successful. (Martini, 2007) 
Other FLOSS advocates echoed this sentiment (Cassino, 2007). Martini's statement, 
however, underscores the extent to which Amadeu intentionally pursued discursive 
mobilization as an end in itself as well as a means to more tangible reforms. 
 
Institutional Transformation 
Expanding on Amadeu's efforts, the FLOSS advocates promoted institutional transformation 
in four primary arenas: domestic legislature; international governance forums; public 
agencies; and state-sponsored “digital inclusion” programs. Overall, these efforts met strong 
opposition and enjoyed limited success. Where success did occur, it seemed to come through 
the collaboration of allies outside the PSL. The domestic legislative agenda failed to get very 
far during Lula's first term.  
FLOSS supporters within the congress sought to replicate laws from Paraná and Rio Grande 
do Sul (Mazoni, 2003; Teza, 2004b). In both of those states, the local legislature mandated 
                                                 
11 This was driven home to me by a number of my interviewees (Hoffman, 2007; Martini, 2007; Valois, 2007). 
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the use of FLOSS in all levels of public administration. The proposed federal measures 
likewise sought mandatory FLOSS adoption in public agencies as well as state-run schools 
and hospitals (Kaminski, 2007; Pinheiro, 2005). For some skeptics, these proposals 
resembled the “market reserve” policies of the 1980's too closely. The new measures would 
have also posed technical challenges to decrepit legacy systems still handling much of the 
state's computing. Faced with such high political and economic costs, the congress voted 
down the proposals. 
The administration pursued more flexible reforms at the international level. For the most 
part, these did not involve the participation of PSL community members. Nevertheless, the 
political stance mirrored the domestic FLOSS agenda in key respects. At both the WTO and 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Brazilian negotiators built a Southern 
alliance behind a “pro-development” trade agenda to restructure the regulation of global 
markets (Paranaguá, 2005; Shadlen, 2004). The creation of a permanent Committee on 
Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP) at WIPO in September 2007 indicated partial 
success of Brazil's efforts. Nevertheless, representatives of wealthy, Northern states continue 
to actively resist these movements in a number of forums (Sell, 2008; Shaw, 2008). 
In public agencies, ministries and firms, the FLOSS advocates promoted migrations to 
FLOSS and technical training. The ITI and CISL coordinated these efforts. The most 
extensive migrations occurred in the state-owned technology firms where FLOSS supporters 
already held (or acquired) influential positions. Among these, the Previdência Social (social 
welfare administration), and its IT management organization DATAPREV led the way, 
migrating many databases, servers, and Web platforms onto FLOSS (DATAPREV, 2004; 
Teza, 2004a). These migrations built on experiences under the Cardoso administration, but 
now involved core PSL members such as Mario Teza. A similar pattern unfolded at 
SERPRO, the Federal Data Processing Service firm affiliated with the Ministerio da Fazenda 
(Ministry of Finance). There, Vice President Sérgio Rosa championed the FLOSS agenda as 
SERPRO migrated many of its systems, beginning with thousands of servers and 
workstations (Kuhn, 2007). With the support of the ITI and CISL, SERPRO also promoted 
and managed migrations for client organizations within the federal administration, and 
developed several custom FLOSS applications for government agencies' use. 
Approximately a dozen other federal entities followed the lead of these early-adopters. 
Among them, Petrobrás, the state-owned energy giant, and the Ministry of Culture invested 
most heavily in FLOSS. Security concerns led the Brazilian Armed Forces and the 
Intelligence Service to transition onto Linux-based systems. Additional migrations occurred 
in the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industrial Development and 
Commerce, as well as the national postal service. The pace of migration moved steadily 
between 2003 and 2006. The transitions focused on “back-end” IT operations, with a smaller 
number involving systems in use at employee workstations. 
The administration promoted “digital inclusion” and FLOSS-based IT education through 
market-based incentives and state-sponsored programs (Afonso, 2007). These initiatives 
derived from the CISL's strategic recommendations and targeted different socio-economic 
strata of the population. Among them, the PC Conectado, Casa Brasil, and Centros de 
difusão da tecnologia e conhecimento (Technology and Knowledge Diffusion Centers, or 
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CDTC's) programs had direct support from the ITI and the FLOSS advocates. The CDTC 
also received US$1 Million in seed funding from IBM in early 2004, followed by a similar 
amount in 2005 (Business Monitor Online, 2005; McMillan, 2004). However, opposition 
from the finance and development ministries limited the CISL's ability to implement all three 
proposals effectively (Valor Econômico, 2005b). 
 
Changing Momentum and Preliminary Assessments 
Early in Lula's third year in power, a series of political scandals altered the balance of power 
within the administration. In June, the media uncovered a P.T. vote-buying scheme that 
reached high into the party leadership and included “superminister” José Dirceu. Although he 
denied the allegations, Dirceu resigned his post as Chief Minister of the Casa Civil and 
returned to his previous role as a São Paulo state representative (Folha de São Paulo, 2005). 
The FLOSS agenda had lost one of its most powerful allies. Even before Dirceu's departure, 
Sérgio Amadeu had expressed frustration with the glacial pace of government procedure and 
wrangling over funds. With Dirceu gone things only got slower. After the delay of the PC 
Conectado program, Amadeu had additional funding requests for digital inclusion programs 
held up by the Ministry of Planning for several months. Fed up (and perhaps discouraged in 
Dirceu's absence), he resigned in the middle of August (Valor Econômico, 2005a). Dilma 
Rousseff, Dirceu's replacement as Chief Minister of the Casa Civil, announced that the 
administration would continue to promote FLOSS in ministries and state-owned firms as 
before. Nevertheless, the sudden personnel changes were a setback for the FLOSS 
mobilization. 
Despite Dirceu and Amadeu's exit, the FLOSS advocates had initiated an impressive set of 
changes by 2006. It remains to be seen what long-term results these changes will bring about. 
Preliminary assessments suggest that while national debates about IT have become more 
politicized, the administration's strategy has not yet transformed the state or the IT market in 
the way Amadeu and others argued that it would. This should not be surprising given the 
scope of Amadeu's rhetoric and constraints on some of the changes that were implemented. 
In addition, while the FLOSS advocates built support for non-proprietary information within 
the state, their ability to reverse long-term IP trade inequalities or transform the IT industry 
was limited. The global IT economy continued to evolve rapidly and off-shore trends affected 
the Brazilian market in unforeseen ways.  
Despite such limitations, the FLOSS mobilization remains a unique attempt to pursue an 
alternative to neoliberal development politics by means of insurgent expertise. In interviews, 
many of the FLOSS advocates recognized the challenges and uncertainties that have 
constrained the success of their efforts. At the same time, they offered divergent views as to 
why the grand radical vision articulated at the outset of the Lula administration has proven so 
elusive. Sérgio Amadeu (2008) maintains that a combination of proprietary firm lobbyists 
and ideologically motivated opposition within the government ministries prevented him from 
executing FLOSS migrations and digital inclusion projects on a broader scale while at the 
ITI. Commenting on the different levels of adoption in some state agencies versus others, he 
reflected: 
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Where is the instrument that legally enforces technological policy? It doesn't exist. 
The proposal [for a mandatory FLOSS adoption law] exists – the proposal is there. It's 
waiting...But that is where the barrier remains because that is where the issue ceases 
to be a conversation, a voluntary idea that the agencies adopt...and becomes a norm 
within the government. 
Absent the force of law, Amadeu believed that dissenters would never relent. 
In contrast, Marcelo Branco (2008) argued that the shortcomings of Lula's first term stemmed 
from the personnel decisions made by the PT leaders – specifically in their choice of the 
inexperienced Amadeu to coordinate the agenda. He emphasized how, “Some people...that 
had political experience and administrative experience were not considered during the 
formation of the first Lula government.” Indeed, among the original PSL leaders from Porto 
Alegre, only Clarice Coppetti was immediately offered a high ranking position in Brasilia. 
Teza won an elected spot on the national Committee for Internet Governance, but without a 
formal post within a federal agency, he could do little to affect broad changes at the national 
level. Marcos Mazoni accepted an offer to direct CELEPAR, the state technology firm of 
Paraná, where he went on to oversee extensive FLOSS migration projects. Branco himself 
worked as a consultant on some of the FLOSS implementation committees during the first 
two years of the administration, but then left and took a temporary position in the regional 
government of Cataluña, Spain. Branco's experience shows how only some of the wisdom 
accumulated in the state agencies of Rio Grande do Sul made it into the federal FLOSS 
mobilization. 
Arguably, the most impressive achievement of the FLOSS advocates was the 
institutionalization of the movement itself. An extensive social and professional network of 
FLOSS advocates remains inside the state bureaucracy. This network continues to grow 
through events such as the Fórum Internacional do Software Livre and groups such as the 
PSL. The FISL now enjoys support from the federal government and numerous private sector 
firms. New leaders and initiatives have also emerged since 2006 following Lula's election to 
a second term in office. Of particular significance for the old PSL leaders, Marcos Mazoni 
was appointed to be the President of SERPRO at the outset of Lula's second term, signaling 
that the FLOSS agenda may have entered a new phase focused on further institutionalization. 
 
Conclusions 
The ability of the FLOSS advocates to promote their agenda resulted primarily from their 
collective mobilization in state and civil society organizations. Built on the strength of a 
social and professional network of experts, the FLOSS advocates drew strength through 
affiliation with the PT as well as the federal government, disseminating ideas and projects 
across a fragmented bureaucratic field. From this position, FLOSS advocates challenged 
dominant ideas about the nature of the knowledge-based economy through a radical, 
politicizing discourse. The discursive component of the agenda transformed public debates 
about information technology and challenge the hegemony of proprietary information 
regimes in Brazil and abroad. At the same time, the FLOSS advocates met with resistance in 
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many of the federal bureaucracies as well as some private sector groups. Their experience 
does not provide a generalizable example of how to transform developmental states or 
implement FLOSS across the Global South. Instead, the case of the FLOSS advocates in 
Brazil reveals key factors and strategies that shaped this process in a specific context and 
with theoretical as well as comparative implications. 
The FLOSS advocates positioned themselves as counter-hegemonic, insurgent experts in 
several different ways that correspond to both my criteria of self-representation and practical 
action. More than any other individual, Sérgio Amadeu promoted a radical discourse aimed at 
re-politicizing information technology and the role of the state in setting industrial 
development policy. From his position in the ITI, Amadeu and his colleagues also performed 
a coordinating role between several of the state agencies and state-owned enterprises, 
promoting a series of policy initiatives across the federal bureaucracy. At the same time, 
people like Marcelo Branco and Mario Teza worked outside of the formal structure of the 
state to expand the social and professional network of FLOSS supporters through the FISL 
and other PSL projects. Finally, and perhaps most significantly for the long-term survival of 
the FLOSS agenda in the Brazilian state, individuals with positions in key state-owned 
technology firms, banks, and enterprises (including, among those mentioned or cited in this 
paper, Marcos Mazoni, Clarice Coppetti, Paulo Maia, João Cassino, Ulisses Pena, Sérgio 
Rosa and Deivi Kuhn) sought to establish FLOSS in the core operations of their 
organizations. In aggregate, these efforts may have produced some successes and some 
failures, but they unquestionably altered the ideological and organizational landscape of 
technology policy-making, re-framing subsequent debates around questions of access, 
freedom, and openness, in addition to questions of profit. Consistent with personal 
experiences in the labor and student movements under the dictatorship, many of these 
individuals saw their actions as a continuation of political struggles for national development, 
economic equality, and access to informational resources. 
At the same time, the FLOSS advocates' position as insurgents was neither uniform, constant, 
nor entirely consistent with the conditions of the global information technology industry. On 
some occasions, as in the case of the cooperation between several federal agencies and IBM, 
strongly politicized FLOSS advocates capitalized on alliances with the private sector while 
downplaying the ways in which these alliances contradicted some of the anti-corporate 
rhetoric employed by Amadeu and others. In addition, the alliances between the FLOSS 
advocates and large IT firms such as IBM and Intel were also indicative of the fact that the 
mainstream of the global IT industry had embraced FLOSS during the early 2000's. This 
transformation does not undermine the possibility that FLOSS could lower royalty and 
licensing costs while advancing certain forms of technological autonomy in Brazil; however, 
it complicates the idea that FLOSS constituted an alternative to multinational capital 
accumulation. Finally, a number of individuals who identified strongly as advocates of public 
sector FLOSS adoption did not necessarily see themselves as leftist insurgents. Adopting 
more liberal stances reminiscent of those held by FLOSS elites in the Global North, these 
individuals tended to be talented engineers who just wanted to maximize the quality, 
performance and affordability of the technologies they used. In a few cases, such as the 
Banco do Brasil, these less ideologically committed FLOSS advocates made the point that 
the political salience of FLOSS had helped them make their case to supervisors eager to 
score points with the new administration. 
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The relationship between the PT and the FLOSS advocates waxed and waned over the course 
of this period. The early affinities between key FLOSS advocates' (such as Valois, Teza, 
Branco, Coppetti, Mazoni, and Amadeu) ideas of political and technological freedoms as 
well as their connections to the labor movement facilitated the emergence of a network of 
FLOSS advocates as well as a coherent FLOSS agenda. Similarly, individual PT leaders in 
some of the most politically and economically influential regions of the country, such as 
Olivio Dutra in Porto Alegre and Jose Dirceu in Sao Paulo, went to great lengths to 
incorporate the FLOSS advocates into public institutions and the PT agenda at key moments. 
However, outside of Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and later Bahia and Parana, questions of 
FLOSS policy did not gain much traction within the party – even after Lula's election to the 
presidency and the appointment of several FLOSS advocates to key positions in the federal 
bureaucracy. In addition, some PT party elites, such as the finance and development ministers 
of the Lula administration, resisted aspects of the FLOSS adoption agenda within the federal 
bureaucracy. In this regard, the ability of individuals like Amadeu to frame the FLOSS 
agenda in such radical terms may have helped to align FLOSS adoption with the PT's public 
image at the same time as it pushed away some of the party's more centrist elements. 
The context of the domestic and global IT industry also played an important role in enabling 
and shaping the FLOSS mobilization, as the FLOSS advocates enjoyed the support of key 
multinational and domestic IT firms that rode the rising tide of IT services following the 
2001 dot-com bust. This alliance appeared somewhat contradictory at times, but generally 
worked to the advantage of all involved. Politically and financially, IBM and other FLOSS-
friendly multinationals lent support and credibility to the FLOSS adoption efforts. While they 
rejected the radical terms in which some FLOSS advocates framed the agenda, they also 
recognized this as just another cost of doing business with the PT. In exchange, several firms 
(but IBM in particular) reaped large, long-term contracts with government agencies; public 
relations support for FLOSS; and a strong, vocal critic of Microsoft, one of their largest 
competitors in the marketplace. In a strictly causal sense, it is impossible to say whether 
private sector support was necessary for the FLOSS agenda to advance as far as it did, but it 
is hard to imagine that the case for federal FLOSS adoption would have been taken seriously 
in the absence of a viable marketplace for FLOSS services and support. 
As a contemporary example of insurgent expertise, the FLOSS mobilization in Brazil 
illuminates several key dynamics of elite-led policy change. First, the FLOSS advocates' 
creation of a network across many state agencies and civil society groups implies a model of 
mobilization in political and economic fields dominated by expertise. In this case, national 
elites with prior connections to public institutions established a coalition that mitigated the 
fragmentation of Brazil's state bureaucracy. Other studies of expert networks intervening in 
the knowledge-based economy demonstrate similar characteristics. Saxenian (2006) 
illustrates how highly trained elites utilized their social networks and cross-cultural 
knowledge to create successful technology firms in India and China. Kapczynski (2008) 
considers how a community of technically-savvy lawyers and policy advocates mobilized to 
promote flexible IP at the multinational level. Taken together, these cases suggest that expert 
communities can and do use their skills to promote economic equality and growth in the 
Global South. The extent to which the collective participation of technological, legal and 
scientific elites may determine the success or failure of such strategies remains to be seen. In 
the case of the FLOSS advocates it may be that their coordinated efforts ultimately will 
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neither overcome the disjointed structure of the Brazilian state nor the political economic 
resistance to their agenda. Subsequent comparisons across national and regional contexts 
should explore the factors that predict these differences in FLOSS-related policy agenda-
setting as well as the consequent variations in policy impacts. 
In more general terms, the history of FLOSS in Brazil provides a reminder that technocratic 
governance institutions are vulnerable to appropriation and transformation. These 
conclusions should not seem surprising in the wake of the neoliberal revolution that swept 
through the post-soviet states and much of the Global South during the 1980's and 90's. 
While national socio-economic conditions played a key role in determining the impact of 
neoliberal policies (Fourcade and Babb, 2002), global diffusion of such policies largely took 
place through an epistemic community of individuals with similar training and values 
(Woods, 2006). Expert reactions against the logic of the market are the inverse of these 
processes and complement other forms of counter-hegemonic struggles (Evans, 2005, 2008). 
Lastly, as the importance of policymaking arenas dominated by technocratic experts have grown 
since the mid-twentieth century, the question of how to make public debate over complex issues 
more accessible and democratic has emerged as a major political and scholarly concern. Both the 
experience of the FLOSS advocates in Brazil as well as the A2K mobilization described by 
Kapczynski (2008) suggest that the possibility of opening up a public debate around intellectual 
property rights may hinge on re-framing technical topics so that their moral and political 
implications become more transparent. This is a suggestive finding that merits substantive 
follow-up. Comparative research should analyze mechanisms and techniques of mobilization in 
the context of development politics and technology policy. The resulting insights can, in turn, 
facilitate an enhanced understanding of how low and middle income countries might create 
policy space to bring about enhanced growth, innovation, and equality in an information age. 
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Participation in Online Creation Communities 
Conventional participation in most industrial countries has decreased in recent decades 
(Blais, 2000). Furthermore, citizens' discontent with the mechanisms and institutions of 
representative democracy has increased (Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Dalton & Wattenberg, 
2000). From the perspective of the evolution of democracy, it could be argued that the 
representative democratic system is in a period of turbulence and readjustment. Some authors 
also argue that the crisis of conventional forms of participation creates resources for new 
forms of participation (Norris, 2002). In this line of thinking, the crisis of participation in 
conventional politics has been accompanied by the increase of non-conventional forms of 
participation and public expression (Norris, 2002; Cain, Dalton & Scarrow, 2003; Stolle, 
Hooghe & Micheletti, 2005). An area of particular interest is how the Internet and the new 
technologies of information and communication (NTI) in general are related to the increase 
of non-conventional forms of participation. Previous research on the Internet and politics 
debate has mostly concentrated on well-established and traditional actors and with mainly 
offline bases (Trechsel, Kies, Mendez, & Schmitter, 2003; Norris, 2002; Römmele, 2003; van 
den Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004; Vedel, 2003). The analysis presented in this paper 
instead concerns online creation communities. 
Online creation communities (OCCs) are a specific type of online community. OCCs are a 
form of collective action performed by individuals that communicate, interact, and cooperate 
in several forms and degrees of participation which are integrated in an eco-system. This 
communication, interaction, and cooperation is mainly via an Internet-based platform for 
participation and with the common goal of knowledge-making and sharing. OCCs result in a 
digital common, that is, an integrated resource of information and knowledge (partly or 
totally) collectively owned and freely accessible to third parties. 
Knowledge-making in the frame of this research is defined as the process of the creation and 
systematization of socially dispersed information and knowledge resources and cognitive 
capabilities resulting in evolving bodies of shared knowledge.  
Other terms used to refer to these types of online communities are mass collaboration, 
common-base peer production, and/or social production (Leadbeater, 2008; Benkler, 2006). 
The OCCs emerge in diverse fields, including scientific communities (i.e., multi-media 
content, scientific resources, political organizing, or linguistic communities).  
OCCs are an interesting form of collective action from two points of view. First, OCCs are 
interesting from the point of view of constituting spaces for civic engagement, the 
dissemination of alternative information, and participation in the public space, which could 
contribute to enriching public discussion in a representative democracy. Second, OCCs are 
interesting from the point of view of citizen engagement in the provision of public goods and 
services based on a commons approach, that is the provision of public goods not necessarily 
linked to the state or other conventional political institutions. 
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Empirical Research Design 
The combination of several approaches and perspectives characterizes the empirical research 
design. Both offline and online methods are used; and a quantitative large-N analysis and a 
qualitatively-oriented comparison of two cases studies contribute to the triangulation of 
methods. 
The large-N Web analysis was based on a sample of 50 units and was analyzed by  
elaborating a codebook, collecting data of digital threads, and producing a descriptive 
statistical analysis of the data.  
For the sampling, a snowball method was used. The strategy for the selection of the units for 
the sample was based on covering a variety of OCCs following several sampling guidelines: 
those with international scope; a balance between larger and smaller OCCs; equilibrium 
between more recent and older organizations; and a balance between the several types of 
knowledge content.  
 After the sample was built, I designed a codebook for the large-N (available on request) 
analysis. The codebook aimed at conducting a structured analysis. The codebook consisted of 
a set of options concerning the presence or otherwise of indicators. I followed the codebook 
for each case, visiting and observing the Web site of each OCC. During the "field notes" 
stage the general impression was also kept. The data was collected in May 2008 and in 
January 2010.  The large-N analysis helped to define the analysis for the case studies and 
their selection.  
The in-depth case studies focused on Wikipedia and openesf.net. Starting in 2001, Wikipedia 
is one of the great successes of collective action on the Web. It is an online encyclopedia built 
through the collaboration of volunteers on the web. It contains millions of articles and ranks 
among the top ten most visited sites. It is based on wiki technology, every one of its articles 
can be edited by anyone – credentials are not checked. Changes are visible to everyone 
immediately, without any review cycle. The platform that hosts Wikipedia is provided by the 
Wikimedia Foundation.  
The other case study is openesf.net. Openesf.net is a platform provided by the European 
Social Forum (ESF). The ESF is the main gathering of social movements in Europe. It is the 
European section of the World Social Forum, which started in 2001 as a meeting of 
alternatives and to critique the neoliberal approach of the World Economic Forum of Davos. 
Both Social Forums host platforms for archiving information on the forums, developing the 
forum program, facilitating the network among the forum participants, and allowing the 
collective (re)construction of the memory of the forums. It covers issues such as the 
alternative economy, neoliberal criticism, and environmentalism, among other issues.  
One of the positive aspects of this case selection is the independence of the cases. These 
cases have multiple causes, diverse roots, and varied trajectories. However, similar 
organizational principles are involved regardless of the substantive contexts. 
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I combined several methods in carrying out these case studies. Furthermore, I did not follow 
the same plan for each case. Before starting this work, I had already researched the Social 
Forum case study, but not alongside Wikipedia. In this regard, I carried out fewer interviews 
for the Social Forum case because I was already familiar with it. Furthermore, for the Social 
Forum case, I developed statistical analysis of participation data for Openesf.net, since such 
data were not already available, while for the Wikipedia case, I did not analyze data on 
participation because there was already information available from previous empirical 
research.  
Data on the social forums was collected and developed during 2007 and 2008. The 
Wikimedia data collection took place between July 2008 and August 2009. 
The data for the openesf.net case study was collected using online ethnography; participant 
observation at meetings of ESF organizers; 25 interviews of main ESF organizers, 
openesf.net providers and participants, assuring a plurality of nationalities and backgrounds; 
and most importantly the statistical analysis of participation data available about the Web 
site.1 
 The data collection for the statistical analysis of participation in openesf.net was extracted 
through online ethnography on 4, 5, 6, and 7 March 2008. The data was extracted for the 
complete population (220 participants and 62 projects). Field notes were also made during 
the data collection. (The codebook on participation data can be provided on request). 
 It is worth mentioning that Openesf.net closed in March 2010 due to a lack of resources of 
the ESF. 
The Wikipedia case study evidence was gathered through online ethnography; participant 
observation at meetings of Wikipedians, the annual meeting of Wikipedians (Wikimania), 
and at the Wikimedia Foundation headquarters; and 35 interviews with Wikipedians of 
several nationalities and backgrounds. For the Wikipedia case I did not analyze data on 
participation, using instead the available data from previous research. More concretely, I used 
the data available from the wiki analytics developed by the Wikimedia Foundation and 
available at the Web site, and the research conducted on the ten bigger linguistic Wikipedia 
by Ortega & Gonzalez-Barahona (2009).2 
                                                 
1 Online ethnographies were conducted for the mailing list and online spaces at the openesf.net Web team 2008, 
Openesf team 2008, fse-esf mailing list, Nordic ESF Documentation and Nordic Web group; for the Web sites 
fse-esf.org, openesf.net, openelibrary.info and esf2008.org; and for weekly chat meetings of the ESF Web team. 
Interviews were carried out during the European Preparatory Meetings. Participant observation was carried out 
at the European preparatory Assemblies and ESF Web team meetings at Lisbon April 2007; Stockholm 
September 2007; Istanbul December 2007; Berlin February 2008; and, Kiev June 2008. 
 
2 Online ethnography of English, Italian and Spanish Wikipedia and of the mailing list foundation_l, Wiki-
research-l and Wikipedia_l.  Participant observation at Wikimedia Italia annual meeting: Rome, September 
2007; Meet up Palo Alto November 2008; Wiki meet up Boston October 2009; Ten Days volunteering at 
Wikimedia Foundation (From 10 to 20 December 2008); Wikimania. Buenos Aires August 2009; and 
Wikimedia Italia annual meeting at Rome in September 2009. 
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Distribution of Participation in Content Generation in OCCs 
Highly cooperative OCCs are emerging around online media (i.e. Wikis, e-lists, Internet 
forums). The question is: how is participation organized in such forms of collective action?  
Research on the distribution of participation in online communities suggests some common 
features of the distribution of participation in content generation in online communities. A 
very low percentage of committed participants usually account for a disproportionately large 
amount of the content; a low percentage of participants that make very small or indirect 
contributions; and, finally, a large presence of individuals that do not participate. This 
distribution of participation is known as 90/9/1 principle or 1% power law (Hill, Hollan, 
Wroblewski, & McCandless, 1992; Horowitz, 2006; McConnell & Huba, 2006; Nielsen, 
1997;). It refers to the general observation that 90% of visitors are lurkers who read or 
observe but never contribute, 9% who contribute a little or from time to time, and 1% of 
participants who contribute a lot and account for almost all the content and system activity 
(Nielsen, 2006).  
Lurker is a term that refers to a person who reads discussions and observes an interactive 
system, but rarely, if ever, posts or participates. However, many lurkers feel that they are part 
of the community (Nonnecke & Preece, 2000). 
Even before the Web was invented researchers documented participation inequality in a 
variety of online media (Hill, Hollan, Wroblewski & McCandless, 1992; Nielsen, 1997; 
Whittaker, Terveen, Hill & Cherny, 1998). In a study of more than 2 million messages on 
Usenet, Whittaker, Terveen, Hill & Cherny found that the most active 3% of posters 
contributed 25% of the messages, while 27% were from people who posted only a single 
message (1998). The presence of lurkers was also documented by initial online communities 
such as the Well (Rheingold, 1993; Turner, 2006). In Free and Open Source projects 
(FLOSS), a small amount of very active participants are responsible for the vast majority of 
the work (Ghosh & Prakash 2000; Koch & Schneider, 2002; Mockus, Fielding & Herbsleb, 
2002). This behavior in FLOSS is not only specific to source code production, but can 
generally be found in other elements in software, such as documentation and translation tasks 
(Robles, Gonzalez-Barahona & Merelo, 2006).  
Previous analyses of Wikipedia have addressed the question of participation distribution and 
showed that contributions to Wikipedia also present strong inequalities. Depending on the 
research, the importance of a “core team” as the main contributor of most of the content is 
more or less balanced with the contributions of a long line of less frequent participants. 
Jimmy Wales, the founder of Wikipedia, originally noted in December 2005 that "half the 
edits by logged in users belong to just 2.5% of logged in users." (Wales, 2005). Research 
since 2005, particularly by Kittur, Chi, Pendleton, Suh, & Mytkowic, measuring contribution 
differently by different classes of editors, showed that elite contributions (10,000 or more 
edits) were less powerful in comparison with the "long tail" of small participants. The authors 
put it in this way: “Power of the Few Vs. Wisdom of the Crowd: Wikipedia and the Rise of 
the Bourgeoisie” (2005). However, Ortega & Gonzalez-Barahona later concluded that less 
than 10% of the total number of authors are responsible for more than the 90% of the total 
number of contributions or, in the opposite terms, 90% of the active editors are responsible 
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for less than 10% of the total number of contributions. Ortega & Gonzalez-Barahona's results 
reduced the importance of the "long tail" and instead reinforced the idea that contributions by 
the most active participants overwhelm contributions by the crowd of sporadic authors. 
According to these authors, the evolution of this inequality over time remains very stable 
(with a typical value of between 80% and 85% of content produced by a core team). 
Furthermore, all the top-ten languages of Wikipedia showed a similar pattern. A very variable 
behavior pattern at the very beginning of each Wikipedia (up to 20 months) then altering and 
showing a common growing trend of inequality, characteristic of mature Wikipedia 
environments in every language. Finally, these authors also pointed out that the “core team” 
of very active participants is not necessarily formed by the same individuals over time 
(2009).  
Concerning the openesf.net case, previous research on the social forum has not paid attention 
to the distribution of participation in the online platforms linked to them. To fill this gap, I 
analyzed the actual participation at the openesf.net, an online community hosted by the 
European Social Forum.    
Participation at the ESF is organized around both organizations and individuals. However, I 
analyzed participation in openesf.net in terms of individual participation, since the large 
majority of the accounts (97,19%) are registered with the name of an individual rather than 
an organization. 
Concerning participation by generating content, the results of the analysis showed that 18 % 
of the participants generated content and 82 % of the participants did not. Among the 
participants that did generate content the more frequent contributors are those that generated 
content for only one project (14,2%) while the rest generated content for two to seven 
projects (3,7%).   
The results show that 18% of participants generated content and 82% did not. Within the 
18% of content generators, 3,7% were very active participants (generated content in more 
than one project) and 14,3 % were less active participants. In this regard openesf.net follows 
an 82/14,3/3,7 rule. Several reasons could underlie the higher percentages at openesf.net as 
opposed to 90/9/1. On the one hand, openesf.net is not completely open, it requires 
registration which already indicates a higher commitment to participation. If we consider 
participation in terms of only visiting the site (without registering) the percentage of active 
participation would be lower, as the number of participants with lower commitment would 
increase in contrast to those with higher commitment. On the other hand, participants in 
openesf.net also meet in organizational meetings and during the ESF itself. The fact that 
openesf.net participants have other ways of knowing and meeting each other could affect the 
way people act on the site, for example, it could be the case that it increases participation as 
some of the participants already know each other. 
Furthermore, the results depend on how content is conceived. The generation of content was 
strictly defined as activities which are not directly related to personal information. Content 
was understood as the creation of spaces for a project, the editing of wiki pages in the 
projects and the upload of documents or other audio-visual material in the projects. Instead, if 
we look at participation in terms of “exhibitionism”, that is considering if the participant 
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provides not compulsory information about him/her at the participant page, then the results 
change. 44,9% of participants provided at least one extra item of information about 
her/himself in the registration process. In this regard, if we consider providing personal data 
as content generation, 44,9 % of users would be considered participants. According to 
Bimber, Flanagin & Stohl one primary effect of NTIs is to make boundaries between private 
and public domains porous and easily crossed (2005). In this regard, the decision to consider 
the provision of personal data as content or not must be taken carefully, as it would change 
the results on the distribution of participation in content generation.  
In sum, the tendency to inequality seems to be characteristic of most online communities. 
However, actual percentages per each profile (active participants/participants/lukers) may not 
follow the 90/9/1 principle to the letter. Percentages for each profile may depend on what the 
content is and the protocols for participation in each community. For example, for some 
communities the percentage of active participants is a bit higher, as will be shown in the 
following section for the Openesf community case, while in other cases, such as YouTube, 
only 0.16% of visitors upload content (Source: 90-9-1.com). From this analysis it also 
emerges that depending on how active content contribution is conceived, results may vary 
substantially. In order to develop rigorous comparisons of participation at OCCs shared 
indicators of participation in content generation must be established - which is difficult due to 
the diversity of content addressed by OCCs.  
 
Organizational Logic of Participation in OCCs 
In the previous section, I addressed the distribution of content generation among the 
participants according to quantitative data on participation. In this section a qualitatively-
oriented analysis will be presented instead, in order to approach the organizational logic and 
main organizational principles of the OCCs’ environment. Environment refers to the 
architecture or structure of the space combined with the social norms and values that regulate 
it. Additionally, how the several organizational principles relate to each other will form part 
of the analysis. Finally, reflections on how these organizational principles affect types of 
participation, and, more concretely, result in the 90/9/1 principle, will also be presented.  
My analysis departs from the assumption that collective actions following a representational 
ethos and collective actions following a participative ethos have their own distinctive logics 
and dynamics. The meaning and function of participation in a representative organization 
could be different from participation in an open-to-participation organization. Furthermore, 
online environments have some constraints that could affect the way participation takes 
place.  
 
Main organizational principles of participation in OCCs 
a) Openness to participation 
Openness to participation is the main principle in OCCs. Concrete indicators of the openness 
to participation dimension are the provision of multi-interactivity channels of participation 
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that allow participation in the content hosted at the site, and the protocols that guide those 
applications. Protocols refer, for example, to low requirements for credentials to participate. 
According to Reagle, this open character has a non-discriminatory meaning, and "prohibits 
arbitrary discrimination against persons, groups, or characteristics not relevant to the 
community’s scope of activity" (2004).  
According to the large-N analysis, OCCs usually have an average of 4 different channels of 
participation (i.e. the possibility to add comments to a specific section of the contents, upload 
materials, and edit Web pages, among others). The protocols that guide participation in OCCs 
appear to incentivise participation in a high percentage of the cases (i.e. 80% of the 
registration systems allow automatic registration without requiring any filter to become part 
of the platform). 
By highlighting the importance of the openness to participation principle in OCCs, I am not 
implying that all OCCs are equally accessible. OCCs constitute a substantial reduction of the 
barriers to information and knowledge. However, the level of inclusion of OCCs and the 
reduction of sources of barriers to participation is not absolute and depends on the issue dealt 
with. In terms of information usability, the analysis shows that this is an important aspect of 
the OCCs (all the cases have at least one indicator of usability). However, in other aspects 
linked to inclusion OCCs perform badly. For example, OCCs turned out not to be inclusive in 
terms of accessibility for people with physical disabilities. In terms of inclusion by reducing 
the barriers to use and access the technology which supports the collective action, the OCCs 
are again irregular. Some OCCs have mechanisms to reduce the barriers linked to the 
technical base, however 16% of the cases have none.  
Although the OCCs are characterized by the importance of openness to participation, the 
participant observation data showed that equal participation and contributions did not seem to 
be expected.  
While according to the representative ethos, equal participation (understood as equal 
representations of all voices) constitutes one of the pillars of legitimacy in representative 
systems, in OCCs, equality seems to refer to the openness for participation (as a possibility) 
rather than in the resulting participation and contribution. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that openness to participation has a trade off. It does result in 
disruptive behavior, such as spam or vandalism.  
Concerning the case studies, in both of these the indicators for the importance of openness as 
defined for the large-N analysis are present: that is, both cases adopted easy to use 
technology and channels for open participation, plus a lack of requirements for credentials or 
other requirements in order to intervene. However, in contrast to Wikipedia, where a person 
can intervene in the content without being registered, in openesf the user must register in 
order to intervene. Registration is however automatic, and so it is not a very high barrier to 
openness to participation. Furthermore, openesf.net had different degrees of openness. 
Openesf.net is divided into projects and each project can decide the level of openness for 
intervening in the project, choosing between: open to any person registered at openesf.net or 
open only to members of each specific group at openesf.net.  
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Finally, in the discourses of both cases it is emphasized that the community provides the 
accessibility to participation. For example, when Wikipedia is presented as "the encyclopedia 
that anyone can edit" (Source: Wikipedia main entrance). 
The emphasis on the openness to participation principle impressed in the environment does 
not necessarily result in actual participation, that is it does not necessarily mean that the 
OCCs see high participation. If an OCC is participated in or not is a difficult, but overall a 
relative question. The maximum level of participation depends on the actual goal and target 
constituency of each case. As will be presented in the following, the openness to participation 
principle is at the service of the goal or mission of each OCC.  
In terms of resulting participation in the case studies, it may be said that Wikipedia achieved 
a high level of participation in accordance with its goal. As mentioned previously, empirical 
research showed that 10% of the participants generate 90% of the content (Ortega & 
Gonzalez-Barahona, 2009). Considering that 10% of the very active participants in 
Wikipedia number more than 300.000, it can be concluded that Wikipedia is highly 
participated in (Source, Wikimedia Foundation). More than 300,000 participants is a high 
level of participation if we compare with other forms of organizing for the achievement of a 
similar goal, such as the Encyclopedia Britannica (Emigh & Herring, 2005).  
Furthermore, the Wikipedia community accomplishes its goal. Wikipedia is the largest 
encyclopedia in history. There does not seem to be a problem with a lack of participation in 
Wikipedia. On the contrary, on some occasions a problem of "too much participation" occurs. 
This happen when the levels of participation are so high that technically the system is not 
able to sustain the amount of activity and collapses. This occurred for example after the 11 
September 2001 attacks or the Obama elections, during which many people wanted to keep 
Wikipedia updated (Interview Tomasz Finc, Wikimedia Software Developer, San Francisco, 
November 2009).  
Interestingly, from my participant observation, I noticed some signs that suggest that 
inequality in terms of contributions does not seem to be interpreted as a problem among the 
Wikipedia participants. GerardM, an active wikipedian, spoke out in an mailing list against 
the idea of regular equal contributor and for valuing all community forms: “When you divide 
people up in groups, when you single out the ones "most valuable" (because they contribute 
more), you in effect divide the community. (...). When you label groups of people, you divide 
them and it is exactly the egalitarian aspect (independently of their contribution) that makes 
the community thrive” (GerardM e-mail to the mailing list Wiki-research-l 21 October 2008). 
However, this hypothesis on how Wikipedia interprets the inequality of participation would 
require further research to be fully analyzed.  
Concerning the resulting participation in openesf.net, the picture is less clear. Openesf.net is 
the first tool based on the open participation principle to actually raise significant 
participation in the Social Forums. However, the levels of participation at openesf.net are low 
(less than 1200 registered at the highest point) in contrast with the number of participants in 
the ESF (between 20,000 and 60,000 people registered at the ESF, depending on the year) 
(Source, main page of the European Social Forum).  
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Furthermore, in terms of the interpretation of the inequality of participation in openesf.net, 
there is a discrepancy among ESF participants. In some of the interviews with ESF 
participants some resistance to the adoption of open platforms was expressed, because they 
could increase sources of inequality in participation, while others do not mention this reason 
or do not consider inequality a problem in itself. So again, more systematic research on this 
specific question would be required in order to investigate the interpretation of inequality of 
participation in openesf.net and in OCCs more generally. 
 
b) Participation is possible in multiple forms and to different degrees  
Participation is possible in multiple forms and to different degrees. Multiple forms refers to 
task distribution. Not all participants necessarily fulfill the same tasks, but can choose among 
several (i.e. adding new content, editing content, classifying content, among others). One 
person could contribute with non-edited information while another participant takes care of 
editing it and increasing its quality. Some tasks may require more effort and commitment 
than others, however, tasks in most of the cases are highly divided, so that each participant 
can develop just a small part of a module, or a large part of it, facilitating the scaling of the 
participation. 
This must not be confounded with a lack of structure, on the contrary the system is highly 
structured. The environment is split into modules, which makes it easy to locate information 
without knowing what occurs on the overall site. Search engines and meta-data systems, 
which are present in 98% of the cases, allow all the modules to be put together, making them 
easier to handle. 
It may also be worth mentioning another type of participation present, "bots", that is a 
program developed and controlled by specific participants to execute specific and repeatable 
acts (such as automatic corrections) which are on some occasions responsible for a large 
amount of activity. 
That participation is possible to different degrees refers to different levels of commitment to 
the site in terms of time and active task performance. The environment’s design allows 
different availabilities for contributions to be accommodated, which, furthermore, results in 
the three main profiles of participation: very active or strong, weak and non-participant. 
Several empirical studies have shown how a mixture of strong and weak ties are crucial for 
organizational success in social movement organizing (Campbell 2005, p.64; Mansbridge 
1986; Morris, 2000, p. 450; Uzzi, 1996).  
Very active and committed participants are present. That is, people who have a large degree 
of commitment to the process and dedicate a great deal of time and a large volume of work or 
complex effort to it. 
The formation of a “critical mass” of active participants is particularly important for starting 
an online community. In Howard Rheingold’s (a proponent of the virtual community) words: 
“An online community either gets started or it doesn’t. The first important stage is growth, at 
the very beginning. If you do not have a critical mass of participation – that could be ten 
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people! (then the online community doesn't get started). But then you’re going to have to 
scale that so that it’s not overwhelming for people.” (Interview Howard Rheingold, Palo Alto, 
December 2009).  
Sporadic or low level participants are also present. The modular organization and task 
distribution makes it easy to make only small or weak contributions.   
The weak ties enable OCCs to reach populations and audiences that are not accessible via 
strong ties. That is, people who can contribute only sporadically, but not with high levels of 
commitment.  
At FLOSS, the low level of active commitment required among participants is seen as an 
advantage (Freeman & Rogers, 2002). Granovetter suggests the importance of weak ties for 
collective action. Weak ties favor reaching vast and diverse fields of information resources 
(Granovetter, 2005). The concept of weak cooperation, as proposed by Cardon and Aguiton 
(2007), refers to this characteristic of the relational model of online-based collective action. 
According to these authors, online cooperation around a common goal generally creates 
weak links (but a large network) in comparison with offline collective action (Cardon & 
Aguiton, 2007).  
In sum, both strong and weak participation are present and accommodated in OCCs. Weak 
and strong participation constitute important contributions to the community. Furthermore, 
non-participation or unintended participation is also present and plays a role.  
Non-participation could be characterized as free riding behavior. However, free riding, and in 
general the fact that a large percentage of people do not contribute, do not necessarily 
constitute a problem for the achievement of the common goal of OCCs. Free riding 
constitutes an impediment depending on the good the community aims to build. With 
exhaustible goods, such as natural resources, which can be “used up” and are costly to 
extract, free riding constitutes a problem. But in a context where new information and 
communication technologies have substantially decreased the cost of the reproduction of 
information, goods-based information, like that provided by OCCs, do not necessarily face 
scarcity problems. When goods are non-exhaustible, non-competitive and exclusion from 
their use is costly, then free riding is not necessarily a problem. It is even said that OCCs are 
anti-rival (Weber, 2006). They are not only non-rival in the sense that they can tolerate free 
riding without reducing their stock of value, but are actually anti-rival in the sense that as a 
whole OCCS positively benefit from free riders. That is, ironically, the value of the outcome 
of the OCCs increases when more people use them (Benkler, 2006; Bollier, 2008). This 
implies that for any participant, whether contributor or "free rider", the mere "use" implies a 
contribution. Nevertheless, this is only so where there is a sufficient number of contributors. 
There are several mechanisms by which the value of a digital commons resulting from OCCs 
increases as more people "use" it.  
Firstly, non-participants contribute due to network effects. When network effects are present, 
as more people "use" the same product or service the more valuable it is.  
Secondly, in online environments most of the actions are translated into digital information, 
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known as digital threads, the elaboration of the digital threads are a source of very valuable 
information to improve the content and environment functioning. It could provide relational 
and attention data. For example, the environment can learn about the connections between 
content according to how users navigate across them. Or the number of times an article was 
visited or downloaded could be used as an indicator of quality.  
Thirdly, the non-active participants also play a role as audience. Free-rider audiences 
increase the relevance and value of the site’s content and increase the motivations for 
participation.   
Finally, it is also worth considering that even though exclusion is present in OCCs, restricting 
access to non-participants could be costly. 
Concerning the case studies, both Wikipedia and openesf.net are based on a modular and 
high task distribution architecture. Plus, as presented in the previous section, both at 
openesf.net and Wikipedia the distinction of strong/weak/non-participants is present.  
 
c) Modularity and decentralized participation  
The modular organization of the environment with the splitting of content into separate units 
(such as articles, software packages, albums of thematic pictures etc.) not only facilitates the 
presence of several degrees of participation, but also regulates the decentralization of activity, 
which facilitates the scaling of participation. 
Not all participants are involved in all the projects or modules, instead, particularly as the 
OCCs grow, there is a recurrent tendency for participation to split or fragment into projects or 
modules.  
Empirical research has been carried out on the relationship between centralization and project 
size in FLOSS. According to Crowston & Howison, centralization scores are negatively 
correlated with the number of active participants. “In a large project, it is simply not possible 
for a single individual to be involved in fixing every bug (errors). As projects grow, they have 
to become more modular, with different people responsible for different modules. In other 
words, a large project might be an aggregate of smaller projects, resulting in what might be 
described as a ‘shallot-shaped’ structure, with layers around multiple centres” (2004, p. 15). 
In Lanzara & Morner terms: "a characteristic feature of development communities is that the 
process oddly combines a slow global convergence (among all the participants) on the one 
hand and short and fast local activity cycles" between a small number of participants on the 
other (2004, p. 20). 
Additionally, distributing the environment between modules favors the scaling of 
participation. The participation of many people in a single (central) place is more difficult to 
handle.  
The division into projects and the resulting decentralization of the participation is present in 
both the Wikipedia and the openesf.net cases.  
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Concerning the Wikipedia case, only very rarely are there occasions which co-involve the 
entire Wikipedia community. Most of the activities of Wikimedia projects are based on the 
interaction of small groups. Interviewees even mention a profile of participants “that just 
write articles in his corner” (Interview Jon Davis, Wikipedian, Berkeley, November 2009).  
Concerning the openesf.net case, any participant can be part of all the projects. In fact, 41,5% 
of the projects are composed by one only member, the rest are composed of 2 to 27 members. 
The projects with 3 members are the most frequent (20,8%).  
 The decentralized character of the participation is a significant characteristic of the OCCs. It 
is significant in its contrasts with, for example, social movement organizing, such the cases of 
the Social Forums process or the Euromayday (mobilization process around labor precarity in 
Europe). In traditional social movement organizing, collective action or "doing something 
together" is conceived of as experiencing moments and places together, such as a decision-
making assembly which gathers all the participants. In the case of OCCs, collective action is 
not a moment or place of "unification", but instead a form of being together in a fragmented 
or decentralized way.  
 The decentralized and fragmented character of OCCs opens up the question of what links 
them. Importantly, collective action is driven by a common mission (as we will see below). 
However, it is worth mentioning that in terms of the aggregation of the common, 
decentralized form of the OCCs, also have "trade-offs”. After observing OCCs I began to 
suspect that the aggregation of the "collective will" (beyond the common mission) become 
more problematic in this form. Moments which require a collective "voice" in OCCs and 
which are difficult to achieve with a community form are, for example, decisions on 
important changes in the site architecture or requirements which arrive from the external 
world (such as legal questions). However, more research would need to be carried out to 
confirm these impressions. 
 AAdditionally, in terms of what links the whole modules, they share the space (the platform) 
and norms. Furthermore, the use of the same protocols or language links or connects the 
fragmented or decentralized pieces. In my view, this constitutes lateral forms of aggregations, 
(more than hierarchical forms or a unification by centralization form) which are essential to 
the OCCs’ organizational logic. 
 
d) Participation is asynchronous 
As presented in the previous section, participation is decentralized and there are few tasks in 
which all participants are involved, it is very rare that all participants are expected to 
congregate at the same time. 
Members are typically geographically dispersed and the platform is their means of interaction 
(Kollock, 1999). Furthermore, in OCCs of international scope, the time zones of the 
participants can be very different, which makes it difficult to meet at the same time. 
A moment in which participants congregate at the same time is during physical encounters. 
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Interestingly, some interviewees said that as more online interaction takes place, there is 
more need to meet physically.  
Asynchronic participation is present in all the cases studies. In the two cases, there are 
organized "local" meetings among the participants. Plus, both of the case study OCCs hold 
an annual meeting. For the case of Openesf the annual meeting is much bigger than the 
online community; while for Wikipedia the opposite is true. Wikimania, the annual meeting 
of Wikipedia, gathers a small fraction of the community, and from my participant 
observation, I noticed that those who attended tend to be the more strongly committed. In the 
case of the ESF, there is also organized synchronized communication through chats.  
 
e) Participation is mission-oriented and methodologically plural 
The online frame and the communication possibilities available define the possible 
organization of the OCCs, and explain some of the organizational choices present, but the 
issue for analysis in the sector is that the agenda of each OCC also shapes the organizational 
choices.  
Collective action is understood as the pursuit of a goal or set of goals by more than one 
person. The goal or mission of an OCC is very specific and limited, to build a specific 
information pool. 
I observed that the level of attachment to the mission among each of the different forms and 
degrees of participation present in the OCCs could be different. That is, there are participants 
who seem strongly committed, while others do not seem to consider the common mission 
when they intervene. In this regard, as there are different degrees of participation, there are 
different degrees in the identification of each individual with the overall mission and goal. 
Some participants do strongly identify and build an identity as part of the OCC. However, 
participants do not need to identify with the project as a whole in order to participate. Along 
the same lines, Stalder argues that the majority of the participants have an individualistic 
approach to the platform and very few participants have a holistic interest in caring about the 
dynamic of the whole platform (Transcripts discussion on web communities, Networked 
Politics Seminar, 2007). In this regard, OCCs are based on a change in the identity building 
of the individual. From an identity building based on a relationship with big projects, such as 
political parties or churches, there is a move to the development of a networked individual 
identity, “where individual self-identity – both in terms of the image one has of oneself and 
the image others have of one - can no longer be separated from one’s position within a 
relational network” (Stalder, 2007; Wellman, 2001). 
Furthermore, several empirical researchers have concluded that the motivations to participate 
in fulfilling the common goal are also very diverse (Benkler, 2006; Weber, 2004). 
Interestingly, researchers point out how OCCs are able to bring together people with very 
diverse political orientations (Coleman, 2004; Colleman & Mako, 2004).  
However, interdependently of the linkage between the common mission and the individuals, 
the overall OCC environment, its architecture and its norms, is shaped by the fulfillment of 
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the common mission.  
In order to transmit the relevance of the mission in defining the organizational choices it is 
interesting to compare OCCs with other forms of collective action. For example, in the frame 
of the global social movement, organizational choices are greatly influenced by 
methodological ideals (della Porta, 2009), that is, following specific methods (such as 
decision-making by consensus) is very present in the GJM’s organizational choices. In 
contrast, OCCs are more characterized by choosing methods according to their effectiveness 
in fulfilling the mission. As a result, OCCs are characterized by methodological pluralism or 
polymorphism. That is, the coexistence of several working or decision-making styles. That is, 
there is no one single way to solve all the situations of the site, but a flexible approach that 
adopts several methods. It could also result in a heterachy between the positions of 
participants.3 In the famous FLOSS catchphrase, "rough consensus and running code" 
captures the sense that actions working towards the accomplishment of the mission are more 
valuable than the use of a precise method. The methodological pluralism of the OCCs might 
appear as a lack of coherence of the overall system. However, for some researchers, this 
apparently chaotic diversity becomes a powerful resource for knowledge making and 
innovation (Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
For example, as previously presented, openness to participation is a key principle in OCCs. 
However, this does not imply that for every task the OCCs must follow the same method 
developed in a participative way, this may depend on the requirements for fulfilling each 
aspect. 
This mission-oriented principle also implies that the organization follows a logic of 
accomplishing a collective goal, not a logic of representation of the people involved. This 
also explains the expectations and evaluations of participation distribution. That is, insofar as 
a distribution of participation in a 90/9/1 manner does not create an impediment to the 
accomplishment of the mission, unequal distribution will not be considered a problem.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, when analyzing OCCs, this methodological pluralism 
should be recognized, instead of trying to reduce OCCs to just one of their expressions.  
Concerning the case studies, Wikipedia’s mission reads "Imagine a world in which every 
single human being can freely share in the sum of all knowledge. That's our commitment" 
(Source: Wikimedia Foundation main page ). In terms of how the mission shapes the 
expectations of participation, further research might give a more precise and complete picture 
of the variety of expectations, however, the way in which Sue Gardner, executive director of 
the Foundation, expresses it is significant: "we need sufficient people to do the work that 
needs to be done". "But the purpose of the project is not participation". 
In terms of polymorphy or methodological pluralism, I observed that in Wikipedia most 
activity is developed in a form primarily based on open groups on specific articles using 
consensus decision-making. However the community combines this with a heterogeneous, 
sometimes secondary options mechanism to force decision-making, block the violation of 
policies and keep the process within certain margins. For example, on some occasions 
alternative forms of decision-making such as polls and voting are adopted. Heterogeneous 
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forms refers to hierarchies of administrators and other roles with other privileges, tasks 
assigned historically to respected individuals and a symbolic leader (the founder).  
Concerning the openesf.net case, openesf.net does not have a mission in itself, but is a "tool" 
for support the working groups in their roles within a much larger process, the ESF, whose 
goal or motto is that to "change the world is possible" (Source ESF Web site main page).  
This lack of a common mission specific to the platform could explain why the 
methodological pluralism of openesf.net is much more deep and of a different character than 
seen in the other case. Openesf.net is based on different projects or modules, like the other 
case. Each of the projects has similar features (e-lists, wiki pages, etc.). However, there is no 
fixed structure about what has to be done in each of the projects, as is the case for Wikipedia, 
where what can be done is loosely defined by the architecture of the space and norms. While 
in the other case methodological pluralism refers to different methods for solving different 
tasks, in openesf.net methodological pluralism refers to different strategies about what to do 
in openesf.net.  
Each group at openesf.net adapts its use of the site to its own communicational strategies. 
This makes the incorporation of new participants into the openesf.net projects difficult, as a 
person must understand what each project is doing in order to be able to contribute. While in 
Wikipedia, modules share a similar structure, which makes the flow of people and content 
among them easier. 
 
f) Participation is based on autonomous individuals and volunteers 
Participation is autonomous, firstly, in the sense that each person has the autonomy to decide 
his or her level of commitment and in how he or she wants to contribute on the basis of 
personal interests, motivations, resources and abilities. The autonomy of participants in 
driving their actions favors decentralization. The distribution of participation is not based on 
the centralized planning of the action, but on decentralized, volunteer entrepreneurialism 
from the participants.  
Secondly, participants are volunteers. They do not have a contractual labor relationship with 
the community, even if some participants may develop their contributions as part of their 
work outside the community (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). As a consequence, each 
participant assumes the costs of participation (in terms of time, connectivity costs, and 
education skills, among others), which results in a distribution of costs.  
All the cases share these characteristics of autonomous and volunteered participation.  
The volunteer character of participation could contribute to the scaling of participation or 
not: as far as people have the resources required to participate, they will be able to contribute. 
The participants are able to contribute according to their own resources of time, skills or 
money. According to the civic voluntarism model (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995), 
resources are a key factor in understanding why some people participate whereas others do 
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not. Resource-rich participants with free-time, connectivity, skills and money can contribute 
more easily than those without such resources, and so the resource-rich tend to be 
disproportionately represented among participants. In this regard, participation in OCCs 
could reproduce social and economical inequalities present in society. For example, looking 
at the gender distribution of participation at the openesf.net shows that only 36 % of active 
participants are women. While in the case of Wikipedia, previous research concluded that 
women accounted for 10% to 23% (Ortega, 2010; Glott, Schmidt & Ghosh, 2009). 
However, the resource theories applied to OCCs could adapt their analyses to these types of 
organizational form. OCCs accommodate the different levels of availability and resources of 
participants. In this regard, it could be useful to apply resource theories according to different 
degrees of participation (active participation, weak contribution and lurking) - in other words, 
to analyze if there are systematic differences in distribution according to criteria such as age, 
gender, time, money or income, physical disabilities and the digital divide along the 90/9/1 
principle. 
Furthermore, the lack of resources may not be the only explanatory variable. Even people 
with the necessary resources may decide not to participate for a variety of reasons such as 
questions of identity or personality. For example, people who identify themselves as creative 
and/or are more adapted to public exposure may be more likely to participate. 
Additionally, the costs (human force) of producing digital commons as assumed by the 
participants open another perspective for interpreting the sense of participation. Digital 
commons (partially or totally depending of the case) are accessible to third parties who do 
not contribute to their production. From this perspective, participation appears not as a 
"privilege", but as a contribution to society or a "donation".  
 
g) Participation is public and content is publicly accessible 
Most OCCs are public. Their public character has to do with external and internal 
requirements. External here refers to a communicative issue, the goal to spread the contents 
to the external world. The internal refers to organizational issues.  
OCCs provide a public good or service, anyone can access their “outcome”. This public 
character of the OCCs’ outcomes is also referred to as free or open. The type of ownership of 
the content in OCCs, regulated by the license, promotes free access. 
On some occasions, the type of license also favors the re-use of the content. In such cases, 
the content can be moved by someone else and it is possible to re-launch the interaction in a 
different direction. This is known as forking. However, not all the OCCs are based on 
conditions of forkability. According to the large-N analysis, free licenses over all content are 
present in 68,1% of the cases. 78 % of the OCCs use FLOSS, which also favors forkability, 
the remaining 18% use proprietary software.  
Secondly, digital commons are developed in public, indeed it would be more accurate to say 
OCCs live in public. In this regard, from the large-N analysis of OCCs it emerged that in 88 
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% of the cases the content of communications among participants is publicly accessible. That 
is, it is possible to read the content of communications among participants without 
registering.  
The public, or the transparent, character of the organizational process favors openness to 
participation. Participants can enter the organizational process without having to fulfill any 
previous requirement. Public organizing also favors the training of new participants. New 
participants can see how others perform some tasks. Finally, it also favors the autonomy and 
decentralization of participation and the coordination of participation without a predefined 
plan or gatekeeper to distribute roles. Participants can themselves identify where 
contributions are needed and at what level they wish to get involved. 
In the Wikipedia case the whole process is visible to all, not only the resulting content. The 
channels that host the interaction (such as Wikis, mailing lists, IRC, meet-ups etc) are public 
by default.  
In the case of openesf.net, each project creator may choose how public each project may or 
may not be. They decide whether the project will be accessible to the general public, only to 
people registered at openesf.net or only to members of that particular project. However, the 
majority of the projects have a public character. 
 
h) Participation is implementation 
Participation is mainly based on implementing tasks by directly creating or editing content. 
This is not a major risk. Online interaction facilitates the undoing of actions, and so mistakes 
are not irreparable. Plus, the content is conceived of as a permanent work in progress.  
Participation as implementation is a major characteristic of participation in OCCs. As 
presented in the mission-oriented principles, the environment is shaped by the 
accomplishment of a goal, building a digital commons. Participants "build" or "do".  
Participation as doing goes beyond participation understood as deliberation. The goal of the 
participation is not to put together opinions, argue about issues and/or take decisions. To 
participate is to implement decisions. Deliberation is developed through the doing and 
undoing of content. There is no separation between decision-making and implementation, nor 
between a delegation and an implementation body. In this regard, this form of participation 
goes beyond the principle of participation as it is understood in participative democracy. 
Participation is not understood as a consultation about a decision to be implemented by 
public institutions. Instead, participation is engaging in building non-state public services. 
Furthermore, participation is not a consultation on the use of collective public resources 
(such as the participative budgeting approach) but, in line with the autonomous character of 
participation, the participants themselves assume an important part of the costs of the 
activity.  
This form of participation opens up the idea of "doagraphy" or "implementation democracy". 
Implementation democracy in terms of participation as builders rather than as opinion 
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holders. Doagraphy in terms of who decides on (and assumes the costs of) actions. The logic 
is not to do with the representation of visions, but the logic of aggregating forces to develop a 
common goal, where whoever does more has more capacity to "decide". In this sense, it 
comes closer to the logic of economical democracy (but instead of capital, the key resource is 
time) than representative democracy. 
Concerning the case studies, in Wikipedia, in some cases participants deliberate among 
themselves before they edit the articles (Viegas, Wattenberg, Kriss & van Ham, 2007). 
However, even in this cases deliberation among participants is not geared to providing an 
opinion in a consultation exercise as part of a delegation, but to implementing changes in the 
platform. Furthermore, Wikipedia forms a “doagracy” in two senses. On the one hand, 
whoever takes care of a particular part of an article decides about it, including defining the 
policies that will govern that article. On the other hand, the control of the system is about the 
ability to bring together forces which will act, more than favoring opinions.  
 
Conclusions 
OCCs constitute forms of collective action based on virtual environments that result in the 
provision of a digital commons.  
OCCs share a common pattern regarding the distribution of content contribution. The 
quantitative analysis of participation in OCCs shows that strong inequalities in contributions 
among the participants is a characteristic of these types of collective action. The 90/9/1 
principle refers to this unequal distribution of contributions, that is 90% of participants lurk 
or act as an audience, 9% make minor contributions and 1% are very active participants. The 
exact percentage among these three profiles may depend on the contents and culture of each 
community. Furthermore, the review of the openesf.net case has shown that the percentage of 
these three features might depend significantly on how content contribution is conceived. In 
this regard, the 90/9/1 principle might be adopted as an approximation, while a comparison 
of participation in OCCs would require the establishment of shared indicators of 
participation, although the high variability of OCCs makes it difficult to define common 
indicators. 
While much literature has pointed to the unequal distribution of participation, there is a lack 
of analysis of the main organizational characteristics which could allow us to better 
understand it. From this analysis it was found that the main organizational principles of 
OCCs are: a) the environment is open to participation; b) participation has multiple forms 
and degrees of integration; c) the environment is structured and modular which results in a 
decentralized but connected participation; d) participation is asynchronous; e) the 
environment is framed by a common-mission. The methods are shaped by the specific 
questions to answer, resulting in a methodological pluralism; f) participation is autonomous 
in the sense that each person decides which level of commitment he or she wants and in what 
aspects he or she wants to contribute. Plus, participation is voluntary. Participants are not 
linked by a contractual relationship and participants assume the costs of participation; g) 
participation is in public, that is, its outcome is available for others and the organizational 
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process is transparent; and h) participation is implementation. 
 
Ecosystemic Participation? 
The analysis of the organizational characteristics exhibited by OCCs suggest that they can be 
usefully regarded as interactive systems (Bateson, 1972; Goffman, 1983; Luhmann, 1995). 
From this perspective, I propose the concept of ecosystemic participation in order to stress 
the creating of eco-systemic, feedback and synergistic effects between the diverse forms of 
participation present inside the OCCs. Furthermore, the term ecosystemic participation 
highlights the co-dependency and mutual adaptation of the different forms and degrees of 
participation in order to find an equilibrium between them for the sustainability and 
effectiveness of the common mission. Organization principles mentioned previously 
including openness, autonomy, decentralization, transparency and implementation provide 
the conditions for ecosystemic participation.3  
With this paper and the proposal of the concept of ecosystemic participation, my aim is to go 
beyond the mere recognition that the 90/9/1 principle is present in most OCCs; and also to 
move beyond the "fascination" that causes us to asses why the 90/9/1 principle is also present 
in many other fields of collective action (such as hyper-links or income distribution). This 
concept aims to look to how it works, that is, to better understand the functioning and 
organizational principles of the OCCs which result in the unequal distribution of the 
participation. More specifically, I look at how they work, rather than looking at the 90, 9, and 
1 in isolation, by introducing the interdependency between them into the analysis.  
Furthermore, this ecosystemic participation concept is grounded in the deconstruction of the 
approach to participation as single acts. 
On the one hand, I deconstruct the dichotomous approach to participation. The forms of 
participation in OCCs cannot be reduced to binary schemes. In this line, Bimber, Flanagin 
and Stohl suggested that recent uses of NTI for collective action challenge the notion that 
there is a binary choice between participation or not (2005). Ecosystemic participation shifts 
the focus away from single and unequivocal dimensions (to participate or not participate), 
towards the development of dynamics in complex cohabitation and the co-evolution of 
diverse forms and degrees of participation.  
Furthermore, these different forms and degrees of participation are integrated, each playing 
                                                 
3 Finally, ecological or systemic approaches have a variable and long tradition and can be adopted in several 
senses. In this regard, it might be worth mentioning that the specific sense of the eco-system which I refer to 
here relates to the "internal" dynamics of the individual participants is each OCC. Other authors, also from an 
evolutionary perspective, use the ecological approach to refer instead to the interrelations through 
communication networks among organizations or collective actors in a shared space (Monge and Contractor, 
2003; Monge, Heiss and Margolin, 2008; Monge and Poole, 2008; Shumate, Fulk and Monge, 2005; cf. Powell 
et al., 2005). This must not be confused with the ecological ethics of technology, which refers to the 
environmental issues related to technology (Maxwell & Miller, 2008). Or ecology media which is a systemic 
approach to communication that analyses the role that media play in influencing meaning and mind, ways of life 
and worlds views (Barner & Strate, 2008, p.16). 
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its own role. In this regard, ecosystemic participation deconstructs the view of unequal 
participation (through the 90/9/1 principle) into the independent layers of a pyramid. Instead 
these three degrees 90/9/1 are interdependent. The mechanisms of interdependency between 
them could change across time and size of the community.  
In this line, the different levels of participation (strong participation, weak and non-
participation, weak and strong participation) play a role and are integrated and complement 
each other. Active and committed participants are important to start the online community 
and assure most of the content; weak participation allows vast and diverse fields of 
information resources to be reached; and unintended participation improves the system, and 
as audiences increase, the value and relevance of the content and the participation in the site. 
On the other hand, the concept of ecosystemic participation moves away from an analysis of 
participation as an isolated act to an analysis of participation as an act coordinated with 
others and the overall collective action. An individual decides his or her role according to the 
overall stage of participation and acts strategically to fit into the overall equilibrium of the 
collective action. In this regard, individuals shape the form and degree of their participation 
according to the overall collective process.  
 
Future Research 
Furthermore, I consider the adoption of an ecosystemic participation approach adequate for 
future research. Ecosystem participation problematizes the analytical and methodological 
designs centered on framing participation as an isolated individual activity and/or centering 
analysis on only one of type of participation. For example, it is frequent in the literature for 
the analysis to focus only on strong participants.4 In my view, these designs are limited and 
most importantly inadequate. Instead, I argue that to integrate and consider the different 
forms and degrees of participation in the research design is appropriate. However, obviously, 
to integrate an ecosystemic approach in the analysis of participation is clearly a 
methodological challenge.   
Finally, there are several reasons which explain the unequal distribution of content generation 
and why some people in the online community do not participate. From my analysis, it 
emerged that, in part, the unequal contributions could be associated to the ecosystemic 
approach to participation in terms of accommodating and combining several degrees of 
availabilities for contributions. Additionally, an observation which also emerges from my 
analysis is that the 90/9/1 principle could be related to a phenomenon of multiple-belonging. 
The distribution of the participation resources of each individual among the several OCCs he 
or she could belong to result in the unequal distribution of participation in each OCC. For 
example, belonging to several groups could explain the weak contribution. A person 
belonging to several groups could distribute his or her contributions among the groups she or 
he belongs to. In this line, empirical research on the Global Justice Movement also highlights 
the multiple-belongings or distribution of activists’ participation across groups (della Porta, 
                                                 
4 Fed by the Habermasian view that speaking out is more valuable than silence. 
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2004). Multiple-belonging is also present among Wikipedians. According to my interviews, 
amongst Wikipedians it is common that a person has a “home project” where they 
concentrate their efforts and then on occasion weakly contribute to other secondary projects 
(Interview Jon Davis, Wikipedian, Berkeley, November 2008; Interview Betsy Megas, 
Wikidictionary, Palo Alto, November 2008). Further research, adopting field-level analysis 
and individual-centered analysis instead of case-centric analysis, is required in order to fully 
verify this hypothesis.  
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within this field and suggests some lessons for bringing “open 
source” into other domains.  
 
 
 
 
Jon Smajda is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at the University of Minnesota. Correspondence concerning this 
article should be addressed to jon@smajda.com 
 Politics of Open Source  297 
The Open Meme 
In the mid-1990s, as part of the “dot-com bubble,” open source software achieved notoriety 
among both those in the technology industry but also among media pundits and 
technologists. The growth of the internet—and internet commerce—was being powered in 
large part by an out-of-nowhere free operating system called Linux and a suite of 
accompanying free software including the Apache web server software and upstart 
programming languages like Perl and PHP. Rather than relying on expensive servers from 
companies like Microsoft, new internet companies like Amazon, eBay and Google built their 
own servers running cheap and flexible open source software and open source software 
became darlings of the technology and business press. They seemed to be breaking all the 
rules. Instead of having a corporate bureaucracy overseeing the development of complex 
software by paid, professional developers, open source software was being developed by a 
decentralized, unorganized army of volunteer hackers. Instead of keeping their source code—
the recipe for building the programs that computer users run on their computers—secret and 
proprietary, open source projects were giving away their software for free and allowing 
anyone to modify and redistribute it as they saw fit.  
The tech boom went bust, but open source’s influence has not waned. Many of the biggest 
companies in technology—Google, IBM, Apple, Oracle, even Microsoft—now sponsor open 
source development in one capacity or another. The popular appeal of “open source” has 
remained as well. In fact, one can find activists, politicians, businesses and commentators 
pushing for the “open sourcing” of just about every possible domain of social life.  
In government, the Obama administration has caught the “open” meme. On election night on 
CNN, Alex Castellanos lauded Obama as an “open source president,” citing hacker Eric 
Raymond’s book on open source software, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (Raymond, 2001). 
Whitehouse.gov now runs on the Drupal open source content management system and 
Obama created a new Chief Technology Officer tasked with implementing an Open 
Government Directive to bring “transparency, participation and collaboration” to the White 
House. The White House isn’t alone: the Committe on Homeland Security held a hearing on 
“Using Open-Source Information Effectively” (Congress, 2005). In 2007, former USAF pilot 
John Robb wrote a best-selling book classifying the Iraqi insurgency as “open source 
warfare” (Robb, 2007). Inspired by Washington’s newfound receptivity to all things “open,” 
70 major tech companies (including Google, Novell, Mozilla and Sun) and the Electronic 
Frontiers Foundation launched the “Open Source for America”, which aims not only to “raise 
awareness in the U.S. Federal Government about the benefits of open source software” but to 
encourage the “incorporation of open source community dynamics to enable transparency” 
throughout government. In virtually every other sphere of the social world, one can also find 
calls to open source: from open source medicine (Woodford, 2004) to open source urban 
planning (Buskirk, 2009).  
But if the “open source” concept is going to be imported into so many different domains of 
social life, a complete understanding of the open source concept in its source domain, 
computer programming, is necessary. This is the case not just because of the obvious fact that 
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there’s no clear analog for source code in government.1 The concept of “open source” 
emerged out of a long-running political and moral discourse within the computing field on 
rights and obligations among programmers and users of software. “Open source” is often 
prefixed to any domain where one wishes to encourage, as the Obama administration put it, 
“transparency, participation and collaboration.” But open source was initially selected, and 
has thrived, not just because it evokes these values and design principles in software 
production, but because of the way it fits the social and political culture from which it 
emerged.  
This paper will proceed as follows: First, in the next section, I will sketch out a framework 
for understanding the moral and political culture of computing. Second, I will provide a 
historical overview of key events in computing history. Third, I will link together the 
previous two sections, showing how my proposed framework can be used to understand the 
changes brought on by the events and developments discussed in the history section. Next, I 
will sketch out a few other possible applications of this framework, in particular to help us 
understand the structure of Linux distributions. 
 
The Moral Field of Computing 
The problem with focusing exclusively on the open source/proprietary divide is that there is a 
long history of moral and political debate in computing culture that predates these terms and 
created the context in which “open source” emerged and continues to resonate. 
In particular, I argue that the computing field is shaped by both competing moral and ethical 
visions (an ethic of community vs. an ethic of the market) and competing conceptions of 
identity and community (a community of experts vs. a community extending to all of 
humanity). In other words, there are two axes that make up what I will refer to as a moral 
field of computing. (Figure 1) 
 
My choice of “moral field” here obviously evokes Bourdieu’s idea of a field, though I am 
admittedly somewhat unsure about whether this is correctly classified as an application of 
Bourdieu’s field or not. There are several reasons behind my choice of this label though. 
First, the spatial metaphor: it’s not just that there are two kinds of questions—of community 
boundaries, of ethical visions—that one can observe animating debate in computing culture, 
but that these appear to be linked together into specific configurations of how to situate 
individuals and actors onto a structured, cultural terrain. Second, I argue that this structure is 
internalized by individuals as a moral and political mapping of actors and events in 
computing. Participants in the computing field—hackers, corporations, end-users, and so 
on—position themselves and others on a moral terrain built upon attitudes towards what kind 
of community is worth building and who counts as a part of that community, and what kind 
of moral values should guide interaction in that community. 
 
                                                 
1The policy process as source code compiled into law and institutions?  
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Figure 1: The Moral Field 
 
Open source is best understood within the context of this moral field. The term was chosen, 
and has succeeded, precisely because it can be adapted to fit the needs and concerns of actors 
located at multiple points in this field. “Open source” is not a solution to these divisions, but 
a shared language inside a culture where these debates continue. I will also argue that these 
ethical divisions and community boundaries that structure the discourse of open source in the 
computing field are ultimately grounded not in the technical details of writing computer 
software but in age-old political and moral debates about organizing social behavior. From 
this point of view, importing the concept of open source into government is not necessarily 
introducing a bold new idea at all, but is more accurately viewed as re-introducing old ideas 
back into the political realm, but wrapped in a new technological language. 
The rest of this paper will outline the history and structure of the computing field, discuss the 
role the term “open source”, and “open” generally, plays in the field today and suggest some 
lessons we can draw as we apply the concept of open source and a principle of “openness” to 
other areas of social life. 
 
Historical Overview 
Many books could, and have, been written about the social and cultural history of computing 
(to name just a few: Levy, 2001/1984; Markoff, 2006; Moody, 2001; Salus, 1994; Weber, 
2004). In this section, I will draw on these works to assemble a relatively brief social history 
of computing. This is not intended to be a complete literature review, nor is it intended as a 
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contribution to scholarly knowledge about these historical events. Instead, the intent is to 
briefly highlight the key aspects of computing history that I believe are relevant for 
understanding my argument about the moral field. I acknowledge this is a bit of a hard sell as 
this section takes up a proportionately large chunk of this paper, and readers already well-
versed in this history could safely skim this section while proceeding to the next section. 
However, I think getting the history right is important, and the details in the section were 
chosen carefully to highlight what I think are the key ingredients in the political culture of 
computing in general, and open source in particular. 
 
MIT Hackers 
The term “hack” originated in the student culture at MIT. A hack was a playful prank, though 
a subculture of MIT “hackers” phrase’s meaning was elevated beyond the mere prank into a 
feat “imbued with innovation, style, and technical virtuosity” (Levy, 2001/1984, 23).2 
In the 1950’s, programming involved punching a series of holes in cards, handing those cards 
off to the only people allowed to be in the room with the computer, certified administrators 
who came to be known as “The Priesthood,” and waiting hours or even days to get the 
results. Hackers rejected this way of doing things and articulated a “Hands-On Imperative,” 
the belief that one learns about the world by taking things apart and putting them back 
together (Levy, 2001/1984, 40-46). Hacking was about more than punch cards, it was about 
interacting with machines, and a group of hackers in MIT’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) lab 
were among the first to develop a hands-on culture of computing. 
A “hacker ethic” evolved out of the Hands-On Imperative. Information, necessary for 
diagnosing problems and making improvements in any type of system, ought to be free. 
Authority, in particular large bureaucratic authority, was viewed as an obstacle to this free 
exchange of information. The central nemesis in this war: IBM and its bureaucratized model 
of computing-by-Priesthood. Early hackers theorized that the giant, inflexible IBM machines 
were a reflection of the social structure that produced them: rigidly bureaucratic and button-
down. Hacking, on the other hand, was about creativity and flexibility. The beloved PDP 
series of computers in use at the AI Lab embodied this openness and flexibility. Hacking was 
about meritocracy—your programming skill was the source of all prestige in the 
community—and programming was not the mindless management of technology, but a 
source of creativity, art, beauty and, for some, social change and the faith that: 
 If everyone could interact with computers with the same innocent, productive, creative 
impulse that hackers did, the Hacker Ethic might spread throughout society like a 
benevolent ripple, and computers would indeed change the world for the better. (Levy, 
2001/1984, 49)  
                                                 
2In popular culture, “hacker” has taken on more negative connotations in recent decades. In this paper, hacker 
refers to the original, positive meaning. For those interested in how these two, contradictory images of hackers 
came into being, Nissenbaum, 2004 is a good starting point. 
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The MIT hackers reserved the right of total control over the machines in the AI lab. For 
instance, when MIT adopted a new multi-user operating system for their computers, the 
Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS), hackers revolted over their distaste for the new 
system. CTSS required each user to have their own account and password, and administrators 
limited and charged for access based on time, memory usage and disk space. Where the 
hacker ethic encouraged openness, CTSS encouraged privacy; where the hacker ethic 
encouraged Hands-On tinkering that pushed a machine to its limits, time-sharing sequestered 
users away from the computer at their own terminal and charged them if they spent too much 
time tinkering (Levy, 2001/1984, 120). The hackers responded by building their own time-
sharing system, which they playfully called ITS, or “Incompatible Time-Sharing System.” 
Rather than leveraging the system’s multi-user abilities to increase privacy and isolation, ITS 
built upon a culture of sharing. From the vantage point of today’s computer security, the 
deliberate lack of security in ITS is shocking. ITS users had no passwords and all users could 
access one another’s files. Just as hackers used to look over one another’s shoulders prior to 
time-sharing, ITS included a system of screen sharing where a user at one terminal could 
have another user’s terminal displayed on their own screen. Just as hackers used to have 
cabinets full of paper tape that anyone could access to learn from the work others had done, 
ITS users could access the personal files of all other users. ITS was an astonishing collective 
achievement, assembled piece-by-piece by hackers who sought to instill the hacker ethic into 
the system. Hacker Don Eastlake described ITS’ development like this: 
 In general, the ITS system can be said to have been designer implemented and user 
designed…Features are less likely to turn out to be of low utility if users are their 
designers and they are less likely to be difficult to use if their designers are their users. 
(Levy, 2001/1984, 127)  
 
Computing and the Counter-Culture 
Levy (2001/1984, 66) identifies an important distinction between “hackers” and “planners” at 
MIT. For pure hackers, hacking is an end in itself and getting hands-on access to hardware 
was all that mattered. Planners, however, while often hackers themselves, were also wrapped 
up in the social applications of technology, “more absorbed by the goals of computing than 
addicted to the computing process,” (Levy, 2001/1984, 66). At MIT, the planners were 
typified by professors taking an academic interest in the social impact of computers, but on 
the West Coast hackers more immersed in the counter-culture and social movements of the 
time and lead the “planner” element of computing culture to take on a more political bent. 
The history of computing on the West coast of the United States is interwoven with the early 
counter-culture (Markoff, 2006). In the 1950s, engineer Myron Stolaroff discovered LSD 
through membership in a Santa Cruz-based cult-like religious group called the Sequoia 
Seminar and introduction to Al Hubbard, the “Johnny Appleseed of LSD.” Stolaroff became 
fascinated with the creative potential of mind-altering drugs as an “unprecedented design 
tool” (Markoff, 2006, 28). Stolaroff recruited fellow engineers at his employer, electronics 
company Ampex, to begin experimenting with using LSD to enhance their work. This lead to 
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Stolaroff leaving the company and founding the International Foundation for Advanced 
Study in Menlo Park, close to Stanford University and technology giants such as Hewlett 
Packard. Stolaroff used the Foundation to continue his experiments, recruited prominent 
engineers, scientists and artist from around Silicon Valley. Participants in Stolaroff’s 
experiments included figures such as Stewart Brand, who would go on to found the Whole 
Earth Catalog, and Doug Englebart, an engineer credited with inventing the mouse and 
pioneering approaches to human computer interaction still influential today.  
Englebart’s big idea was that computers could be used for more than raw data processing, to 
“extend and empower” human intelligence and memory (Markoff, 2006, 46). In the 60’s, 
Englebart’s vision would be picked up by a collection of hacker-activists blending the social 
movements of the time with computing. At the time, the Left was highly suspicious of 
technology, with the dystopian visions of 1984 and Brave New World painting technology as 
a tool for oppression and surveilance. The liberation-through-technology worldview of the 
hackers was perceived as naive and dangerous, to the extent that it was perceived at all: at 
this point, computers were still something only a very small minority of the population 
experienced hands-on. 
Decrying the “excessive purity” of the “technological Jesuits” from MIT (Levy, 2001/1984, 
182), a new group of hackers fully immersed in the student culture at Berkeley and Stanford 
cultivated a more populist, politicized strain of the hacker ethic. A group of Berkeley-area 
hackers started a tabloid publication and walk-in center, dubbed People’s Computer Company 
(PCC). The first issue’s cover contained the text, “Computers are mostly used against people 
instead of for people. Used to control people instead of to FREE them. Time to change all 
that—we need a…People’s Computer Company.” An influential book at the time was called 
Computer Lib, whose hand-drawn cover boldly pronounced, “You can and must understand 
computers NOW” and promoted widespread “computer literacy.” The hackers behind the 
PCC also enacted an ambitious project called “Community Memory”: a series of networked 
terminals around the city that made up the first electronic bulletin board, used for everything 
from classifieds to sharing poetry and jokes. The PCC and Community Memory were 
political projects, and while their founders were, of course, hackers who loved fiddling with 
technology, the broader social implications of the technology was a serious motivation 
behind their efforts:  
 [Hackers considered] the computer itself a model for activism, and hope the 
proliferation of computers to people would, in effect, spread the Hacker Ethic 
throughout society, giving the people power not only over machines but over political 
oppressors (Levy, 2001/1984, 181).  
 
Homebrew 
Hacker evangelism in the 1970s was aided greatly by technological advancements. The 
BASIC programming language made programming far easier to learn: it was interactive (i.e. 
a user typed commands and recieved instant feedback) and its syntax was designed to be 
more intuitive to English speakers. The plummeting prices of hardware lead to a growing 
community of “hobbyists,” who spent their evenings and weekends scavenging parts stores 
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and soldering together all varieties of gadgetry. With the mid-70s arrival of the Altair, a home 
computer cheap enough for anyone to buy, hacking took off as a hobby in the mid-70s and 
California saw the emergence a group whose only rival is MIT’s AI Lab in its impact on 
hacker culture: the Homebrew Computer Club, whose attendees would turn into a who’s who 
of Silicon Valley in the next decade.  
The culture of sharing and cooperation that defined the hacker ethic continued at Homebrew. 
Perhaps the most famous story in hacker history is Bill Gates’ “Open Letter to Hobbyists,” 
published in Homebrew newsletter in 1976. Gates, and his upstart company Microsoft, had 
written a version of the BASIC programming language for the Altair and was selling the 
software in partnership with MITS, the company behind the Altair. Following the hacker 
tradition of sharing paper tapes, however, a hacker brought Microsoft’s BASIC to a 
Homebrew meeting and copies were made and circulated. (The only rule at Homebrew: if 
you take a tape, bring two copies next time to give away to others.) Gates responded by 
writing a letter: 
 As a majority of hobbyists must be aware, most of you steal your software. Hardware 
must be paid for, but software is something to share. Who cares if the people who 
worked on it get paid? … Who can afford to do professional work for nothing? What 
hobbyist can put 3-man years into programming, finding all bugs, documenting his 
product and distribute for free? The fact is, no one besides us has invested a lot of 
money in hobby software…Most directly, the thing you do is theft.  
Despite the ethic of sharing and aversion to the commercialization of software, Homebrew 
gradually transitioned from a collection of hobbyists to participants in a thriving young 
industry: from starting hardware companies selling add-ons for machines like the Altair to 
building new next-generation machines themselves. For example, Apple cofounder Steve 
Wozniak would bring prototypes of his early Apples to Homebrew meetings to show off to 
other hackers and to solicit feedback and advice. 
The original activist-planners, who saw technology as a means to human liberation and 
freedom, were not surprisingly uncomfortable with the encroachment of business into their 
community. But even the Homebrew hackers themselves—money aside—veered too closely 
to the exclusive, inward-looking clique that the MIT AI Lab had been. Computer Lib author 
Ted Nelson called the Homebrew attendee’s “chip-monks,” and Albrecht said, “I could only 
understand about every fourth word these guys were saying” (Levy, 2001/1984, 220). 
Homebrew co-founder Fred Moore became disenchanted with the group’s “seduction” by 
technology as well, particularly as the microcomputer industry took off (and people came to 
Homebrew “with dollar signs in their eyes”) and Moore learned of the awful labor conditions 
under which hardware was being manufactured in Asia (Levy, 2001/1984, 216).  
The social landscape we see at both MIT in the 60’s and in California in the 70’s illustrates a 
pattern that will continue throughout the next several decades as well: along one axis, tension 
between pure hackers (less favorably characterized as “chip-monks” or “technological 
Jesuits”) and planners (less favorably characterized as ideologues or politicized hackers), 
and, along the other axis, the tension between commercial market forces and values and a 
non-commercial culture of sharing and public goods.  
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Unix 
While hobbyists in the garage were advancing their own populist flavors of the hacker ethic 
and culture, universities and tech industry research hubs, such as Bell Labs, continued the 
hacker traditions. The invention and growth of the Unix operating system is a landmark event 
in the history of computing culture. In 1969, Bell Labs researchers Ken Thompson and 
Dennis Ritchie were working on an operating system called Multics, but when the project 
was officially abandoned, Thompson decided to revive the effort, “just for fun,” and began 
work on Unix (Salus, 1994). Unix went on to become arguably the most influential, 
successful operating system of all time. Forty years later, Unix and its descendants are now 
running on everything from mainframes to laptops to cell phones. 
Thompson and Ritchie built Unix with a specific design philosophy in mind (Salus, 1994; 
Raymond, 2003). This philosophy was most famously expressed by Douglas McIlroy, a 
programmer responsible for developing several foundational Unix tools: 
 “This is the Unix philosophy. Write programs that do one thing and do it well. Write 
programs to work together. Write programs to handle text streams, because that is a 
universal interface.”  
This may not make much sense to a non-technical audience, but a good way to illustrate this 
is by way of a comparison with software most academics today are intimately familiar with 
that is, in many ways, the antithesis of the Unix philosophy: Microsoft Office.  
Microsoft Office is a single package of software consisting of a word processor (Word), a 
spreadsheet application (Excel) presentation software (PowerPoint), and other supporting 
programs. Each of these applications store their data in their own unique file format: .doc 
files (Word), .ppt (Powerpoint) and .xls (Excel). Over the years, Microsoft has added many 
features to Office: a spell checker, a thesaurus, a grammar checker, clip art, multimedia 
support, a commenting system and “track changes” feature for collaborators, and, of course, 
an animated paper clip aimed at helping you find your way around these various features. 
Each of these tools exists only within the Office universe. Everything you might want to do 
with these files—from editing to printing to spell-checking to merging and converting—all 
takes place inside Office. To share these files with others, they need the complete Office suite 
as well (and preferably the same version as you). Office is a monolith. As technology evolves 
and new features are required of Office (from multimedia support to internet connectivity), 
these features get tacked on to Office, making it ever-larger and slower, and making its users 
more and more locked in to the Office ecosystem.  
To translate Office into the Unix philosophy would require some heavy redesign.3 Each of 
the components—not just Word, Excel and Powerpoint, but the spell checker, searching 
capabilities, multimedia library, versioning system, etc.—would have to be broken up into 
their own independent utilities. Instead of being a part of one huge monolith, the utilities 
would have to communicate with one another. 
                                                 
3Regretably, this hasn’t been the path taken by most Unix office suites, which have tended to 
simply clone the functionality of Microsoft Office. 
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Designing Unix according to these principles—small, focused programs that interact through 
a universal interface—had social consequences. It facilitated a collaborative, decentralized 
division of labor from the start. If your program took text streams as its input and resulted in 
compatible text streams as output, then it could be dropped in seamlessly with the rest of the 
Unix system. Like its predecessor ITS in the MIT AI Lab, the structure of Unix invited 
individual tinkering and collaborative, but decentralized, systems design. Again, the social 
structure developing and maintaining the technological system was inherently linked with the 
technical design of the system (Weber, 2004).  
Unix’s spread was also in large part due to an accident of birth: it’s founding in Bell Labs 
(BTL) at the precise time the federal government was taking action against AT&T under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. AT&T was forbidden from profiting from sales outside of the 
telephone, telegraph or “common carrier communications” industry. “Common carrier 
communications” is a vague phrase open to interpretation, and its shifting interpretation by 
federal regulators and AT&T lawyers explains much about the history of Unix ( Salus, 1994; 
Weber, 2004, 22). Early on, the phrase was conservatively interpreted and, fearful of 
commercializing Unix, AT&T decided to license Unix, complete with source code, for a 
nominal fee. This led to widespread Unix adoption and a growing community of 
programmers contributing to the platform. AT&T provided no support, so community-based 
support and development flourished in their absence. Universities adopted Unix and an entire 
generation of programmers learned programming on Unix and the portability of Unix’s 
source code—written in the C programming language—allowed users to port Unix to a wide 
range of machines. In short, Unix was, like MIT’s ITS and the code shared at Homebrew, 
“open source” before the “open source software” existed. The technical design of Unix and 
the social conditions in which it was distributed created a community of user/programmers 
devoted to the platform. Salus (1994, 143) describes this process: 
 Something was created at BTL. It was distributed in source form. A user in the UK 
created something from it. Another user in California improved on both the original and 
the UK version. It was distributed to the community at cost. The improved version was 
incorporated into the next BTL release. 
There was no way that Patent and Licensing could control this. And the system got 
better and more widely used all the time.  
By the late 1970’s and early 80’s, the antitrust environment had changed dramatically and 
AT&T changed course on commercializing UNIX. After nearly a decade of an open, 
decentralized development process, this proved to be quite tricky. The University of 
California, Berkeley, in particular, had become a center of Unix development. In 1975, Ken 
Thompson took a sabbatical from Bell Labs and spent a year at Berkeley, working with 
several faculty members and graduate students that were extending Unix in innovative ways, 
creating tools such as the Pascal programming language and the vi text editor, that became 
staples of Unix and computer programming. By the late 70’s, a graduate student at Berkeley, 
Bill Joy, was distributing a popular collection of Unix tools and utilities he called BSD 
(“Berkeley Software Distribution”).  
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When AT&T began commercializing Unix, the collaborative relationship with Berkeley 
soured. In place of generous, affordable licensing terms, AT&T tightened up Unix licensing: 
by 1984, official AT&T Unix licenses ran $100,000 or higher (Weber, 2004, 39). Berkeley, 
whose BSD had transformed from a collection of utilities into a full-blown version of the 
Unix operating system, spent much of the 1980’s carefully stripping AT&T-owned code and 
replacing it with Berkeley-written code. Unlike AT&T, BSD was distributed for free under an 
extremely liberal license: essentially, they ask you give credit to Berkeley, but other than that 
users are free to do whatever they wish with BSD. AT&T and Berkeley became fierce 
competitors. AT&T owned the Unix trademark and only their version could be called Unix.4 
However, much of the cutting edge development was taking place at Berkeley, who won 
lucrative DARPA contracts to develop the TCP/IP protocol for BSD, a development which 
formed the backbone of the internet today. 
Consequently, the 1980’s saw the Unix world splinter into a variety of incompatible variants 
of Unix and expensive lawsuits over the Unix trademark and the ownership of Unix code. 
Universities abandoned Unix as the teaching tool of choice because of AT&T’s skyrocketing 
licensing fees. By this time, another development had shaken the computing world: the 
personal computer.  
 
The PC Goes Mainstream 
In the 1980s and 90s, the personal computer went mainstream for both business and personal 
use. To the chagrin of the early hackers, however, the “share and share-alike” model of free 
distribution did not carry over to the early mainstream successes of personal computing such 
as Apple and Microsoft, who embraced a proprietary model of software development and 
distribution. 
Take Microsoft’s Windows operating system, for example. The platform is owned and 
controlled by Microsoft. The source code for the Windows operating system is maintained 
internally by Microsoft engineers and is not available for others to view and modify. If you 
want to develop software for Windows, you’ll use the Application Programming Interfaces 
(API’s) developed by Microsoft. If you find a bug or a limitation in these API’s, you can 
submit a report to Microsoft and hope they fix it. When Microsoft releases updates to 
Windows, you pay Microsoft to get access to the updates. When Microsoft adds a feature to 
Windows—such as networking or graphics capability—or creates file formats such as 
Microsoft Word’s “.doc” format, they do so in a manner that ensures compatibility with 
Microsoft software, but nothing else. 
                                                 
4Or technically, UNIX, with all capital letters. I’m skipping this convention here simply because it’s awkward to 
type and read, but also because Dennis Ritchie, who created Unix, prefers “Unix” as well: “The difference came 
because the lawyers decided that all trademarks should be spelled in upper case…Since Unix isn’t an acronym, 
just initial-cap, which I now prefer, seemed more logical. However, one complicating factor was that when we 
got a phototypesetter, we were so thrilled by it that we thought it was fun to spell UNIX in small caps just to 
prove we could do it” (Manesh, 2002). 
 Politics of Open Source  307 
Millions of businesses run Microsoft software on each of their desktop computers and 
servers. Thirty years ago, almost none of these businesses used computers, but now they all 
do, and they all bought into the Windows platform when they decided to go digital. They 
hired support staff trained in supporting the Windows platform, purchased or developed in-
house software that runs on the Windows platform, and have employees and customers for 
whom using a computer means using Windows. For the past decade or so, Microsoft has 
continued to dominate largely due to the sheer inertia of the Windows platform.  
Today there are credible challengers to this platform, but the task is daunting because, as a 
platform, Windows is not just about Microsoft. The platform also consists of a social network 
of businesses, software developers and users. The platform confers a set of values, norms, 
and expectations not just about how software should function technically, but about the kinds 
of social, financial, even political relationships that shape the way the platform is used. 
Developers outside Microsoft do not have access to the source code and have only indirect 
input on the direction of the platform. This is not to say this necessarily makes for a bad 
platform: Windows is arguably the most successful software platform ever, and much great 
software has been written for the platform. My point is that the Windows platform carries 
particular kinds of social relationships and cultural expectations that are anathema to the 
hackers from the MIT AI Lab or the Homebrew Computer Club. 
 
The Free Software Movement 
In the early 1980s, MIT AI Lab hacker Richard Stallman had grown frustrated with the 
increasing commercialization of computing and the restrictive, secretive policies companies 
were adopting for their code. Stallman believed these developments were not just 
inconvenient, but were immoral and unjust.  
Stallman was widely known for creating the popular Emacs text editor. Emacs began as a 
collection of macros that allowed a user to customize and add features to the TECO text 
editor. A community of hackers began using Stallman’s macros, improving them and creating 
their own. Over time, Stallman took the most popular macros and unified them into a single 
editor, Emacs. Stallman decided to distribute the editor for free, with one condition: 
contribute any changes made back to Stallman so he could improve the editor, an 
arrangement Stallman called the “Emacs Commune” (Williams, 2002). Taking the lessons 
he’d learned from the Emacs Commune and his mentors in the AI Lab, Stallman quit his job 
at MIT in 1984 and went to work full time on building a completely free implementation of 
Unix. Following hacker tradition of playful naming, Stallman called his operation system 
GNU, a recursive acronym for “GNU’s Not Unix,” poking fun at the fact that Unix was 
trademarked by AT&T so he couldn’t officially call it a “Unix.”  
Stallman saw the development of proprietary software as antithetical to the hacker ethic, but 
also immoral, violating not only the scientific ethic of academic computing but also the 
golden rule (Williams, 2002). The moral nature of Stallman’s dissent is clear in his language. 
The non-disclosure agreements programmers are forced to sign to keep source code secret 
are “anti-social” and “unethical,” making “the first step in using a computer [a] promise not 
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to help your neighbor” (Stallman, 1999). Stallman likes to compare software to cooking, 
thinking of source code as recipes: 
 So imagine what it would be like if recipes were packaged inside black boxes. You 
couldn’t see what ingredients they’re using, let alone change them, and imagine if you 
made a copy for a friend, they would call you a pirate and try to put you in prison for 
years. That world would create tremendous outrage from all the people who are used to 
sharing recipes. But that is exactly what the world of proprietary software is like. A 
world in which common decency towards other people is prohibited or prevented 
(Stallman, 2001).  
Stallman vowed to fight these “fascist advances with every method I could” (Levy, 
2001/1984, 419), and is responsible for a series of steps that laid the foundation for today’s 
free/open source ecology: launching the GNU Project, founding the Free Software 
Foundation, and creating the GNU General Public License. Together these projects promote 
what Stallman called “Free Software.” As we’ve seen, the notion that code should be freely 
shared between hackers and that charging for software while keeping source code secret had 
a long tradition in programming culture, Stallman’s contribution was to give this tradition a 
name, institutionalize the practices of free software and to develop a formal, written 
philosophy of free software. 
The “free” in free software stands for “liberty” or “freedom,” not for “without charge.” Libre, 
not gratis. “Free as in speech, not beer,” is a popular expression of this distinction. Stallman 
articulated the “four freedoms” that any computer user should have with free software. 
Counting, like a computer programmer, from zero (Free Software Foundation, 2009):  
0. The freedom to run the program, for any purpose.  
1. The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs.  
2. The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor.  
3. The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements (and modified 
versions in general) to the public, so that the whole community benefits.  
Stallman, and those he recruited to his cause, began to build, piece by piece, a free operating 
system. And perhaps the most influential thing Stallman would write, however, was not 
software but a legal document: a software license he dubbed the GNU General Public 
Licence (GPL). The GPL takes Stallman’s four freedoms and wraps them inside a legal 
license. Whereas copyright is traditionally viewed as a protection for the content producer, 
the GPL uses copyright for the purpose of protecting the content consumer, a twist Stallman 
calls the “copyleft.” The GPL, to put it as simply as possible, states that a user of GPL’d 
software has each of the four freedoms outlined above on one condition: that if they 
redistribute and/or modify the code, they must do so under the GPL or a “compatible license” 
that grants future users those same freedoms. In other words, like traditional licenses, the 
GPL places restrictions on what end users can do (they cannot redistribute under a more 
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restrictive license) and grants users privileges (the four freedoms) but the nature and scope of 
these privileges are radically different than a traditional copyright. Stallman has described the 
copyleft as “a form of intellectual jujitsu, using the legal system that software hoarders have 
set up against them” (Williams, 2002). Like the name GNU, the GPL is a “clever hack” of 
the legal system. 
In Stallman, we see a melding of the two hacking traditions: the elite hackers of MIT and the 
populist, politicized hackers of the PCC era. Like both traditions of hackers, Stallman 
represents a tension between the “hackers” and the “planners.” No one doubts Stallman’s 
skill as a hacker, but he emphasizes the social and political aspects of hacking culture in a 
way his predecessors at MIT resisted. For instance, Stallman makes a point of explaining that 
he will choose an inferior free program over a technically-superior proprietary application: 
 “I think that freedom is more important than mere technical advance…I would always 
choose a less advanced free program rather than a more advanced non-free program, 
because I won’t give up my freedom for something like that. My rule is, if I can’t share 
it with you, I won’t take it” (Stallman, in Williams, 2002, Ch 8).  
Stallman has a reputation as a hard-liner with respect to what counts as “free software.” The 
GPL is the most famous open source license, but in fact, there are several “open source” 
licenses with different philosophies. The open source license most often contrasted with the 
GPL is the BSD License, which the University of California adopted for it’s BSD distribution 
of Unix. The BSD license is, in one sense, “more free” than the GPL in that it places very 
few restrictions on users: do whatever you want with the software, just make sure to include 
credit to the University of California. So companies can take BSD-licensed code, make 
modifications and release the result under any license they want. Apple’s proprietary Unix 
operating system, Mac OS X, for example, is built on top of BSD Unix.  
Stallman does not see this as “more free” however. For example, the X Windows system, the 
software that allows Unix systems to draw graphical windows on the screen like Microsoft 
Windows or Apple’s operating systems, was developed at MIT and released under the MIT 
license, which, like the BSD license, is extremely permissive. The result was X Windows 
being incorporated into proprietary Unixes without the source being made available. 
Stallman argues: 
 The developers of the X Window System did not consider this a problem—they 
expected and intended this to happen. Their goal was not freedom, just “success,” 
defined as “having many users.” They did not care whether these users had freedom, 
only that they should be numerous (Stallman, 1999).  
 
Linux 
In the early 1990’s, the Unix world was a relatively bleak place compared to the rest of the 
computing industry. PC’s were starting to take off, and Microsoft’s Windows operating 
system was dominating both the growing business and consumer markets. While Microsoft 
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was cleaning up, competing Unix vendors were busy taking legal action against one another 
and building proprietary elements into their own flavors of Unix, creating a mess of 
incompatible Unix systems. Berkeley’s BSD Unix, despite years of rewriting from scratch to 
remove any proprietary code, was tangled up in lawsuits as well. Stallman’s GNU Project 
had successfully produced many components of the GNU operating system, but had yet to 
complete the GNU kernel, which as the name suggests, is at the core of the operating system, 
interfacing between the computer’s hardware and the other components of the system. 
In the 1990s, the free operating system would find it’s kernel at last, but it would not come 
from Stallman and the GNU project, but from Finnish student, Linus Torvalds. Torvalds 
simply wanted to be able to follow his email and newsgroups from the comfort of his dorm 
room during the cold Helsinki winters. So he decided to build his own version of Unix to run 
on his personal computer. Like Ken Thompson two decades earlier, Torvalds began this 
project “just for fun,” as he would title his autobiography (Torvalds, 2001). However, 
whereas Unix spread slowly over the course of a decade via the passing of tapes between a 
handful of Universities with computers, Linus’s Unix (which would become “Linux” for 
short) came into being right as the internet was coming into its own.  
In 1991, Torvalds announced his new project on the mailing list of an education-based Unix 
variant, Minix, and shortly thereafter posted version 0.01 on a public ftp server and it quickly 
gathered steam. The initial versions of Linux were licensed under terms Torvalds crafted 
himself, but he switched Linux to the GPL relatively quickly. Fearful of commercializing 
Linux, but wanting to make accomodate certain kinds of commercial transactions, the GPL 
was an attractive option. Additionally, Linus admits some loyalty to the GNU project, early 
on: 
 The fact is, to make Linux usable, I had relied on a lot of tools that had been distributed 
freely over the Internet—I had hoisted myself up on the shoulders of giants. The most 
important of these free software projects was the GCC compiler (GNU C Compiler). It 
had been copyrighted under the General Public License…Under the terms of the GPL, 
money is not the issue. You can charge a million bucks if somebody’s willing to pay it, 
but you have to make the sources available. And the person you give or sell the source 
to has to have all the rights you have. It’s a brilliant device (Torvalds, 2001, 95-6).  
In 1991, Torvalds had attended a talk by Stallman at the University of Helsinki. From the 
beginning the practical benefits of the GPL were obvious to him, but not the political bent of 
Stallman and the GNU project: 
 Judging from the fact that I don’t remember much about the talk back in 1991, it 
probably didn’t make a huge impact on my life at that point. I was interested in the 
technology, not the politics (Torvalds, 2001, 58). 
[…]  
Richard Stallman wants to make everything open source. To him, it’s a political 
struggle, and he wants to use the GPL as a way to drive open source. He sees no other 
alternative. The truth is, I didn’t open source Linux for such lofty reasons. I wanted 
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feedback. And it’s how things were done in the early days of computers, when most of 
the work was done at universities or defense establishments and they ended up being 
very open (Torvalds, 2001, 194).  
In just a few short years, Linux would go from being a fun side-project starting in a Helsinki 
dorm room to a full-fledged operating system competing with the Microsoft’s and IBM’s of 
the world. The social structure and norms that guided this quick development echo the 
history of hacker culture.  
In the language of the MIT hackers, Torvalds was emphatically not a planner. Linux was not 
a platform to test groundbreaking ideas in computer science. Rather the overarching goal was 
digging in and making things work: “Make it work first, then make it better” (Moody, 2001, 
80). Two quick examples of key early design decisions illustrate this example.  
First, without going into technical detail, there are basically two routes towards developing 
an operating system kernel, a “monolithic kernel” and a “micro-kernel.” Suffice to say that a 
monolithic design is more common and traditional and a micro-kernel design is an improved, 
more elegant, more efficient—and more academically interesting—way to design a kernel. 
Micro-kernels have also proved much harder to produce. GNU’s failure to produce a free 
kernel is often attributed to Stallman’s decision to produce a micro-kernel. Torvalds opted for 
a monolithic kernel simply because he knew they could make it work. Andrew Tanenbaum, 
creator of the Minix operating system Torvalds drew early inspiration from, was scathing in 
his critique of this decision, calling it a “giant step back into the 1970’s” and pronouncing 
Linux “obsolete” (Moody, 2001, 50). Torvalds’ response: 
 From a theoretical (and aesthetical) standpoint, linux loses. If the GNU kernel had been 
ready last spring, I’d not have bothered to even start my project: the fact is that it wasn’t 
and still isn’t. Linux wins heavily on the points of being available now.  
A second case illustrating this “make it work first” principle was the addition of networking 
code to the kernel in 1992. At the time, the lead developer on the networking code was trying 
hard to implement a new, improved approach to networking that was taking an excessive 
amount of time. Because of user impatience with the lack of networking, Linus approved a 
separate track for networking development aiming to just “make it work first.” The lead 
developer on this second project, British hacker Alan Cox, fast became Linus’ “Number 2” 
and the initial networking approach was abandoned.  
The networking example illustrates another key component of the social structure of Linux: 
Linus has final control over the kernel, but early on began delegating responsibility for 
specific components of the kernel to a group of trusted “lieutenants.” The technical design of 
Linux mirrors this social structure: it is a modular design, enabling developers to work within 
the space of their own kernel modules that fit together to form a functioning end product. As 
Linux became more and more popular, the bug reports from users, and proposed patches 
from developers, increased in volume as well. In the first few years of Linux’s life, Linus 
frequently released major updates just days apart, incorporating bug fixes and feature 
improvements submitted by contributors from around the globe and vetted by his trusted 
circle of lieutenants.  
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This social structure continues today. For example, the log for Linus’ kernel tree is publicly 
available at git.kernel.org: you can check it out at any time, compile it, make changes to it or 
study it. Or, if you’re not quite up to kernel hacking, you can at least get a revealing history 
of work on the kernel. Table 1 contains a snippet from the source control logs of the kernel. 
This is the most recent activity on Linus’ kernel tree at the time of writing (Saturday, April 
11, 2009, with version 2.6.30 of the kernel nearing release). 
 
Table 1: Linus’ Kernel Tree Log, April 11, 2009 
 
Each line in Table 1 represents a “commit,” the name for when a modification is accepted 
into the code base. Of course, the specific content of each of these commits isn’t important to 
us here, but two other things are. First, the first column shows the time of the commit relative 
to when I retrieved it, and, as you can, development is fast and furious, even today as Linux 
is a relatively stable, mature product. Second, you can see that Linus is not the author on all 
of these changes. In fact, if you read the description of each commit attributed to Linus, they 
all actually show Linus merging changes made by others into his own branch of the kernel. 
Other kernel contributors push changes to Linus which he accepts, rejects or modifies 
himself.  
At the time, Linus’ willingness to to delegate flew in the face of traditional theories of 
software development. Andrew Tanenbaum was critical of this as well: 
 During the 1970s, when structured programming was introduced, Harlan Mills pointed 
out that the programming team should be organized like a surgical team—one surgeon 
and his or her assistants, not like a hog butchering team—give everybody an axe and let 
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them chop away…I think coordinating 1,000 [software] prima donnas living all over the 
world will be as easy as herding cats. (Moody, 2001, 78)  
In addition to the challenge in “herding cats,” Linux faces a constant threat: forking. A 
software “fork” is one developer or group of developers takes the existing code base for a 
piece of software and starts their own, independent development track rather than 
contributing their code back to the initial project. The GPL guarantees the “freedom to fork,” 
yet Linux has managed to avoid this fate. By incorporating the strongest candidates to lead 
forking projects into Linux as “lieutenants,” and by consistently making progress on 
improving the kernel instead of chasing academic dead-ends, Linus has developed a loyal 
following many open source projects lack. Disagreement among BSD developers, for 
example, has lead to several separate BSDs: NetBSD, FreeBSD, OpenBD and others. 
Eric S. Raymond, who describes himself as the anthropologist of the open source movement, 
wrote an influential essay, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, contrasting the Linux development 
style with traditional software development: 
 I believed that the most important software (operating systems and really large tools 
like the Emacs programming editor) needed to be built like cathedrals, carefully crafted 
by individual wizards or small bands of mages working in splendid isolation, with no 
beta to be released before its time. 
Linus Torvalds’s style of development—release early and often, delegate everything 
you can, be open to the point of promiscuity—came as a surprise. No quiet, reverent 
cathedral-building here—rather, the Linux community seemed to resemble a great 
babbling bazaar of differing agendas and approaches (aptly symbolized by the Linux 
archive sites, who’d take submissions from anyone) out of which a coherent and stable 
system could seemingly emerge only by a succession of miracles. (Raymond, 2001)  
 
“Free Software” vs. “Open Source” 
 
The internet was crucial to the development of Linux, which appeared on the scene just as 
the internet was becoming widely available to computer programmers around the globe. As 
the internet expanded from a relatively obscure resource for academics and the technical elite 
into a central component of our economy and our public culture, Linux was again in the right 
place at the right time. In the early days of the web, two companies competed in the web 
server market, Netscape and Microsoft, both offering their own proprietary systems. 
However, a third option, the free, open source Apache web server, would soon take off as the 
web server of choice, carrying Linux along with it. Linux servers were not only cheaper, but 
also faster, more reliable and, thanks to being open source, more flexible for the upstart web 
market. Virtually all of superstars of the online economy—Google, Amazon, Yahoo, eBay 
and more—built their businesses on Linux, the Apache web server, and a collection of other 
open source tools like the Sendmail email server software and scripting languages such as 
Perl and PHP. 
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However, Linux faced a credibility problem with businesses. On the one hand, IT managers 
ought to rejoice at a free alternative to the expensive systems available at the time. But how 
could the “free” software, built by a rag-tag bunch of hobbyists, possibly be as good as the 
software written, and supported, by a respected, successful corporation like Microsoft? 
Additionally, for fledgling businesses built around free software, how can one expect venture 
capitalists, looking to make a profit off their investments, to fund something that is “free.” Of 
course, this is not what the “free” in “free software” means—it means “free as in speech,” or 
libre, not “free as in beer,” or gratis, but this isn’t a distinction an outsider can easily pick up 
on right away. Complicating things was the fact that “Freeware” frequently referred to 
software that was gratis but not libre: software distributed for no charge, but with proprietary, 
secret source code.  
To address some of these questions, Tim O’Reilly (founder of O’Reilly Media, a technology 
book publisher) organized a “Freeware Summit,” assembling a who’s who of free software 
project leaders at the time—with one notable exception: Richard Stallman, who O’Reilly felt 
would “disrupt the effort to achieve a consensus” (Moody, 2001, 167). The group decided 
they needed to agree upon a name if they were going to maximize their collective chance at 
business success, and after putting several options to a vote, “open source” was selected. The 
group decided that the crucial component was the sharing of source code. “Free software” 
got “almost no positive votes” (van Rossum, 1998). 
Stallman interpreted this as treason against the GNU mission: “free software” is 
fundamentally about a ethical, moral belief that proprietary software is a threat to human 
liberty and equality. “Open source” drained this of it’s moral content in Stallman’s view, 
leaving only a argument about the practical benefits of sharing source code. When asked a 
question about “open source,” Stallman always retorts, “I do free software. Open source is a 
different movement” (Williams, 2002). 
From here on, I will refer this debate between “free” and “open source” software as the 
“FLOSS Discourse,” FLOSS being an acronym for Free Libre Open Source Software, one of 
several acronyms commonly used to represent the entire community. While “open source” 
has won in popularity, and the debate between “free” and “open source” factions has cooled a 
bit in recent years (if not from Stallman himself: see Moon, 2007, for example), the labels 
remain problematic, forcing people to concoct weird acronyms like FLOSS to embrace the 
entire field of non-proprietary software. The division also illustrates the difficulty in 
chopping up the computing world into just two camps: “open source” and “proprietary.”  
The distinction is made even more tricky by the fact that open source software has become 
big business since the days Linus Torvalds started Linux in his dorm room. Large 
corporations like IBM, Google, Apple and Oracle are among the biggest contributors to open 
source projects. Businesses have embraced open source software for a variety of reasons. 
Some companies that produce open source software, such as Red Hat, who produces the Red 
Hat Linux distribution, have a business model where they give away their software for free, 
but make money by charging businesses for support. For the bigger companies, such as 
Google, though, investing in open source software is a smart investment in infrastructure. 
Google is not really a software company: they sell advertising based on an online search 
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service they run. Open source software underlies much of the technology they use to this end, 
and they want to have the best engineers capable of bending this software to Google’s will. 
 
The Moral Field and Computing History 
Throughout the history in the previous section, I’ve identified two axes along which conflicts 
tend to occur: one involving competing models of community, another involving competing 
ethics with respect to the role of the market and private enterprise. 
First, there is a history of tension between visions of an exclusive community of experts and 
visions of an inclusive community for everybody. Programming is an expert culture: one 
must acquire technical and difficult knowledge and the skills necessary to mobilize that 
knowledge. Status within the community of programmers is, at least ideally, based on 
technical merit and competence, and programmers frequently describe themselves as artisans 
or craftsmen. However, computers have always attracted those with a belief that technology 
can be a vehicle for empowering ordinary people, not just those comfortable learning C or 
playing with a soldering iron and a circuit board. “Computing for the People” vs. “showing 
off at Homebrew.” “Planners” vs. “Chip-monks.”  
Second, there is a history of tension between communal values and practices and commercial 
values and practices. Student hackers at MIT cultivated a hacker ethic in direct opposition to 
the commercial, bureaucratic IBM. The increasing presence of Silicon Valley technology 
companies at Homebrew caused controversy among Homebrew participants. Unix was 
created “just for fun” by Ken Thompson and Dennis Ritchie and developed a thriving, active 
developer community in the 1970’s despite—even because of—AT&T’s lack of interest in 
commercializing Unix. In 1984, Richard Stallman started the GNU project out of the belief 
that computer code ought to be free and not owned and controlled by private companies.  
 
Figure 2: Historical Timeline 
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Figure 3: Computing History and the Moral Field 
 
To illustrate this, a timeline of the key events in computing history reviewed in this chapter is 
presented in Figure 2. Each of these key events is then mapped onto the moral field I 
introduced earlier in Figure 3. Figure 3 represents the moral and cultural field of computing, 
which is structured by the two concurrent debates between visions of community and the 
market, on the one hand, and visions of an expert culture and a liberatory “computing for the 
people” on the other. The key events in computing history can each be described in terms of 
their impact & position within this field. The MIT Hackers’ rebellion against IBM and 
corporate bureaucracy in favor of a tightknit group of elite hackers represent a shift towards 
the lower-left quadrant of the field. The “People’s Computing Company” pulled activity 
away from a tighknit group of “chip-monks” into the lower-right quadrant, taking the 
community-model of computing culture to the masses. The “Unix Wars” of the late 1980s 
taking Unix out of it’s community roots and into a environment of competing, proprietary, 
big business-oriented vendors and Unix-based OSes shifted activity upwards into the upper-
left quadrant. The PC revolution and Microsoft’s mission of a “PC on every desktop and in 
every home” took the pro-market, proprietary model of computing to the masses in the 
upper-right quadrant. 
The term “open source” was coined and has thrived in this context. In Figure 3, I’ve 
positioned the adoption of the open source label in the “market pragmatism/for anyone” 
quadrant because the term originated as an attempt to make free software more palatable and 
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more understandable to an outside audience, particularly outside businesses. For experts 
interested in the technical details of the software, it conveys the crucial bit of information: 
they can get at the source code and play with it. For non-programmers, open source becomes 
a kind of ethical consumption cause—rejecting software created by power-hungry 
corporations who want to hold you hostage by locking you into their software and by 
infringing on the rights of their workforce. Earlier I said that Stallman believes that open 
source is free software drained of the moral cause, but this isn’t quite right: open source, even 
in its most business-friendly guise, does engage a range of moral positions about the value of 
particular kinds of human organization and motivations. Adherents to an ethic of business see 
a parallel between free, open markets and open source software, while adherents to an ethic 
of community see open source as consistent with an inclusive, democratic culture. Of course, 
people can believe in both of these things: that free markets are good and that making money 
is a worthwhile goal, and that building transparent and participatory communities are 
admirable goals as well. But as scholars of political culture and philosophy know well, these 
values can also come into frequent conflict with one another.  
To bring this historically-informed argument into the present, I’m going to turn to another 
brief example: Linux Distributions. 
 
Linux Distros and the Moral Field 
Technically, Linux is just a kernel, but when someone says they’re “running Linux” on their 
computer, they’re usually referring not just to the kernel itself, but to an entire system made 
up of hundreds of packages pulled from from hundreds of sources. While in principle, 
anyone can download the source code to the Linux kernel and these hundreds of associated 
open source tools and build a complete working Linux system, in practice this doesn’t 
happen very often. Nearly everyone, Torvalds now included, uses a Linux “distribution” 
these days. Distributions vary, and I’ll discuss distributions in more depth shortly, but in 
general, all Linux distributions include pretty much the same software. This includes the 
Linux kernel and the GNU tools developed by Stallman’s GNU Project, but your standard 
Linux distro today includes much more software than Linux plus the GNU packages. To 
name just a few popular packages: 
• The Firefox web browser and Thunderbird email client (Mozilla Corporation).  
• OpenOffice.org office suite (Sun Microsystems).  
• Apache web server (Apache Software Foundation).  
• Either the X.Org or XFree86 implementation of the X Windows system.  
• A “Desktop environment” such as GNOME (part of the GNU Project) or the German-
based KDE. (Unlike Windows or Mac OS X, where Apple or Microsoft determine the 
“look and feel” of the interface (windows, dialog boxes, buttons, menus, etc.) for all 
versions of the OS, there’s a wide range of interfaces for Linux. There are many 
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“desktop environments” that manipulate the appearance and behavior of the interface 
and provide competing visions of what Linux should look like.)  
• The Vim text editor (“charityware” maintained by Bram Moolenaar).  
• A variety of programming languages these and other popular applications are built 
upon (Ruby, Python, Perl, PHP and more).  
• Samba, software that lets Linux computers communicate with Windows networks  
• CUPS (Common Unix Printing System), which allows a computer to act as a print 
server on a network (Owned by Apple).  
Because no one entity owns the exclusive right to distribute Linux, one can choose from 
various distributions managed by a wide range of individuals, organizations, businesses, and 
even governments.5 This practice of building a usable, out-of-the-box Linux system was 
among the first business opportunities to arise from Linux.  
Despite the fact that anyone can start a new distribution at any time, the world of Linux 
distributions has proven relatively stable. While some early distributions have gone away, 
several of the early “distros” are still around today, with each major distro tending to fill a 
particular niche within the distribution market. Debian, for example, was one of the first 
distributions that attempted to bring the distributed, online development model of Linux to 
the distribution as a whole. Debian pioneered a system that broke the components of the 
operating system into “packages” and delegating responsibility for maintaining individual 
packages across a massive group of volunteers coordinated over the internet. When a user 
installs Debian, they pick and choose from a vast collection of packages that all plug right 
into the Debian system. Red Hat is an another early distribution that survives to this day as 
the leading distribution for business use.  
Distributions play much more than a merely technical role though. In the Linux world, 
distributions are arguably the central units of social organization and identity. One of the first 
steps one takes in becoming a Linux user is choosing a distribution. In many respects, this is 
often an arbitrary decision: all Linux distributions include more or less the same software 
packages and look and feel more or less the same. The distribution simply does the hard work 
of pulling together the disparate packages that make up “Linux” and making them work with 
one another so the end user has less work to do when setting up their system. However, 
picking a distribution is important as much for social reasons as for technological reasons. 
Distributions are the hub of community activity for many programmers, but particularly for 
end users. Because the support model for much open source software is “search the forums 
and ask for help,” one chooses a community as much as they choose software.  
                                                 
5In February 2009, the Cuban government launched their own Linux distribution for use on all government 
computers. The distribution, called Nova, is based on the Gentoo Linux distribution. Russia is reportedly 
developing its own distro as well. 
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Linux distributions and their communities, I will argue, situate themselves within the social 
computing field I introduced above. Figure 4 places Linux distributions within this 
framework.  
Figure 4: The Moral Field of Linux Distributions 
 
One’s choice of distribution communicates to other Linux users the kind of Linux user one is. 
Some Linux distributions are geared towards highly technical users who enjoy compiling 
their software from source and having a completely customized system (such as Gentoo). 
Other distributions aim to be “Linux for Humans” (Ubuntu’s motto) and seek to provide a 
desktop experience that is easy enough for Grandma. Some distributions (such as Red Hat 
and Novell’s SUSE) strive to serve the enterprise market, putting Linux on servers and 
desktop computers inside businesses. Other distributions (such as Debian) have a strong non-
commercial community mission and a commitment to the free software ideal. Other 
distributions aim to be more “user-friendly” by adopting the business and support model of 
traditional proprietary OS vendors (Linspire), while others, like Ubuntu, attempt to bring the 
community software ethos to the masses.  
The label “open source,” and the “free software” challenges to its legitimacy, are mobilized 
in the distinctions between these distributions and their communities. Some advocates of a 
Linux for the masses view the inclusion of and interoperability with proprietary software as 
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an acceptable end to work towards. For example, Linux distributions differ in whether they 
distribute non-free media codecs, such as the software necessary to play mp3 files, a non-free 
format, or the proprietary drivers to some graphics cards. Some distros include these pieces 
of software by default, arguing it’s a necessary evil in order for Linux to reach a mass 
audience, while others make the user install these themselves, often with a stern warning (see 
Figure 5). The most prominent contributors to FLOSS projects today include employees of 
companies like Google or Oracle, whose job responsibilities include writing free code that 
will be given away to anybody, including competitors. However, the dedicated defenders of 
Free Software purity today are not limited to bearded Unix programmers who speak in 
regular expressions, but often includes non-technical Ubuntu users who switched to Linux 
(or GNU/Linux) out of political opposition to the tactics of proprietary software companies 
like Microsoft or Apple. Other devoted Linux users and programmers could care less: the 
ideological debates are just a distraction from the source code itself. 
 
Figure 5: Installing Media Codecs in Ubuntu 
 
The case of Linux distributions is just one case where we can see a field structured according 
to the dynamics of competing ethics and models of community. This paper is part of a larger 
project that, in addition to looking at the culture of Linux distributions in greater detail than 
presented here, is also exploring how other computing platforms today—from web 
applications and platforms like WordPress or Twitter, to mobile platforms like Apple’s 
iPhone and Google Android—are shaped by the history of computing culture and are 
engaging with this culture today.  
 
Wrapping Up 
 
I began this paper by claiming there is value in contextualizing “open source” within the 
larger field of computing before we haphazardly import the concept into everything from 
medicine to urban planning and government.  
There is more to open source than a vague commitment to “transparency, participation and 
collaboration” or just its literal meaning alone (that you can view and modify the source 
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code). There is also more for scholars of politics and social behavior to learn from open 
source than just specific organizational principles or legal strategies, both of which are 
significant and well-covered by current research and literature. Computing culture has a 
tradition of free, open and contentious deliberation about the rights and responsibilites shared 
by members of a community. Understanding the political culture of computing requires more 
than just an appreciation of the distinction between open source and proprietary, but of the 
ways in which actors situate themselves and others according to positions taken on questions 
of community boundaries and ethical worldviews. Open source is not “the political part” of 
the software world, but rather an entree into an entire domain of social life—with 
corporations and hobbyists, experts and activists—shot through with political and moral 
tension and deliberation.  
In other words, the “politics of open source” is bigger than just open source, and there is 
more than a novel and innovative method of software development going on here. In addition 
to organizational, technological and legal innovations in the computing sphere, there is a 
distinctive, complex moral and political culture that ought to be of interest, even to scholars 
who currently are unaware of what’s going on in open source and computing, and ought to be 
understood and respected by those seeking to extend the open source techniques and 
philosophies to other domains. 
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